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Note about sources
I have frequently used Reports prepared for 
thè Project on European Integration conducted in 
thè Law Department of thè E.U.I. and directed by 
M. Cappelletti. Since these have not yet been 
published I have cited them simply as Flogencg 
P|TO 2§gì-
For thè statistical data used in chapters 9 
and 11 I have conducted a manual search through 
thè officiai sources of thè Community. Very 
kindly thè legai service of thè Commission and 
thè Secretariat of thè Commission have agreed to 
verify and complete these data with thè help of 
their computerised data banks. Some of thè tables 
have not been included pending thè verification 
from thè Communities.
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Presenting a new legai study on thè European Community 
1 /system— may require some explanation or even justifi-
2/cation. After all since its creation in 1951— an
abundance of ccmprehensive legai analyses of thè Com-
3 /munity (thè main framework for European integration—'}
has emerged, second only in volume among treatments of
internationai organizations and associations of states
to thè extensive literature on thè United Nations system.
Several factors, I believe, may be found which render
a new retrospective analysis worthwhile.
In a sharp critique of a recent study of thè Euro-
pean Community juridical order, an eminent politicai
scientist has made thè following comments —  comments
which could be leveled against much of thè recent legai
literature on thè Community:
It is a careful and systeraatic exposition
of thè judicial review provisions of thè
"constitution" of thè European Economie
Community, an exposition that is helpful
for a newcoraer to these materials. But ...
__  i
£i/t is constitutional law without politics.,
£I/t presents thè Community as a juristic
idea; thè written constitution as a sacred
text; thè professional commentary as a
legai truth; thè case law as thè inevitable
working out of thè correct implications of
XNTgQDgQTiOg
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■ - - '-//•.• 7 7/ '• ■. -
/ / / / -v.-'-v,- - '////.-. /,
,/// / confi ti tutional text; and thè consti-
y1 • '• 'X.'/■ ; tutional/court as thè disembodied voice of
,/'■// right reason and constitutional theology ....
; 7: ^|7uch an approach has proved fundamentally
■ ■ • ■ / - • A' / • arid in thè study of ,/national? constitutions
V//.-- /' ... it must reduce constitutional scholar-
/////r////////y1/// ’-'ship to soniething like that early stage of 
.■ .V//-'/yy/.; ’/.y 1 archeology that reseinbled thè collection 
///////'/,-///////of antiqui-ties ... oblivious to their con- 
' / V t e x t  or living matrix.— ^
/ The priraary goal of my own study will be precisely 
to raeet this critique of, and challenge tof European 
legai literature. For I shall try to analyse thè Com­
munity constitutional order with particular regard to
•7"its living matrix"' and thè interaction between law 
and politics, constitutions and institutions, principles 
and practice, thè Court of Justice and thè politicai 
organs wi'llV lie at thè core of this work. I shall try to go 
even further: By engaging in this type of analysis of
thè Coótàtinity system I will seek to clarify some of thè
/ // aj - /^fundaraental concepts used to characterize thè Community
within thè framework of thè theory of international
f
órganizations. /Intìeed I hope to demonstrate that thè
li:, ì iajaalysisy o£ law/within its politicai context may offer 
us fresh insights iato these theoretical concepts.
/
' Wtiat/.aré th« roots of thè disciplinary entrenchment
* ' /•
of European constitutional law from which this volume
i /. i h
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tries to break out? In some senses thè problera is of 
relatively recent origins. In its formative years ~  
thè 50's and early 60's —  thè Community and thè study 
of thè Community presented an interesting episode in 
thè history of ideas. In thè first place there was a 
high raeasure of congruence between social science theories 
(and even predictions!) and actual socio-political events. 
The process of European integration seeroed to confinn 
thè predictions of thè theorìsts; raoreover thè politi­
cai Vision and practice of many of thè politicai actors 
themselves seemed to be inspired by thè precepts of thè 
major integration theories. Politicians were in this 
sense theorists in action.
Second, a broad consensus-^ existed within thè 
social sciences that an understanding of thè process of 
integration in generai, and thè eraerging Communities 
in particular, would require excursions beyond any single 
fixed classical discipline. This consensus was not 
merely a reiteration of thè standard lip service that 
many of us so often pay to "interdisciplinary" analysis. 
Here instead was a phenomenon wherein thè actors them­
selves deliberately sougìit to use economie means within j 
a new International legai framework to achieve social 
and politicai objectives. And m  this scheme thè eco-
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lilìHiHUWillllttHIiiiWWIItH': ■ '■ /V//'////////-''V////7/////»//// '//// •///.■;/■ •••/• ,.
hllllllililìiiiliiìliiì- ' ■ ; ; 
h noraic and legai means be carne as iraportant as thè/ //// '
// /politicai/ends.///,Lawyers and thè/law, often thè "ugly
• /  •. . r ■ 1 ■ r
!l ducklings" of thè social sciences, were perceived as
 ^ having a/centrai role in thè new venture. Not only
was thè generai framework for integration set out in
International treaties, but an essential/feature of
/"thè Community was thè creation of quasi-autonomous law-
i creating organs and a sophisticated legai system with 
1 . •■// / 
all thè paraphernalia of a court and rules for judicial
review. 7 / V / ^
■' ' 'V///,'.', This convergence of theory and practice and thè
!l ,
emergence of “European Integration'* as a field strad- 
dling thè well established social Science disciplines
li 1produced a'series of challenging studies dealing with
j thè/Coimatmity la its flrst phases.—^ So long as pre-
: ■ : ’ i ' ' • ; 
/scriptióa/coincided (more or less) with description
.,// '/' / / 7; ■///zand/so long//as//events seemed to follow thè predictions 
which/thè theories had/ charted, thè coalescence of
7 7 /  -.///politicai, legai and economie analysis/in thè inter-
#   ^ 7*// ■■ ■■■-
7 pretation/of thè Community system was maintained.
//////// ;•// / ■" . /
1t J . 'JJl UU* 1 rP>-> o  rrH H  —  £  fi V e  /-•T'imid-60 s cr ses in thè process of European
7 :///'-■ ■ / 7integration (iinked to and symbolised by the advent .'X
/. ; '/ : / / / •;;'of De Gaulle) and thè subsequent/economia crisis pre-*
■ / 7 '■7 /cipitafced /in 1973,/introduced a rupture into thè
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marriage of theory and practice and into thè dìscipli- 
nary coalescence. This rupture^manifested itself in 
several different ways. '/ V '
As regards thè overall theories of integration, 
despite thè immense and intellectually exciting effort
7  /to adapt these to changing events-r reality no longer 
seemed to follow predictions and therefore thè interest 
in, and thè relevance of, thè "generai theory" could 
not be revived. Indeed, thè very reporting of thè facts 
of thè raid-60's crises revealed a diverging perception 
of thè process of integration and a cleavage,especially 
between politicai and legai treatment^ became apparent.
(I shall return to this cleavage in greater detail in 
subsequent chapters.) Thus thè disintegration of generai 
integration theories in thè late 60's and early 70's was 
accompanied (with some notable exceptions) by a strong 
tendency towards disciplinary entrenchment. Further- 
more, in sheer volume, Community activity had become 
overwhelmingly intense and extremely intricate so as 
to defy a single analytical framework. As a result of 
these developments, interpretations tended to fall into 
one of two types : a) generai treatments of either law, or 
politics or economics* or / t>) where a more integrated approach '
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was adopted, .sectoral treatises deali^g with fisheries,
/ . '■
j j or agricuiture# or competition, and thè like. Fre- 
quently studies were to become both unidisciplinary 
and sectoral.—^ Thus, whereas/ thè need for thè specia-
lised legai text, whether generai or sectoral, has been• f<■ *• l ì
amply satisfied, thè above mentioned danger of aridi ty has
't7- 7' *"•/
increased, j Several recent scholarly treatments, to
which this study adds a specific dimension, have per-
;Ceived and begun to fili this lacuna,^
In addition to methocblogy où\W
/ i.t is possible to articulate several/factors which
make this task particularly urgent and potentially
rewarding.
In thè first place, thè Community is obviously
(f ___'/
Ih not a static phenomenon; indeed in its thirty years
ir ■'
of existence it has displayed a remarkable dynamism 
■wfaich has affected dramatically important aspects of 
its constitutional and politicai architecture. This 
thirty-year period might well provide a suitable per- 
spective from which. to analyse these developments and 
identìfy certain/ longer terni trends in thè Community1 s 
evolution. Indeed, some recent developments may be of 
such. conseguence as to render thè early 8 0*s a turning 
point in this evolution, presenting new challenges for
thè ‘'future and calling for a fresh understanding of thè/ /
/system at present. In particular three develop-
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ments deserve special mention.
3 0/a. The accession of Greece’"'-' has opened thè second 
phase of Community enlargement. Once coxnpleted thè number 
of Member States originally parties to thè Treaties of 
Paris and Rome will have doubled, The quantitative 
change is likely to put serious strains on thè Community1s 
decision making apparatus as well as raising a host of 
technical problems; thè social and economie character
of thè new Members is likely to put no less a strain
on thè substantive policies of thè Community and thè
precarious balance of Member State interests which
11/they represent.—
b. The impact of thè European Parliament —  
directly elected in thè closing raonths of thè last 
decade —  on thè instiutional balance is likely to 
increase. The newly "legitìmized" chamber has already 
flexed its muscles, indicating its growing awareness
of thè discrepancy between its self-perceived functions
and its constitutional impotence. Institutional conflict is
12/likely to becane more frequenti— ' as will proposals for
13/structural changes within thè Community.—
c. The third developraent is a combination of
several factors going beyond thè periodic crises to which
14/thè Community has become accustomed,— It goes to
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thè very viability of thè Community as a workable binding
SyraptCTnatijC of this malati se is thè fact, for exaraple, that system.;/ thè Common Agriculturai Policy, one of thè main-
' ' ' ■■///,/.'-.".■■.........
stay/Cononunity poìicies, thè elaboration/of which in thè7 ' '
60 ’s/ represented a major Community success/ and indicated
7 !a/communion of interests/between France and Germany,
seems to be on a /crisis/ course. Not only/are thè
effects of/thè/policy criticized' but/even under thè 
of thè Treaties 
budgetary rules/the<Community/ will not be able to
finance/it for/long. Attempts at reformulation of this
basic/policy are taking place in an economie climate of
• / .  / ;  ' i
stringency, unemployraent, energy shortages and balance 
of payment /deficits all of which have sharpened national 
differences and are already testing thè Community co- 
hesion to its limit. These difficulties are partially 
responsible forh an orainous resurgence of national
resistance —  both politicai and legai —  to thè Community
/
system. In thè forrner/sphere/ thè commitment of thè 
British Labour/party/to withdraw from thè/Common Market 
and/the Debré-Foyer Bill in thè French Assembly indicate 
strong grass roots feelings .^5/ • //•//.'/•/ <' -
thè legai//arena as well, thè Community, standing 
anlque International organizations and associations
of states as fcegards/the credibility of its judicial
* sJJ * 16//ordet, is facing /a dangerous incidence of non-corapliance. — '
Not only/ have several judgments of thè/ European Court of
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Justice been flouted —  with apparent ixnpunity —  but
even thè basic judicial policy of integration has been
17/called into question.— ' Should these so far isolated 
events become a trend one basis for thè operation of 
all Community policy will have beèn destroyed.
Thus, in terms of thè number of its Member States, 
its institutional composition and thè substantive 
probleins it must face, thè Community of today is very 
different frora that of thè 50's, 60's and even early 
70 ' s.
One can add,beyond these numerical, institutional 
and substantive changes,yet another set of factors which 
would vindicate a new departure. In many ways thè Com­
munity remains a systera characterized by a series of
interlinking contradictions which seem to defy an
rexplanatory framework. It will be sufficient to identify 
a sample of these contradictions at several levels of 
abstraction. At a very pragmatic level there would 
appear to be a contradiction, or at least a tension, 
between thè never ending cycle of Community crises set 
against thè surprising measure of resìlience and "staying
power" of thè system. All predictions of demise, dis-
18/integration or irrelevance— 7 have so far underestimated 
an apparent "survìval instinct" of thè Community. Many() 
of these crises revolve around thè relationship of thè /
- 9 \
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/ Community to/the Member States, and, since that
/'
r
relationship is to be thè centrai/therae of our enquiry 
some explanation of/ these/ survival mechanisms will 
be attempted in thè course of this/study. Looking at 
thè process of substantive unification in thè EEC one■*•• • f ... rr-tf
may ,identify a similar tensioni In some sectors a high
/
nveasure of integration has been achieved whereas in 
others rauch iess or none at all —  and this often with
< . -*W
*■ i 19/no apparent correlation to thè provisions of thè Treaties-j— ‘ 
/■' At a more abstract and theoretical level onefinds
■ H ; / : :  -#v
similar, contradictions. For instance an apparently
" "  / ......
paradoxical tension exists between thè formai limitation 
on Community/competenees , within/a systein of enumerated 
powers tiaving as its aim thè demarcation of jurisdiction 
between thè Community and its Member States and thè 
forceful/expansion, successful or otherwise, of thè 
Community into a variety of new fields not envisaged in 
thè Treaty.-^/ At yet another level, thè Community as a 
| formai institutional/and constitutional hierarchical 
/ structure i s Constant odds with thè Community as a
 ^ ! Processi  of transnational policy making, a process
f j  j  '■, •/ +-H.
’ ’ which transposes all these structural modalities.
.Indeed some see thè tension not only fas between formai
structure and politicai process»/. Dahrendorf, for example,
////'cpnsiiaers that .there is a marked contrast between thè ///////,; 
jjjr : /;
// //latter element1 and-thè often sue- ------------------- X'/-■ III / .////.' . h i ■
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cessful substantive integration. ThuSf he says,
If we survey thè history of European
co-operation and integration since thè war
... thè conclusion which suggests itself
is arabivalent, not to say contradictory.
European union has been a remarkable
politicai success, but an equally remarkable
institutional failure. So far as thè sub-
stance of European co-operation is concerned,
we have gone a long way forward; so far as
thè framework for taking common decisions
is concerned, we have locked ourselves into
procedures and institutions which at times
22/do more damage than good.— '
To be sure thè politicai institutions and thè Com­
munity decision maJcing process have received much
attention both from academic writers and even thè organs 
23/themselves —  as has thè evolution of thè legai system
and thè role of thè European Court of Justice in that 
24/evolution.— ' Far less explored has been thè relation-j 
ship between thè legai order and thè politicai process, 
between thè Court and thè politicai institutuions. / ;
Certainly this relationship —  operating in both 
directions —  is not an easy one. But thè tension 
between thè different ethoses inspiring thè Court and 
these other —  or at least some of thè other —  insti­
tutions and thè consequences flowing from these dif-
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W ! ! : ! i h  -  ^  '  ■ 7
feirences^ is/^ nofc only a^  final contradictory element to 
/be/added/ to/aur enumeration/but nvay also provide a 
key /tÒ*/and/expIanation/of/some of ^ the points raised
•/in this/Iist and a means to solving thè tensions which
./ '?■ ■ ■■■■■■■ 7À
have perpl,<pxed Dahrendorf and others
*l II!Illlfàé& llitàitlt! thè/ source of/all these//contradictions?
7/7 -■' ■'/Can/.théy be/reconci led?/ Or- at least can they be fitted, .1 I ' ■ ..  / ; /■{
f in to , fa coherent/explanatory fraraework? I /Shall not claim 
to previde answers to/all these/queries but I shall at 
 ^ ,/some new light deriving/ from thè7 - • -/ ■'/ /•<•'/ •// , ,. / ■ ■' V
/legai-politicai analy&is. It coroes as no surprise that
. i . -è • ,
1 all/these eleraents have/become manifest in thè theoreti-
, ^ ì l: Ileast try ,to/ pour/
cal characterizations/Gf thè Community experience. The 
Conmunity/has been described, sometimes at thè sanie 
time, as federai, confederai, supranational and, 
easiest of àAiy/as/sui--generis. Supranatiqnalism
(whatever/this might mean) has beenydiagnosed as
" liprogressing>, stagnating/or retrogressing, sometimes all 
a ^  thè/sanie time.^/ yAnd indeed, if thè/Community 
is neither federai nor^confederai /(at least/not in thè 
4 la&si'^al. sense/of/these/terms), and if one chooses thè 
corx?ept pf^a/supranational/ system to/connote its special 
identity, a new set of //questione; arises. j What do we 
mean by thia concept?// How has thè Community developed ^
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as a supranational system? In what sense does it 
remain one - if at all? And what are thè specific 
problems that thè system faces in this period of transi- 
tion? So it is also to these questions that this study 
will attempt to suggest some replies.
Considering this entire set of problems it becomes 
obvious that I have a doublé concern throughout this 
study. On thè one hand I will offer an analysis of thè 
constitutional-institutional system and thè relationship 
of thè Community to thè Member States.-»But inextricably 
linked with this analysis will be an attempt to give 
meaning to some of thè key concepts, theories and doc- 
trines associated with thè Community experience —  
principally thè concept of supranationality.
How then is this enquiry arranged? As thè title 
of this volume indìcates I shall be essentially con- 
cerned with thè alleged special —  supranational <—
relationship which exists between thè Community as a
26/"generai power"— and its constituent members. I do 
not follow any particular model of system analysis but 
have tried to construct my own framework following a
rationale which emanates from thè Community itself
Part One of this study deals with thè legai and 
politicai structure and process which. govern thè 
relationship between Community and Member States and
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On thè basis of thè analysis of thè legai and
politicai process in Part One I shall then in Part Two,
\attempt to explain thè dynamics in thè competences of thè 
Community. In this sense Part One and Part Two not only 
complement each other, they represent thè two basic 
axes along which thè relationship between thè General 
Power and thè constituent members unfolds. Part One 
concerns thè vertical axis: thè hierarchy (and thè changes
therein) in our case between Community actors and Member 
State actors, Community norms and Member State norms.
Part Two concerns thè horizontal axis: The demarcation
(and thè changes therein) between Community and Member 
States' substantive jurisdiction and powers. The com- 
bination of thè two axes becomes thus my framework for 
understanding thè structure and process of thè Community 
as a non-unitary system.
The dynamics of change as regards competences is 
once again a phenomenon in which thè politicai and thè 
legai seem at odds with each other. The tension emerges 
when considering thè Community system both
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as conceived in thè Treaty and as it has developed later.
Whereas thè Treaty sought to accord a strcng cynamic
and autonomous role to thè politicai organs and especially
thè Commission, it did this within a legai framework 
we are told
which/confined Community competences to a restricted 
domain and one could thus expect jurisdictional 
expansion to be a priori complex and difficult. The 
reality of thè Community turned out differently however with 
tremendous legai dynamism but politicai ossification. The 
main paradox as regards expanding competences is that 
at least at first sight thè very politicai motivation 
behinc expansion seems irreconcilable with thè powerful 
trend of Member State circumspection towards thè Com­
munity. Since thè Member States
"assembled in thè Councii"— •^have a controlling influence 
on all Community affairs this expansionist trend calls 
for some explanations . ! _____________________ _______—X
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------------------ Chapter 6 will outline some of thè
initial premises of thè Community: a system of attribu-
ted powers and limited competences with a cumbersome
mechanism for Treaty amendment. Chapters 7, 8 and 9
trace thè disintegration of this closed system and
thè process of expanding competences. Here as well it
i.e., Chapter 9, 
is in thè Chapter which concludes Part Two,/that I
attempt to harmonise legai and politicai phenomena
into a single coherent explanation.
Finally we may turn to Part Three of thè study.
For if thè first two parts combine to present thè
Community system at a certain level of maturity after
30 years of existence, Part Three completes thè picture 
major
with two /problems and challenges emanating precisely 
from that maturity. Thus ehapter 10 deals with thè issue 
of implementation, application and enforcement of Com­
munity policy and law, a problem which has become acute 
only as a result of thè massive expansion in Community 
activity. Thus, whereas Chapter 4 dealt with thè con­
sti tutional principle of compliance, Chapter 10 high- 
lights its pragmatic problems. Chapter 11 
deals with thè dual pressures of uniformity and diversity 
within thè Community system.-------------------------- ■$>
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ti'J i-oThus if Parts One and Two^clarify thè main features 
of thè system as evolved in thè first decades and achieving 
a certain measure of equilibrium, Part Three focusses on 
some of thè forces, external and internai, which are 
already threatening thè stability and to which thè system 
will have to adapt in thè years to come.
Although I have extolled thè virtues of thè generai 
integrated approach to thè treatment of thè Community 
system it is clear that an all-encompassing and inter- 
disciplinary study is probably beyond thè scope of any 
singly authored volume and in any event beyond thè scope 
of thè present study. My approach remains essentially 
a legai analysis although one which attempts to be sensi­
tive to thè external politicai environment. There are how- 
ever even limits to that sensitivity.
First it will by now be clear that I do not deal,
except by way of illustration, with thè substantive 
policies pursued by thè Community. This has perhaps 
absolved me from thè need to introduce more than 
marginai economie and social analysis but it also 
indicates that this study is neither designed as a 
fully fledged theory of integration nor even as an 
evaluation of thè overall progress of integration; for 
in relation to both of these thè actual policies, and
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above all their impact in bringing about integration^ 
would be essential. Although my purpose will be served 
if this study leads to a better understanding of thè 
evolution of Community structures and Community process 
and thè concepts associated therewith, it may also be 
regarded as a building block in thè way towards a 
revived generai theory of integration since it is 
within these structures and by these processes that 
substantive integration will have taken place and might 
take place in thè future.
Second, neither thè entire politicai gamut nor even 
thè whole range of constitutional law receive full 
treatment. Thus, I have only slightly referred to, say, 
national party politics and in thè treatment of thè 
judicial system I have not delved with depth into 
questions regarding standing, grounds for illegality, etc., 
except where these were important to understand judicial 
review as a system of compliance.
Finally, even in respect of my principal approach
—  thè interaction of law and politics —  a measure of 
caution is necessary. The model I have adopted is 
neither exclusively a simple two-way model of cause and 
effect nor ,once again ,exclusively a functional model 
in which external requirements determine thè internai 
organization of thè system and relations therein. To
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begin with we must always bear in mind other variables,
social, economie and psycho-political, which receive
only limited attention here but which certainly influence
thè system. Law and politics and their mutuai interaction
can only provide part, albeit an important part, of a
full explanation to thè changing structures and processes
of thè Community. But even within thè parameters of law
and politics thè dynamics are not exclusively inter-
active. Indeed in analysing legai and politicai process
I will try to show that many of thè changes follow their
own legai or politicai internai logie. The interaction
is an additional supportive facet which complements,
sharpens and renders more subtle our understanding.
Inevitably, and almost tautologically, my analysis is
concerned with change —  with process over time. In this
sense thè treatment is historical and even evolutionist.
This evolutionism is certainly not Darwinian in thè
sense of having a fixed mechanism of adaptation, a princi-
a
pie of mutation and/linear progression towards better- 
ment. Rather, if anything, it is more of a 
model in which tensions resolve themselves into
equilibrium which in turn generates new tensions 
in a continuous dialectical cycle. It is this system cf 
tension and its Wicjubioti ^ equilibria and disequilibria;
which we can now turn to examine.
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FOQ^QTES
1. Given thè measure of institutional integration 
among thè three European Communities I shall 
refer to thè combined structure as"the Community'.
2. The Treaty Establishing thè European Coal and
Steel Community (hereinafter : Treaty of
Paris) which launched thè Community experience 
was signed in Paris on Aprii 18, 1951. Treaties 
establishing thè European Economie Community 
(hereinafter : Treaty of Rome) and thè European
Atomic Energy Community (hereinafter : Euratom)
were signed in Rome on March 25, 1957. The 
|chy^|n Q|£Ìar§^igg of May 9th, 1950 may be 
regarded as thè starting point: See 5/6
 ^ (1980) and see also, 13 
Sall-iiS. 1.2.1. (1980).
3. The treatment here will be confined solely to 
thè Community experience although other 
regional organizations such as thè Council of 
Europe have undoubtedly played a role in European 
integration and display certain supranational 
features. See, e.£., Drzemczewski, The Sui 
Generis Nature of thè European Convention on
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Human Rights, 29 JUSikiQ• 54 (1980).
4. Shapiro, Comparative Law and Comparative
Politics, 53 Sgu£jigrn_galifQ£Bai_LJ._Rev. 53 7 
at 538 (1980). In his comment Shapiro 
alludes to what in thè strict legai sense 
is an excellent paper: Barav, The Judicial
Power of thè European Economie Community, 53 
Southern_Cali f ornia_LJ._Rev. 4 61 (1 980).
5. In one of thè earliest studies of thè Com­
munity as an emerging "federai" system thè 
learned editor suggests that thè very 
content of thè concepts "... invites col- 
laboration among disciplines, particularly 
of students and practitioners of thè law
and politicai Science". è^=^==“ =ll3“  ' (e<*. )
( Doub leday,
N.Y., 1 955) at VII.
6. The apex of this effort may be represented
28i=i=^2MlÉ=^i=l§àì^i==:lSS=i=2i"I===SBSS
(Prentice Hall,
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Englewood Cliffs, 1970; prominent analyses
which sought to combine law and politics were S.A.
====iSI=i= ' e_Q£_Law_i n_Europe an
Integration (Greenwood Press, Westport, 1976
reprint of Yale Univ. Press, 1965);
> The_Law_is_Political_Integratioiì
(Harvard Univ. Center for International
Affairs, Harvard, 1971); other works of importance 
narrower disciplinary approach 
but of a / are Ej.B^ ._Haas, Thg_Uniting_of
Europe_l_PQlitigal_Sogial_agd_Economic
(Stanford Univ. Press,
Stanford, 1 958). ' Beyond_the
Organi2 ation (Stanford Univ. Press, Stanford,
1 9 64). K-i.Wj._Deutsch_et. al. . SQÌÌÌÌg§ì_£Q^_ 
g?uiìity_and_the_North_Atlantic_Areaj._Inter­
na tional_Organization_in_the_Light_of_Histori- 
cal_Experience (Princeton Univ. Press, Prince­
ton, 1968). A useful bibliography of research 
efforts in thè first two decades of European 
integration has been compiled by Haas in 24 
l£Ìe£fìÌÌA§D§l_QlgiIììii£Ì2£ 1003 (19 70).
See e.g., |U_S§§i r IÙi=9èi§iii=iS=i=====i3è=^ÌÌ 
Integration_Theory (Institute of International 
Studies, University of California, Berkeley,
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This process of crisis in integration theories 
is ably described by Greilsammer, Theorising 
European Integration in its Four Periods,2 
The_ Jerus al ein_ Journal _of_ I n r na£i o na 1 
§§ìl=à==i ^29 (1976).
8, In making this observatìon no overall criti­
ci sm is necessarily implied. Sectoral 
analyses have thè potential of achieving 
a level of detailed profundity which no 
generai treatment can match. And in, say, 
thè legai field thè tremendous growth in 
Community law had created a definite need 
for thè specialized legai texts; many of 
those now avaìlable display thè highest 
measure of scholarship.
9 . E . g . , DJ._Lasok_&_PJ._Soldatos ,
(Bruylant, Brussels,
1 981).
1975),
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10. Greece acceded formally on January 1, 1981.
The Treaty of Accession was signed in Athens
on May 28, 19 79. For details of thè conditions 
of accession and thè main prcvisions in that 
Treaty, see 12 Bulletin_gf_£uroggg^_gggpunities 
1.1.1 - 1.1.19 (1979). See also Fatouros,
Greece Joins thè Communities, 6 ILL^Bèv. 495 
(1981); Evriger.is, Legai and Constitutional 
Implications of Greek Accession to thè European 
Communities,17 .157(1980).
Spain and Portugal are candidates for accession 
within this decade.
1 1 . For a useful analysis of thè possible impact
of, and probiems created by, accession, see
gi=^rcugng, (Jonathan
Cape, London, 1979) esp. at 30-33. See also,
^==Si=i-i=ii ' £bi=lil==ii-====li=è=e===ì==ièi£il“ 
iiSiiSsIOìisSiiliSi (George Alien & Unwin, London, 
1981).
12. One shouìd not of course exacgerate thè pctent^a^ 
for cirect or incediate chance in thè ir.stìtJtic~:i 
balance which tne new directly elected Pari iarr.cr.t
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may have. For a restrained and cautious analysis 
emphasizing "... thè limits to thè influence 
upon public policy of a directly elected European
Parliament", see The Policy Implications of 
Direct Elections (various authors) 17 Journal 
=à===-=§H==Ì£=====£==ii- 281-349 (1979).
At thè same time thè Parliament has already 
exhibited its politicai aggressiveness and 
legai astuteness. The-foeal point for Parlia- 
ment&ry activiry has become, naturally, thè 
annual budget exercise. Parliament started 
in 1979 by rejecting thè budget in toto but 
soon learnt that this was too clumsv a move 
more likely tc harm thè Community and even 
Parliament itself. Subsequently it has adopted 
more subtle measures: in 1980 Parliament voted
an increased supplementary budget deliberately 
so as to be able to use unspent surpluses in 
1981 (see 16 Eu^ogeag £arliamegt Column 1 (1 980)).
This move was particularly astute since it 
exploited disagreement among thè governments of 
thè Member States in thè Council of Ministers 
thereby allowinc Parliament to take special 
advantage of thè particular bucgetary votmg 
rules.
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The 1 980 action precipi-catec a politicai and legai 
crisis whereby Belgiuro, France and Germany 
threatened to refuse to make their full Community 
budgetary contributions and which was sclved 
only a year later. In thè 1981 Budgetary exer- 
cise thè directly elected chamber unilaterally 
reclassified certain items of expenciture (food 
aid) as non-compulsory so as to give Parliament 
thè final say on financial allocations. As a 
result thè Comici1 has decided to sue Parliament.
On institutional conflict regarding thè budget, 
see generallv Ehlemann, Conflict in Implementarion 
of Community Law, 3 r^I^D^E^_Regorts 3.1 (Sweet & 
Maxwell, London, 1 980). In addition, Parliament 
has been testing its constitutional positicn in 
thè decision making process. See e .g ., its inter- 
vention in thè Isoglucose cases (Case 138/79 
Roquette Frères v Council; Case 139/79 Maizena 
v Council 980/ ECH 3333; 3393 (Comment, Jacobs/
1 8 CMLEev 21 9 (1 980) .
re13. Parliament irself has now produced an entir<
range of proposals for institutionai mocifications.
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Some of these are of a limited nature not 
necessitating Treaty modification. See, e .g .,
E.P. Doc. 1-207/81; 1-216/81; 1-335/81; 1-206/81
and Resolutions of 9.7.1981, O.J Annex 1-273,
192 ff. More radicai suggestions, involving 
Treaty amendment, are being prepared by a newly 
established Committee of thè European Parliament.
14. "For years thè Community has been described 
as being in crisis. But when crises exist 
permanently, merely changing their immediate 
causes, it should be asked if they really are 
crises, that is to sav exceptional conflict 
situations. It is rather more likely that thè 
conflicts thè Community has so far experienced 
are significant of tensions inherent in thè 
integration process itself". Everling, Possi- 
bilities and Limits of European Integration,
(1 980) .
Whilst I accept Everling's analysis of thè 
Community as a system of crises my argument is 
not that thè present problems and challenges 
are inherently more difficult than previous
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ones, but rather that conditions for se luti or.
—  such as thè present economie climate —  have 
worsened.
15. of course when assessing thè Labour Party decision, 
ailowance must be made for thè traditional 
licence of Opposition parties cut of Government.
As for thè Debrè-Foyer Bill (Proposition de Loi 
portant rétablissement de la souverainté de la
Républicue en matière d'energie nucléaire, No.
917, Assemblée Nationale, 2ème session extra— 
ordinaxre de 1978-1979) thè election of a 
socialist government in France, apparently 
committed to thè Suropean enterorise, has solved 
thè xmmediate problem but not thè deeoer roots.
On recent popular attitudes to thè Community, 
see Eurobgrggftre No. 15, June, 1981.
Tf, See in generai Chapter 10 infra.
We must distinguisi: between several types of 
Community law infraction by States. Most 
common are cases of non-incorporation into 
thè legai orders of Community directives.
----------------- Then come inaevertent
"pre-litigation" legislative or administrative
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violations. Less cor.-non are deliberate m: : jr- 
tions such as thè French-Italian 1981 "wine 
war" , Effective judicial remecy in respect of 
these is usualìy available. "Post litigation" 
defiance may consist in dilatory compliance bv 
thè Member States (e.g., Case 7/68 Commission 
v Italian Republic ^1968? ECR 4) or even outright 
defiance (e.g., Case 232/78 Commission v French 
Republic ^1979? ECR 2729. Cf. Joined Cases 
24/80R and 97/80R Commission v French Republic 
«/Ì980? ECR 1319). In addition national courts 
may evasively apply Community law (e.g., Secretary
of State for thè Home Department, ex parte 
Santillo /T9817 2 AllER 917) or even deliberately 
defy it (e.g., Cohn-3endit Case, Conseil d'Etat 
</Ce 7 22 December 1978, Dalloz 1979, 155.
The cases of deliberate judicial and executive 
defiance are of course most troublesome. See 
'Editorial Comment', 17 QM^^ev 31 1 (1 980).
17. Note 15 suora.
18. In thè sixties these were fairly frequer.t.
See e.g., Heathccte, The Crisis of Europear. 
Supranationali ty , 5 = ì
Siygig§ 1 40 (1 966) esp. at 170. Sut ever. v*. : y 
recently Ralf Dahrendorf speaks of a "cisr.::.
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failure of institutions" and of thè danger of 
"irrelevance". R^_D|&reggprf, £_I|ìird_Euroge, 
(Third Jean Monnet Lecture, European University 
Institute, Florence, 1979).
<1 9  ^ Thus, e . g . , successes in thè environmental 
field —  for which no explicit basis exists 
within thè Treaty —  probably outstrip thè 
relative failure of thè Community to evolve 
a Common Transport Policy as provided in Title 
IV of thè Treaty (Articles 74-84 EEC) .
20. An exoellent analysis of this expansion is Tizzano,
Lo Sviluppo Delle Competenze Materiali Delle 
Comunità Europee, 21
139 (1981).
21 • For a useful analysis of this particular duality, 
see Marguand, Parliamentary Accountability and thè 
European Community, 19 Jourg§l_of_CQ^on_.Mar^§t 
221 (1981) esp. at 223-226.
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-52 Dahrendorf, note 1S supra a: 6 (emphasis m  
originai).
23. See e ■g ♦, proposals for reform by thè European 
Parliament, note 12 supra; Report_oo_European 
laStiiutiQgs (Three Wise Men Report) (Council
of thè European Communities, Brussels, 1980); 
Prc2 0 sals_f0 r_R§ìg£m_2 |_è&i_ggSSÌiii2 n_Sf_ibi 
Eurogean_QorTm^QÌtÌ£i_igÌ=isi==i==4£=i (Spierenburg 
Report) (Commission of thè European Communities, 
Brussels, 1 979). For academic ccxnmentary see 
recently, Rosenthal & Puchala, Decisional Systems, 
Adaptiveness and European Decisionmakinq, 4 40 
è S i i i 5 4 (1978); Tizzano, COREPER, in 
Novisg4S0_DiSgg^g_Ita1iano, (Utet, Torino, 1981);£4, 
^angemann, Report of thè "Three Wise .Men": A
Criticai Assessment (European Cooperation Fund,
Brussels, 1980); S^ Henig, ESHgl-iSé-DiSÌiiQD 
àS=I=£=SS (Suropotentials Press, London, 1980); 
==” Iiii=I^==i • ' Pggisionmakinc_in_the_EurgPg§n 
Communi ties .
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24. A profound hook which repays careful study is,
, The_Function_of_Jyg4g4|2-.Decisign_j_n 
Sii§2iÌi=l£§BSS*i£=2S^iSIgìÌgD (Nijhoff, The 
Hague, 1 9 72); see also A^W^ Greeg, Politicai 
IS£gSiatign_bY_Jurisgrudence (Sijthoff, Leiden, 
1969).
25. See infra Chapter 1.
26. most studies relationships in non-unitary
systems are usually described in terms of 
central-periphery. I prefer Elazar's terminologv 
of a generai power since in non-dualistic analyses 
of such systems it is difficult to locate one 
centrè for all system functions. Cf. Elazar,
The Role of Federalism in Politicai Integration
in £>_, J-Ì-21&Z3J t (ed.) , Federalism_and_Political
=8^i=S=Si2= (Turtledove, Ramat Gan, 19 79) at 13.
27 I have borrowed this terni from Professor Stein 
to stress thè intergcvernmental function ano 
procedure of this body. "The Representatives 
of thè Member States meeting in thè Counczl 
of course a different matter.
See Stein, Towards a European Fore^n ?oli^_> 
n.10, F1or£gce=Prgject.
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P a r t O n e
Norms and Actors
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What then do we mean when speaking of a supra­
national system? And does it stili make sense to 
refer to thè Communities, in thè 80s, as such a sys­
tem? The term supranationalism is evocative of an 
earlier era of high aspirations which seems at odds 
with recent developments already mentioned in thè 
introduction: A resurgence of overt national polit­
icai resistance to thè Community, a less open but 
even more dangerous measure of non compliance with 
Community obligations and a continuous cycle of po­
liticai crises thè solutions to which often seem 
elusive. And yet, as I suggested, despite all this, 
thè Community stili displays a surprising measure of 
institutional resilience, an impressive record of 
substantive integration and a relevance in fields—  
such as foreign policy— not originally contemplated 
in thè Treaty.
On thè one hand to speak of thè Community as
supranational in thè literal meaning of ". . . over
and above individuai states" gives too generai and
antiquated a notion of thè system. For we know that
whatever thè dreams of thè past, thè Community's
present structure and process involve "bits and
2pieces of thè national governments" with a cruciai
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say in all aspects of Community activity. But even 
so in thè transfer of certain functions to Community 
organs and in relation to certain constitutional hi- 
erarchies there remains a measure of "aboveness" in 
thè old sense. Further, like all "federai"^ models, 
thè Community presents a tension between thè whole 
and thè parts, centrifugai and centripetal forces, 
centrai Community organs and Member States. In some 
ways thè balancing of this tension in thè Community 
system departs, perhaps even radically, from most 
other federai models. The primary purpose of this 
part of thè study will be to examine thè evolution 
of these tensions with a view to explaining in what 
sense, if at all, one may stili speak of a Community
g Ifaboveness. The analysis will be limited to thè le­
gai structure and politicai process of Community de- 
cision making txrt<Lwill not deal with any substantive 
field. I shall be concerned to see
whether through this analysis we might not find thè 
elements for a working hypothesis as to what are thè 
necessary characteristics which render a system su­
pranational .
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Notes
1. Robertson, Legai Problems of European Integration, 
91 RDC 105, 143 (1957).
2. A. Shonfield, Europe : Journey to an Unknown Des-
tination (Alien Lane, London, 1972) at 17.
3. In this context I am using thè term "federai" in 
its widest, most fundamental sense of sharing in 
governance over activities. Elazar usefully re- 
cords thè origins of thè term
. . . first in thè biblical hebrew term brit,
then thè latin foedus (literally 'covenant')/ 
from which thè modern 'federai' is derived 
. . . . Elaborated by thè Calvinists in 
their federai theology, thè concept formed 
thè basis for far more than_a form of politi­
cai organization . . . .  /T/he originai use 
of thè term deals with contractual linkages 
that involve power sharing— among individu- 
als, among groups, among states. This usage 
is more appropriate than thè definition of 
modern federations, which represents only one 
aspect of thè federai idea and one applica­
tion of thè federai principle.
D. Elazar (ed.)', Self Rule/Shared Rule (Turtle- 
dove, Ramat Ganr- 19 79) at 3.
This overview of thè federai principle is 
particularly important since although thè Community
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is, in this wide sense, a "federai" entity, it de- 
cidedly does not conform to thè traditional notion 
of having (or aspiring to have) a strong important 
centre and a periphery linked thereto.
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Chapter One 
Supranationalisin; A Conceptual Conundrum
Although supranationalism is a term well estab- 
lished in thè politicai and legai lexicon its usage 
is not unambiguous or without difficulty. It is pos- 
sible to identify four interconnected issues around 
which these difficulties and ambiguities revolve.
A. Supranationalism; The Amorphous Concept
a. The definitional problem
The need to revert to a novel term in character- 
ising thè Community was indication that existing ter- 
minology was not felt to give adequate expression to 
thè new venture.  ^ But since thè new term, suprana­
tionalism, derives from, indeed is thè explication 
of, thè phenomenon it seeks to define a measure of 
circularity is inevitable. For one must employ thè 
distinguishing features of thè Community to give 
meaning to thè term supranationalism which in turn is 
thè concept used to express distinctions between thè 
Community and other international organisations.
Thus, to thè extent that thè European Community expe- 
rience was and remains unique one cannot usefully
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speak of a strict definition but only of one or more
hallmarks which either identify it with, or— more im-
portantly— distinguish it from other forms of associa-
2tion of states and legai orders. In thè earlier anal- 
yses thè concept was tackled by reference to thè known 
juridical-political categories of public international 
law (which embodies thè formai traditional modes of 
international relations) and municipal law (which em­
bodies thè variety of non-unitary state arrangements).
3In a powerful study of synthesis, Hay analyses
4thè most important of these atternpts. Few writers
5adopted extreme positions of total assimilation.
More often thè analyses, using an analogical method,
characterised supranationalism as veering towards one
or thè other of thè two known systems. Insistence on
finding a positive definition could only resolve it-
self in characterising thè system as sui-generis. But
6to so characterise it with no more is hardly helpful. 
And to say more leads inevitably to thè necessity of 
fixing thè distinguishing marks. Thus although thè 
current trend is to include thè Community among inter­
national organisations its distinguishing supranation- 
al character— whatever this may be— is always empha- 
sised.^
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Even if one cannot, as a result, have a fully 
fledged definition, thè exercise of determining thè 
most relevant hallmarks as indicia for supranational- 
ism^remains of interest. First, these may serve as a 
significant comparative tool for evaluating thè simi- 
larities and differences between on thè one hand both 
older and novel associations of states and on thè 
other hand thè European Community. Also, should a 
true pattern of resemblance between other such asso­
ciations and international organizations and thè Com­
munity begin to emerge, thè hallmarks may become a 
proper definition.
Secondly, in relation to thè European experience 
itself, thè hallmarks may provide a tool which will 
enable us to tackle thè problem deriving from thè dy- 
namic nature of thè Community and supranationalism.
b. The dynamic nature of supranationalism— thè 
Community experience as a process
In attempting to fix certain distinguishing fea- 
tures there is a danger of failing to give expression 
to thè dynamic nature of supranationalism. The Com­
munity experience has not been a static one, neither 
in thè sostantive activities pursued by it nor— more 
significantly for our discussion— in thè internai
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principles of its operation be they in thè institu-
tional framework, thè location and exercise of deci-
sion making power, and, generally, thè relationships
between thè Community as a whole and its constituent
parts. The interplay of centripetal and centrifugai
forces— manifesting itself in different eguilibria
at different times— is a Constant feature of thè
Community as a "federai" creature. Indeed, as will
be readily accepted, in many ways thè Community can
only be understood as a type of dialectical process
of action and reaction among thè various forces
shaping it. This poses a doublé edged problemi one
may select hallmarks reflecting thè evolution of thè
Community at a fixed point in time. But with thè
passage of time these may be overtaken by events and
cease to give a true reflection of supranationalism.
Thus, for instance, studies which concentrated— as
thè primary distinguishing factor— on thè ability of
Community organs to take decisions immediately bind-
ing on individuals within thè national legai sys-
8tems would, today, in thè light of subsequent de- 
velopments in thè Community, no longer reflect thè 
mature evolution of that factor. Alternatively, a 
completely fluid set of hallmarks constantly chang-
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ing with events would become no more than a descrip- 
tion thereby losing its value as a comparative tool 
and its potential as an embryonic definition thè im- 
portance of which was underlined above.
A compromise could be to shape as a dynamic tool 
a set of criteria within which thè hallmarks would 
feature. The criteria would be sufficiently wide so 
as to be applicable to different legai orders and In­
ternational organisations and so maintain their util­
ity in comparative analysis. The hallmarks related 
to these criteria but changing with thè evolution of 
thè Community would provide thè elastic element ena- 
bling us to understand supranationalism as a processu- 
al rather than fixed relationship or structure. This 
feature is particularly important in a retrospective 
analysis. The processual character highlights, how- 
ever, two further difficulties: thè cleavage between
legai and politicai assessment and thè diffuse nature 
of thè term supranationalism.
c. Evaluating thè supranational process - The 
cleavage between politicai and legai assess­
ment
Acceptance of thè processual character of supra­
nationalism and its subject, European Integration,
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entails thè possibility of evaluating it in thè sense
of establishing, with whatever measure of precision,
thè progress or retrogression of supranationalism and
integration. It has been common to divide thè process
of European integration into "phases" and "periods"
characterised by different degrees and levels of su-
9pranationalisation and integration. So as to avoid 
confusion in illustrating thè legal-political cleavage 
it is necessary to draw a distinction between European 
integration and supranationalism. "European integra­
tion" is a concept wider than supranationalism for 
whereas thè focus of thè latter is on thè constitu­
tional, institutional and decision making process 
within thè Community, thè former incorporates these 
processes but includes also thè substantive develop- 
ments in thè areas covered by Community activities and 
their social and economie impact on thè system as a 
whole. In this sense it could be said that suprana­
tionalism is concerned with thè "means” and European 
integration with thè totality of social, politicai and 
economie results. The separation is, naturally, not 
total since a strengthening of thè means available for 
substantive integration, e.g. establishing that Commu­
nity measures in generai override national measures, 
may in itself be regarded as a substantive achieve-Weiler, Joseph H. H. (1982), Supranational law and the supranational system : legal structure and political process in the 
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ment. Thus, a diagnosis of stagnation in European in­
tegration as a whole would seem necessarily to entail 
a stagnation in thè process of supranationalisation. 
Conversely substantial progress of supranationalism
would indicate progress in an important facet of Euro-
10pean integration generally.
The cleavage between thè legai and politicai 
evaluation of thè progress of European integration and 
supranationalism is most apparent by reference to con- 
trasting assessments of different "phases" in thè 
process.
The chasm appears both in thè choice of phases
and, more strikingly, in thè evaluation of progress.
Thus in a useful study synthesising three decades of
politicai theories on European integration, thè period
1 1of 1958-1969 is signalled out as a "distinct phase".
Evaluating this period thè learned writer comments
that "Throughout /these/ eleven years during which
General de Gaulle /who was "allergie to anyting supra-
nationalV remained in power, no notable progress
could be made in integration, either in thè politicai
domain, thè institutional domain, thè monetary domain
or in thè geographical extension of thè Common Mar- 
12ket". Yet, from thè juridical point of view--as
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shall be analysed in detail below— it was precisely
during this period that certain fundamental facets of
supranationalism took cruciai, even revolutionary,
strides ahead establishing, e.g., thè doctrines of
1 3direct effect and supremacy of Community law.
This, of course, is not a unique example of thè 
14cleavage. To be sure thè departure point of each
discipline is different. The politicai theories of
European integration were to a large measure wedded
to a certain notion about thè outcome of thè process
and embodied to a larger or smaller extent a certain
predictive element about continuous progress. In
addition politicai theory laid great emphasis on thè
social, politicai and economie substantive achieve-
ments and lesser emphasis on means and ways. The
starting point was thus one of high expectation and
failure to maintain thè visible social politicai mo-
mentum led to a measure-of disillusion in thè reas-
15sessment of European integration.
The juridical point of departure was different. 
The constituent instruroents of thè Communities were 
traditional multi-partite international treaties 
which even if including certain novel institutional 
features were, in line with precedent, expected to 
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of treaty interpretation one of which is, for example,
a presumption against loss of sovereignty by states.
The process of integration which in thè legai sphere
was accoralished by a "constitutionalisation" of thè
16Treaties was set against limited initial expecta-
tions. This conditioned among lawyers a far more pos-
17itive evaluation of thè process. Besides, legai 
preoccupation especially in Europe has been concemed 
traditionally with means and tools, thè legai instru- 
ments, and somewhat less with their political-social 
impact. Important as thè supranational developments 
were, they formed only part of thè total picture of 
European integration.
This attitudinal explanation cannot obscure thè 
fact that in dealing with thè same subject matter, 
such a cleavage has emerged. Thus even in reviewing 
thè narrower instrumentai notion of supranationalism 
one of our concerns must be to try and provdie some 
mechanism which will bridge, at least partially, this 
cleavage.
Finally, thè existence of thè cleavage within thè 
context of thè processual character of supranational­
ism, points to thè last difficulty deriving from thè 
complex nature of thè term.
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d. The "diffuse" nature of supranationalism
In discussing thè definitional problem we noted 
thè need to rely on a multiplicity of distinguishing 
attributes— hallmarks— to give meaning to thè term.
We also noted thè evolutionary nature of supranation­
alism reflecting thè developments in thè Community.
But how are these two factors to be related?
The difficulty may best be illustrated by reference 
to thè relationship between sovereignty and suprana­
tionalism.
Hay correctly suggests that "/W/ith few excep-
tions, . . . thè criteria for thè loss of sovereignty
coincide with those which much of thè literature re-
gards as thè elements of supranationalism. Thus, thè
concept of a transfer of sovereignty may be thè le-
gal-analytical counterpart of thè political-descrip-
18tive notion of supranationalism".
The criteria which Hay distilled from thè liter­
ature as elements of supranationalism include one or 
more of thè following:
i) The "independence of thè organisation and of 
its institutions from thè member states
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ii) The " . . .  ability of an organisation to 
bind its member states by a majority or 
weighted majority vote", 
iii) The " . . .  direct binding effect of law
emanating from thè organisation on naturai 
and legai persons". 
iv) The attribution to thè organisation of 
certain powers, functions and jurisdic- 
tions which in terms of sheer quantity re- 
sult in a qualitative difference from non- 
supranational organisations.
v) The nature of supranational institutions—
19principally thè Parliament and Court.
It is not necessary at this stage to examine 
in depth these criteria and evaluate thè extent, if 
any, to which they fulfil a distinguishing function 
and meet thè other problems mentioned above.
In generai, in trying to choose thè most apt 
hallmark one could of course focus on a single cri- 
terion such as thè creation of a parliament or 
court as representing thè most criticai distin­
guishing factor and evaluate thè process by refer- 
ence to this single factor. The danger there would 
naturally be one of missing thè complexity of su-
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pranationalism and indeed of European integration. 
The political-legal cleavage described above can, in 
some cases, be explained by an emphasis on one or 
some of thè criteria to thè exclusion of others by 
politicai scientists and jurists respectively. By 
selecting a multiplicity of factors a different dan­
ger is created— that of treating them as an inte­
grateci contplex progressing or retrogressing as one
20whole. A cursory examination of thè list of cri­
teria cited above will reveal that it is quite pos- 
sible that in respect of some there may be "a loss 
of sovereignty" whereas in relation to others much 
less or none at all.
How then is one to evaluate thè progress or 
retrogression of supranationalism? To recognise thè 
complexity of supranationalism which calls for a 
multiplicity of factors but to fail to realise that 
thè processual character may take a different evolu- 
tionary direction in relation to each of these fac­
tors is to deny thè diffuse nature of thè term and 
to deprive thè dynamic analysis of one of its impor- 
tant elements.
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B. Normative and Decisional Supranationalism
In order to overcome some of thè difficulties 
outlined above it is submitted that a distinction 
should be drawn— if only for use as an analysis tool 
— between two facets of supranationalism. For con- 
venience, I shall cali them normative and decision-
Normative supranationalism is concerned with 
thè relationships and hierarchy which exist between 
Community policies and legai measures on thè one 
hand and competing policies and legai measures of 
thè Member States on thè other. Decisional suprana­
tionalism relates to thè institutional framework and 
decision making processes by which Community poli­
cies and measures are, in thè first place, initiat-
ed, debated and formulated, then promulgated and fi-
22nally executed. The make up of both these terms 
may include factors which can be stated at suffi- 
cient a level of generalisation so as to serve as 
criteria for evaluating thè progress or retrogres- 
sion of thè two particular facets of supranational­
ism.
A high measure of normative supranationalism 
will denote, in generai, a hierarchy in which Commu-
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nity measures will take effective precedence over na- 
tional ones. The choice of criteria is relatively 
simple since we may use thè traditional principles by 
which relationships between on thè one hand national 
and/or state law and, on thè other, federai, confed­
erai and international law are expressed: The prin-
ciple of self-execution (direct effect), thè princi- 
ple of supremacy and thè principle of preemption.
The hallmarks will be thè specific manifestation in 
thè Community of these principles.
The centrality of thè Member States in thè in- 
stitutional set-up and thè absence of an autonomous 
popularly elected 'Community legislature and govern- 
ment 1 were basic structural choices taken when set- 
ting up thè Community. Yet thè institutional struc- 
ture projected in thè Treaty may be seen as an at- 
tempt to achieve a model of 'Community decision mak- 
ing' which despite thè centrality of Member States 
would depart as far as possible from traditional di- 
plomacy and intergovernmentalism and would, in thè 
literal sense, be supranational (or at least above 
thè individuai state). In thè Community context a 
high measure of decisional supranationalism would 
thus be indicated in relation to decisions taken
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a. by Community organs thè composition and mode 
of operation of which are autonomous (commu- 
nautaire) and not intergovernmental in thè 
traditional sense, 
or b. by Community organs thè composition and po­
liticai functions of which are intergovern­
mental but thè process of decision making—
e.g. thè voting procedure^— is not strictly 
that of intergovernmental diplomacy, 
or c. in pluri-institutional decision making where 
thè role of thè autonomous organs may be 
said to be criticai,
and in which thè execution of these measures will be
d. either directly by, or under thè supervisory
authority and responsibility of, thè autono-
23mous bodies.
Although all four factors are expressed in rela­
tion to thè institutions of thè Community, by virtue 
of thè composition of these institutions, they con- 
tain thè involvement, both direct and indirect, of 
thè Member States in thè decision making process.
The separate treatment of these two facets cov- 
ers thè essence, if not thè detail, of both thè "ju- 
ridical" approach which focuses on formai relation-Weiler, Joseph H. H. (1982), Supranational law and the supranational system : legal structure and political process in the European Community 
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ships, deiuarcation of competences and resolution of 
conflicts, and thè "politicai" approach which is con­
cerned with thè actualities, influenced by legai and 
non-legal factors, of cooperation and coordination of 
thè different elements in thè association of states. 
Having a clearer view of developments in both spheres 
may be helpful in drawing composite conclusions.
The other major relationship between Member 
States and thè Community concerning thè question of 
competences is dealt with in Part Two of this study.
Having introduced these distinctions it is now 
possible to analyse and trace thè dynamic nature of 
supranationalism as a key to understanding thè evolu­
tion of thè legal-political framework of thè Community.
C . The Dynamics of Normative and Decisional Suprana­
tionalism: Diverging Trends And A Resulting
Balance
Examination of thè European Community's evolu­
tion in thè last three decades reveals thè apparently 
paradoxical emergence of two conflicting trends. One 
may have expected in thè process of integration a 
parallel evolution in thè transfer of power from thè 
periphery to thè centre— an increase in centrai nor-
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mative competence accorapanied by a strengthening in 
thè "centralised" decision making process. In thè 
Community, however, we can trace on thè one hand a, 
more or less, continuous process of approfondissement 
of normative supranationalism whereby thè relation­
ship between thè (legai) order of thè Community and 
that of thè Member States has come to resemble in- 
creasingly a fully fledged (USA type) federai system. 
On thè other hand, and contemporaneously, we can de- 
tect a, more or less, continuous process of diminu- 
tion of decisional supranationalism, stopping, in 
some respects, only short of traditional intergovem- 
mentalism. The very existence of supranationalism—  
in both its forms— in itself distinguishes thè Commu­
nity from most other intemational organisations.
The divergence in thè evolution of thè two forms may 
be one of thè special--perhaps even unique— features 
of thè Community as a process of integration and as a 
form of governance. The possible meaning to be given 
to these diverging Community trends will be discussed 
and assessed below. First, however, we should turn 
to examine in greater detail thè two facets of supra­
nationalism with a view both to a clearer understand- 
ing of their meaning and so as to illustrate thè re- 
spective evolutionary processes.Weiler, Jos ph H. H. (1982), Supranat onal l w and the supranational ystem : legal structure and political process in the 
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Notes
1. The Community is new in thè post-World War II pe­
riod. The 19th century German Zollverein (Keeton, 
The Zollverein and thè Common Market, in Keeton & 
Sch^arzenberger (eds. ) , English Law and thè Common 
Market (Stevens and Sons, London, 1963) 1) and thè 
Danube Commission (Smith, Danube, 4 Yearbook of 
World Affairs (195 0) 191) were two antecedents in 
earlier days. The term supranationalism also pre- 
dates thè Community. Schermers cites Einstein as 
writing to Freud in 1932 and stating "At present 
we are far from possessing any supranational or­
gani zation." H.G. Schermers, International Insti- 
tutional Law, Voi. 1 (Sijthoff, Leiden, 1972) at
20. It is, of course, possible to adopt an a-pri­
ori definition but this theoretical approach de- 
pends on a choice of criteria which will necessar- 
ily be subjective. Schermers prefers this ap­
proach adopting a useful list of such criteria but 
even he is then pushed to conclude that since to 
be "completely supranational, an international or- 
ganization should fulfil all /these criteria/
. . . no such supranational organization exists".
Id. at 2 1 . I have preferred a more inductive ap-Weiler, Joseph H. H. (1982), Supranational law and the supranational system : legal structure and political process in the 
European Community 
European University Institute                                                                    DOI: 10.2870/67242
proach relying on thè e.xperience of thè Community 
itself even if thè result is not as cheoretic^lly 
satisfying as thè a-priori method. See also, G. 
Mally, The European Community in Perspective 
(Lexington Books, Lexington, 1973) esp. at 26.
This is perhaps my bias as a Common Law lawyer: 
"The pursuit of definitions has never appealed 
much to lawyers because they are aware that thè 
concepts they employ have been rough-hewn by his- 
tory and stoutly resist philosophical formula- 
tion." Pollock, The Distinguishing Mark of 
Crime, 22 M^L^R. 495 (1959).
P. Hay, Federalism and Supranational Organiza- 
tions (University of Illinois Press, Urbana and 
London, 1966). In its historical synthesis parts 
Hay's study offers thè most exhaustive treatment 
of different studies of supranationalism espe- 
cially in its legai and institutional aspects. 
Moreover, thè analytical parts of thè study have 
retained their value despite thè passage of 
years. Even today thè book repays careful study.
I have relied on Hay for thè brief survey of dif­
ferent treatments in thè present retrospectiveWeiler, Joseph H. H. (1982), Supranational law and the supranational system : legal structure and political process in the European Community 
European University Institute                                                                    DOI: 10.2870/67242
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4. Id. chapter 2 and appendices pp. 77-78.
5. See, e .g . N^rgaard, The Position of thè Individuai 
ìS International Law (Munksgaard, Copenhagen,
1962) (International Law Approach) and Kohnstamm, 
The European Coal and Steel Community 90 RDC 1 
(1956 II) and comments thereon in Hay, id.
6 . ". . . an unsatisfying shrug" Hay, Federai Juris-
diction of thè Common Market Court 12 Am. J. Com. 
L. (1963) at 39. Cf. Hay :Ld. at 44 and note 106.
7. Thus in a leading current treatment Schermers has
no hesitation in including thè Community in his 
generai treatise on international institutional 
law but he is careful to distinguish between su­
pranational and intergovernmental organisations. 
See Schermers, note 1 supra at 19-24.
8 . E.g. Robertson, Legai Problems of European Inte­
gration, 91 RDC 105, 143 (1957).
9. In their comprehensive collection of texts, cases 
and readings, Stein, Hay and Waelbroeck suggest 
six phases (The Phase of Enthusiasm 1945-1949; To-Weiler, Joseph H. H. (1982), Supranational law and the supranational system : leg l structure and political process in the 
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wards Integration by Sectors 1950-19 55; Relaunch- 
ing 1955-1958; A Split— A Bridge— Politicai "Re- 
launching"? 1958-1963; Crisis-Consolidation 1963- 
1968; Enlargement 1969- ). E. Stein, P. Hay ,
M. Waelbroeck, European Community Law and Insti- 
tutions in Perspective (Bobbs-Merrill, Indianapo­
lis, New York, 1956) pp. 10-13. Greilsammer, 
suggesting that "/t/here is virtually no process 
that can be delimited in time as well as thè 
process of European integration" opts for four 
periods 1946-1950; 1950-1958; 1958-1969; 1969-
Greilsammer, Theorizing European Integra­
tion in its Four Periods 2 The Jerusalem Journal 
of International Relations 129 (1976) (for thè 
evaluation of thè different periods see text to 
notes 25-26 infra). Dahrendorf suggests three 
less well-defined phases: The Founding Fathers—
Monnet et al. (approx. 50s); Founding sons-- 
Hallstein et al. (approx. 60s), and thè present 
generation. R. Dahrendorf, A Third Europe? 
(E.U.I., Florence, 1979— Jean Monnet Lecture).
Pryce also suggests six phases although dif­
ferent from Stein et al.: 1950-51; 1952-54;
1955-57 (Relance); 1958-62 (New Communities in 
Action); 1963-69 (Conflict, Crisis and Stagna-Weiler, Joseph H. H. (1982), Supranational law and the supranational system : legal structure and political process in the 
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tion); 1969-72 (Second Relance). R. Pryce, The 
Politics of thè European Communi ty (Butterworths, 
London, 1973) at 1-27.
10. Stagnation of supranationalism, however, does not 
imply stagnation of substantive integration.
11. Greilsammer id.
12. At 141 (emphasis added).
13. The major decision on direct effect was given on 
February 5, 1963. On supremacy on July 15th, 
1964. For more detailed discussion, see chapter
2 infra.
14. The period of De Gaulle in which UK accession was 
rejected (on a French "veto") and in which thè 
Luxemburg crisis occurred created a generai over- 
haul of theories of integration. See e.a. Haas, 
The Uniting of Europe and thè Uniting of Latin 
America 5 Journal of Common Market Studies 315 
(1967) at 325-331.
An extremely pessimistic assessment in thè 
mid-sixties— with statements such as "Suprana-Weiler, Joseph H. H. (1982), Supranational law and the supranational system : legal structure and political process in the 
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tional structures may not survive into 1966"— is 
that of Heathcote, The Crisis of European Supra- 
nationality, 5 Journal of Common Market Studies 
140 (1966). The analysis, strongly influenced by 
thè politicai crises of that period, is instruc- 
tive in illustrating thè cleavage. Heathcote, at 
141, adopts an a priori definition of suprana- 
tionality-according to which "a supranational or­
ganisation is one which (a) bypasses thè nation- 
state's authority and deals directly with thè 
citizens; which (b) takes over some functions 
traditionally exercised by thè nation-state; and 
(c) is in thè position to originate decisions not 
only on behalf of thè state but despite it". It 
is interesting that there is almost exclusive 
concentration on thè decision making actors and 
processes and only oblique— if at all--reference 
to thè validity and status of thè decisions 
adopted vis-à-vis national measures. The latter 
are thè traditional preoccupations of thè lawyer. 
And yet without this latter type of validity thè 
power to originate measures despite Member State 
opposition would have precarious value if these 
measures could subsequently be overturned by a 
Member State change of mind; Heathcote1s firstWeiler, Joseph H. H. (1982), Supranational law and the supranational system : legal structure and political process in the 
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criterion,— thè authority to deal directly with 
thè individuai— introduced already by thè Treaty 
of Paris (a power which, incidentally, remained 
largely intact during thè Sixties) has been over- 
taken by developments in thè Sixties by decisions 
on self-executing measures and supremacy which 
are more revolutionary, have greater impact and 
-could far better serve as distinguishing criteria 
for supranational organisations.
Puchala, although dealing with thè wider 
concept of international integration captures 
with his 'blind men and elephant’ metaphor neat- 
ly, if somewhat acidly, thè problem of thè disci- 
plinary cleavage: "Each blind man . . . /touch-
in£/ a different part of thè large animai, and 
each /concludine/ that thè elephant /internation­
al integration/ had thè appearance of thè part he 
touched." Puchala, Of^  Blind Men, Elephants and 
International Integration, 10 Journal of Common 
Market Studies 267 (1972) at 267. His own so- 
phisticated "concordance system" strangely pays 
little attention to thè constitutional develop­
ments which could have been regarded as important 
supportive elements, at 277-284 but see at 269- 
271. Lawyers have also fallen in thè gap. See
-^>■2. -
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devastating remarks by Shapiro, supra Introduc- 
tion p. 1 .
15. Cf. Greilsammer, note 9 supra at 142-146.
16. "Constitutionalisation" implies a combined and 
circular process by which thè Treaties were in- 
terpreted by techniques associated with constitu­
tional documents rather than multipartite trea­
ties and in which thè Treaties both as cause and 
effect assumed thè "higher law" attributes of a 
constitution. For an interesting discussion see 
?I2£-§§^ÌD2§ of thè 72nd Annual Meeting of thè 
American Society of International Law 166-197 
(1978) .
The German Federai Constitutional Court has 
actually said that "The European Economie Commu­
nity Treaty is, as it were, thè constitution of 
this Community" Federai Constitutional Court, 
First Chamber, Decision of October 18, 1967; 
/1967/ AWD 4 77-78; /19 6 8 / Europarecht 134-37 cit- 
ed by Stein in Proceedings icì. 168. See now, 
Stein 75 AJIL 1 (1978).
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18. Ha^, note 3 supra, p. 69.
19. Hay, id., p. 31 ff.
20. Cf. P. Pescatore, The Law of Integration
(Sijthoff, Leiden, 1974) . In his excellent study 
Judge Pescatore tends to play down thè institu- 
tional crises (e.g. pp. 11-19) such as thè Luxem- 
burg accord. Consequently his treatment gives a 
generai impression of continuing progressive evo­
lution.
2 1 . I prefer "decisional" to "institutional" since
thè former conveys thè need to look at thè actual 
processes and not merely at formai functions.
Far more sophisticated tools and frameworks have 
been offered for thè analysis of federai models 
in generai and thè Community model in particuiar. 
Elazar's series of matrixes is a recent most val- 
uable contribution as regards thè former (see, 
Elazar, The Role of Federalism in Politicai Inte­
gration , in D.J. Elazar (ed.), Federalism and Po­
liticai Integration (Turtledove, Ramat Gan, 19 79) 
13). See also W.H. Riker, Federalism: Origin,
Opera^ion, Significante (Little, Brown, Boston,Weiler, Joseph H. H. (1982), Supranational law and the supranational system : legal structure and political process in the 
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1964). Lindberg's model has become something of 
a classic as regards thè latter (see Lindberg,
The European Communi ty as a Politicai System: 
Notes Toward thè Construction of a Model 5 Jour­
nal of Common Market Studies 359 (1967) and L . 
Lindberg & S. Scheingold, Europe's Would-be Poli- 
ty: Patterns of Chance in thè European Community
(Prentice Hall, New Jersey, 1970). The limited 
framework here is probably sufficient for our 
purposes since it concentrates on supranational­
ism in its instrumentai facet and not on thè uses 
to which it has been put in thè evolvement of 
substantive policies and thè evaluation thereof. 
The limited framework will also enable me, in thè 
confines of this essay, to flesh it out so that 
it does not remain too abstract.
22. A fully fledged decisional analysis would have to
take separately each single policy, determine thè
factors, forces and actions relevant thereto and
attempt to trace thè decision making process. 
Puchala, note 14 supra at 278, has constructed 
such a model as regards thè agricultural sector. 
Inevitably, this cannot be done here and I have 
to content myself with a generai Community analy-Weiler, Joseph H. H. (1982), Supranational law and the supranational system : legal structure and political process in the 
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sis even if at a great sacrifice of sophistica- 
tion. It is submitted however that thè generai 
Community analysis remains relevant to individuai 
sectors. Naturally I do not claim that this 
framework can achieve precise measurement. It 
fails, thus, one of Deutsch's cruciai tests for 
"theoretically powerful" models. (See K.
Deutseh, The Nerves of Government (The Free Press 
of Glencoe, New York, 1963) Ch. 1.) Stili, as 
providing a rough measuring instrument enabling 
at least thè indications of trends it may be con- 
sidered adeguate for this retrospective analysis. 
Detailed frameworks such as Puchala's, carry thè 
danger of remaining too theoretical and incapable 
of practical applications. Thus, in H. Wallace,
N . Wallace & Webb (eds.), Policv Makinc in thè 
European Community (John Wiley and Sons, London, 
1976) which analyses policy making in specific 
fields, thè authors, including Puchala himself, 
had to adopt less detailed frameworks.
Lindberg, in his "scale of decision locus", note 
21 supra at 356-357, offers a more comprehensive 
breakdown along a ". . . continuum ranging from
decisions taken entirely or almost entirely inWeiler, Joseph H. H. (1982), Supranational law and the supranational system : legal structure and political process in the European Community 
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thè Community system" to "decisions taken entire­
ly by thè national systems individually". The 
full range consists of:
1. Decisions . . . taken entirely in thè
£EC/ system
2. Decisions . . . taken almost entirely in
thè /EC/ system
3. Decisions . . . taken predominantly in
thè European Community system, but thè 
nation states play a significant role in 
decision making
4. Decisions are taken about equally in thè 
European Community system and thè na- 
tion-states
5. Decisions are taken predominantly by thè
nation states, but thè European Communi­
ty system plays a significant role in 
decision making
6 . Decisions are taken almost entirely by 
thè nation states
7. Decisions are taken entirely by thè na­
tion states individually
This model is less useful for us, since its main 
purpose is to determine in relation to a list of 
substantive functions which politicai systems 
fulfil, thè degree to which thè Community is 
"substituting" thè Member States. In legai terms 
its purpose would be to delineate substantive 
Community jurisdiction and competence. It does 
not focus on thè decision making process itself 
and thus its utility here may be questioned.
Since, if there is a measure of truth in thè as- 
sessment " . . .  that thè Council /of Ministers/
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is in fact no longer a Community Institution, 
but only a sort of clearing house for national 
interests, which by using thè principle of una- 
nimity prevents any further progress of thè Eu­
ropean Community" (Aigner, Member of thè Euro­
pean Parliament, Debates of thè European Par- 
liament 10.7.80 p. 290 (English version), then 
in terms of thè instrumentai means of suprana­
tionalism, thè fact that thè locus of decision 
falls within Lindberg's first category, becomes 
less meaningful. Lindberg's "scale of periph- 
eralization-centralization" (drawing on Riker) 
and of systems and subsystems goes some way to­
wards this decisional analysis but is, again, 
too detailed to be of use in a limited survey.
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0 . Self-Executing Measures —  The Doctrine of 
Direct Effect
The first distinguishing feature, or hallmark, of
supranationalism in its early ECSC days was thè power
vested in thè Community's main autonomous institution,
thè High Authority, to adopt self-executing measures
which were directly binding on individuals —  mainly
undertakings in thè coal and steel sectors.-^ Once thè
Treaty of Paris was ratified by thè Member States this
power could be executed regardless of thè monist or
dualist character of thè municipal legai order of thè
Member States. Hitherto, traditional international
organizations had thè powers "... to negotiate agree-
ments ad referendum; ... to take decisions which were
2/binding on thè members— but which would depend on na- 
tional governments for their implementation ... ^and7  
to take decisions which thè organizatior.- itself could 
implement"^ The power of thè Community's High Authority 
directly to bind individuals, subjects of national law, 
was, thus, a major innovation introduced by thè Treaty 
of Paris which was acknowledged in most analyses of that 
period as thè centrai characteristic of thè Community. 
Despite thè novèlty of this feature, at least in modern
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times,— thè international law character of thè Treaty 
of Paris remained largely unaffected, since this mani- 
festation of self-executing rule-making power was 
explicitly agreed upon by thè Member States which 
were signatories to thè Treaty.
Later, however, this first characteristic of 
normative supranationalism was judicially developed 
in relation to thè Treaty of Rome. In a series of 
landmark decisions thè European Court of Justice, 
throughout thè 60's and 70's took this doctrine far 
further than thè limited provisions in thè Treaties.—^
It first held that subject to certain conditions, 
provisions of thè Treaty of Rome —  a Treaty which on 
its face resembled other treaties establishing inter­
national organizations —  could by virtue of their self 
sufficiency (have direct effect) bestowing enforceable 
rights as between individuals and thè Member States.—^ 
Important as this celebrated decision may be in relation 
to thè substantive consequences which would follow in 
respect of all Treaty Articles which could be shown 
to satisfy thè conditions for direct effect, thè main 
interest lies in thè fact that this was thè first major
step in thè "constitutionalization" of thè Treaty of
7 /Rome— —  its transformation by adopting a "constituti­
onal interpretation" method into a quasi-constitution 
of thè supranational entity. Implicit in thè decision
4/
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of thè Court was thè notion that thè Member States were 
bound in their internai legai orders by their Inter­
national treaty obligations. No less revolutionary an 
aspect of thè decision was thè fact that this binding 
characteristicv derived from thè reciprocai acceptance 
of thè Treaty of all Member States, could not subsequently 
be dependent on reciprocai observance. Failure by a 
Member State to fulfil its obligations would lead to a 
remedy under thè Treaty system but could not, in law,
be used as an act which would release other Member States
Also
from their obligations./ thè individuai was put, in 
certain respects, on a par with thè state, a feature 
which usually appears only in municipal law. In other 
words, breach of international obligations, at least 
those which were self-executing and materially capable 
of bestowing rights on individuals, became a matter of 
internai law.
Thus, Member States, vis-à-vis individuals, could 
no longer break their international treaty obligations 
relying on thè weakness of traditional public inter­
national law. This weakness was based in part on thè 
exclusion of thè individuai as a direct subject of rights 
and duties (and of individuai standing to sue) and on thè 
traditional tardiness of states in bringing international 
claims on behalf of individuals when their national 
interest is not involved. The Court's ruling had thus 
another dimension since it gave a new vigilant and effi-
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cient guardian to international obligations —  thè 
individuai.
Since that 1963 decision thè doctrine of direct
effect has been extended, deepened and has become a
generai rule of construction applicable to all Community
law. Important steps in its evolution have been its
extension to create directly enforceable Treaty rights
between individuals i n t e r - s ^  and its application,
step by step, even to types of Community secondary legis-
latìon (e.g., directives) which are addressed to Member
States and which on their face would not suggest thè
possibility of bestowing rights and duties on individu-
9 /als.— The process of refinement continues to date.
The elaboration of this doctrine was absolutely 
fundamental to thè subsequent evolution of thè system and 
can, in many ways^be regarded as its cornerstone. Not 
only, as I have mentioned above, did it signify a new 
attitude by thè Court to thè constituent Treaties. Not 
only would it strengthen thè system of vigilance and 
compliance. But it was also to start an irreversible 
evolutionary process for, as we shall see^it necessitated, 
in combination with thè principle of uniformity which was 
enshrined in thè Treaty (Artide 177 EEC) , thè constru­
ction of thè supremacy principle. And once thè system 
had these twin concepts established it would have to con- 
tend with thè issue of preemption. At an even more prò—
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found level thè coexistence of law creating agencies 
and a principle of direct effect which did not depend 
on reciprocity meant that thè Community order established 
itself as a system of governance akin to munìcipal states 
rather than a source of normative obligations thè execu- 
tion of which would depend in all cases for thè "translation" 
and intermediacy of national governments.
S* The Doctrine of Supremacy
During thè same period thè European Court evolved its
second cruciai doctrine, thè doctrine of supremacy, which,
again, encapsulates a major aspect, in this sphere, of
legai
fully fledged state-federal / systems. In another landmark
1 0 /case, Costa v ENEL,— ' thè Court established a clear
hierarchy of norms. In its view, which, according to thè
Treaty of Rome, is thè authoritative view regarding thè
interpretation of that Treaty, Community law within thè
sphere of competence of thè Community, be it primary or
secondary, is superior to Member State law even if thè
latter is subsequently enacted and of a constitutional
nature. As in thè case of "direct effect" ,the derivation
of supremacy from thè Treaty depended on a "constitutional"
1 1 /rather than international law interpretation.—  The
Court's reasoning that supremacy was enshrined in thè 
Treaty was contested by thè Governments of Member States 
in this case and others. Acceptance of this view amounts
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in effect to a quiet revolution in thè legai orders of
thè Member States. For, in respect of any matter coming
within thè competence of thè Community —  not always an
1 2/easy matter to determine— ' —  thè legai Grundnorm will 
have been effectively shifted, placing Community norms 
at thè top of thè legai pyramid.
It follows that thè evolutionary nature of thè 
doctrine of supremacy would —  necessarily —  be bi- 
dimensional. One dimension would be thè elaboration of 
thè pararneters of thè doctrine by thè European Court.
But full reception thereof, thè second dimension, would 
depend on its incorporation into thè constitutional 
orders of thè Member States and its affirmation by their 
supreme courts. It is relatively easy to trace thè 
evolution of thè Community dimension of thè doctrine.
In thè Costa v ENEL decision, where it was launched, 
thè Court was concerned with thè paradigmatic conflict 
between substantive national and Community law. One may
single out from thè numerous cases in which it was
13/ 14/affirmed thè decisions in Walt Wilhelm— ' and Simmenthal—
as illustrations of subsequent development. In thè
former, thè Court accepted thè possible legitimacy of a
nation having a competing policy operating concurrently
with thè Community policy with each proceeding "... on
15/thè basis of thè considerations peculiar to it".—  Thus 
thè issue was not about thè possible coexistence of con- 
flicting substantive law. But despite thè legitimacy of
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having a parallel national competition policy which thè 
Court did not dispute, thè principle of supremacy required 
that a national court in proceedings before it in cases 
of national competition law must keep an open eye that 
its decisions even in their procedural, civil or penai 
aspects would not prejudice any concurrent Community —  
as yet incomplete —  proceedings.— ^ In thè Simmenthal 
case thè issue was not whether supremacy should exist
but which court, in thè national order, would decide this.
17/The European Court, controversially,— ' but seemingly 
consistently with its earlier jurisprudence, insisted on 
thè immediacy of supremacy so that even national pro­
cedural rules which did not deny thè ultimate supremacy 
of Community law but designated internai procedures as
to thè court in which thè review of thè national legis-
18/lation should take place, were prohibited.— ' This was 
aiming at establishing supremacy not as a question of sub­
stantive conflict but as a principle which would dictate 
thè replacement of national law.
As regards thè second dimension, thè evolutionary 
character of thè process is more complicated. It should 
be remembered that in respect of thè originai Member 
States there was no specific constitutional preparation 
for this European Court inspired development. The 
process of approfondissement may be thus seen in thè 
graduai acceptance of thè doctrine by thè "supreme courts"
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of thè Six. The pattern although uneven is clearly pro­
gressive. In some Member States thè reception of thè
19/principle caused little problems (Benelux)?— ' in others, 
thè Courts accepted thè doctrine with reservations 
regarding either thè procedural implications of thè doc­
trine (Italy) or thè possible incompatibility of Community
law with fundamental human rights enshrined in their
20/constitutions (Italy, Germany).—  Now that thè European
Court has indicated its willingness to review Community
law itself in relation to a "higher law" of human rights
based, in part, on thè common constitutional traditions,
21 /these objections will have been somewhat guelled.—  In
others stili, thè judiciary split, with one branch accepting
22/thè doctrine and thè other refusing it (France).— ' As
regards thè new Member States, especially those with a
written constitution, thè matter was simpler since at thè
time of accession supremacy was already an established
principle and could be regulated formally in thè process of 
23/accession.— ' The U.K. however presented a special
problem since doubts remain as to thè very theoretical
possibility of a shift in thè Grundnorm of thè type dis-
cussed above. The problem derives from thè lack of a
written constitution and thè conceptual difficulty of
entrenching legislation —  such as an Act giving pros-
pective supremacy to Community law —  so as to bind sub-
24/seguent parliaments.— ' The matter is not fully resolved
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since no clear case involving U.K. legislation contra-
dicting earlier Community law has come before thè higher
courts. In those cases in which thè House of Lords
25/occupied itself with Community law—  it has, judiciously, 
avoided making a direct pronouncement on thè subject.
The Court of Appeal under thè tutelage of Lord Denning 
has been less inhibited; its pronouncements —  always 
obiter —  see-sawed but have now settled on a halfway— 
house a c c e p t a n c e ^
So far we have treated thè doctrine of direct effect 
and supremacy as distinct concepts; whereas analytically
—  linked by thè Court's Vision of thè exigencies of a 
cohesive and integrai legai order and its insistence 
on thè principle of uniform interpretation and applica­
tion of Community law —  thè two are tìghtly connected; 
in this sense supremacy is consequential of direct 
effect. Consideration of this connection will highlight 
another aspect of thè evolutive nature of normative 
supranationalism. In Van Gend en Loos thè Commission of 
thè European Communities in its submissions stated that
... analysis of thè legai structure of thè 
Treaty and of thè legai system which it 
establishes shows ... that thè Member 
States ... ^intended/ ... to establish a 
system of Community law and ... that they 
did not wlsh to withdraw thè application 
of this law from thè ordinary jurisdiction 
of thè national courts ,.. ,/that Community 
law7  must be effectively and uniformly
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applied throughout thè whole of thè Community. 
The result is ,.. that thè national courts 
are bound to apply directly thè rules of 
Community law and finally that thè national 
court is bound to ensure that thè rules of 
Community law prevail over conflicting
27/national laws even if they are passed later-i—
By contrast, thè Advocate General in that case argued
against thè extension of direct effect to Treaty articles.
He suggested that such extension —  at a time ln-_which thè
principle of supremacy was not established (and according
to his exhaustive comparative analysis at least in some
Member States Treaty law was decidedly not supreme over
national laws) —  would have thè "... consequences of
an uneven /non-uniform/ development of thè ^substantive^
law involved in thè principle of direct application,
consequences which do not accord with an essential aim
2 8 /of thè Community".—
The Commission and Advocate General reached different 
conclusions in their submissions but were ad idem in 
seeing thè inevitable lìnkage between supremacy and 
direct effect once thè requirement for uniformity was 
acknowledged. It is submitted that thè fact that thè 
Court rejected this cue and preferred to introduce thè 
two concepts into thè Community legai order in two 
separate cases —  even if, inevitably, using thè very 
similar "uniformity" argumentation —  indicated a 
deliberate and politically wise attempt to phase out
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thè progressive evolution of normative supranationalism 
so as to ensure as far as possible a smooth reception 
in thè national legai and politicai orders. The strict 
connection between thè two is evìdent also in Slmmenthal 
where at times it is difficult to teli if thè Court was 
applying thè principle of supremacy or that of direct 
effect.
Both these episodes illustrate thè inevitable logie 
and autonomous dynamism in thè evolution of normative 
supranationalism. Later on we shall examine other, 
external, factors which might have influenced this 
evolution.
29/£. The Principle of Preemption—
It is here that one finds thè third and final 
hallmark of normative supranationalism. In its purest 
and most extreme form preemption means that, in relation 
to fields in which thè Community has policy making 
competence, thè Member States are not only precluded 
from enacting legislation contradictory to Community 
law (by virtue of thè doctrine of supremacy) but they 
are preempted from taking any action at all, Initially, 
before thè full ripening of thè doctrine, thè European 
Court achieved this objective by its decisions which 
forbade thè disguise of thè Community nature of regula- 
tions.— ^ This however was clearly ìnsuffìcient. Sub- 
sequently, thè principle carne to its own even though
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it is stili in an evolutionary stage. The Court of 
Justice is strìving to attain an equilibrium between, 
on thè one hand, thè wìsh to promote thè policy making 
capacity of thè Community (which is at thè essence of 
thè preemption doctrine) and, on thè other hand, thè 
pragmatic necessity of regulation in fields in which 
thè Community has competence but in which —  for various 
reasons such as problems in its decision making processes
—  it has not been able to evolve comprehensive Community 
policies. The Court has felt that in these situations 
thè policy lacunae should be filled by Member State 
action implying a more flexible rendering of thè pure 
preemption principle. In this thè Court will be following 
in thè footsteps of all federai systems, none of which 
apply pure preemption.
This shift in thè Court's formulation may be illustra- 
ted by a number of decisions in thè field of external 
economie relations. Whereas, at first, in thè ERTA Case 
and OECP thè Court emphatically adhered to thè pure
preemption principle, it moderated its stance in thè
later case of Kramer and International Rubber Agreement.
31 /One of thè questions in thè ERTA Case—  was whether thè 
competence to negotiate and conclude an international 
agreement in thè transport field rested in thè Community 
or thè Member States. Since, in its Transport Chapter, 
thè Treaty does not refer specifically to Community com­
petence to engage in international agreements, it was
Weiler, Joseph H. H. (1982), Supranational law and the supranational system : legal structure and political process in the 
European Community 
European University Institute                                                                    DOI: 10.2870/67242
- Sf­
arglieli that such matters were to be left within Member
State powers. In a judgment thè importance of which
goes beyond thè specific question before us, thè Court
laid down an emphatic absolute principle of preemption:
/E/aeh time thè Community, with a view 
to implementing a common policy envisaged 
by thè Treaty, adopts provisions laying 
down common rules, whatever form these may 
take, thè Member States no longer have thè 
right, acting individually or even collec- 
tively, to undertake obligations with third 
countries which affect those rules. As and 
when such rules come into being, thè Com­
munity alone is in a position to assume and 
carry out contractual obligations towards 
third countries affecting thè whole sphere 
of application of thè Community legai system.
In thè OECD byujs,*—  this emphatic statement was even
strengthened v/hereby thè Court said that thè occupation
of a field may be determined even by a mere external act
of thè Community, in thè absence of any formai internai
'policy deferring' measure having preceded it (by thè
external act rather than by an initial internai measure):
A commercial policy is in fact made up by 
thè combination and interaction of internai 
and external measures ... Sometimes agree- 
ments are concluded in execution of a 
policy fixed in advance, sometimes that 
policy is defined by thè agreements them- 
s e l v e s ^
32/
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In thè case of Kramer—  there is a certain retreat from
thè earlier emphatic position in ERTA. The Court stated
that despite thè fact that thè Community had adopted
internai measures, these "... limit themselves to pro-
viding thè Community institutions with thè power to take
measures similar to those which thè Member States ...
did take ... ^T7he Community not yet having fully
exercised its functions in thè matter ... thè Member
States had thè power to assume commitments ... and ...
thè right to ensure thè application of those commitments
3 6 /within thè area of their jurisdiction,"—
On thè wide ERTA formula one may have expected
absolute preemption and yet thè Court in Kramer, mindful
of thè practical difficulties which such an approach
might have had, was more lenient. This leniency was not,
at that stage of thè evolution of thè principle, unquali-
fied. The Court added that this concurrent Member States
3 7/competence was transitional. The Treaties— had stipula- 
ted a deadline for thè Council to adopt a fully fledged 
common policy and thè prospect of adoption could have 
been an alternative explanation to thè Court’s pragmatic 
approach.
38/In thè International Rubber Agreement —  thè
Court accepted concurrent jurisdiction of thè Member States 
in a field "occupied" by thè Community 'Yi/f •.. thè 
financing (of thè agreement in question) is to be by thè 
Member States". The Court acknowledged however that as,
35 /
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unlike Kramer ".,, no formai decision has been taken on 
thè question /as to whether thè Community of Member 
States should finance thè agreement, and as? there is 
no certainty as regards thè attitude of thè various
Member States.... The exclusive competence of thè Com-
3 9/munity could not be envisaged in such a case.— Here 
we find a retreat even in respect of a policy thè Com­
munity exclusiveness of which was already established. 
This pragmatic approach was accepted even without thè 
definite future prospect of a common policy, and in 
generai this approach was to replace thè purist principle 
evoked in ERTA. A pragmatic approach implies inevitably 
more difficulties in thè determination of parameters and 
in thè application thereof. Only through successive 
court decisions will these be clarified.
On its face then it would seem that in relation to 
thè principle of preemption there has been a retardation 
rather than a deepening of thè scope of thè principle 
in thè Community legai order. For, in thè terminology 
aptly adopted by Professor Waelbroeck, there seems to 
have been a shift by thè Court from a "Conceptualist- 
federalist approach" which corresponds to preemption 
in its purest and most exclusive form to a "pragmatic 
approach" which leaves thè Member States concurrent 
competence with thè Community. It should first be 
pointed out that in its second approach thè Court has
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displayed, characteristically, a measure of politicai
acumen. To insist on pure preemption when thè Community
institutions are not yet ready for their task could be
retrogressive for thè generai evolution of thè Community.
At thè same time thè Court has insisted that in certain
cases thè pragmatic approach is transitory in nature.
With thè full occupation of a field by a Community
policy, national measures (even if not contradictory
and thus not in violation of thè supremacy principle)
could become prohibited per se. In other cases con-
current jurisdiction may remain Constant. The appro-
fondissement of preemption may thereby be explained in
two ways. First, by its maturing from a crude even
dogmatic statement of pure principle to a relatively
sophisticated doctrine sensitive to Community needs.
Secondly, preemption is seen to be spreading from one
substantive field of Community law to another. It now
affects sectors such as fisheries, competition policy
40/and agriculture.—
fi. The Evolution of Normative Supranationalism -- An 
Iterim Assessment
The evolution of normative supranationalism has been 
both determined and rapid and, until recently, largely 
consistent. The moving force behind it, as we have seen, 
has been thè European Court of Justice, thè self perception
Weiler, Joseph H. H. (1982), Supranational law and the supranational system : legal structure and political process in the 
European Community 
European University Institute                                                                    DOI: 10.2870/67242
- s s -
of its role in thè process of integration being thè 
key to understanding thè development. As a supreme 
adjudicator in a non-unitary system in which inherent 
tensions exist between centrai institutions and thè 
constituent member states, thè Court of Justice had thè 
choice between two different visions of its role.
Artide 164 EEC which charges thè Court with ensuring 
"... that in thè interpretation and application of </th§ 7  
Treaty thè law is observed" may indicate a Vision in 
which thè Court would be cast as an aloof and remote 
arbiter decidedly detached from thè national-Community 
conflicts related to supranationalism and European inte­
gration. According to this Vision thè role of thè Court 
could even be to prevent thè normative evolution unless 
specifically agreed upon by thè Member States. The 
entire jurisprudence of thè Court of Justice represents 
a rejection of this approach, and, not surprisingly,
it has come under acute criticism for this. Thus, in
41 /a criticai even if sympathetic article, Hamson,—  
implicitly adopting thè restrictive view based on Article 
164, charged thè Court in relation to thè Van Gend en Loos 
case and its progeny of severing "... thè legai world
—  thè world in which it operates —  from thè world of 
what we called reai or actual events", of "short-circuit- 
/ing7 thè scheme elaborated in thè Treaty" and warned of 
thè danger of thè Court trespassing "... outside its 
province and ^attempting/ to establish by its own fiat
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what thè Treaty directs to be established by a very
42/different process".— '
Although it is clear that thè Court has not remained 
aloof in interpreting thè Treaty and has taken a decidedly 
integrationalist approach, even Hamson has been careful 
not to charge thè Court of actually overstepping thè 
limits of th.e powers conferred upon it by thè Treaty.
The first question that has to be answered nevertheless 
is whether thè integrationalist approach adopted by thè 
Court is juridically legitimate within thè scheme of thè 
Treaty.
The key to answering this question and to under- 
standing thè Court's own vision of its role —  which 
contrasts sharply with thè narrow interpretation of 
Artide 164 —  must be found in thè Preamble and Part One 
of thè Treaty dealing with thè principles upon which thè 
Community is founded. The Preamble and Articles 1-2-3 
declare thè main objectives of thè founding fathers and 
delineate thè specific tasks to be pursued, and means 
to be employed in attaining these objectives. Thus we 
find, as thè first provision in thè Preamble, thè ob- 
jective of laying down foundations for an ever closer 
union among thè peoples of Europe, in Artide 2 thè task, 
inter alia, of establishing a Common Market and in Artide
3 thè elimination of custom duties. For our purposes
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Artide 4 is of importance, It provides that thè tasks 
entrusted to thè Community (namely thè provisions indica- 
ted generally in thè Preamble and outlined more specifi~ 
cally in Articles 2 and 3) shall be carried out by thè 
Assembly (Parliament), thè Council, thè Commission and 
thè Court, each institution acting within thè limits of thè 
powers conferred upon it by thè Treaty. It is clear that 
thè Court, within its powers and while faithful not only 
to thè Treaty but also to thè generai fundamental guaran- 
tees of due process and justice has conceived its charge 
alongside thè other institutions with forwarding thè 
tasks entrusted to thè Community. In Van Gend en Loos, 
thè Court can be seen as taking its philosophy from 
Article 4 to which Article 164 is subordinate, Van Gend 
en Loos is a speclfic case which links thè elements of 
uniting thè peoples of Europe (Preamble), establishing 
a Common Market (Article 2) and eliminating custom duties 
(Article 3) in one maverick doctrine which simultaneously 
achieved all three effects. The entire pattern of 
decisions creating thè normative framework represents 
a grand design to achieve thè same effect.
It is probable however that whatever textual mani- 
pulation we may use to explain thè Court's ethos, thè 
true motivation lies in thè Court's politicai self per- 
ception. The normative design does represent a qualita-
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tive leap, Indeed in some pre~1963 analyses of thè
system thè lack of supremacy and direct effect were per-
4 2a/ceived as naturai,---' But without these princxples it
was unlikely that a Community which envisaged a wide 
and detailed substantive programmatic evolution could 
ever evoke or, more crucially, become effective. It 
is in this commitment to effectiveness that is probably 
at thè root of thè judicial revolution. This however 
does not preclude us from pointing out thè implications 
of this perception according to which thè Court "regards 
itself as thè trustee of thè hopes and aspirations, thè
purposes and thè objectives of thè founders of thè Com-
43/muni ty. . . " . — '
The Court was able —  at least for a time —  to 
maintain thè momentum of normative evolution because of 
thè traditional insulation which separates courts from 
direct pressures from thè other politicai actors. The 
very vision adopted by thè Court —  a vlsion which, in 
thè wide sense, gives it a measure of partisanship 
in thè Community-Member State tensions —  has thè 
possible effect of eroding thè traditional insulation 
and diminishing thè authorìty with which thè Court may 
speak. This in turn may lead to a curtailment of thè 
Court's power to preserve and even continue thè process 
of normative evolution. This interrelationship between
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tile judicial process and thè politicai process will 
be discussed in thè light of thè analysis of decisional 
supranationalism.
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1. Articles 14f 15 ESC, Interestingly, thè
Sgìlìnnan_Dg£2aration merely states: "Par la
mise en commun de productions de base et
1 1institution d'une Haute Autorité nouvelle, 
dont les décisions lieront la France, l'Allemagne 
..." indicating decisions binding on states and 
not in states. The formai supranational leap 
was effected by thè actual Treaty framers who 
gave thè High Authority power to adopt measures 
directly effective in thè legai order of thè 
Member States. For analysis see Robertson,
Legai Problems of European Integration 91 R£C 
105 (1957).
2. Decisions binding on members may be taken by UN
organs see, e .g ., £harter_of_UN, eh. VII. For
Commentary, see Y. Dinstein, >
voi. 5 pp. 53-57 (Schocken, Tel-Aviv, 1979).
3. Robertson, note 1 supra,
4. See note 1 Chapter 7, Religious law —  especially
where given exclusive jurisdiction in, say,
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fami ly matters —  may be regarded as supra­
national in this sense, The Catholic Church 
could therefore be regarded in old and modern 
times as being in this sense supranational.
5. The literature on thè doctrine is immense. For 
a lucid up-to-date statement see, e.g., D. Wyatt 
and A. Dashwood, The Substantive Law of thè EEC 
eh.3 (Sweet and Maxwell 1980); J. Usher, European 
Community Law and National Law (G. Alien & Unwin 
1981) at 17-3Q. For earlier studies which fore- 
shadowed and perhaps even influenced developments 
see, Waelbroeck in Miscellanea W.J. Ganshof Van Per 
Meersch, Tome Deuxième (Bruylant 1972) 573. Bebr
(1 97Q) 1 9 ICLQ 257 .
6 . Case 26/62 Van Gend en Loos v Nederlandse Admini- 
straitie der Belastingen ^1963/ EìCaB* 1-
7. The main operative part of thè judgment is so 
well known as to render citation almost super- 
fluous. For thè benefit of non-Europeans, thè 
following are thè key elements in tie judgment:
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«The objective of thè EEC Treaty, which is 
to establish a Common Market, thè functioning 
of which is of direct concern to interested 
parties in thè Community, implies that this 
Treaty is more than an agreement which merely 
creates mutuai obligations between thè con- 
tracting states. This view is confirmed 
by thè preamble to thè Treaty which refers 
not only to Governments but to peoples.
It is also confirmed more specifically by 
thè establishment of institutions endowed 
with sovereìgn rights, thè exercise of which 
affects Member States and also their citizens. 
Furthermore, it must be noted that thè nati- 
onals of thè States brought together in thè 
Community are called upon to cooperate in 
thè functioning of this Community through 
thè intermediary of thè European Parliament 
and thè Economie and Social Committee....
This confirms that thè States have acknow- 
ledged that Community law has an authority 
which can be invoked by their nationals 
before those courts and tribunals.... The 
conclusion to be drawn from this is that 
thè Community constitutes a new legai order 
of international law for thè benefit of 
which thè states have limited their sovereign 
rights, albeit within limited fields, and 
thè subjects of which comprise not only 
Member States but also their nationals
at 12* For thè process of constitutionalization
in generai, see Stein, 75  ^ (1981).
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In Case 127/73 Belgische Radio en Televisie v 
SABAM ,/T9747 EUC. R m 51 , thè European Court held 
that Artìcles 85 and 8 6 EEC were capable of 
bestowing rights and duties on individuals inter 
se. It should be noted however that these Treaty 
articles themselves involved actions of individu­
als. Cf. case 13/61 Bosch v de Geus /?962/
=£===• which this development is already
anticipated. (See Wyatt_and_Dasfcwogd, note 5 
supra, at 29-30.) The doctrine was evolved 
further in a subsequent case which was concerned 
with thè generai principle embodied in Artide 7 
EEC (non-discrimination on grounds of nationality) 
and which, unlike SABAM, did not
necessarily involve individuals. Even thè Com­
mission —  usually very integrationalist minded
—  doubted whether this Treaty principle should 
be given "horizontal effect". The Court took thè 
radicai position and held that thè Treaty could 
indeed bestow rights and duties on individuals 
inter se: Case 36/7 4 Walrave and Koch v Associa-
tion Union Cycliste Internationale 1*974/ •
1405. See also Case 43/75 Defrenne v Sabena
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9. It is not propoaed to discuss here thè well
known distinction between direct applicabilìty 
and direct effect, (See, e .g., Winter’s 
seminai Direct Applicabllity and Direct Effect,
Two Distinct and Different Concepts in Community 
Law, 9 • 425 (1 972) and Usher, supra,
n.5, at 18, 26-3Q. The extension of direct 
effect to directives was remarkable. Whereas 
Regulations by yirtue of Article 189 EEC are 
directly applicable and thus inevitably,if self 
executing, produce —  by analogy to thè reasoning 
of thè Court in relation to Treaty provisions —  
automatic direct effect, directives are only 
binding as to thè result but leave to thè national 
authorities thè choice of form and method. It 
may then have been thought that they could not 
produce direct effect. See Joseph Alm and Société 
SPAD v L 1Administration des douanes ^1972/
9 0 1 . The Court of Justice, in a step- 
by-step approach, has applied thè doctrine even 
though subject to possible different structural
conditions ----------------^ to directives as well.
Cases signalling this evolution are: Case 9/7Q
Franz Grad v Finanzamt Traunstein ^197(1/
825 (direct effect of a time limit in a directive
—  "vertical" effect); Case 41/74 Van Duyn v
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Koinè Office £1 974/ |LQ±B, 1337 (direct effect of 
a substantive provision of a directive but one
which elaborated a substantive right bestowed
by thè Treaty —  "vertical" effect); Case 51/76 
Verbond van Nederlandese Ondernemjpgen v Inspect&r
der Invoerrechten en Accijnzen £1 971J . 113
(direct effect of a substantive provision of 
directive concerning an obligation not directly 
bestowed by thè Treaty and against which a national 
implementing measure was reviewed —  "vertical" 
effect); Cf„ Case 21/78 Delkvlst /T978/
2327 (Directive as source of judicial review).
On thè possible extension of "horizontal" direct 
effect to directives see Easson, Can Directives 
Impose Obligations on Individuals 4 67
(1 979). But see now Case 1 48/78 Ratti ^1*9797 
EaC^B. 1 629 (Advocate General submissions) and Case Becker
268 (1 979); see also Timmermans, Directives: Their
Effect within thè National Legai Systems 16 C.M.L.Rev.533 (1979) 
in Ratti and more directly in Becker thè Court has retreated sane- 
what frcm its wide doctrine and accepts direct effect of directives 
only as a shield against a non-implementing Member State.
10. Case 6/64 Costa v ENEL /T9647 E^g^g. 585. With 
thè same reservations expressed in note 7 supra 
thè following are thè main operative elements in 
thè judgment:
k j l Usher, The Direct Effect of Directives Ej.Lj._BfY-
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By contrast with ordinary international 
treaties, thè EEC Treaty has created its 
own legai system which, on thè entry into 
force of thè Treaty, became an integrai part 
thè legai system of thè Member States and 
which their courts are bound to apply. By 
creating a Community of uniimited duration, 
having its own institutions, its own persona- 
lity, its own legai capacity and capacity of 
representation on thè International piane 
and, more particularly, reai powers stemming 
from a limìtation of sovereignty or a trans­
fer of powers from thè States to thè Commu­
nity, thè Member States have limited their 
sovereign rights, albeit within limited fields, 
and have thus created a body of law which 
binds both their nationals and themselves.
The integration into thè laws of each Member 
State of provisions which derive from thè 
Community, and more generally, thè terms and 
thè spirit of thè Treaty, make it impossible 
for thè States, as a corollary, to accord 
precedence to a unilateral and subsequent 
measure over a legai system accepted by them 
on a basis of reciprocity. Such a measure 
cannot therefore be inconsistent with that 
legai system. The executive force of Commu­
nity law cannot vary from one State to another 
in deference to subsequent domestic laws 
without jeopardizing thè attainment of thè 
objectives of thè Treaty set out in article 
5(2 ) and giving rise to thè discrimination 
prohibited by article 7
at 593-594.
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11. Another important instance of constitutional 
interpretation occurred in Case 38/69 Commission 
v Italian Republlc ^197Q/ SìCaE» 56 in relation 
to Community "secondary" legislation, The 
Italian Government argued that a certain internai 
Community measure (pursuant to Article 235 EEC 
and accelerating thè realization of thè Common 
Market) had a contract basis as between thè 
Member States and constituted an international 
agreement to which even reservations could be 
made. The Court gave short shrift to thè argu- 
ment upholding thè institutional rather than 
contractual nature of Community measures.
12. Here, of course, we have one of thè most intract-
able problems of Community law. The Treaty of 
Rome is in many of its provisions fairly generai 
lending itself to expansive teleological inter­
pretation by thè Court. This coupled with certain 
"elastic" clauses (e.g., Art. 235 EEC) gives a 
wide measure of latitude to thè policy making 
organs to extend thè boundaries of Community 
competence. Often this meets with national resist- 
ance. Cf. Close, Harmonization of Laws: Use or
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Abuse of thè Powers under thè EEC Treaty? 3 
E±Li=EiY- 461 (1 978),
13. Case 14/68 Walt Wilhelm and Others v Bundeskartel- 
lamt ^1969/ ECR 1. This is an ambiguous case.
See, e.g., Korah, (1981) 6 . 14, 26 and
n. 50.
14. Case 106/77 Italian Finance Administration v
Simmenthal ^1978/ 629.
15. Recital 3 of Judgment,
16. Recitals 7-9 of Judgment.
17. See, P^_Barile (ed.) Il_Primato_del_Diritto 
Comunitari,o_e_I_Siudici_Italiani (Franco Angeli,
Milano, 1978).
18. The case involved, naturally, a combination of 
direct effect and supremacy issues. In relation
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to supremacy thè court stated in Recitals 17-23 
that
In accordance with thè principle of precedence 
of Community law, thè relationship between 
provisions of thè Treaty and directly appli- 
cable measures of thè institutions on thè one 
hand and thè national law of thè Member States 
on thè other is such that those provisions and 
measures not only by their entry into force 
render automatically inapplìcable any con- 
flicting provision of current national law 
but —  in so far as they are an integrai part 
of, and take precedence in, thè legai order 
applicable in thè territory of each of thè 
Member States —  also preclude thè valid 
adoption of new national legislative measures 
to thè extent to which they would be incom- 
pativel with Community Provisions.... </È7very 
national court must, in a case within its 
jurisdiction, apply Community law in its 
entirety and protect rights which thè latter 
confers on individuals and must accordingly 
set aside any provisions of national law which 
may conflict with it, whether prior or sub- 
sequent to thè Community rule. Accordingly 
any provision of a national legai system and 
any legislative, administrative or judicial 
practice which might impair thè effectiveness 
of Community law by withholdlng from thè 
national court having jurisdiction to apply 
such law thè power to do everything necessary 
at thè moment of its application to set aside 
national legislative provisions which might
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prevent Community rules from having full 
force and effect are incompatible with those 
requirements which are thè very essence of 
Community law. This would be thè case in thè 
event of a conflict between a provision of a 
Community law and a subsequent national law 
if thè solution of thè conflict were to be 
reserved for an authority with a dxscretion 
of its own, other than thè court called upon 
to apply Community law, even if such an im- 
pediment to thè full effectiveness of Com­
munity law were only temporary
(emphasis supplied).
The controversy is mainly with Italian doctrine. 
For an uncompromising but sophisticated statement 
of thè Italian positionjsee Sorrentino, 'Lo 
Sviluppo della Forma di Governo Italiana nella 
Giurisprudenza della Corte in Materia Communi- 
taria', in Convegno sulla Corte Costituzionale e 
Sviluppo della Forma di Governo Italiana (Mimeo, 
Univ. degli Studi di Firenze, Facoltà di Giuris­
prudenza, 1981 ) .
The Italian system whereby any question of con­
flict between Community law and national law 
becomes a constitutional issue, resolution of 
which must be left to thè Constitutional Court 
itself (Case 205/76 of 4,8,76 /T97§7 99 II Foro 
Italiano /Foro It7 2299 may be criticized in terms 
of its own internai efficìency. It resembles
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thè sad story of thè Mexican Amparo and thè 
"degeneration" of an important constitutional 
mechanism in that legai order. See M. Cappelletti, 
Judlcial Review in thè Contemporary World (Bobbs- 
Merrill 1971) 20-21. Note, however, that according 
to Italian doctrine even if a national court were 
to declare thè non-applicability of a Community 
norm —  this decision would not have erga omnes 
effect. Italian doctrine refuses to accept that 
in matters of Community law thè European Court 
has a position similar to its Supreme Constitu­
tional Court.
From thè point of view of European law, thè 
European Court's decision contains a possible 
ambiguity since, as seen, its ruling is applicable 
to a "... national court having jurisdiction to 
apply such law..,". It could possibly be argued 
thatin cases of conflict thè lower national court, 
by virtue of thè decision of thè Italian Constitu­
tional Court, has no such jurisdiction. Since 
thè jurisdictional competence of courts is usually 
a raatter for thè national legai order, thè Court 
of Justice could not interfere in this matter any 
more than if certain lower courts were denied 
jurisdiction over matters involving a large sum 
of money even if concerned with Community law.
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See generally, Bebr (197 4) 11 CMLRev 3 and 
R. Plender and J. Usher, Cases and Materials of 
thè European Communities (Macmillan 1980) 173-220» 
In thè Netherlands and Luxemburg, havi'ng a monist 
system which acknowledges thè supremacy of treaty 
law, acceptance was not difficult. (See Articles 
63 and 65, 6 6 , 67 of thè Dutch Constitutìon.) 
Application of thè European Court1s decision in, 
say, Van Gend~en~Loos was in fact non-problematic. 
As regards Luxemburg see Pescatore, Prééminence 
des traités sur la loi interne selon la juris- 
prudence Luxeirtbourgeoise </19537 Journal_des 
4 55.
In Belgium, thè situation was constitutionally 
ambiguous until thè landmark decision of thè 
Belgian Cour de Cassation in thè Le Ski Case 
1^ 9727 373 in which thè Belgian Supreme
Court adopted thè most full-blooded version of 
supremacy as required by thè European Court.
Cf. Artide 25 bis of Constitution (1 970) and 
profound discussion by Louis in Mélanges Fernand 
Dehousse (Fernand Nathan/Editions Labor 1979) 
235-242, The question of a Community provision 
coming into direct conflict with norms of thè 
Belgian (and French) Constitution arose in a 
recent decision —  Case 149/79 Commission v 
Kingdom of Belgium decision of 17*12.80 (not yet
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reported), The Court remitted thè case back to 
thè partìes for further clarification before 
final resolution. The Belgian government in 
its pleading did not deny that Community rules 
override national rules but suggested that in 
interpreting thè meaning of a term in thè Treaty 
(in that case "public Service") thè Court should 
use an approximation of thè Constitutional law 
of thè Member States as an interpretative aid.
2Q. This was thè case in Germany and Italy. For 
Italy see n.17 supra and "Italian Frontini*
Case /T9747 2 CMLR 386. For Germany see,
German Handelsgesellschaft Case /1 9 7 4/ 2 CMLR 
551 (Decisions of 29.5.1974 BVerfG 37; 271).
For a useful discussion on thè implìcations of 
this case see H^G^_S£Ììgrmgrs, Judicial_Protection
(Kluwer, Deventer, 
1979) pp. 92-97. Note that thè German Federai 
Constitutional Court was concerned with consti­
tutional safeguards as regards legislation; thè 
supremacy challenge was only indirect. Otherwise, 
thè German Federai Constitutional Court has fully 
accepted thè supremacy of Community law even over 
subsequent national law —  see, German Lutticke
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Case, Bundesverfassungsgericht decision of June 
9, 1971 ^T97l7 AWD, 418-420 (BverfG 31; 145).
The German Federai Constìtutional Court has 
rejected thè possibìlity of Verfassungsbeschwerde 
(constìtutional coinplaints) as agaìnst acts of 
thè Community authorities limiting this type of 
recourse to action by German publìc authorities.
See German Constitutional Rights case, Bundes- 
verfassungsgericht decision of October 18,1967 
(/T9677 AWD 477 (BVerfG 22; 293); and note in 5 
g^LEgy 483 (1967-68).
21. However, unless thè German Federai Constitutional
Court modifies its own position (cf. now BVerfG
decision of July 25, 1 979, 1 5 6 8 ,
(1 980) 2 531) thè conflict cannot be fully
resolved until thè Community has a written bill
of rights which corresponds to thè guarantees
of thè German basic law. Another condition which
thè German Federai Constìtutional Court imposed,
which has been only partially fulfilled is thè 
evidence of a democratically legitimated Parliament 
directly elected by generai suffrage (which now exìsts)
which possesses legislative powers and to which
thè Community organs empowered to legislate are 
fully responsible on a politicai level. Whereas
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thè demand for a codified hill of rights may 
not be unreasonable thè latter demand is fanciful 
and fails to appreciate thè politicai nature and 
politicai potential of thè Community. It is 
doubtful whether thè Parliament will ever get 
full legislative powers. It can hope perhaps 
for co-decision powers, The Councìl of Ministers 
will not —  unless fundamental changes in thè 
Treaty take place —  be subject to politicai 
control by thè European Parliament.
22. See generally, Weiss ^19797 1 Legal_Is,gugs_o,f
Sa£2SSia=iflìS3£IÌÌSB 51 . The French Cour
de Cassation (Chambre Mixte) accepted thè doctrine 
in thè celebrated case Administration des Douanes 
v La Société "Cafés Jacques Vabre" S .A . (1975) 2
Q4LE 33 6 . The Court reliea however on Artide 55 
of thè French Constitution which gives Treaty 
provisions (subject to certain conditions, esp. 
reciprocity) a force higher than French statutes 
even those subsequently enacted. This reasoning 
does not amount then to full acceptance of thè 
shift in thè Grundnorm. It should be noted that 
Procureur Général Touffait had explicitly re- 
quested, in relation to Artide 55 of thè French
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Constitution, that thè Court should not "... 
mention it and instead base /its? reasoning on 
thè very nature of thè legai order instituted 
by thè Rome Treaty". This thè Court implicitly 
declined to do. In a subsequent case, however, 
Clave Bouhaten von Kempis v Geldolf (Eusband and 
Wife) /1976/ 2 Q^LE 152 thè 3rd civil chamber 
arguably "... did take thè plunge .,." (March- 
Hunnings, Rivai Constitutional Courts: A Comment
on Case 106/77 15 £^LB§¥ 483 at 484 (1978) and 
accepted thè doctrine without reference to Artide 
55 of thè French Constitution. The Criminal 
Chamber of thè Cour de Cassatìon has also been 
Community minded —  see, Administration des Contri- 
butions Indirectes v Ramel </197iy CMLR 357; and 
Republic v Von Saldern et al. noted in 10 CMLRev 223 
(1971). By contrast thè Conseìl d'Etat has, basing 
itself on somewhat antiquated notions of separation 
of powers, refused thè acceptance of thè supremacy 
principle as applied to parlìamentary "loi". The 
doctrine would probably apply to governmental 
decrees (cf. Cohn-Bendit case, note 16, Introduction, 
supra) . See Syndicat Général des Fabricants de Semoules
/T9707 £MLB 395. See also, Syndicat des importeurs 
de vgtements et produits artisanaux C.E. 28.5.1979,
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and C.E, 22,10,79 ^1980/ Actualité Juridigue 
Droit Administratif 95, On thè ambiguous 
position of thè French Constìtutional Court, 
see Mitchell, What Happened to thè Constitution 
on 1st January 1 973? 2 Caxnbrian_L^Rey. 69
(1980) at 78-79 and notes therein. See also 
Kovar & Simon, Some Reflections on thè Decision 
of thè French Constitutional Councìl of December
30, 1 976 1 4 525 (1 977).
23. Ireland actually ìntroduced a Constitutional
amendment —  see Article 29, Thìrd amendment to 
Irish Constitution of 1972. And see Temple-Lang, 
Legai and Constitutional Implications for Ireland 
of Adhesion to thè EEC Treaty 9 CMLRev 16 7 (197 2), 
The Danish Constitution already had a provision 
of delegation of powers to international organiza- 
tions (Article 20 of Danish Constitutions). But 
see, Due and Gulman Constitutional Implications of 
thè Danish Accession to thè European Communities 9 
QMLBev 456 (1972) analyzing thè debate as to thè 
possibility of Danish compliance with thè principle 
of supremacy especially vis-à-vis constitutional 
provisions (at 265-267). There have been very few 
references from Denmark to thè European Court so 
that thè matter is stili judicially open. See
Weiler, Joseph H. H. (1982), Supranational law and the supranational system : legal structure and political process in the 
European Community 
European University Institute                                                                    DOI: 10.2870/67242
-  i o S
Rasmussen, Survey of Cases. 4 E^Rgv 484 (1 979), 
For Greece see Everigenis (19.80) 17 CMLRev 157,
24. See e.g,, Wintertorn, The Brltish Gjrundnorm:
Parliamentary Supremacy Re-examined 92 LQR 5 9.1 
(1976). But see Mitchell, note 22 supra.
25, In thè most recent case —  indeed thè fi'rst case 
in which thè House itself niade a reference under 
Artide 177 —  R. v Henn & Darby ^T980/ 2 WLR 597 
their Lordships did not raise directly thè question 
of supremacy. They did however accept thè duty 
to refer and by implication thè binding authority 
of Community law as interpreted by thè European 
Court, Note however that in any event this case 
was not concerned with British legislation sub- 
sequent to Community law, See, Faull, Moralité 
publique et libre circulation des produits 4 
446 (1980); Weiler, Europornography, First 
Reference of thè House of Lords to thè ECJ, 44 
91 (1 981 ) .
26. Lord Denning's judicial statements have so oscil- 
lated that they must now be taken with a measure
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of caution, In BXackburn v A.Gt 2
&11EB 1380 he saìd "We have all been brought up 
to believe that ±n legai theory, one Parliament 
cannot bind another and that no Act (such as 
thè European Communities Act, Sections 2 and 3 
of which sought to entrench thè supremacy of 
Community lav) is irreversihle . . , if Parliament 
should /try and revoke thè Act7, then I say we 
will consider that event when it happens" at 
1382. It would seem thus that he was acknow- 
ledgìng that thè sovereignty principle was a 
legai rule which could be changed by thè Courts 
and that in thè case of thè Treaty of Rome that 
possibility of Grundnorm shift was not excluded.
By contrast in Felixstowe Dock and Railway Co.
v British Transport Docks Board /197 6/ 2 £^LB 
655 he stated "It seems to me that once a Bill 
is passed by Parliament and becomes a statute, 
that will dispose of all this discussion about 
thè Treaty. These courts will then have to abide 
by thè Statute without regard to thè Treaty at 
all" at 664. In two subsequent cases his state- 
ments became more subtle. Thus in Shields v E . 
Coomes (Holdings) Ltd. /1979/ 1 £Ì1ER 456 he made 
thè following hypothesis:
"Suppose that thè Parliament of thè United
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Kingdom were to pass a statute inconsistent with 
article 119 /dealing with equal pay for women/ 
by giving thè right to equal pay only to an- 
married women, I should have thought that a 
married woman could bring an action in thè High 
Court to enforce thè right to equal pay given to 
her by article 119... If /thè courts7 should 
find any ambìguìty in thè statutes or any incon- 
sistency with Community law, then /It7 should 
resolve it by giving thè primacy to Community 
law"
at p.4 60. This may look like acceptance of supremacy
but Denning was careful to choose a sìtuation of
inconsistency rather than conflict that is where thè
Community provision extended British law and did not
directly conflict with it. But in Macarthys Ltd. v
Smith 1^*97 97 3 3 25 , he stated that filling thè
gaps in this way was on thè assumption
"... that our Parliament, whenever it passes 
legislation, intends to fulfil its obligations 
under thè Treaty. If thè time should come when 
our Parliament deliberately passes an Act with 
thè intention of repudiating thè Treaty or any 
provision in it or intentionally of acting incon- 
sistently with it and says so in express terms 
then I should have thought that it would be thè
duty of our courts to follow thè statute of our
Parliament. I do not however envisage any such 
situation. As I said in Blackburn v. Attorney- 
General: ’But if Parliament should do so, then
I say we will consider tht event when it happens,' 
Unless there is such an ìntentional and express
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repudiation of thè Treaty, it is our duty to 
give priority to thè Treaty"
(at 329) . With which Lawton LJ agreed,
The third judge (who subsequently retracted somewhat:
cf. </T980/ 3 at 949) said "If thè ternis of thè
Treaty are adjudged Luxembourg to be ìnconsistent
with thè provisions of thè Equal Pay Act 197Q,
European law will prevail over that municipal legis-
lation." I.e., adopting a supremacy position although
not in relation to subsequent legislatìon, This
position does not change in thè lìght of thè final
decision of thè court of appeal once thè reference
from Luxembourg was received, Denning said then /19807
3 WLB 94 7 at 94 9:
"... It is important now to declare —  and it 
must be made plain —  that thè provisions of 
article 119 of thè E.E.C. Treaty take priority 
over anything in our Englìsh statute on equal 
pay which is Ìnconsistent with article 119. That 
priority is given by our own law. It is given 
by thè European Communities Act 1972 itself. 
Community law is now part of our law: and,
whenever there is any inconsistency, Community 
law has priority. It is not supplanting English 
law. It is part of our law which overrides any 
other part which is Ìnconsistent with it"
and
",,. Community law is part of our law by our 
own statute, thè European Communities Act 1972.
In applying it, we should regard it in thè same
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way as if we found an inconsistency between two 
English Acts of Parliament: and thè court had to
decide which had to be given priority."
Denning could be read to be saying that thè 1972 Euro­
pean Communities Act is no more or less than any 
other Act and that supremacy in this case is simply 
a result of it being enacted after thè 197 0 Equal Pay 
Act which was at issue (although several provisions 
were reenacted in thè 1975 Act).
A leading authority summarizes thè situation thus;
(1) While thè European Communities Act 1972 
remains in force, existing directly applicable 
or effective Community law will be thè law in 
thè United Kingdom, notwithstandìng any legis- 
lation prior to thè Act which is inconsistent 
with such directly applicable or effective law;
(2) Community law which is not directly applica­
ble or effective will have no force in thè United 
Kingdom until given effect by Act of Parliament 
or by order or regulation enacted pursuant to 
powers given by thè European Communities Act 1972 
or other legislation;
(3) Directly applicable or effective Community 
law will take effect in thè United Kingdom, not- 
withstanding any legislation prior to thè 1972 
/European Communities? Act, or even after thè Act 
but prior to thè coming into effect of thè Commu­
nity rule :
(4) A subsequent Act of Parliament which is 
inconsistent with a rule of Community law will be 
read subject to thè rule of construction in s. 2(4)
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so that Community law can take effect notwith- 
standing thè Act, at any rate if thè Court is 
satisfìed that thè subsequent inconsistent 
legislation is not intended, expressly or 
impliedly, to repeal s. 2(1) pr. (4) of thè 1972 
/^European Communities/ Act; but
(5) Any subsequent Act of Parliament inconsistent 
with thè European Communities Act 1972, ìncluding 
one which repeals thè latter in whole or in part 
and one which is intended to limit thè applica­
tion of s, 2(1) and (4), will be given effect by 
thè United Kingdom courts.
Eurgeean Community_Lay_j;B_ t&e_LU K. (But- 
terworths, London, 1980) at pp. 25-26.
27. Note 6 supra at p.7 (emphasis supplied).
28. Id. at pp. 23-24.
29. I am most indebted here to a paper delivered by
Professor M. Waelbroeck at a conference held in
Bellagio, Italy in July 1979 entitled Community
Preemption and Related Problems on which I have 
relied extensively in this part. See also
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£ijìii£§_§£=§ì• (eds , ) Leading_Cases_ggd_Matg:g4glg_Qg 
the_Law_gf _ ^ g_EuroBean_Communities (Kluwer, Deventer, 
1 97 7 at 88-95) and Loui's (1 979) 2 Revue d ’integration 
Européenne 355.
30. Thereby indirectly prohibiting national legislation 
even if compatìble in fields already occupied by a 
regulation. See e.g., Case 34/73 Variola /19737 ECR 
990; Case 39/72 Commission v Italy /T973? ECR 113.
See also Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v 
Ditte Fratelli Grassi e Greco Rocco Michele /1 976/
I Giurisprudenza Costituzionale 1292.
31. Case 22/70 Commission v Council /197V SQS 273.
32. Recitals 17-18 of Judgment p. 274.
33. Opinion 1/75 /T975? |QE 1335,
34. Id. at 1363, Note however that unlike ERTA where
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competence in relation to transport, thè OECD case 
fell within thè commercial policy which. has such 
provisions,
35. Joìned cases 3f 4 and 6/76, Cornelis Kramer and Others 
^T976? ggg 1279.
36. Id, Recitals 35-39 of Judgment, p. 131 Q.
37. Treaty of Accession, Article 102.
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40. See note Gijlstra, n.29 supra.
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Conference (Court of Justice of thè European Com­
muni ties, Luxemburg, 1976) II,
42. IcL at II 9; II 25 and II 26. Ha son's critique 
is not merely one of judicial policy and judicial 
role. In analyzing Van Gend en Loos he makes an 
acute distinction between categorica! Treaty provi- 
sions which prescribe a particular consequence 
(e.g., Article 85(2)) and imperative provisions 
which only prescribe a legai obligation. He maintains 
that thè doctrine of direct effect as expounded in 
Van Gend en Loos and its progeny renders —  unjusti- 
fiably and illegitimately —  all imperative provisions 
categorical.
42a. See, & (eds.) |DSlÌi^=y ^
and_the_CommQn_Mar^et (Stevens, London, 1963).
43. Hamson, note 41 supra, II 25.
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Chapter Three 
The Diminution of Decisional Supranationalism
Decisional supranationalism and its expression 
in thè evolution of decision making in thè Community 
are, by comparison to normative supranationalism, 
less easy to trace and analyse. Several reasons ac- 
count for this difficulty. Strangely (or, perhaps, 
wisely), thè Treaties are rather cryptic in their 
institutional provisions. A literal reading of 
texts gives little Vision as to thè function of thè 
institutions and only a formai indication as to 
their competences and powers. Inevitably, there is 
an enormous gap between these formai provisions and 
thè Realpolitik manifestation of power in Community 
life. We noted, in discussing normative suprana­
tionalism, thè preeminent role played by thè Europe­
an Court of Justice in widening and deepening thè 
scope and meaning of normative supranationalism. 
Apart from all other features in its operative part 
thè judicial process is characterised by a high 
measure of transparencv which facilitates thè task 
of thè Community observer. It was possible to iden- 
tify with relative ease and precision thè evolving
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stages of normative supranationalism. By contrast
thè process of politicai decision making and policy
1formulation is much more obscure and its evolution
is marked less by clear cut landmarks— although some
criticai ones exist— and more by a subtle process of
2institutional interplay. The tension between 
:iwhole and parts" is, naturally, a Constant feature 
of this field as well. It manifests itself here in 
two, sometimes converging, axes: 1) Community ver­
sus Member States; and, within thè Community, 2) 
non-intergovernmental versus more intergovernmental 
institutions. It would, naturally enough, be far 
too simplistic to suggest that decision making may 
be explained by simple reference to these axes. The 
formulation of Community policies is a complicated 
and multi-phased process and thè duality of axes 
manifests itself at almost each stage.^ This will 
be illustrated below. At thè same time, if a global 
view is adopted it is possible to detect a clear 
enough evolutionary line in decisional supranation­
alism, namely its decline. This decline is apparent 
in relation to all criteria which were used to char- 
acterise decisional supranationalism.
i) The independence and thè autonomous policy 
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emmental institutions is declining;
ii) thè weight of non-intergovernmental institu­
tions in pluri-institutional decision making 
processes is declining; 
iii) within quasi-intergovernmental institutions 
there is a decline of their unique suprana­
tional features; 
iv) in thè execution or detailed legislative im- 
plementation of Community policies there has 
been a shift to Member States domination.
To understand this decline we must first discuss 
briefly thè politicai institutions themselves and 
then turn to thè decision making process.
The main European Community institutions are 
sufficiently well known and do not need detailed de- 
scription here. In thè first three decades of Commu­
nity life, apart from thè Court, thè institutions 
which dominated thè scene were, clearly, thè Commis- 
sion (and High Authority) and thè Council of Minis- 
ters. Also clear enough is thè generai role assigned 
to both organs. The Commission and its staff— al- 
though reflecting thè national composition of thè
4Community — is undoubtedly thè more communautaire and 
less intergovernmental of thè two. The Commissioners
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are required by thè Treaty "/i/n thè performance of 
/their/ duties /neither to/ seek nor take instruc- 
tions from any Government or from any other body 
. . . . Each Member State undertakes to respect 
this principle and not to seek to influence thè mem- 
bers of thè Commission in thè performance of their 
tasks".
The Commission as a body is thus notionally au- 
tonomous from thè Member States and specifically 
free to pursue thè Community interest. The func- 
tions of thè Commission are varied. It has thè ex­
clusive role of initiating legislation (in thè for­
mai sense); according to this scheme it is also thè
6centrai administrative organ of thè Community; it 
has a potentially important "diplomatic" role in 
acting as broker between thè Member States; it acts 
as "federai agency" in those spheres where thè Com­
munity has assured fully fledged federai powers 
(e.g. competition policy); it supervises thè execu- 
tion of thè Treaties and Community law by Member 
States and acts as a "supranational public attorney 
generai" in case of violation. According to early 
theory of thè Community it was to be thè technocrat- 
ic "functional" core which would engineer and pre­
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cipitate thè famous spillover leading thè Community 
towards politicai union.
The Council of Ministers by contrast is thè main 
formai legislator— clearly indicating thè centrality 
of thè Member States. It would be wrong, stricto 
sensu, to characterise thè Council as an intergovern- 
mental institution. Its rules of voting and proce­
dure, thè role of thè President and thè formai reli- 
ance on Commission draft legislation distinguish it 
from classical intergovernmental organs and charac­
terise it as supranational as well— albeit in a lim- 
ited way.^ Also, one important feature must be em- 
phasised if thè supranational character of thè Coun­
cil is to be fully appreciated. It is true that thè 
Council can refuse to enact any legislation put be- 
fore it by thè Commission even if thè policy is 
clearly in thè interest of thè Community. In reject-
ging such legislation, or amending it, thè Council
can be— and often is— motivated by interests which
9are contrary to thè "Community spirit". The Member 
States are, however, obliged to act jointly, though 
not necessarily unanimously, within thè framework of 
thè Council of Ministers. This is one of thè strik- 
ing interactions of normative and decisional suprana-
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tionalism. In any given field which is regulated by 
Community law and for which competence has been trans- 
ferred to thè Community organs, thè individuai Member 
States are precluded from taking unilateral action in 
implementing and/or changing thè policy; they must act 
jointly as thè Council of Ministers within thè normal 
decision making procedures of thè Community. I shall 
elaborate this point further below.
In theory, then, thè tandem of Commission—
charged with policy initiative, a secondary legisla-
10tive function and with execution and supervision 
tasks— and Council— charged with policy decision mak­
ing and actual "primary" legislation thereby repre- 
senting directly thè interests of thè Member States—  
was meant to achieve thè balance in thè decision mak­
ing process between Community and Member States. The 
reai story has been very different, its main theme be- 
ing thè ever increasing strengthening in thè weight of
thè Council and Member States and a corresponding de-
11cline of thè Commission. This process has manifest- 
ed itself in several ways:
J|. The decline of thè Commission: thè signs
In thè early years of thè Coal and Steel Communi­
ty, thè High Authority enjoyed a large measure of au-
Weiler, Joseph H. H. (1982), Supranational law and the supranational system : legal structure and political process in the 
European Community 
European University Institute                                                                    DOI: 10.2870/67242
- a s -
tonomy. Its responsibilities were fairly narrow— con- 
fined to these two sectors— and its functions re- 
sembled thè current Commission functions in, say, thè 
field of competition. Its main addressees were sec- 
toral undertakings and thè governmental departments 
directly concerned. This relative narrowness explains 
perhaps its measure of autonomy. The effect of High 
Authority activity on thè Member States was ex hy- 
pothesi rather limited. Politically it did not emerge 
as a serious focal point of reai power. Moreover, 
normative supranationalism was as yet fairly embryon- 
ic. The High Authority was king in its Court.
With thè conclusion of thè Treaty of Rome thè 
sphere of activities of thè Communities received an 
enormous qualitative and quantitative boost. Despite 
thè deliberate attempt to play down thè supranational 
character of thè Community, since 195 8 Community de­
cisions have had a much greater effect on national 
life: establishment of thè Customs Union, thè pursuit
of thè Communities' four "freedoms" (free movement of 
goods, labour, services and capitai) and thè creation 
of Community common policies inevitably and increas- 
ingly encroached on national policies, national legis­
lative competences and national administrative free-
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dora. One could expect an a priori greater interest
and greater involvement of thè Member States in thè
Community process. A further problem was bound to
develop— thè emergence of thè Community "democracy
12deficit". The democracy deficit has two tightly 
connected aspects. In thè first place given thè pos- 
sible, often exaggerated, tensions between Community 
interests and national interests there was a fear 
that Community programmes would be developed which 
did not pay due respect to national interests. The 
European Assembly (Parliament) was denied by thè 
Treaties any meaningful say in thè evolution and su- 
pervision of policies and law. Its members were not 
directly elected to their posts but nominated by and 
from national parliaments. The Commission for its 
part lacked any direct popular legitimacy and thè 
Council of Ministers— thè main legislative body— rep- 
resented thè executives of thè Member States. It was 
only to be expected that uneasiness about thè Commu­
nity legislative process would develop. In thè ab- 
sence of an effective democratically legitimate Com­
munity check on thè legislator, it was inevitable 
that there would be a shift to national scrutiny. 
Alas, national parliaments have created largely unim- 
pressive mechanisms for control of Community ac-
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tions. Instead a powerful Council of Ministers 
which was, at least in theory, answerable to nation­
al parliamentary control could be seen as some an-
14swer to this aspect of thè democratic deficit.
This solution is largely illusory. Much of thè 
Council work is done by thè civil servant COREPER 
members who are no more "legitimate" than thè Com­
mission and with thè possible exception of Denmàrk, 
there is little direct control, except on major is- 
sues, on ministerial work within thè Council. In- 
deed— and this is thè other aspect of thè deficit, 
which remains unanswered to date— thè national min­
isters may use thè legislative forum of thè Council 
so as to pass legislation which may have been 
checked and even vetoed in thè national parliaments. 
The other traditional check on thè legislature was 
of course to be thè Court of Justice. In thè early 
60’s, however, thè Court saw as its main task thè 
evolution and consolidation of European institutions 
and policies. Thus, for example, when a Community 
measure allegedly violating fundamental rights en- 
shrined in a constitution of a Member State was 
brought before it for judicial review, thè Court 
adopted a narrow formalistic approach and declared 
in effect that thè Treaties did not impose a duty toWeiler, Joseph H. H. (1982), Supranational law and the supranational system : legal structure and political process in the 
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-respect those rights. The Court was concerned not 
to impede in any way thè function of thè Community 
institutions nor to threaten thè primacy of Community 
law. Later thè Court learnt that thè process of in­
tegration would be enhanced rather than impeded by a
16bold policy of judicial review but thè Court's ear­
ly attitude added thus to thè democracy deficit.
Despite these two factors, thè enormous increase 
in thè range of Community activities and competences 
and thè emergence of thè democracy deficit— both of 
which would seem to suggest an inevitable increase in 
thè importance of thè Council of Ministers— thè 
eclipse of thè Commission was not immediately appar- 
ent. Two interrelated factors contributed to thè 
maintenance of Commission power. First, thè proximi- 
ty in time to thè conclusion of thè Treaty of Rome 
bestowed legitimacy on thè activities of thè EEC in 
its first years. The Treaty and its provisions were 
debated in all six national parliaments and were ap- 
proved. Secondly, so long as thè Community was seen 
to be confined to an implementation of thè explicit 
operative parts of thè Treaty, thè democratic deficit 
did not come to thè fore. Given that thè Commis­
sion1 s main task was thè execution of these explicit
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policies--principally thè establishment of thè Cus- 
toms Union— it did not come into major policy con- 
flicts with thè Council. (There were in fact certain 
personality clashes, in itself indication of thè po­
liticai self-perception of thè Commissioners and
17their President in thè early years.)
The Commission was thus able to gain immense 
prestige by thè rapid and professional manner in 
which it coordinated thè process of implementation 
and by its skill in fulfilling its "broker" role in 
securing thè agreement of, and settling thè disputes 
among, thè governments of thè Member States. Once 
these first tasks were substantially achieved, howev­
er, thè process of erosion in thè Commission's posi­
tion began to become more transparent.
The signs of thè Commission decline are clear
1 8enough and discussed ably elsewhere. Of thè more 
important signs one should mention thè rise to emi- 
nence of thè Committee of Permanent Representatives 
(COREPER) as a powerful intermediary between thè Com­
mission and Council and thè initial exclusion and 
subsequent toleration of thè Commission in thè new 
policy-shaping European body--the European Council. 
The European Council was set up dehors thè Treaties
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and became thè institutionalised forum for thè meet­
ing of Heads of State and Government. Its function 
was not only to shape new "second generation" poli- 
cies but also to serve as thè main arena for thè set- 
tlement of intergovernmental disputes regarding Com­
munity issues. The rise of COREPER meant that Com­
mission initiatives were subject to intergovernmental 
influence at an extremely early stage in their formu-
lation thereby detracting from thè Commission role as
1 9representing thè Community vision. This process of 
national intervention occurs not only after a Commis­
sion proposai is made and before it is submitted for­
ma lly to Council. "Legislative Committees" compris- 
ing representatives of thè Member States and Commis­
sion officials already scrutinise embryonic proposals 
closely after their conception within thè Commission 
services and directorates-general. A proposai might 
be aborted because of national disagreement even be­
fore it is put on thè Commission agenda. The emer- 
gence of thè European Council contributed to thè de- 
traction from thè Commission1s role as a source of
fresh Community ideas and as thè broker between thè
20Member States. The Commission was hemmed in by two 
new bodies "usurping" both its technical and politi- 
cal-diplomatic functions.
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The Council of Ministers— Erosion of supra­
national features: thè signs
The erosion of decisional supranationalism has 
not only been apparent in thè decline of thè Commis- 
sion vis-à-vis thè Council (in both its derivatives: 
European Council and Council of Ministers). Within 
thè Council of Ministers itself there has been a de­
cline in its supranational characteristics. We have 
already noted thè emergence of thè European Council. 
This, it is submitted, is an indication of thè fall­
ure of thè Council of Ministers' "First Eleven"--the 
Foreign Ministers— to assert themselves as an insti- 
tutional body capable of giving direction to thè Com­
munity and solving its problems. The need to resort 
to old style loosely structured summitry is a clear 
regression in thè role of thè Council of Ministers 
qua Community body.
The second, perhaps more, important landmark in 
thè decline of decisional supranationalism was thè 
retreat by thè Council of Ministers from majority 
voting--which had been designed as thè clearest mani- 
festation in thè decision making process of thè prec­
edence of thè Community interest over thè national 
interest— to consensus decision making. This move,
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precipitated by Francé and at first grudgingly accept-
ed by thè other five in thè legally dubious Accord of
2 1Luxembourg, was to become, with thè accession of thè 
three new Member States, an accepted Community norm. 
Thus, one of thè truly outstanding supranational fea- 
tures of thè Council1s procedure was reduced. Majori­
ty voting itself is not entirely exceptional in inter- 
national organisations. It is thè law making power of 
thè Council and thè effect of that law on and in thè 
national legai orders as expressed in thè concept of 
normative supranationalism which made thè prospect of 
majority voting so unique. The existing veto power 
which each Member State now holds does not necessarily 
paralyse thè Council because, as we have seen, in are- 
as controlled by thè Community thè Council must at thè 
end of thè day take a decision if entire policies are 
not to come to a halt. The power to veto does not 
give an individuai Member State thè power to impose 
its own desire as to thè eventual outcome of thè deci­
sion making process. Rather thè effect had been to 
force thè nine partners into "package-deal decision 
making" with compromises being sought not only as re- 
gards each policy but among various policies. This 
development was no doubt instrumentai in thè emergence 
of thè European Council as a forum for this high pow-
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ered politicai horse-trading although, as subxnitted 
above, thè Council of Foreign Ministers could have as- 
sumed this function.
The Luxembourg Accord and thè power of veto did 
not coinpletely destroy Community superiority in deci­
sion making. First, there is thè simple fact that, 
albeit by consent of thè Council, many issues, notice-
ably thè budget, are stili decided by majority vot-
22ing. Secondly, thè veto power of thè Member States 
in itself does not necessarily entail, as most commen- 
tators assume, thè blocking of thè Community suprana­
tional process. What is cruciai is thè legislative 
context in which thè veto is exercised. When thè
Treaty provides explicitly for Council unanimity in
23adopting certain policies, thè veto power thereby 
entailed gives thè individuai Member State thè ability 
to block directly any unacceptable measure. And to 
thè extent that thè Luxembourg Accord extends this 
power to measures in which thè Treaty provides for ma­
jority or qualified majority voting, thè same ability 
will naturally exist.
However, Artide 149 EEC provides that when act- 
ing on a proposai from thè Commission "unanimity shall 
be required for a /Council/ act constituting an amend-
Weiler, Joseph H. H. (1982), Supranational law and the supranational system : legal structure and political process in the 
European Community 
European University Institute                                                                    DOI: 10.2870/67242
- IV* -
ment to that proposai". In this case, then, thè veto 
power available to thè individuai Member State gives 
it thè power to prevent any tampering with a Commis­
sion proposai— i.e. a "supranational veto"— but not 
thè ability to force an amendment. The only way open 
to a recalcitrant Member State whose proposed amend- 
ments are "supranationally blocked" by thè veto of 
another state insisting on thè Commission originai 
proposai, is to veto thè entire measure which of 
course is a rnuch more serious matter and demands a 
higher threshold of national interest. Indeed Par­
liament made astute use of this principle in its lat- 
est budgetary wrangle with thè Council. The regime 
of "deadlines" in thè budgetary process which prevent
indefinite delays and thè ability of three Member
24States to block by a "qualified veto" thè changes 
which thè Council wished to introduce to thè 1980 
Parliamentary supplementary budget led to adoption of 
that budget by thè President of Parliament.
The strict doctrine of separation of powers ac- 
cording to which thè executive is concerned solely 
with implementation of policies adopted elsewhere was 
probably never tenable and thè cruciai policy making 
role of executives is so apparent as to obviate any 
analysis. The definition of thè executive functionWeiler, Joseph H. H. (1982), Supranat onal law and the supranational system : legal stru ture and political process in the 
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in thè Community system is not easy. We have already 
noted that one traditional function of executives in 
contemporary Western democracies, that of initiating 
and submitting policy proposals to thè legislative 
branch— a task initially associated with thè Commis­
sion— has, except in thè narrow technical sense, been 
taken over to a large extent, by thè Council of Min­
isters and thè European Council.
Has there been a similar decline in thè post­
legislative phase? The issues here are complex and 
our conclusions must be regarded as rather tentative 
and speculative. In some limited fields, such as 
competition, thè Commission acts like a federai agen- 
cy with full executive powers although even here it 
has to rely for enforcement measures on thè national 
systems. In most matters, however, thè practical ex- 
ecution of Community policies and rules, be they in 
thè field of agriculture, thè application of thè Com­
mon Customs Tariff, is performed by thè national ad- 
ministrations acting as "agents" for thè Community in 
such things as collecting charges, issuing clearances 
and dispensing grants. To thè extent that thè "agen- 
cy" is automatic, acting directly on Community meas­
ures and Commission instructions, this feature cannot
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be viewed as a weakness in thè executive role of thè 
Commission and as a sign of decline in decisional su­
pranationalism.
However, thè Communities as a politicai system 
have not escaped thè world-wide trend of increased 
government by administrative legislation and action. 
Thus, whereas thè legislature (thè Council) enacts 
enabling measures or issues policy mandates, it is 
left to thè "executive" to implement thè policies by 
series of secondary legislative measures and adminis­
trative acts. Just as thè COREPER was introduced by 
thè 1965 Merger Treaty as an extra tier of Member 
State representation designed ostensibly to facili­
tate thè technical preparation of Council meetings 
but in practice precipitating an erosion in thè poli­
cy initiatory role of thè Commission, it is possible 
to identify a similar trend in thè establishment of 
Member State Committees in relation to thè executive 
functions of thè Commission. I shall focus, by way 
of illustration, on two aspects of this development: 
first, by way of micro-analysis on thè role of one 
Committee already provided for in thè Treaty of Rome, 
and, secondly, by way of overview on thè generai pro- 
liferation of Committees set up by Council secondary 
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i. The "Artide 113 Coramittee"
Artide 113 EEC dealing, inter alia, with con-
clusion of trade agreements by thè Community bestows
responsibility on thè Commission for negotiating
agreements although acting on a mandate given by thè
Council. The Commission must consult with ". . . a
special committee appointed by thè Council to assist
thè Commission in this task . . This "113 Com-
25mittee" was duly set up, composed of representa-
tives of thè Member States; its presidency held in
rotation by thè Member States holding thè presidency
of thè Council. Its mode of operation is a useful
illustration of thè diminishing executive role of
26thè Commission. On thè one hand a Council-Member 
State Committee would be useful especially if amend- 
ments to thè mandate were needed and could be pro- 
vided at thè locus of negotiations. The Committee 
would also ensure that agreements negotiated would 
receive thè ultimate assent of thè Council upon 
which thè constitutional power to conclude thè 
agreement is bestowed. At thè same time it has been 
pointed out that thè role assigned to thè Committee 
(and to national observers in other types of Commu­
nity agreements) has meant that " . . .  thè Member
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States are able to oversee thè Commission's behaviour 
in every negotiating session and insure that its ap­
plication of thè mandates to concrete issues comports
27with their wishes" and that thus thè " . . .  picture 
of thè Commission . . . is that of Community spokes- 
man and agent or, more technically, plenipotentiary 
of thè Council. The term 'negotiate' has clearly not 
been interpreted /by virtue of thè role assumed by 
thè Member States and thè Council/ to accord thè Com­
mission an authoritative role in forming EEC negoti­
ating policies or directing thè negotiations them-
28selves. To thè extent that thè Commission has man- 
aged to re-build its role it has not relied on a re- 
interpretation of thè Treaty provisions but on thè 
sheer technical expertise which it can bring to thè 
treaty making process. But in this sense it is no 
more than an eguivalent to a coupétent national civil 
Service.
It is perhaps worth pointing out that use of a 
"democracy deficit" argument to justify these devel- 
opments is hardly convincing for, except in thè most 
formai sense, curtailment of Commission power has re- 
duced thè role of one set of (European) civil serv- 
ants and elevated another (national) set. The con-
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tinued reluctance of thè Council to increase thè role
of thè European Parliament in thè process of treaty
29making testifies to thè fact that national inter- 
ests play a greater role than does concern for democ- 
racy.
ii. The proliferation of Committees
With thè substantive expansion of Community ac-
tivities, especially in thè agriculturai sector, a
wide ranging network of Committees has been set up,
many of them to partake in thè "legislative implemen-
tation" of Community policies. Some of these are ad-
visory committees thè consultation of which is oblig-
atory but thè opinion of which once consulted is not 
30binding. Others, thè Management and Regulatory 
Committees, have a more decisive role.
As regards thè Management Committees, particu- 
larly prominent in thè agricultural and fishery 
fields, thè Commission must submit its draft measures 
to them. The Committee may approve thè measure— by a 
qualified majority— or fail to reach a decision (if 
no qualified majority is reached either way) whereup- 
on thè Commission is free to adopt thè measure which 
will have full legislative force. If thè Committee 
manages in fact to "reject thè measure" (qualified
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agreement against) thè Commission may stili adopt thè 
measure but this measure will come into effect only 
after a certain period in which time thè full Council 
may— by qualified majority— reject it. The Regulato- 
ry Committees procedure is slightly more restrictive 
on thè Commission.^
It is difficult to assess this proliferation of 
Committees in relation to thè power of thè Commis­
sion. Unlike, say, thè "113 Committee", thè Commis­
sion presides in all these Management and Regulatory 
Committees. And since executive power is exercised 
here through legislative means thè involvement of thè 
Council would seem to be naturai. Pragmatically, thè 
involvement of representatives of thè Member States 
may also contribute to smooth functioning of whatever 
policy is executed regardless of thè implications to 
thè institutional balance. Besides, in thè decision 
making process thè qualified majority rule means that 
--as regards Management Committees--thè vetoing power 
of a few States may actually assist thè Commission in 
adopting thè measure. All these elements would tend 
to point to thè conclusion that thè proliferation of
Committees serves thè ends of open end efficient gov- 
32ernment and as regards formai decision making in- 
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At thè same time— taking a longer term view— one 
cannot avoid noting that these mechanisms indicate an 
unwillingness of thè Council and Member States to en- 
trust thè execution of policy to thè Commission with, 
say, safeguards of reporting and information. In 
this sense, then, thè proliferation of Committees may 
be regarded as one element in thè decline of deci­
sional supranationalism.^
G. The reasons for decline
It now remains to try to give some reasons for 
this erosion in thè position of thè Commission and 
thè generai decline of decisional supranationalism. 
Several such reasons may be given.
i. We noted thè early success of thè Commission
in implementing thè explicit policies in thè 
Treaties. The need to evolve a "second genera­
tion" of Community policies based on broad indi- 
cations in thè Treaties but not explicitly set 
out imposed a much more delicate and politically 
sensitive task on thè Commission. The power of 
"initiative" now called for was less formai and
technical, that is it no longer called for pro-
posals which gave legislative form to explicit 
Treaty obligations but rather it called for wide,
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reflective and more "value" prone proposals.
Whereas thè first generation of policies were nega­
tive— in thè sense that thè Member States undertook 
to refrain from certain actions and thè Commission 
was charged with implementing this negative regime 
— thè new policies were to have an actual positive 
content on which agreement was more difficult. The 
ability of thè Commission to propose new initia- 
tives and get them accepted was thus considerably 
weakened. The importance of thè Council of Minis- 
ters and European Council was strengthened. It was 
those bodies which could give thè drive to new pol­
icies. To be sure, thè Commission retained its 
position as a source of ideas and Vision for devel- 
opments on thè Community level. The environmental 
policy, to give but one example, would not have 
emerged without an internai Commission initiative. 
But it was for thè European Council to sanction thè 
policy, to balance it and officially to launch it. 
The Commission was left somewhat in thè background.
The need for "second generation" policies 
brought thè democracy deficit to thè fore. What is 
more, with thè widening of Community activities, 
national parliaments felt threatened by a process
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which would wrest even more power from them. The 
Commission which had little formai democratic le- 
gitimacy became an easy target for attack.
The Commission itself, although growing in
experience, put on much bureaucratic fat. This
expressed itself not only in its numerical staff
growth but also in thè evolution of traditional
bureaucratic ailments which significantly reduced
34its internai efficiency. Lack of internai 
(lateral) coordination, distortions in thè pat­
tern of promotion, and personal and national ri- 
valries all contributed to an internai drop in 
morale and an external drop in esteem. The mate- 
rially privileged position of Commission employ- 
ees (alongside all other Community employees) in 
thè current harsh climate may also have contrib­
uted to this process.
The independence of thè Commission and its 
judicial impartiality began breaking down in a 
bizarre dialectical process. The very importance 
of thè Commission prompted thè Member States to 
take not only— as was constitutionally permissi- 
ble— an active interest in thè appointment of thè 
Commissioners themselves but also in thè promo­
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tion of personnel within thè Commission and in thè 
allocation of portfolios among Commissioners. The 
Commission was thus seen to be losing its imparti- 
ality, a singular handicap when considering its in- 
tended mediatory role in Council disagreements. 
Internally, this govemmental intervention contrib- 
uted both to a strain on thè collegiate nature of 
thè Commission and thè authority of its Presi- 
dent.
Finally, it may be that thè process of appro- 
fondissement of normative supranationalism, as de- 
scribed above, had a negative effect, at least as a 
contributing factor, on decisional supranationalism 
both in thè Council-Commission relationship and 
within thè Council itself. Normative supranation­
alism meant that thè impact of Community policies 
and law was perceived as growing not only in scope 
— to cover more fields— but also in depth— so as to 
have a more immediate and binding legai effect from 
which thè Member States could not escape. Thus, to 
give one example, thè politically delicate issue of 
supremacy was countered by an insistence of thè 
Member States on their control of thè making of 
this "supreme11 law and their ability to block its
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making. This view of thè role and power of nation­
al governments was emphasised strongly by "pro-mar- 
keteers" in thè 1975 U.K. Referendum, using it 
(somewhat misleadingly) as a tool against charges 
of thè "loss of sovereignty" which Community mem- 
bership entailed. It is thus suggested that thè 
correlation between thè approfondissement of norma­
tive supranationalism and thè diminution of deci- 
sional supranationalism is not accidental but at 
least partially causai. As we noted, thè European 
Court of Justice had not excluded thè sensitive 
field of foreign economie relations from thè ef- 
feets of normative supranationalism--giving one of 
its decisive rulings— thè ERTA decision— on thè 
doctrine of preemption in relation to thè treaty 
making capacity of thè Community. The Council of 
Ministers and thè Member States, for their part, 
have ensured that in thè execution of thè Communi­
ty ’s external policy thè Commission is kept--by de­
vi ces such as thè 113 Committee— on a very tight 
rein and that thè Member States, by a legai inter-
pretation of thè limits of Community competence,
36are active parties in many Agreements.
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j> The decline of decisional supranationalism: 
an interim assessment
Evaluation of thè changes in thè decision making 
process is rendered difficult not only because of thè 
diversity of criteria which may be employed but also 
since in relation to each criterion thè facts do not 
lend themselves to straightforward negative or posi­
tive conclusions. Rather it will be seen that thè 
final balance sheet is mixed; one in which thè "good" 
and thè ”bad:' are intertwined. In this evaluation I 
propose to make reference to criteria of efficiency, 
democracy and supranationality.
Efficiency
In terms of efficiency it is clear from our 
analysis that thè system has become burdened with ad- 
ditional layers— especially thè COREPER and its au_x- 
iliaries— and that these layers coupled with thè bu­
reaucratic impediments in thè Commission identified 
in, say, thè Spirenburc Report, have contributed to 
thè emergence of thè so-called lourdeur of thè proc­
ess. Whereas undoubtedly thè speed of decision mak­
ing in thè Community has slowed and thè need for na­
tional consensus is taking its toll, one may stili 
give a positive interpretation to these facts.
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First, one should not forget thè essential tech- 
nical role which thè COREPER fulfils. Indeed it 
is inconceivable that thè Council in its pre- 
Merger days could have operated at any level of 
efficiency without thè screening activities of 
thè COREPER. The sheer volume of Community leg­
islative activity would have defeated such a 
purely politicai organ as thè Council. COREPER 
on this reading has become indispensable and it 
is safe to suggest that without thè COREPER far 
fewer Community acts would get through. It is 
also clear that thè Commission simply does not 
and cannot manifest all thè technical and politi­
cai expertise which is necessary to draft profes­
sional legislation in highly technical economie 
and social spheres with thè added imperative that 
such legislation should fit without too many ob- 
stacles into 1 0 fairly diverse national systems. 
Despite all talk of increased bureaucratisation 
thè entire Commission retains fewer professional 
administrators than most government departments 
in any of thè medium sized and larger Member 
States. COREPER and thè working groups provide 
this essential professional function.
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The issue of consensus decision making is equal- 
ly open to a dual interpretation in relation to thè 
criterion of efficiency. To be sure thè need for 
consensus and thè ability of a Member State to veto 
has contributed much to thè transformation of thè 
Community decision making process from a legislative 
one to a diplomatic one. It has also enabled recal­
ci trant Member States to impede thè process or delay 
it indefinitely. At thè same time when one remerabers 
that thè Community has not got its own executive 
branch and that it depends on national authorities—  
and principally thè national bureaucracies— for thè 
faithful implementation, application and enforcement 
of Community law and policies, thè silver lining of 
thè cloud of consensus decision making begins to 
emerge. Even if majority voting were to exist, it is 
easy to imagine that there would be little thè Commu­
nity could do in thè face of a reluctant, recalci- 
trant or even defiant national administration^in 
whose hands thè actual implementation and application 
of Community law and policy lay.
The great potential advantage of consensus deci­
sion making in a system in which one bureaucracy is 
notionally responsible for legislation and another
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for its execution is thè increase in thè probability 
of "acceptabi1 ity" of, and receptivity to, thè even- 
tual outcome of thè Community process. The ability 
of each national administration to block genuinely 
harmful measures and generally to iron out technical 
and politicai difficulties of Commission proposals 
increases thè likelihood of subsequent faithful im- 
plementation. The psycho-political commitment which 
is created by national participation in thè decision 
making process in Brussels may, on this reading, 
bear some fruit in thè subsequent receptivity in 
Paris, London and thè other capitals.
Democracy and representativity
The Community system departs in two fundamental 
ways from its national counterparts: parliamentary
accountability is not integrai to its decision mak­
ing process, and its legislative capacity is not 
formally limited by a higher law of human rights.
The evolution of normative supranationalism has ren- 
dered thè problem more acute since it has increased 
thè legai impact of this unaccountable and theoreti- 
cally uncontrollable law. Whereas thè question of 
human rights has been at least partially solved by 
thè European Court of Justice (I shall return to
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this theme in chapter siWWbelow), thè question of 
parliamentary accountability remains acute. It would 
thus appear that, at least in accordance with current 
politicai values, thè system lacks thè essential 
characteristics of formai legitima^j
The argument that in thè formai sense thè problem 
does not arise since thè mechanisms of thè legai or­
der derive from thè Treaties (as amended) which were 
ratified by thè people through national parliaments, 
loses much of its force precisely because of thè 
process of approfondissement. Supremacy, direct ef­
fect and all thè rest were not spelt out in thè Trea­
ties. They represent fundamental innovations which, 
as mentioned above, render thè legitimacy problem 
acute.
But legitimacy is not merely a question of legai 
validity and formai accountability. It is also a 
question of social acceptability. Certainly these 
elements of accountability may constitute conditions 
which play a part in contributing to social accepta­
bility and thè lack of which may hinder such accepta­
bility. Legai validity and formai accountability 
manifest other influences that may be equally impor- 
tant. I do not wish to enter into a theoretical dis-
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cussion of legitimacy nor do I propose to enter into 
a sociological-psychological account of those ele­
ments in thè Community which may or may not contrib- 
ute to acceptability. It is however clear that thè 
loyalty to thè technical organs predicted by thè ear- 
ly functionalists has failed to materialise. Indeed 
thè bureaucratic nature of thè Community— which is 
thè antithesis to any Weberian notion of charisma—  
can only be a hindrance to thè sociological dimension 
of legitimacy.
1
What then of thè substance of Community activi- 
ty? Certainly analysis of this dimension— concerned 
with thè actual content of law— is rendered difficult 
in thè absence of discussion of Community policies. 
But then we also know that material legitimacy is de- 
pendent as much on thè process by which law and regu- 
lation are adopted as on thè actual content of such 
law. It is clear that thè deficiencies in accounta- 
ble and responsive processes reduce thè feasibility 
of material legitimacy. Whereas thè possible impact 
of a lack of parliamentary control is fairly evident 
there is another dimension to thè current Community 
decisional process which might also impede material 
legitimacy. The decisional process in thè Member
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States does not take place entirely within parlia­
ments. Whether we adopt a model of representative 
democracy or a neo-corporatist model it is clear that 
often enough thè normative content of national policy 
is thè outcome of a process in which parties, employ- 
ers, trade unions and other pressure groups interact 
— to influence thè levers of power be they within 
parliament, thè administration and at times even thè 
judiciary— or to determine thè outcomes themselves.
In this game thè government and thè administration 
may be only two elements among many forces. These 
national pressure groups often represent delicate so- 
cietal balances thè preservation of which may at 
times be seen as contributing to national legitimacy 
and even stability.
The Community system as it has developed dis- 
rupts this balancing process in several ways.
In thè first place because of thè diplomatic 
Community game most issues have now to be reduced in­
to thè form of a "national position" or a "state in­
terest". A government has to take a position. In 
many fields this is an artificial category and one 
which on thè national scene is often avoided. Sec- 
ondly, thè executive and thè administration will on
Weiler, Joseph H. H. (1982), Supranational law and the supranational system : legal structure and political process in the 
European Community 
European University Institute                                                                    DOI: 10.2870/67242
-  ( S f -
the transnational level have a freedom which at least 
in some fields they might not enjoy back home. Fi- 
nally thè balancing achieved at thè national level 
between various interests and interest groups may be 
disrupted with dangerous implications for thè subse­
quent acceptability of thè policy output. Thus, for 
example, certain pressure groups, say, thè motor in- 
dustry, may find it much easier because of its rela­
tive concentration and ampie resources to transfer 
impact to thè European level. Their ability to re- 
group at thè transnational level and effectively t* 
monitor and influence thè decisional process may be 
far superior to that of, say, consumer groups. The 
latter are characterised by thè diffuseness of thè 
interests they represent, and by notorious organisa- 
tional and financial difficulties that are all magni- 
fied on thè European level. Once thè focus of deci­
sion making— as regards, say, safety measures for au- 
tomobiles— is transferred to thè Community as part of 
thè harmonisation of obstacles to trade, one can see 
how thè balance of national decision making may be 
disrupted. Whereas thè motor car industry may even 
profit from thè concentration of decision making, 
consumer groups might find themselves in an invidious
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situation. First they will have to organise transna- 
tionally--a much more formidable task considering thè 
number of consumer groups not to mention thè diffuse 
nature of their interests. Secondly, whereas in thè 
national arena consumers, because of their electoral 
power may succeed in counterbalancing producer power 
by parliamentary impact, on thè European level they 
are denied this classical lever. Thus if there is 
any truth to thè charge that thè automobile direc­
tives were "written by thè industry" we have both a 
practical explanation to thè phenomenon itself and 
also an illustration as to why thè Community deci­
sional process might contribute to material illegiti- 
macy. As I suggested however at thè outset thè evo­
lution of changes in thè decisional process is one in 
which light and shade intermix.
It is possible to argue that even here thè 
changes in Community decision making have created el- 
ements which alleviate thè issue of formai legitima­
cy. From this formai point of view thè shift to con- 
sensus decision making mav, at least theoretically 
mitigate thè issue of accountability. Whereas under 
a majority voting system a minister could always ar­
gue before his national parliament that a decision at
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*thè Community level was taken despite his opposition, 
thè availability of a Member State veto limits this 
possibility. Thus thè potential for indirect ac- 
countability increases although in practice it is 
difficult for national parliaments to exercise effec- 
tive supervision over their own executive at thè Com­
munity level. At thè level of social acceptability 
and material content thè argument is more subtle and 
tentative. It is clearly thè case that in as much as 
contentious Community policy is perceived— wrongly or 
rightly— as revolving around a conflict between thè 
national interest and thè Community interest, a domi- 
nance of national policy makers especially at thè 
highest level of, say, thè European Council, will be 
reassuring in national circles and render Community 
outcome more palatable. Indeed I would submit that 
governments often deliberately construe thè decision­
al process in this way so as to enhance thè dominance 
they have assumed and to legitimate themselves qua 
executives in fields where they might be much more 
curtailed at thè national level. There is always a 
tendency to accept governmental action as regards is- 
sues— particularly in thè external arena— where an 
alleged national interest is at stake. Finally and 
most tentatively of all, thè generai dominance of thè
-153-
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Member State in thè Community fora may help "lend" 
whatever legitimacy governments have "at home" to thè 
overall Community process. The game may be seen less 
as "them" and "us!l since them becomes us. This 
transposition is not however complete. Indeed often 
governments will use thè Community as a convenient 
"whipping boy" for their internai problems.
Supranationality
It is clear from our earlier analysis that thè 
changes in thè decisional process have diminished thè 
supranational character of thè Community. It is how­
ever important to indicate with precision thè ele­
ments which determine thè reduced supranationality.
Certainly thè emergence of consensus decision 
making is thè single most important element in this 
decline. We have however to be cautious in evaluat- 
ing thè significance of this development. In thè 
first place it should be remembered that thè Luxem- 
burg Crisis and subsequent Accord which instituted 
thè Member State veto power took place before thè 
compietion of thè transitional period. It was only 
after that period that majority votino was to come 
into force. In thè strict sense thè Accord did not 
destroy an existing practice but prevented it from
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developing. Further, even after majority voting was to 
come in, thè Treaty itself provided for unanimity in 
most cruciai areas of Community policy making. In 
thè narrow sense thè significance of "Luxemburg" was 
restricted to those operational areas of thè Treaty 
programme where unanimity was not required. I would 
however suggest that thè Accord did have a signifi­
cance which went far beyond thè potential disruption 
of those operational areas: it symbolised a trans-
formation from a spirit of 'Community' to a more 
selfish and pragmatic 'cost benefit' attitude by thè 
Member States. It was a change in ethos at first 
resented and rejected by thè five but later— espe- 
cially after thè first enlargement— eagerly seized 
upon by all. In this sense thè damage to thè supra­
national nature of thè Community was very substan- 
tial.
In thè second place it is important to realise 
that consensus decision making is not a homogeneous 
practice. Not only, as we have seen above, is ma­
jority voting stili practiced in, say, thè various 
Committees set up to "assist" thè Commission in thè 
implementation of Community policy. But also in thè 
decision making process itself we can distinguish
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between several situations in which thè specific con- 
stellations of law and fact create different catego- 
ries of consensus making. The differentiation of 
these categories depends on thè existence of incen­
ti ves to consensus. These might exist either as a 
matter of law enshrined in thè doctrine of preemp- 
tion, as a matter of fact where "factual preemption" 
may exist or as a result of politicai and
diplomatic factors.
Category a: no legai preemption and minimal or no
factual preemption
In a field such as consumer protection thè Com­
munity competence derives essentially from thè volun- 
tary agreement of thè Member States ex Article 100 
and 235.^^ There is no positive obligation to oper­
ate in thè field and crucially, in thè event of fail- 
ure to adopt rules thè Member States are free to pur- 
sue national policies. No legai preemption exists. 
Also thè level of market integration in thè Community
has not reached thè stage where thè "regulatory gap"
3 8factor, evidenced in, say, thè USA provides a 
strong economic-political incentive to create factual 
preemption: namely a situation wherein thè national
policy option is not a factually viable alternative
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in thè absence of agreement at thè Community level.
As a result thè leeway given to each state is 
great and thè pressure to arrive at Community consen- 
sus is low. The potential for delaying technicsA in-
sistence on national priorities is high and above all
thè penalty be it in law or in fact for failure to
arrive at a decision is largely absent.
The process within this category is indeed very 
dose to an international diplomatic treaty making 
conference.
Category b: consensus decision making in thè context
of legai and factual preemption
To illustrate this category we may utilise thè 
area of thè annual farm price fixing within thè Com­
mon Agricultural Policy. We can hardly imagine a 
more controversial and nationalistic area of Communi­
ty policy. In recent times this annual event has be- 
come almost an institutionalised crisis. There is 
all thè potential for lack of consensus. And yet 
there is thè cruciai preemptory factor: whereas thè
Member States might fail to reach agreement they are 
not permitted, legally, to adopt in thè absence of a 
Community decision unilateral national measures. To
Weiler, Joseph H. H. (1982), Supranational law and the supranational system : legal structure and political process in the 
European Community 
European University Institute                                                                    DOI: 10.2870/67242
be sure, in extremis, there have been threats by some 
of thè Member States to break thè preemptory obliga- 
tion. On one or two occasions slight breaches were 
introduced, but thè politicai damage to thè entire 
structure of thè Community is such that thè legai 
preemption has held firm. As a result, each year we 
observe a quasi-ritual. Lengthy negotiations, mara- 
thon meetings, delays and threats. But consensus in- 
variably emerges despite thè power of veto.
Between these two categories we may of course 
find many variables of thè same theme. The budget 
procedure is an interesting example. Here thè Member 
States, once again in a contentious area, have no 
complete freedom to disagree. The European Parlia­
ment may step in under certain circumstances^and a 
total budget failure will be damaging to virtually 
all Member States. As a result, thè governments have 
agreed that in thè budget procedure they will follow 
majority voting.
Category c: contingent politicai and diplomatic fac-
tors
Even in thè absence of preemptory rules or fac- 
tual preemption it is possible to reach consensus. 
Either through genuine agreement on thè utility of
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measures or through bargaining and traditional diplo- 
matic efforts. It should not be forgotten that during 
thè mid 70s, a period in which thè supranational de­
cline was well established thè Community adopted over 
600 directives and several important regulations (be- 
sides thè thousands of measures adopted on a daily ba- 
sis criterion, thè framework of thè CAP, thè CCP and 
other policies). It also reached international agree- 
ments, often substantial, within dozens of countries 
in a decisional framework thè unanimity requirements 
of which were even more severe (because of thè "mixed 
agreement” technique).
As thè discussion above has revealed, thè contri- 
bution of unanimity and consensus decision making to 
thè decline of supranationalism is 'qualified1 by a 
host of tempering factors. What then is thè essence 
of thè process of diminution? I have already indicat- 
ed thè change of ethos which veto power illustrated 
and reinforced. But beyond that I would suggest that 
thè most important overall indicator has been thè per- 
vasiveness of thè national interest at all stages of 
thè decisional process. If we combine all thè ele­
ments in our earlier analysis we will observe that thè 
emergence of thè European Council, thè prominence of
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working groups and COREPER, majority voting, and thè 
proliferation of Committees mean that at each and 
every stage of thè process, thè Member States joint- 
ly and severally, have a controlling position. From 
politicai initiative (European Council) through 
technical elaboration (working groups, COREPER) 
through final adoption (veto power) through subse­
quent elaboration and execution (Conimi LLees ) is thè 
presence of Governments felt. Associated with this 
are thè inevitable diplomatic techniques associated 
with such representation— secrecy (so as not to un- 
dermine delicately achieved compromises), national 
pride and all thè rest. The overall interest in 
perpetuating a ’spirit' of Community has diminished, 
thè tendency towards thè lowest common denominator 
holding thè Community together has increased. The 
Community^is less supra-national.
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Notes
1. This is not to imply thè Court's role is a-politi-
cal. In fact thè Court has shown a high degree of 
politicai acumen in, say, changing course on thè 
question of human rights. It has also played an 
important role in demarcating thè division of com­
petences between different European Community In­
sti tutions. See, e.g., Case 22/70 Commission v. 
Council /197V 263 and joined cases 138/79;
139/79 Roquette v. Council, Maizena v. Council
/T980/ I ^ C ^  3333; 339 3
2. This interplay is well illustrated in C. Sasse, E. 
Poullet, D. Coombes, G. Deorez, Decision Makinc in 
thè European Communities (N.Y. - London, Prager 
Publishers Inc., 1977) and H. Wallace, W. Wallace, 
C. Webb (eds.), Policy Makinc in thè European Com- 
munitY (John Wiley, London, 1976).
3. See Wallace et al^ . , id. supra, esp. Webb, Intro-
duction: Variations on a Theoretical Theme, 1-31;
and H. Wallace, National Bulls in thè Community 
China Shop ; The Role of National Governments in 
Community Policy Making, 33-68.
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4. This inevitable feature of Community life is not
only a sharp reminder that it is stili a Europe of 
Nations but also places quality restraints on thè 
body. "The need to cater for thè differing inter­
ests of thè Member States and to accept national
quotas, however unofficial, . . . inhibits thè de- 
velopment of an elite corps of policy-makers
. . .. H. Wallace, id. , at 53.
5. Article 10, Merger Treaty.
6 . It should be noted that apart from a few limited
fields such as competition, thè actual practical 
execution of many Community policies is in thè
hands of thè Member States acting as agents for
thè Community.
7. See P . Pescatore, The Law of Integration 
(Sijthoff, Leiden, 1974).
8 . See Article 149, EEC.
9. There is here an apparent paradox. To thè extent
that, say, thè governments of all ten Member 
States agree on a "desired" course of action, how
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can this be said to be contrary to thè Community 
spirit? For do not thè governments represent thè 
Member States which together are thè Community? 
True as this may be, thè originating Treaties 
stili remain thè main normative basis for Commu­
nity evolution. To thè extent that thè govern­
ments consider disregarding thè Treaty objectives 
(without formally ainending it) they may legiti- 
mately be characterised as acting contrary to thè 
Community spirit.
10. There is a certain terminologicai confusion re-
garding "secondary" legislation. Regulations and 
Directives are often referred to as secondary 
legislation. The better view, it is submitted, 
is to regard them as primary legislation. For if 
we view thè Treaty as being thè Constitution of 
thè European Communities, thè legislation there- 
under, by analogy to national systems, would be 
primary. Perhaps thè power of legislation en- 
trusted to thè Commission under enabling measures 
of thè Council may be characterised as "second­
ary”. See also Jacobs, Florence gro^ect.
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11. A recent study giving a realistic appreciation of 
thè institutional balance is S. Henig, Power and 
Decision in Europe (Europotentials Press, London,
1980); see also Sasse, note 2 supra.
12. Term borrowed from D. Marguand, Parliament for 
Europe (Jonathan Lape, London, 1979).
13. The following remarks by a leading commentator 
are instructive in this context. " . . .  /A/ll 
Member States have organised their policy-making 
in such a way as to promote their own national 
interests . . . .  These efforts to keep thè for- 
mation and implementation of Community rules un­
der national control are sustained by thè fact 
that thè organs of thè European Communities stili 
lack a democratic legitimation of their own
. . . . To date, thè control of European policy
through national parliaments is at any rate com- 
parably weak and is at most exerted via a detour 
that is through thè control of governments." 
Sasse, The Control of thè National Parliaments of 
thè Nine over European Affairs in A. Cassese 
(ed.), Parliamentar^ Control over Foreign Policy
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(Sijthoff & Noordhoff, Alphen aan den Rijn, Ger- 
mantown, 1980) at 147.
14. In fact a different type of democracy deficit 
emerged whereby thè executive branch of thè gov­
ernments of thè Member States were able.to pursue 
policies which, perhaps, would be more open to 
challenge if conducted "at home". See Rogers & 
Bolton, The True Cost of Sanctions, The New 
Statesman 9.1.81.
15. Cf. Case 1/58 Friedrich Stork & Co. v. High Au- 
thority of thè European Coal and Steel Community
/195 9/ E^C^R^ 17.
16. See Cappelletti, The Mightv Problem of Judicial
Review and thè Contribution of Comparative Analy- 
sis, LIEI 1 (1979). On recent developments of
human rights and thè Community legai order see 
Economides and Weiler, Accession of thè Communi- 
ties to thè European Convention on Human Rights: 
Commission Memorandum 42 M^L^R. 683 (1979). See 
also, case 44/79 Liselotte Hauer v. Land Rhein- 
land-Pfalz /197V ECR 3727, and Drzemczewski 
(1981) 30 ICLQ 118, 128-134.
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17. See H. Wallace, note 3 supra, at 53.
18. See, e.£., Regort on European Institutions pre- 
sented by thè Committee of Three to thè European 
Council (Council of thè European Communities, 
Luxemburg, 1980) hereinafter Three Wise Men Re­
port pp. 4 9-53, Henig, supra, n. 11, at 51-63,
105-117. See also Baldi (1981) , Rivista di di­
ritto Europeo 134.
19. On this effect of COREPER thè Three Wise Men com- 
mented that thè Commission " . . .  should not, as 
so often happens now, be drawn into negotiating 
with /national experts, etc_V to find a supposed- 
ly acceptable form of thè /policy/ measure".
They also commented that "/t/he Commission must 
frame its proposals in a more independent man- 
ner". Three Wise Men Report p. 54. COREPER does 
of course increase thè efficiency of thè legisla­
tive system. For a positive analysis see Noel 
and Etienne (1971) 6 Government and Opposition 
422. But see, Tizzano, 'COREPER', Appendice, No­
vissimo Digesto Italiano (UTET 1981) .
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20. Three Wise Men Regort at, e .g., 5 3 and passim.
21. For texts and brief commentary see conférence de 
presse du Président de Gaulle, September 9, 19 65; 
Dichiarazione del Consiglio dei Ministri delle 
CEE, Bruxelles, Oct. 26, 1965; Communiqué de 
presse sur les accords de Luxembourg, 29 janvier 
1966. All in R. Ducei, B. Olivi (eds.), L'Europa 
Incon^iuta 411-422 (Padova, Cedam, 1970). See 
also P.J.G. Kapteyn and P. Veripren-van Themaat,
Ì2 th§ Law of thè European Communi- 
ties (London, Sweet & Maxwell, 1973) at 14 3-146.
22. E.2* thè procedure in thè Agriculturai Management 
Committees. See text to note 30 infra.
23. E.cf. Article 126 EEC— "/T/he Council, after re- 
ceiving thè opinion of thè Commission . . ., may
. . . unanimously determine what new tasks may be
entrusted to thè /European Social Fund/."
24. I.e. where thè Treaty provides for a qualified 
majority in Council a small number of states can 
veto a decision.
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25. See, O.J. 71, 4.11.1961; O.J. L 326, 29.12.1969. 
In relation to agreements based on Article 238 
EEC which does not provide for a consultative 
Committee, thè Council set up a group of national 
observers who "constitute . . . more than token 
representation, although less than active inter- 
vention". Bot, Negotiating Communi ty Agreements: 
Procedure and Practice, C^M^L^ Rev. 286 at 294 
(1970).
26. Among commentators there is no dispute about thè
decline in thè Commission role although opinions 
differ about thè appraisal of thè phenomenon. 
Costanis, The Treaty-making power of thè European 
Economie Community : The perspective of a Decade
5 Rev. 421 (1967-8), Alting von Geseau,
The external representation of plural interest, 5 
of Common Market Studies 426 (1967) and 
Leopold, External Relations power of thè EEC in 
theory and practice I^C^L^Q^ 54 esp. at 59-62 
(1977) tend to be more criticai of this develop- 
ment. Bot, supra, n. 25, offers a more balanced 
approach maintaining that thè exigencies of in- 
ternational relations and their condxict make this 
development largely inevitable.
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27. Costanis, supra, n. 26, at 435.
28. _Id. , p. 434 (emphasis added) . But see Bot, supra, 
n. 25, at 309-310. For an amusing account of thè 
technical obstacles which this negotiating pattern 
produces, see W. Field, The European Communit^ in 
World Affairs (Alfred Publishing, Washington,
1976) at 105.
29. See generally Weiler, The European Parliament and
Foreign Affairs: External Relations of thè EEC in
Cassese, supra, n. 13, at 151; and J. Weiler, The 
European Parliament and its Foreign Affairs Com­
mittees (Padova, Cedam, 1982).
30. See Council and Commission Committees, Supplement 
2/80 Bull. E.C. (Commission of thè European Commu­
nities, Luxemburg, 1980) at 18-19.
31. Id. at 22.
32. The Court of Justice affirmed thè legality of Man­
agement Committees and even seemed to approve 
their politicai role. In a case before thè Court 
it was argued first that since execution of poli-
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cies involved legislative functions it should have 
been left entirely in thè hands of thè Council.
The Court first acknowledged thè distinction: 
"according /with/ thè legai concepts recognized in 
all Member States, between . . . measures directly 
based on thè Treaty itself and derived law intend- 
ed to ensure their implementation. It cannot /thè 
Court concluded/ therefore be a requirement that 
all thè details of thè regulation concerning thè 
Common Agricultural Policy be drawn up by thè 
Council . . .". An alternative argument was that 
thè " . . .  Management Committee procedure . . . 
constituted an interference in thè Commission's 
right of decision, to such an extent as to put in 
issue thè independence of that institution. Fur- 
ther thè interposition between thè Council and thè 
Commission of a body which is not provided for by 
thè Treaty is alleged to have thè effect of dis- 
torting thè relationships between thè institutions 
and thè exercise of thè right of decision." The 
Court’s reply was that thè Management Committee 
procedure was a legitimate exercise by thè Council 
of its power under Artide 155 to stipulate condi- 
tions under which it would delegate power. Thus 
per thè Court: "Without distorting thè Community
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structure and thè institutional balance, thè Man­
agement Committee machinery enables thè Council 
to delegate to thè Commission an implementing 
power of appreciable scope, subject to its power 
to take thè decision itself if necessary." Case 
25/70 Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle v. KSster 
/?9707 II 1161 at 1170-1171; Recitals 3-10
of Judgment.
33. Accord - Doc 115, 1968-69 at 30.9.68 of European 
Parliament and Resolution of 3.10.68 O.J. C 108 
p. 37.
34. See generally Prooosals For Reform of thè Commis-
thè European Communities and Its Servic­
es , Report made at thè reguest of thè Commission 
ìli §0 Re view Bodv Under thè Chairman-
shig of Mr. Dirk Spierenbura (Commission of thè 
European Communities, Brussels, 1979).
35. A recent event has been thè intervention in Janu- 
ary 1981 by thè British Prime Minister with thè 
President of thè Commission as regards thè port- 
folio of one of thè British Commissioners.
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36.
37.
The so-called "mixed agreement". See Kapteyn _& 
Verjpren Van Themaat, supra, note 21, at 351 ff.
See Trubek/Bourgongie (Florence project).
38. See Heller/Pelkmans (Florence project).
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There remains one cruciai factor missing from thè struc- 
tural analysis. What are thè ties that keep thè framework 
together? By what means has it been possible to preserve 
thè integrity of thè system despite thè evident decline in 
decisional supranationalism, thè outright hostility from 
certain national quarters and thè lack of independent 
federai enforcement mechanisms thè evolution of which one 
would normally expect to accompany thè development of 
normative supranationalism?
A. Withdrawal or Selective Application?
The naturai departure point for a reply would be an
examination of thè possibilities of Member State withdrawal
from thè Community. Here again we find if not a cleavage
between legai and politicai analysis at least a sharp dif-
ference of emphasis. Juridically, in discussing withdrawal
from thè Community a distinction is drawn between thè European and Steel Germinity on thè one hand and ikt-
European Economie Community and Euratom on thè other. As 
regards thè former, Artide 97 ECSC provides that "This 
Treaty is concluded for a period of fifty years.. . As 
regards thè latter, Articles 2 40 EEC and 2 08 Euratom provide 
respectively that "This Treaty is concluded for an unlimited 
period." A recent study based on generai international 
institutional law,—^cogently argues "... that no right of 
withdrawal can be implied in thè case of treaties like ECSC..
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The same view is reached as regards thè EEC and Euratom,
namely that thè aforenoted Articles "... exclude any implied
possibility of unilateral withdrawal" since "... no other
meaning which could be given to these provisions would not
2/make them redundant".—
This juridical argument is curtly dismissed in a politicai 
analysis of thè Community system: Pryce argues that "^T/he 
question of unilateral withdrawal is not dealt with in any 
of (thè Treaties) —  for thè good reason that none of thè 
partners was willing to tie its own hands with regard to 
this matter .... The silence on this means quite clearly 
that each of thè signatories maintains absolute authority 
to take such decision at any point in thè future. The fact 
that thè Treaty of Paris was concluded for a 50-year period 
and thè other two for an unlimited period is irrelevant in 
this context." —^
This legally erroneous statement has a strong measure of
politicai truth behind it. Should a Member State be
determined to withdraw, lack of legai consent from its
partners will not be an insurmountable cbstacle in its way. The generai
Hobbesian maxim that covenants without swords are but words
is accurately reflected by Pryce in his statement that in
thè Community "/t7here is no army to convince a reluctant 
4/partner". — The reai glue that binds thè Community together
is thè bond of common vision and common interest in pursuing
5/what has aptly been called "Alliance Politics". — With­
drawal, even if not accompanied by subsequent economie re- 
taliatory measures, would prove painful to all Member States
at least for a considerable period of adjustment.Weiler, Jo eph H. H. (1982), Supranational law and the supranational system : legal tructure and political process in the 
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Does this mean that thè discussion of withdrawal is 
irrelevant to an understanding of thè supranational sys- 
tem? It is submitted that thè question of unilateral 
withdrawal is politically futile. Unlike pre-World War 
II practice, it is rare in thè life of contemporary in­
ternational organisations for states to withdraw their 
6/membership.— The more common pattern is one of selec- 
tive compliance by states with those duties and obliga­
tions of membership which seem to conflict with national 
interests. Given thè wide range of duties and obliga­
tions which flow from Community membership, such a prac­
tice, if successfully adopted, would be lethal to thè 
Communities. Equally common is thè failure of interna­
tional organisations to adopt sanctions against breaches 
or— on those occasions when measures are adopted— to en- 
force them effectively. The essence of what for conven- 
ience I cali thè "all-or-nothing effect" in thè European 
Communities is that whereas Member States retain thè ul­
timate politicai option of withdrawing from thè Communi­
ty and thereby disengaging from their obligations of 
membership (an option which thè process of economie and 
politicai enmeshment has made increasingly difficult but 
not impossible), they are— as long as they opt for mem­
bership— largely unable to practice complete selectiv- 
ity in compliance with Community obligations. I do not 
of course mean that infractions have beccme inpossible; no legai systei
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can guarantee this. Rather thè supranational system of
compliance attaches to international norms thè habit of 
submission associated with national ones and provides in 
cases of breach fairly effective remedies. The "all-or- 
nothing effect" means, above all, thè removai of expediency 
as a primary incentive for compliance with individuai 
measures,and thè replacement of thè virtually voluntary 
character of state obedience which characterizes thè classical 
international legai order with a binding judicial process.
There stili remain, for reasons which will be explained 
below, certain lacunae in thè full realization of thè 
"effect", but it has certainly reached a stage where it can 
be stated as a fundamental of thè supranational system.
We have already noted thè centrai role of thè Court of 
Justice in thè evolution of supranationalism. But thè 
existence of a court as part of thè institutional framework 
of an international organization is not unique and cannot, 
as such, explain thè "all-or-nothing effect", nor can thè 
existence of a compulsory jurisdiction per se be sufficient
*7 /
explanation since— as recently exemplified— — without effec­
tive sanctions submission to thè compulsory jurisdiction and 
subsequent obedience to an award are among thè obligations 
which in thè current state of international law can often be 
flouted with impunity. Rather it is thè entire system of 
judicial review, involving both national courts and thè European Court, whidi
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transnationalizes mechanisms hitherto used only in thè context
8 /of municipal judicial review, — which produces thè "effect".
&. The Functional Division of Adjudicatory Tasks and Judicial 
9/Review —
The Community features a double-limbed system of judicial
review which operates on two levels. Two sets of legislative
acts and administrative measures are subject to judicial
review: a) (thè first limb) those of thè Community legislative
and administrative institutions (principally Council and
Commission) which are reviewable for conformity with thè
provisions and principles of thè Treaties and with an emerging
unwritten higher law based on thè constitutional traditions
of all Member States as well as international treaties such
1 0 /as thè European Convention on Human Rights; — ' and b) (thè
second limb) acts of thè Member States which are reviewable,
in accordance with thè principle of supremacy, for conformity
with Community law itself. Needless to say, in thè context
of compliance of Member States with Community obligations,
1 1 /effective review of thè latter set is thè cruciai issue. —
a. Judicial Review at thè Community Level
Judicial review may take place exclusively at thè level
of thè Community Court. As regards thè first— for our purposes lesi
criticai —  limb, thè organs of thè Community and thè
Member States, as well as individuals, may, in accordance
1 2 /with thè Treaty, — challenge Community acts and measures
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(as well as inaction) directly before thè European Court.
As may be expected thè rules of standing for individuals 
are guite narrowly defined and thè Court has added to this 
narrowness by interpreting them rather strictly. — ^
As regards thè second —  criticai —  limb thè Commission
14/and Member States may, in accordance with thè Treaty, —  
bring an action against a Member State for failure to fulfil 
its obligations under thè Treaty. In generai failure to 
fulfil an obligation may take thè form of inaction in 
implementing a Community obligation or enacting a national 
measure contrary to Community obligations. Although, as 
indicated above, not unique, thè very existence of a non­
optional judicial forum for adjudication of these types 
of disputes sets thè Community above most international
organisations. Moreover, both thè primacy which thè Commission 
has in this procedure*.being charged under Artide 155 EEC with 
ensuring " . . .  that thè provisions of this Treaty and thè 
measures taken by thè institutions pursuant thereto are 
applied"*-and thè procedure under 169, are novel. As noted 
by one commentator, ”^u?nder traditional international 
law thè enforcement of treaty obligations is a matter settled 
amongst thè Contracting Parties themselves. Artide 169, 
in contrast, enables an independent Community body, thè 
Commission, to invoke thè compulsory jurisdiction of thè 
European Court against a defaulting Member State".— ^
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At thè same time thè "intergovernmental" character of
this process and thè consequent limitations on its efficacy
are clear enough. Four weaknesses are particuiarly glaring.
i. The politicai nature of thè procedure
In thè first place, thè decision of thè Commission and/or
Member States to bring an action against an alleged violation 
by another Member State will often be influenced by (other 
extraneous) politicai considerations. The existing problem- 
atics of thè decisional process (as described in chapter 
three) have sensitised thè Commission to any "unnecessary" 
obstacles in getting proposals past Member State Controls. 
Since Directorate Generals within thè Commission are respon- 
sible for thè decisional process vis-à-vis thè Council, this 
responsibility might induce Directorate Generals to prevent 
thè opening of Commission infringement proceedings as this
might have " . . .  adverse effects on thè progress of a par-
16/ticular proposai in Council".—
Moreover, thè Commission, as required by thè infringe­
ment procedure, will strive to reach a friendly settlement 
with thè infringing Member State. This settlement might not 
necessarily fully remedy legally thè infringement.— ^ The 
Commission might be particuiarly reluctant to bring an ac­
tion against a violation committed by a national judicial 
decision. As we shall see, securing thè cooperation and 
confidence of national Courts is a Cardinal objective in thè 
Community1s system of compliance. The psychological damageWeiler, Joseph H. H. (1982), Supranational law and the supranational system : legal structure and political process in the 
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do ne by an action brought against a Member State for
an alleged violation by one of its Courts might be
18/counter-productive.—
ii. The problem of monitoring
Effective supervision by thè Commission dépends
on thè ability of thè Commission to monitor compliance
with Community law. As we shall see in chapter ten
below, given thè vast range of Community measures this
19/has become an impossible task.—
iii. The appropriateness of Article 169 for "small" 
violations
The type of action which is likely to be brought will relate
largely to abject Meirber State failure to inplement a naticnal measure re-
quired by Ocrirunity law or to a gross violation of an existing nomi.
It will be far less suited to review of thè ordinary 
application and enforcement by Member States of Community 
obligations especially as they affect individuals. That 
type of violation becomes normally transparent only through 
cases and controversies affecting individuals. Even if 
alleged violations were brought to thè attention of thè 
Commission, it is unrealistic to expect them to take up 
all but thè most flagrant violations.
iv. The lack of reai enforcement
Finally, although in most cases either thè prospect or 
actual caimencement of infringement proaeedings are sufficient to terminate
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a violation and even more so an actual judgment by thè Cùurt condemning 
thè violation, given thè inter-governmental character 
of this process, a Member State fcund to have failed to 
fulfil an obligation may simply disregard thè judgment 
against it. — ^
b. Judicial Review at National Level
These weaknesses are to an extent remedied by thè review
of both limbs at thè national level, a process possible
through thè functional division of judicial tasks between
thè European Court of Justice and national courts and
which essentially produces thè "all-or-nothing effect". It
is hardly worth mentioning thè fundamental importance of
Artide 177. — ^ This multi-functional Artide provides 
inter alia that when a question concerning either thè 
interpretation of thè Treaty or thè validity and interpretation
of acts of thè institutions of thè Community is raised 
before national courts, thè latter may (and in thè case 
of courts of final instance, must) refer thè issue for a 
preliminary ruling of thè European Court of Justice. Once 
this ruling is made it will be remitted back to thè 
national court which will give, on thè basis of thè ruling, 
thè decision in thè case pending before it. The national 
courts and thè. European Court of Justice are thus integrated 
into a unitary system of judicial decision making. The two 
limbs of judicial review exist on this level as well. A 
referen'ce to thè Court on thè validity of acts of institu­
tions is clearly a mode for judicial review of Community 
acts at thè instance of individuals. One will note that 
thè question of locus standi from thè point of view of thè 
European Court does not arise. Thus it may even be possible 
for an individuai to be denied standing in a direct challengeWeiler, Joseph H. H. (1982), Supranational law and the supranational system : legal structure and political process in the European Community 
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before thè European Court but have thè act reviewed if he 
has standing in accordance with national procedural law.
The individuai will be able to challenge thè Community act 
in thè national courts (Community law being, of course, part
of thè "law of thè land"), whereupon it will be remitted
to thè European Court of Justice for an interpretation on
validity and returned to thè national court for
22/pronouncement. —  Taking then judicial review of Community 
measures as a whole, thè trend, in respect of individuai 
challenges, is one of a restrictive attitude to actions 
brought directly before thè European Court with a shift to 
national courts as thè forum for adjudication, using, when 
necessary, thè preliminarv reference for an interpretation 
or check of validity, of a Community measure. The judicial
practice of restricting standing at thè European level might
be construed as a de liberate measure by thè Court of Justice
to encourage thè integration of national Courts into thè
Community review system. Numerically however challenges to
validity remain stili a small portion of thè cases brought
under Article 177.— ^
Turning to thè second limb concerning thè judicial review 
of national measures for conformity with Community law, thè 
European Court has made astute use of that part of Article 
177 which provides for references on thè "interpretation" 
of Community law. On its face thè purpose of thè procedure 
is to guarantee uniform interpretation of Community law in 
all Member States. However, often thè factual situation 
in which Article 177 is employed is when a litigant pleads 
in thè national court that a rule or measure of nationalWeiler, Joseph H. H. (1982), Supranational law and the supranational system : legal structure and political process in the 
European Community 
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law or an administrative practice, should not be applied 
as ^  -^s contradiction with Community law. On remission 
to thè European Court it renders its interpretation of 
Community law within thè factual context of thè case before it. 
Theoretically, a diVision exists in thè adjudicatory tasks 
of thè two courts: thè European Court states thè law and 
thè national court applies it —  using of course thè principle
of supremacy where necessary —  to thè case in hand. Thus 
thè traditional formula of thè Court is to state that:
... The Court of Justice ruling under Article 177 of thè 
EEC Treaty does not hold that a given national ^Iaw7 is 
incompatible with Community law ... Within thè context 
of thè judicial cooperation established by thè provision 
it is for thè national courts, applying thè fundamental 
rule that Community law takes precedence, to uphold thè 
right, of thè subjects_based, under thè Treaty_itself on 
thè direct effect of ^the provisions concerned? when 
disputes are brought before them by those concerned. 24/
But as usefully concluded in a study on thè role of thè
European Court in judicial review:
It is no secret, however, that in practice, when making 
preliminarv rulings thè Court has often transgressed thè 
theoretical borderline ... it provides thè national judge 
with an answer in which questions of law and of fact 
are sufficiently interwoven as to leave thè national 
judge with only little discretion and flexibility in 
making his final decision. 25/
The Court of Justice must then tread a very delicate 
line. On thè one hand it has to assert as unequivocally as 
possible thè obligations imposed by thè European Community. 
On thè other hand it must respect thè judicial autonomy, 
even thè dignity, of its national interlocutors. In cer­
tain situations this balancing act is not easy to achieve. 
In, say, thè Simenthal decision, thè principle of CommunityWeiler, Joseph H. H. (1982), Supranational law and the supranational system : legal structure and political process in the 
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law seemed so Cardinal that no compromise was possible 
even at thè cost of "antagonising" thè Italian supreme 
Constitutional Court. In two other famous decisions,
Van Duyn and Henn and Derbv, it is my submission that 
thè European Court compromised substantive Community 
law in order not to embarrass thè English High Court 
in thè difficult period of thè Referendum and thè 
House of Lords on its first reference to thè Court. A 
full assertion of Community law in those cases in are­
as to which public opinion was relatively sensitive 
(migration, pornography imports) could have been dam- 
aging to thè relations between thè Courts and perhaps 
even to thè Community as a whole.— ^ Likewise as 
we shall see below, when thè Court does indeed respect 
thè demarcation line between interpretation and appli­
cation, national courts may take advantage and misin- 
terpret thè European Court's interpretation (Santillo).
What is important in thè procedure, indeed cru­
ciai, is thè fact that it is thè national court albeit 
acting in tandem with thè European Court
which gives thè formai final decision on thè compatibility 
of thè national measure with Community law. The main 
result of this procedure is thè binding effect and enforcement 
value which such a decision has on a Member State —— coming 
from its own courts —  as opposed to a similar decision 
handed down from Luxembourg by thè European Court of JusticeWeiler, Joseph H. H. (1982), Supranational law and the supranational system : legal structure and political process in the European Community 
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wearing its inter-governmental hat. This then is a 
procedural dimension of thè Constitutionalization of thè 
Treaties since through ìt thè rule cf law —  of which thè
habit of obedience, even of thè state itself, to thè rulings
of courts is probably thè most fundamental aspect —  is
2 6 /incorporated into thè supranational system. — 7 The quest
for an effective law of nations in thè traditional international 
legai order has been characterised by thè creation of a succession of 
international courts, tribunals, arbitration bodies and other
judicial and quasi-judicial fora. With a few exceptions
these bodies have all been victims of thè inherent weakness
of thè rule of law on thè international piane. International
jurisprudence, with all thè attention it receives from
scholars, has remained on thè peripherv of international
law and international relations. By contrast, thè
supranational system —  in a synthesis of international law
and constitutional law -- puts thè inherently stronger
national system in thè service of thè transnational order.
Retuming thus to thè centrai theme of this study we can
observe a doublé interaction between law and politics. In
thè first place we have thè politicai consequence of thè
special procedure for judicial review as found in Article
177: thè inability of a state to disobey its own Courts.
That itself however would probably not have sufficed 
since it was primarilv thè judicial rendering of thè concept 
of "interpretation" as found in that Article which 
converted it into thè instrument of compliance which it 
has become. But we can go even further by linking our 
present analysis of thè system of compliance to thè earlier 
analysis of thè evolution of normative supranationalism.
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The fur.ctional utility of Article 177 in this context 
depends, naturally enough, on thè direct effect of thè 
Community source of law that can be invoked in thè national 
forum. The clear policy of thè Court to expand thè 
boundaries of direct effect virtually transforming thè 
concept into a rule of interpretation applicable to 
practically all thè sources of Community law, has been no 
less instrumentai in boosting thè system of compliance to 
its current relative strength.
C ■ ££, Nothinc: The Limitations
The above analysis helps to bring to light thè cur­
rent limitations and lacunae in Judicial Review under Ar­
ticle 177. Four main limitations might be mentioned.
First, it is clear that not all issues involving al- 
leged violations of Member States' Community obligations 
can become case-and-controversies involving individuals.
Many obligations do not produce direct effect and rest in 
thè province of intergovernmental relations, violation of 
which remains a matter for thè Commission and Member 
States.
Second, even in matters potentially involving individuals there will exist
inevitable "access-to-justice" barriers to overcome.
Ignorance of thè European rights, thè increased cost and 
time which thè two tier litigation involves (thè procedural
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price of thè system of compliance) and thè fragmentary 
diffuse character of thè rights which might entail a very 
low stake for any one individuai (in Costa v. ENEL thè 
controversy involved a sum of approximately one Pound 
sterling) are thè more obvious barriers.
Third, thè use of Artide 177 as a rnetbod for judicial review of
Member State compliance will depend on thè acceptance
by national courts of thè utility and/or duty to make
references. The practice in this respect although en-
27/couraging is not complete.—
Final ly, preliminary rulings, once re ceived by thè referrine court must b
followed both by that court and thè national administration.
Here as well thè system displays certain breaches either 
overt as in thè case of thè Conseil d ’état or of a more 
suòtle kind.
We may now return to our early discussion of judicial 
review which takes place at thè European Court level (and 
principally thè procedure for state compliance under Arti­
d e  169). In analysing that procedure we noted its novel 
features, aJl&j thè officiai role of thè Commission
and thè binding jurisdiction of thè Court (which is not 
open to reservation). We noted however several weaknesses 
(politicai influence, -problerrs of monitoring, thè irrele- 
vance of thè procedure to minor infringements, and thè 
lack of enforcement mechanisms) . The analysis of Artide 
177 review procedure illustrated how these weaknesses were 
remedied in part or in full. Now we can see however how
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thè weaknesses of thè 177 procedure may be remedied—  
in part or in full— by thè procedure at thè European 
level:
- violations which do not involve case and con- 
troversies and thus can not give rise to indi­
viduai actions come, ipso facto, under thè ju­
risdiction of thè Commission which can then 
prosecute them.
- Access-to-justice problems can be alleviated 
if thè Commission picks up a case thè exist- 
ence of which it has become alerted to by in­
dividuai action (or, indeed, complaint).
There is scope to investigate potential for 
Commission subsidy of cases brought by indi­
viduals .
- The Commission cannot of course intervene di­
rectly in thè practice of courts making refer- 
ences or in faithful application of thè inter- 
pretation given by thè Court of Justice. But 
failure to implement faithfully could in it- 
self become a ground for subsequent proceed- 
ings under 169 especially if thè administra­
tive or legislative practice at thè source of 
thè individuai action is not eradicated. In
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this sense thè Commission can avoid an action 
concerning directly a national judicial abuse.
We see then how thè two levels of judicial review com­
bine and complement each other so as to minimise thè 
weaknesses to be found in each singly.
There is one more dimension worth mentioning in 
thè context of compliance. I have so far placed main 
emphasis on thè system for ensuring compliance of Mem­
ber States with their Community obligations. I have 
paid less attention to review by thè Court of Justice 
of thè legality and "constitutionality" of Community 
measures. There is an indirect important connection 
between thè two. In chapter seven I shall, in a dif­
ferent context, analyse thè evolution by thè Court of 
Justice of a higher law of human rights by which to 
review Community law. My suggestion is that thè firm- 
er thè Controls imposed by thè Court of Justice on thè 
Community organs seem to thè national courts to be, 
thè easier it may become to persuade these national 
courts to partake in thè new judicial structure, to 
accept thè authority of European Law and respect thè 
Cardinal role of thè European Court itself.
Once again I have to emphasise that thè
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emergence of an "all-or-nothing" effect does not eliminate 
thè problem of Community law infraction. A binding system 
of judicial review is at best a necessary condition for a 
high level of legai observance. In addition thè system will 
have to have efficient supervision and policing mechanisms 
so as to bring thè judicial system into operation. Law 
infraction by individuals or even state organs may occur 
even within municipal legai systems where —  at least in
Western democracies —  thè rule of law seems to be an
enshrined principle. In fact thè Community is beginning 
to display a classical tension between thè constitutional 
principle of legality encapsulated in thè reduction of 
voluntariness within thè system of compliance and thè 
policing difficulties resulting from certain veaknesses in 
thè politicai organs. This problem of faithful implementation, 
application and enforcement of thè expanding Community law
and policy will be dealt with in chapter 1 0 .
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1. Akehurst (1979) 32 Current Legai Problems 143.
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(1 963) 39 Br^t^h_Jfearboo]^_ofB!JnternationalB_^aw ^BYBIL?
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128/78 Commission v UK (/?9797 ECR 41 9, 429 and Case 7/71 
Commission v France /1971? ECR. 1 003 . In thè latter case 
thè Court said (dealing with Euratom but in a reasoning 
which can be applied to thè EEC) that "</t7he Member States 
agreed to establish a Community of unlimited duration, 
having permanent institutions invested with reai powers, 
stemming from a limitation of authority or a transfer of 
powers from thè states to that Community. Powers thus 
conferred could not, therefore, be withdrawn from thè 
Community, nor could thè objectives with which such poT.;ers 
are concerned be restaured to thè field of authority of
thè Member States alone, except by virtue of an express 
provision of thè Treaty." For a contrary academic analysis, 
see Dagtoglu, How Indissoluble is thè Community?, in
E^D^Dagtogl^, (§£•)# liii£_§£2]§ì§g;ji_2|=tói_li£2gi§lì 
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3 • R • Pryce , The Politics of thè European Commu­
nity (Butterworths, London, 1973), at 55. Since thè 
Travaux of thè Treaties of Paris and tare have not been released it
is difficult to see how Pryce can be so assertive in his 
submission.
4. Id.
5. "Alliance Politics" is thè refinement of thè "bag 
of sticky marbles" concept. See A. Shonfield, European 
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of Alliance Politics (The University of Essex - Noel Buxton 
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7. See, Case Concerning United States Diplomatic and 
Consular Staff in Tehran (United States of America v Iran) 
(1980) 19 International Legai Materials 555.
8 . See M . Cappelletti , Judicial Review in thè Contem- 
porary World (Bobs Merrill, Indianapolis, 1971), esp. Ch. 
4; and Cappelletti (1978) 23 Rivista di diritto processua­
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9. On thè system of judicial review generally, see 
e.g., thè erudite treatment by H.G. Schermers, Judicial 
Proteetion in thè European Communities (Kluner, Deventer, 
1979); L. Neville Brown and F.G. Jacobs, The Court of 
Justice of thè European Communities (Sweet & Maxwell, 
London, 19 77); G. Vandersanden and A. Barav, Contentieux 
Communautaire (Bruylant, Brussels, 1977). A. lizzane, La 
Corte di Giustizia delle Comunità Eurcpee (E. Jovere, Napoli, 1967). 
Naturally ny treatment here will only sketch thè bare lirrfcs of thè 
ocitplex system.
10. See, Schermers, suora, n 9, i 53 - 8 144 (at 31-80).
11. In this context one may recali thè words of Justice 
O.W. Holmes: "I do not think thè U S would come to an end 
if we lost our power to declare an Act of Congress void.
I do think thè Union would be impeded if we could not make 
that declaration as to thè laws of thè several States." 
Collected Legai Papers 295-296 (Peter Smith, Reprint 1952).
12. E.g., Articles 173, 175, 184, 215 EEC.
13. Cf. Stein and Vining in F. Jacobs, European Law 
and thè Individuai (North-Holland, Amsterdam, 1976) 113.
14. E.g., Articles 169, 170 and 93 EEC.
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1 6 . CJ.DJ._Ehlgrmj|j2g , T^g^go2e_of_thg_Legal_Sgrvice 
of_the_Commission_Q|_^g_g^gggggg_ggggugijjgs_in thè 
Creation_of Community Law (University of Exeter, Exeter,
1981).
17. Cf. Case 80 and 81/77 Paine 1 v Receveur des
Douanes ^19787 £^£^2- 92 7; and see J^tjsher , Ia£2PfiQ 
CQrnmT^itY_Law_and_National_Law (George Alien & Unwin, 
London, 1981)- at 27.
18. Although from thè legai point of view that would
be permissible, see Case 77/69 CoggiiJjign v §§l2 Ìum /?9707
— ===• 237 , 243; Case 8/70 22S3§Ì§i±2D v ^T970? £^9==*
961, 966, where thè Court explicitly refers to thè usage
of thè procedure in cases involving any "constitutionally 
independent” institutions of a Member State.Courts, ex
hvpothesi , come under this rubric. See generally Ch. 10
infra and Evans, supra, note 15. An advocate generai has
suggested, questionaily I submit, that it may only be used
in cases of deliberate breach by a national court. Case
30/77 Bouchereau /T9777 1999, 2020. In any event
thè Commission has been reluctant to use thè procedures
against a Member State. Thus thè Commission has apparently
decided not to bring an action against France in thè wake
of thè decision of thè Conseil d'Etat in thè Cohn-Bendit
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19. See Commission observations in Case 144/77 Coirmission 
v Italian Republic /19787 ECR 1307.
20. See eh. 10 infra for a review of thè practice of 
compliance.
21. Jacobs, When to Refer to thè European Court, (1974)
90 LQR 486 (1974).
22. On thè effect of an invalidity declaration under 
177, see Usher (1981) 6 ELRev 284.
23. The substantive review grounds for legality under
Art. 173 EEC and validity under 177 are largely similar 
although certain slight differences exist. See Schermers, 
supra, n. 9 , at § 371 (at 210-211).
The breadth of thè remedy is also different. Under 
177 which is, strictly speaking, an inter-court procedure 
thè individuali right of arguing his case is more limited. 
There are problems as regards thè ex tunc and erga omnes 
effect of invalidity declarations under Article 177. Cf.
Bebr, 'Remedies for Breach of Community Law: Community Report' 
in FIDE, Reports of thè Ninth Congress, 25-27 September 1980, 
Voi. 1: Remedies for Breach of Community Law (FIDE and Sweet 
& Maxwell, 1980) i 10, 10.6 - 10.6; and see
Case 66/80 ICC v Amministrazione delle. Finanze dello
Stato (not yet reported); and chapter two infra.
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v Denkavit Italiana ^1980/ ECR 1205, Recital 12 of Judgment.
25. Rasmussen (1980) 5 ELRev 112, 115.
Rasmussen's thesis, if correct, lllustrates another
subtle evolutionary trend in thè system of judicial review.
It is not proposed to discuss here all thè various 
advantages and disadvantages that each limb of thè system 
entails. It has e.g., been justifiably pointed out that 
thè 177 procedure for judicial review of Member State actions 
does not allow thè Member States sufficient facilities 
(by comparison to 169-170 EEC procedures) to defend their 
position before thè European Court. See, UK House of Lords 
Select Committee on thè European Communities (1979-80 
House of Lords 23 Report, HMSO). See generally, Rasmussen, 
id., and comprehensive bibliography cited in n 6 therein.
25bis. Cf. Weiler, 44 MLR 91 (1981).
26. In Case 104/79 Pasquale Foglia v Mariella Novello 
</Ì980/ ECR 745 thè Court carne under severe academic criticism 
for rejecting an Italian reference apparently engineered
to produce a ruling in respect of French law. (See e.g., 
Tizzano (1980) 105 Foro It. IV, 256). We should not 
underestimate thè embarrassment of thè Court in having to
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act in thè knowledge that because of thè special 
triangular situation of that case (involving France) thè 
generai normative effect of its judgment would be flouted.
And see now Case 14 0/7 9 Chemical Farmaceutici v DAT (14.1.81);
Case 46/80 Vinai v Orbat (14.1.81); Case 244/80 Foglia v 
Novello (16.12.81) (not yet reported).
2 7. For a useful attempt at analvzing thè different 
pattern of references, see Mortelmans (197 9) 16 CMLRev 
557. See also R. Lecourt, L'Europe des Juges (Bruylant, Brussels, 
1976) 273-283.
28. Thus, thè English Court of Appeal in deciding 
against thè applicant in Secretary of State for thè Home 
Department, ex parte Santillo ^Ì981_7 2 A11ER 917 illustrated 
how, if it "... approves of a rule of English law, no 
amount of EEC law will deflect /it? from giving thè former 
priority." 'European Legai Movement Shows Signs of Strain', 
Financial Times 22.12.1980 at 16. But see, Barav (1981)
6 ELRev 139, esp. at 159. And see chapter ten infra.
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Chapter Five
Law and Politics: Patterns of Interaction
We have seen now three fundamental dimensions of 
Community development: thè evolution of normative
supranationalism which was essentially thè legai 
process of constitutionalisation of thè treaties; thè 
evolution of thè decision making processes, essen­
tially an interplay of politicai organs; and thè de­
velopment of thè system of compliance within which we 
observed a special interplay of thè Community Court 
and its national counterparts but which involved by 
its nature a contact between judicial and politicai 
activity. Let us take first thè two former develop­
ments— normative and decisional supranationalism. Is 
it possible to connect thè two? To suggest some in­
teraction between these two dimensions of thè Commu­
nity?
My tentative answer is positive but thè nature 
of this connection should be carefully qualified.
The evolution of each of thè two dimensions was a 
highly dynamic process. I submit that to a large 
measure each followed its own logie and its own dy­
namics. Thus, for example, once thè Court took thè
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major constitutional leap in Van Gend en Loos there 
was a legai logie enshrined in thè concept of uni- 
formity which led from thè doctrine of direct effect 
to supremacy and preemption. Likewise, with thè 
passage of time, thè increased relevance of thè Com­
munity on^negative integration became felt and
I J Kl^internai developments within thè Member states 
were all factors which gave impetus to thè process 
of diminution of supranational decision making.
To suggest an internai logie does not however 
exclude mutuai impact and influence. The very con- 
stitutional leap mentioned above was undoubtedly 
prompted in part at least by a profound politicai 
conviction on thè Court's behalf that thè concept of 
a "Communi ty" could not develop without a constitu- 
tional basis. This Vision was shared by thè Commis­
sion or, at least, its legai service. For as Stein 
has demonstratedjthe initial concept of thè "special 
legai order" was born in thè Commission and in thè 
unfolding of thè constitutionalisation process thè
Court enjoyed with few exceptions thè support of thè
1Commission. This was important since it meant that 
thè Court's policy even if revolutionary was not 
isolated and enjoyed at least thè support of one of 
thè major politicai organs.Weiler, Joseph H. H. (1982), Supranational law and the supranational system : legal structure and political process in the 
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But I would suggest that one could go even fur- 
ther and find a connection which involves thè total- 
ity of these developments. For, it is submitted, 
thè outcome of thè combined processes represents a 
certain balance of action and reaction, whereby thè 
permeation and expansion of Community influence— ex- 
pansion in breadth expressed by thè growing number 
of fields where Community impact is felt and expan­
sion in depth as expressed by thè approfondissement 
of normative supranationalism— was matched and re- 
sponded to by an ever closer national control exer- 
cised in thè decision making processes. To this ex- 
tent thè approfondissement and diminution may be re- 
garded as antidotes to each other producing, in a 
two-way process, a certain balance by a cyclical in­
teraction of thè judicial-normative process with thè 
political-decisional one. Here then is one dimen­
sion of thè Community formula for attaining an equi- 
librium between whole and part, centripetal and cen­
trifugai, Community and Member States. It is an 
equilibrium which explains a seemingly irreconcila- 
ble equation: a large, surprisingly large, and ef-
fective measure of transnational integration coupled 
at thè same time with thè preservation of strong—
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unthreatened— national Member States. It is this 
equilibrium which may perhaps explain thè overall 
stability of thè system and its resilience to recur- 
ring crises generated within and outside. It ex- 
plains how thè Member States were able to "digest '1 
thè constitutionalisation of thè Treaty and thè nor­
mative evolution unprecedented in other internation­
al organisations. (We shall see below that this Un­
ion of high normative and low decisional suprana­
tionalism may also give a key to reformulating thè 
meaning of thè concept "supranational system").
Shonfield, in his seminai politicai analysis of
thè Community, noted albeit in an unarticulated way,
thè duality. Perplexed, he juxtaposed on thè one
hand " . . .  thè extent to which thè detailed opera-
tion of thè Community powers is today jealously ob-
1 bi sserved and controlled by thè member governments"
2with, on thè other hand, two European Court cases 
which demonstrated thè high level of what I have 
called normative supranationalism. He created thè 
"bag of sticky marbles" metaphor to express this du­
ality and, correctly, sought thè explanation in thè 
substantive features which both draw and repel thè 
members of thè Community: A Community characterised
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on thè one hand by a shared, historical, politicai 
and cultural background which, since repeatedly 
threatened by strife and conflict in thè past and 
finding common economie and politicai exigencies in 
thè present, was and is being pushed and drawn to- 
wards integration. But also a Community which is, 
on thè other hand, equally characterised by a rieh 
diversity which has evolved in a history of separate 
tribai, religious, linguistic, economie and politi­
cai development complete integration of which is 
neither feasible nor desirable.^ The analysis of 
normative and decisional supranationalism comple- 
ments thè substantive explanation of thè "bag of 
marbles" by giving it its structural expression.
But if on one level thè diverging trends repre- 
sent an equilibrium they also create a disequilibri- 
um, since thè divergence can also create a tension 
between thè high level of legai obligation and a 
lower level of politicai commitment. We might ai- 
ready have thè "two speed Europe"• not thè one 
often canvassed between north and south but one 
which transcends thè entire Community. One conse- 
quence of this tension might be a source of thè 
emerging problem of compliance to which we shall re­
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turn in chapter ten.
Further, thè divergence also gives a d u e  to 
another of thè paradoxes and inbuilt contradictions 
of thè supranational system. For, thè diminution of 
thè decisional facet represents thè rejection of thè 
federai option and thè approfondissement of thè nor­
mative facet its affirmation only on one, albeit im­
portant, postulate: thè juxtaposition, in relation
to governance structures in non-unitary systems, of 
this federai option as against an intergovernmental 
one. But if we postulate a different axis, relating 
to thè division of competences and thè content of 
programmes and policies in non-unitary systems, an 
axis on which we would juxtapose thè federai option 
against a centralist one, we would reach opposite 
conclusions. The normative structure and its main 
author thè Court speak thè language of centralisa- 
tion. The concepts of supremacy, direct effect and 
preemption are, naturally, only meaningful in a non- 
unitary arrangement. They do not make sense where a 
single source of authority exists. But their ra- 
tionale in thè supranational system has been based 
on a unitary concept of uniformity, found, sxibstan­
ti vely, in thè notion of one market and, procedural-
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ly, in Article 177 EEC— as well as in thè constitu- 
tionalising Court decisions. By contrast thè deci­
sional decline and thè resurgence of thè Member 
States are, ironically perhaps, an assertion, on thè 
programatic level, of thè federai principle, and thè 
sentiment echoed one of diversity. The divergence 
of thè supranational trends, mirrored in thè tension 
between uniformity and diversity, have important im- 
plications. For thè Court, as we shall see in chap­
ter eleven, it produces challenges, solutions to 
which are not easily found.
As regards thè Commission one has thè impres-
sion that it has not always appreciated that whereas
thè "federai" principle on what we have called thè
normative level is rooted in uniformity, when one
turns to thè programatic level this same principle
calls for a careful consideration of diversity
claims and that an over-centralised ethos by thè
Commission in its programmes (based on thè notion
that Community law must always be one and uniform)
may be an additional factor in burdening thè deci-
4sional process. The divergence between normative 
and decisional supranationalism indicates that many 
of thè tools for integration in thè normative ar-
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moury of thè Communities— even thè more subtle tools, 
like thè directive— are likely to remain underem- 
ployed because of decisional difficulties. In thè 
preparation of new policies and programmes thè Com­
mission will have to shift emphasis. In present con- 
ditions it is no longer sufficient to introduce grand 
programmes for uniform Community policies, based on a 
reasoned presentation of Community needs and poten- 
tials. In relation to each policy thè Commission 
will have to engage in a micro-analysis of thè barri- 
ers to Council decision making, which may vary from 
issue to issue, with a view to presentino programmes 
particularly sensitive to decisional obstacles as 
well as to normative ones. The tolerance to Member 
State variance, especially in positive programmes, 
may also be reassessed with greater circumspection 
being exercised in relation to proposed uniform 
laws.^ This will also mean that where a uniform law 
is necessary a greater insistence could be placed on 
thè integrity of its application. In this context 
thè discussion of committees takes a different turn. 
For what could be seen as a reduction in thè Commis­
sion' s autonomous executive role could be usefully 
employed, by that very Commission, as a device to re­
duce thè decisional barriers. The greater thè in-Weiler, Joseph H. H. (1982), Supranational law and the supranational system : legal structure and political process in the 
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volvement of thè representatives of thè Member 
States, thè less reluctant may they be to new Commis­
sion proposals.
The Commission can, in certain fields, radically 
reassess its own role. Where thè decisional barriers 
seem insurmountable it could abandon, selectively, 
its function as initiator of policies and engage in 
direct-voluntary-contact with thè Member States to 
assist them to develop independent policies which may 
however serve Community ends. We can represent these 
new complex considerations in matrix form.
\rì\ti~QGVtrv\r*t)rìa\ÀSvv\
J 1
/l\
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The 1-2 axis represents thè distinction between high
intergovernmentalism (1) and federalism (2). The A-B
axis represents thè distinction between federai di-
oXversity (A) and centrism (B). Historically we haveA
found thè Court and thè Commission tending towards 
thè lower right corner of thè matrix: a strong re-
jection of thè intergovernmental option but coupled 
with a strong commi tment to uni formi ty, & 0 <\.the con­
cept of one law. By contrast thè Council has tradi- 
tionally been in thè higher left corner. A strong 
insistence on intergovernmentalism with a concomitant 
pressure for diversity. The new trend thè signs of 
which are as mentioned noticeable in thè Commission's 
tolerance of optional measures allowing national dif- 
ferences, in thè Council's increasing usage of thè 
Community framework for new policies which I shall 
analyse in Part Two, and in thè Court’s greater sen- 
sitivity to national diversities (chapter two) show 
perhaps thè beginning of a movement to thè lower left 
hand corner— thè option of Community coupled
with a tolerance of diversity— thè originai federai 
idea. I shall come back to this issue in thè conclu- 
sions.
Relating thè two facets of supranationalism—  
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was made so as to give us an additional tool of anal­
ysis— provides us with a different set of terms of 
reference, albeit a tentative set, with which to ex- 
amine thè jurisprudence of thè Court of Justice and 
thè type of integrationalist philosophy which, as we 
saw above, was at thè basis of its judicial policy. 
The Court's case law and judicial policy may be sub- 
jected to four different orders of analysis.
The first— technical-legal--order is concerned 
with ascertaining thè precise meaning and parameters 
of thè Court's judicial decisions. The recent Cassis 
de Dijon line of cases is stili troubling interpret- 
ers grappling with a new judicial policy.
The second order of analysis is concerned with 
evaluating, in thè strict legai sense, thè correct- 
ness and legitimacy of thè Court's case law. The de- 
bate surrounding thè notion of direct effect as ap- 
plied to directives is an example of this order.
The third order of analysis is concerned with 
thè evaluation of thè Court's case law as regards its 
impact on European legai integration. It hardly 
needs repeating that without thè bold steps taken by 
thè Court, thè most important of which were discussed 
briefly in our analysis of thè evolution of normative
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supranationalism/ thè legai structure of thè Communi­
ty would manifest only a fraction of its present co- 
hesion. So, unlike thè second order of analysis, thè 
terms of reference here go well beyond a strict legai 
evaluation of thè legitimacy of thè Court's judicial 
policy. They are widened to incorporate thè impact
of these decisions on thè generai architecture of thè
6legai order. But even here thè analysis is stili 
confined to an area which flows almost directly from 
thè Court’s jurisprudence. The evaluation, to use 
our terminology, remains at thè level of normative 
supranationalism.
The fourth order of analysis then will try to 
widen thè terms of reference even further. The ques- 
tions which will be asked— and to which, at this 
stage of researeh, only extremely tentative answers 
may be given— concern thè relationship between thè 
Court1s case law and its impact in thè normative 
field on thè one hand and thè decisional facet of su­
pranationalism on thè other. This is, of course, a 
two-way relationship. I do not of course propose to 
analyse all instances of this type of "micro" inter­
action. I believe this avenue of analysis can howev­
er be usefui in relation to most areas of Community 
activity in thè operation of which thè Court has oc-Weiler, Joseph H. H. (1982), Supranational law and the supranational system : legal structure and political process in the 
European Community 
European University Institute                                                                    DOI: 10.2870/67242
io —
casions to intervene. One or two examples should 
suffice. I have already suggested that, in generai, 
in evolving its doctrine of preemption thè Court will 
have been cognizant of decisional difficulties in thè 
Communities' policy and rule making structure. To 
insist on pure preemption and expect it to work ne- 
cessitates efficient centrai organs; thè absence of 
these in thè Community gives one explanation to thè 
pragmatic— less pure--approach adopted by thè Court 
in this instance. It was on thè basis of this analy­
sis that I had argued that what appeared as a retro- 
gressive judicial approach was in fact part of thè 
approfondissement process. One can be even more spe- 
cific. In thè areas of fisheries thè Community for a 
long time now has been striving to adopt a common 
policy. Article 102 of thè first Accession Treaty 
would even suggest thè mandatory nature of such adop- 
tion. But owing to decisional difficulties thè Coun­
cil has not been able to adopt a comprehensive doc­
trine despite "prolongations" accorded by thè Court.
A certain turning point arrived when thè Court had to 
give its decision in May 1 9 8 1 . Faced with this 
politicai paralysis, thè Court could have adopted one 
of two extreme positions. Either acquiesce in polit-
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ical failure and write thè common policy off. Alter­
na ti vely, if its jurisdiction in ERTA, and even 
Kramsr, were followed strictly it could have totally 
preempted any unilateral national policy in this 
field thereby striving to force thè Member States to 
act. But this high measure of legai preemption could 
have yielded two negative results: Firstly, thè fish
and fisheries industries might have suffered from 
such a hiatus in regulation. Secondly, there would 
be a serious danger of defiance by some of thè Member 
States of such a decision. The Court instead adopted 
what I consider a highly imaginative compromise. It 
allowed thè continuation of existing regimes but all 
changes and modifications would have to be subject to 
Commission approvai. Here then was a pragmatic solu­
tion which did not totally obstruct regulation in thè 
field but nevertheless put pressure on thè Member 
States to adopt a policy, since thè power given to 
thè Commission in thè interim period is not liked by 
any of thè protagonists in Council. One sees thus a 
doublé judicial-political action. First it is clear 
that thè Court is aware of thè preemptory devices as 
a consensus forging catalyst. Secondly, thè Court 
has been able to judge correctly thè limits of Commu­
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nity legai obedience and cohesion and has struck thè 
preemption at an intermediate stage. One could at 
this stage only speculate whether thè Court would 
have taken a different approach as regards preemp- 
tion had thè decline in decisional supranationalism 
not occurred.
Looking at thè relationship thè other way round 
we already suggested thè possible negative effect to 
which ERTA may have contributed. One can imagine 
thè policy difficulties if thè Court were called up- 
on to adjudicate in thè debate regarding thè respon- 
sibility for thè expenditure of thè Community budg­
et."^  A "supranational" judicial decision could 
. be countered by a politicai elimination of 
items of expenditure over which control would be de- 
nied to thè Member States.
Let us turn with this mode of analysis in mind 
to thè other co'M\tc.Y?«KN discussed in thè context of 
thè system of compliance— thè relationship between 
thè European Court and national Courts. We may en- 
quire whether thè same type of dialectical process 
tentatively suggested as regards thè normative and 
decisional structure of thè Community may also occur 
in thè relationship between thè Court and its na-
- 2|à -
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tional counterparts. An even greater measure of cau- 
tion is called for in assessing this problem. To be 
sure, negative national judicial attitudes to Commu­
nity jurisprudence are usuaily conditioned by a vari- 
ety of internai factors which have little to do with 
thè posture of thè European Court. But, on occasion, 
a link between Community judicial activism and na­
tional judicial hostility cannot be excluded. It is 
clear that thè Court in Van Duyn failed to convince 
thè Conseil d'état in Coh n-Bendit; that thè logie of 
Rutili in which thè Court stated thè Community claim 
to control national concepts of public policy was 
equally unimpressive to Lord Denning and his col­
leagues in Santillo and that thè Italian constitu­
tional court in Cornavicola was not convinced by 
Sxmenthal. But then, it is only naturai to accept a 
measure of national judicial resistance in thè face 
of some of thè constitutionalising decisions. If thè 
prospect of such resistance were to play a decisive 
role in thè Court's policy making, little of thè nor­
mative edifice would have been created.
At thè same time let us not think that thè Euro­
pean Court has not been aware of thè "politics" of 
judicial cooperation. I have already suggested in 
chapter four that thè substantive decisions in casesWeiler, Joseph H. H. (1982), Supranational law and the supranational system : legal structure and political process in the 
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such as Van Duyn and Henn & Darby were influenced by
a sensitivity to thè delicacy of thè circumstances
and subject matter of thè references. The first dur-
ing thè referendum in Britain for continued EEC mem-
bership, thè second on a subject matter which had thè
potential of public notoriety. Sometimes thè dia-
logue is more compie*. Could it be that thè recent
stepping back in relation to thè direct effect of di­
cirectives (Ratti; Becker) was reaction to thè na­
tional unease spreading from France (Cohn-Bendit) to 
Germany (VAT Directive)? Indeed, could it be that 
this stepping back was not so influenced?
Another well-known dialogue is that relating to 
thè issue of judicial protection of fundamental 
rights. Clearly thè European Court in its jurispru- 
dence (chapter seven infra) was anticipating and re- 
acting to national judicial challenges. In conclu- 
sion then I that on thè whole thè Court has
well adjudged thè impact of its activism and has—  
say, in thè case of direct effect of directives— even 
known when thè time calls for tactical withdrawals.
I believe thè greater perii lies paradoxically 
in judicial inactivism (active passivism), in thè 
fallure to act as a federai adjudicator as regards
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thè substantive expansion of thè Community's juris­
diction. Because of thè peculiar supranational fea- 
tures of thè Community as a non-unitary system, once 
politicai consensus in Council is reached as regards 
jurisdictional expansion this may take place without 
thè usuai problems faced in some federai systems.
For once thè unison of Member States and Community 
interests in thè Council produces thè conditions 
which dampen national resistance. The very sharp 
but largely uncontested increase in thè usage of Ar-
0ticle 235 is evidence of this development. Most of
thè criticism has concentrated on thè undemocratic
nature of thè decision making involved which ex-
cludes national parliaments. To be sure this is a
role which may be given to thè new directly elected
Parliament. The Court, which itself had developed
its own expansive version of implied powers, and
which adopted a very liberal attitude of tacit en-
couragement towards politicai expansion has been
criticised on thè same grounds: as partaking, or
9sanctioning, an -undemocratic process. I shall dis- 
cuss these developments in great detail in Part Two 
of this study.
I wish to shift thè arguments to another level. 
A consistent failure of thè Court to assert itself
- 2)S -
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as a programatic federai adjudicator might not only 
leave doubts as regards thè legai and democratic le­
gitimacy of thè new Community policies as well as 
contributing to an abstract loss of confidence in 
thè European Court by its national counterparts; it 
might have direct effects on thè most hallowed nor­
mative principle— supremacy. The clearest illustra­
ti on of this danger may be found in thè Italian Con­
stitutional Court decision in Frontini. Frontini is 
traditionally read as an affirmation of thè suprema­
cy principle subject to an explicit, if muted, human 
rights reservation. But thè basis of acceptance of 
thè doctrine rested on thè functional division of 
tasks between Member State and Community: " . . .
there is thus made by each of thè Member States a 
partial transfer to thè Community organs of thè leg­
islative function, on thè basis of a precise crite- 
rion of division of jurisdiction by subject matter
indicated analytically in thè second and third parts
10of thè Treaty . . .".
This rationale is echoed in thè jurisprudence 
and constitutional amendments of mcst other Member 
States. Should thè functional division be seen to 
be breaking down without adequate judicial control
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by thè European Court it is difficult to guess what 
shape and depth national judicial resistance might 
take. When thè Court developed its doctrine of fun- 
damental rights its credibility was impaired since 
it was so clearly perceived as a response to a su- 
preinacy challenge rather than a genuine concern with 
human rights. A similar loss in credibility would 
accompany a reactive rather than active__Court doc­
trine as regards jurisdictional limits.
One cannot turn round today and condemn thè 
Court1s activism for any negative impact this may 
have had on thè decisional structure or judicial co­
opera tion. Not only do these two latter develop- 
ments have, as our analysis has shown, independent 
causes to which thè normative evolution was only a 
contributinq factor but without that jurisprudence 
we could hardly have spoken of a Community as we 
know it today; substantive achievements would be 
perhaps no more than, say, thè GATT. Hamson's cri- 
tique that in Van Gend en Loos and its progeny thè 
Court was severing " . . .  thè legai world--thè world
in which it operates— from thè world of what we cali
1 1reai or actual events" may be turned on its head. 
The Court's jurisprudence was inspired perhaps by 
its all too familiar knowledge of that very world inWeiler, Joseph H. H. (1982), Supranational law and the supranational system : legal structure and political process in the 
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which international agreements lacking a normative 
framework have such limited impact. But however 
great thè merits of thè constitutionalising decisions 
it may stili be useful to conclude this section with 
thè profound historical warning so elegantly sounded 
by Daws on :
Judicial agencies have a peculiar power to en- 
list obedience and impose control— essentially 
. ._. because they meet a deeply felt and Con­
stant need for trustworthy neutrals . . . .  But 
there are limits to thè allegiance that judges 
can inspire, as thè experience of France re- 
veals. The judges of pre-Revolutionary France 
became partisans in politicai strife for a rea- 
son that seemed to them persuasive —  that other 
politicai agencies had failed . . . .  In their 
attempt to fili a great gap in French politicai 
institutions they brought disaster on themselves 
and caused a lasting impairment of their own 
function.^ ^
As mentioned above I believe thè Court has perceived 
thè danger and is in what one may cali a period of 
judicial restraint.
The Distinction and thè Union of Normative and Deci­
sional Supranationalism: Theo re tic al Ref lec-
tions
By way of concluding Part One we may return to 
some of thè theoretical problems raised earlier as 
regards thè definition and articulation of thè supra-
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-national order. I think thè distinction between thè 
decisional and normative facets combined with thè 
all-or-nothing principle enshrined in thè Community 
system of compliance may be useful in shedding a dif- 
ferent light on and perhaps even clarifying some of 
those theoretical problems. Five brief observations 
may be made in this context.
First thè distinction and thè different evolu- 
tionary paths alert us to thè danger of adopting mon- 
olithic explanations or characterisations of thè sys­
tem. Studies suggesting an evolution from, say, 
"federai to confederai"^ are correct only on an ex- 
tremely narrow definition of thè concepts employed; 
so narrow as to reduce considerably their explanatory 
utility of a system rich in contradictions.
Although thè distinction between thè two facets 
underlined these contradictions, it enabled us to 
capture thè inevitable processual character and ex- 
press this in a meaningful way: thè evolution of two
diverging trends explicable both independently but 
also by their interaction with one another and their 
ensuing unique balance.
Secondly thè distinction between thè two facets 
of supranationalism explains, at least partially, one
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of thè important reasons for thè cleavage between le­
gai and politicai structural analysis- Lawyers have 
tended to focus on thè normative structure whereas 
politicai scientists have typically avoided this and 
concentrated on thè decisional frameworks. (Natural­
ly, in non-structural analyses, we will have to look 
for similar cleavages between law and economics and 
politicai science with both.)
The third theoretical consideration concerns thè 
issue of sovereignty. The contribution of a purely 
structural analysis to thè sovereignty debate can be 
but limited. The transfer of sovereignty is intri­
cate ly bound to thè weight and importance of thè sub­
stantive areas over which jurisdiction is given, or
14evolves, to thè components of thè system. And yet 
thè distinction between thè two supranational facets 
can articulate with greater precision thè often heard 
politicai notion that participation in thè system 
does not only mean a loss of sovereignty but also a 
gain in terms of thè influence of one state over its 
partners. As we saw it is thè interaction of l©w de­
cisional and high normative supranationalism— espe- 
cially in areas of esclusive Community jurisdiction—  
which explains this phenomenon beyond thè common
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sense but generic observation that it is better to be 
within an important decision making forum than out- 
side it. One Member State, even a small one, through 
thè power of veto (low decisional) may influence im­
portant dimensions of, say, thè agricultural or fish- 
eries policies through thè inability of thè other 
partners to adopt unilateral measures (high norma­
tive) . This direct influence extends beyond that 
possible in thè normal international context. The 
1981 British veto of thè Fisheries Agreement with 
Canada is a recent example. To be sure, there would 
be a politicai price to be paid for continuous ob- 
structionism, but thè explanation of thè very possi- 
bility is I think sharpened by understanding thè dis­
tinction between thè two facets.
Fourthly, thè distinction between thè two facets 
proved a means by which to identify thè two inter- 
secting and oft contrasting axes along which thè Com­
munity is oscillating as a non-unitary system: The
intergovernmental-federal axis and thè centralised- 
federal one. The tension which this produces in
terms of thè competing claims of uniformity and di-
15versity will have their effects in years to come.
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Finally, for what is perhaps thè most far rèach- 
ing, and hence tentative, conclusion we must consider 
thè union rather than thè distinction between thè two 
facets in combination with thè "all-or-nothing ef­
fect". For in this union, with its unequal weight- 
ing, we may possibly find thè underlying principles 
of what we mean when speaking of a supranational sys­
tem. In many international organisations we find a 
measure of decisional supranationalism. In thè UN 
itself there is a surprisingly high measure manifest 
in, say, thè voting rules of thè General Assembly, 
thè Security Council (with thè known exceptions) and 
thè various committees and affiliated organs, as well
as in thè independent role of thè Secretary Gener- 
1 6al. What is crucially lacking--and which accounts 
for thè weakness of that organisation— is any reai 
measure of normative supranationalism. By con­
tras t, any multipartite treaty with self-executing 
measures among monist states will display at least a 
measure of this normative character but to thè exclu- 
sion of thè decisional facet. It is thè union of thè 
two within one framework which distinguishes struc- 
turally thè supranational order from other intema- 
tional organisations. The different weighting and
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especially thè low level of thè decisional facet— ag- 
gravated by thè process of diminution— sets thè sys- 
tem apart from non-unitary (federai) states. For in 
these states, thè separate tiers of centrai and (raem- 
ber) state power with thè independent source of popu- 
lar legitimacy and functional allocation which thè 
former enjoys, always result in a high centrai deci­
sional level. Likewise if thè "all-or-nothing ef­
fect", with all its current lacunae, is a valid char- 
acterisation of thè system of compliance (a necessary 
component in any organisational analysis) then we may 
have found thè complementary principle of thè supra­
national order. For it is clear that thè "all" mech- 
anisms are precisely those lacking from other inter­
national organisations whereas thè politicai option 
of unilateral pacific withdrawal expressed in thè 
"nothing" option, is unavailable in non-unitary 
states. Extrapolating from thè Community experience, 
thè union of thè normative and decisional facets and 
all-or-nothing compliance may provide a new economi- 
cal way of structurally expressing thè concept of a 
supranational system.
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Notes
Stein, 75 AJIL 1 (1981) .
A. Shonfield, Europe : Journey to an Unknown Des-
tination (Alien Lane 1972) 10.
-  22.4-
I believe Shonfield was alluding to Case 4 8/71 
Commission v Italian Republic /1972/ ECR 5 32;
Case 48/69 Commission v I C I /197_2/ ECR 649 .
Shonfield, supra, n. 1, 17.
For criticism of this ethos, explicit and implic- 
it, see e.g. Annex 3 to Three Wise Men Report 
82-83.
The legislative programme is at times sensitive 
to this cali for diversity even within "uniform" 
laws. See, e.g., Artide 5 of Council Directive 
75/129 on appro.ximation of laws relating to col- 
lective redundancies OJ 1975 L 48/29. ("This Di­
rective shall not affect thè right of Member 
States to apply or to introduce laws, regulations
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-or administrative provisions which are more fa- 
vourable to workers.") See also Council Direc­
ti ve 77/187 and Council Directive 72/160.
6 . An excellent study is C .J . Mann, The Function of 
Judicial Decision in European Economie Integra-
-  - - - .................. .....................
tion (M. Nijhoff 1972). See also A.W. Green, Po­
liticai Integration by Jurisprudence (Sijthoff 
1969).
6 bis. See Case #64 \\$ ^
7. For thè debate as to who is responsible for Com­
munity expenditure, see FIDE, Reports of thè 
Ninth Congress, 25-2 7 September 1980, Voi 3^: 
Possible Areas of Conflict between C o it o t i  uni ty In­
sti tutlons in thè Implementation of Communi ty Law 
(FIDE and Sweet & Maxwell 1980) esp. Ehlermann § 
3, at 3.13 - 3.22.
8 . This expansion is brilliantly traced by Tizzano, 
Lo Sviluppo delle Competenze Materiali delle Co-
r  i ■
munita Europee 21 Rivista di Diritto Europeo 139
(1981).Weiler, Joseph H. H. (1982), Supranational law and the supranational system : legal structure and political process in the 
European Community 
European University Institute                                                                    DOI: 10.2870/67242
-9. See e.g. Giardina, The Rule of Law and Implied 
Powers in thè European Communities 1 Italian 
Yearbook of International Law 99, 103 (1975) .
10. 1974/ 2 CMLR 372, 385 (emphasis added) . The 
Italian Court further mentions that thè Community 
subject matter must correlate to thè generai aims 
of thè Treaty but this cannot be read as sanc- 
tioning Wholesale expansion.
11. Hamson, Methods of Interpretation - A Criticai 
Assessment of Results, Judicial and Academic Con- 
ference (Court of Justice of European Communi­
ties, Luxemburg, 1976) II.9. Cf. Kutscher:
"There is no foundation for thè view that thè 
Court's decisions which lean in favour of inte­
gration have gone too far ahead of politicai re- 
alities." Id., 1.47.
12. J.P. Dawson, The Oracles of thè Law (Greenwood 
Press, Westport, reprinted 1978) XVI.
13. Cf. Taylor, The Politics of thè European Communi-
ties: The Confederai Phase 2 7 World Politics 336
(1975). Naturally I do not claim that thè pres-
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ent study has avoided all disciplinary gaps.
Its structural nature for example excludes most 
discussion on thè mainstream theories of Europe­
an integration. A fairly recent assessment of 
thè state of thè art is Haas, Turbulent Fields 
and thè Theory of Regional Integration 30 Inter­
national Organlzation 173 (1976).
14. For a recent analysis by a lawyer, albeit in re­
lation to a limited number of fields, which has 
examined this transfer is J. Usher, European
*■' 1 r .........
Community Law and National Law (George Alien & 
Unwin, London, 1981) esp. eh. 3. L.N. Lindberg 
and S .A. Scheingold (eds.), Regional Integra­
tion, Theory and Research (Harvard UP, Cam­
bridge, Mass., 19 71) is an outstanding contribu- 
tion which complements legai studies by offering 
means of measuring thè impact. See esp. studies 
by Lindberg, 45-127 and Schmitter, 232-264.
15. Jacobs has neatly captured this tension in his
characterisation of thè system as a symbiosis 
between thè various elements: supranational,
integrational and federai. Jacobs, Florence 
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16. See e.g. L. Gordenker, The UN Seeretary-General 
and thè Maintenance of Peace (Columbia UP, New 
York, 1967) and Cox, The Executive Head an Essay 
on Leadership in International Organization 2 3
----------------------------------------------------------------- .------------------
Int. Organ. 265 (1969). A useful theoretical 
discussion of determinants of influence may be 
found in E.B. Haas1 classic Beyond thè Nation- 
State: Functionalism and International Organi­
zation (Stanford UP, Stanford, 1964) 119 ff.
17. This is not to deny thè positive influence thè 
UN may have on thè development of law and legai 
compliance but to suggest thè voluntary, non-ju- 
dicial nature of thè UN system. See thè bal- 
anced analysis of Henkin, International Organi- 
zation and thè Rule of Law 23 Int. Organ. 656,
664 and 680 ff. (1969).
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Powers and Competences
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In Part One of this study I dealt at some 
length with thè vertical relationships (concerning 
actors and thè decision making process as well as norms)
between thè Member States and thè centrai organs of 
thè Community. The analysis of normative and 
decisional supranationalism enabled us inter alia 
to explain some of thè apparent contradictions of 
thè system and to understand better a complex 
structure in which law and politics interact in a 
manner which retains its uniqueness among international 
organizations and associations of states.
However any analysis of a non-unitary system 
cannot be complete without a horizontal examination 
of thè relationships focussing on thè distribution 
of powers and substantive competences between thè 
generai, federai or transnational, organs and thè 
constituent parts. The importance of thè horizontal 
analysis is explicable in tv/o related ways. Firstly, 
an international organization may have highly 
developed supranational structures and processes 
and yet remain of marginai significance if its sphere 
of operation— its jurisdiction covers a very limited
and relatively unimportant area.------------------^
---—---------- -— -----> Thus thè dynamics of
jurisdictional change, thè legai (normative) and
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political (decisional) potential of thè supranational 
structure to adapt to different substantive exigencies 
is no less ixr.portant to our enquiry. Secondly, within 
non-unitary states thè constitutional elexnents of 
supremacy, direct effect and preemption —  thè 
judicial evolution of which so dramatically characterised 
thè Community —  are usually determined by a written 
constitution either explicitly or may be found implied 
therein. They are rarely subject to per se challenges 
or controversy. Rather, thè classical federai debate, 
has focussed on thè demarcation line between federai 
and state competences or, in other words, thè substantive 
areas in which thè federai government is permitted to 
exercise its power backed up by thè principles of 
supremacy, direct effect and preemption. The 
horizontal relationship is thus cruciai to an 
understanding of both non-unitary international 
organizations and states. Whilst remembering that this 
vertical-horizontal taxonomy is designed only as an 
analytical tool enabling us to look in different ways 
or from different angles at thè same phenomenon, we 
should not be surprised if thè images that emerge by 
using these tools are themselves different. Thus, to 
give but one example, whereas in terms of vertical 
relationships supremacy emerged as a necessary
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principle whereby federai law overides Member State 
law, on thè horizontal piane thè same principle will 
have to be expressed as a concurrent supremacy of 
state and federai law each applicable within its own 
j jurisdiction. The rule of supremacy can thus no longer te
Iframed as Eederal/transnational law is supreme to member state 
---------- -j
law1but rather federal/transnational law and member 
state law are supreme in their respective spheres of 
competences. How that sphere of competences is 
determined, whether it is static or dynamic and v/ho 
determines its reach will be among thè questions which
I shall examine in this part of thè study.
It is thè interaction of thè two visions, 
horizontal and vertical, which may give us a 
comprehensive view of thè structure of thè non-unitary 
system. As mentioned above in non-unitary states 
vertical relationships are determined by thè 
Constitution a fact which usually forecloses thè 
potential for problems on this level. By contrast 
much of thè legai history of federalism in these states 
is concerned with either thè shift in, or stagnation of, 
thè distribution of competences. And much of thè 
political-economic history of thè federai aspects of 
these systems has been concerned with tracing on thè 
one hand thè effect which distribution of power between
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federai government and thè states might have had on
politicai economy and, on thè other hand, with thè
extra-legal means (usually taxation and dispensation of 
1 /resources) — devised by federai governments to
2  /circumvent juridical jurisdictional limits. — Since
this study is concerned primarily with structure and
process it becomes of lesser importance for us to try
and list thè actual demarcation of powers and
jurisdiction within thè Community. Rather I shall
try to explore thè principles which govern this
distribution of competences and above all thè dynamics
which determine this distribution.
Traditionally, thè horizontal relationship in non-
unitary systems is conceptualised by thè doctrine of
enumerated powers and therefore it will be thè
manifestation of this doctrine in thè Community system
which will be thè main focus of this part of thè study.
As a doctrine, enumerated powers often expresses a
belief in thè importance of preserving thè originally
struck balance between transnational (or federai) and
national (Member State) interests. Since in our
analysis of normative and decisional supranationalism
we saw thè tenacity by which thè governments of thè
Member States sought to preserve that balance in relation
3/to thè vertical relationship, — we could expect that in 
thè horizontal sphere, in relation to enumerated powers,
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thè Community would follow/federai models in which
enumerated powers were treated as strict and formally
loose and thus 
preserved (Canada) rather than/dissipated (USA). And
yet examination of thè evolution of thè Community reveals, 
in a system already rich in contradictions yet another 
interesting doublé paradox. In thè first place we can 
detect a steady trend whereby thè entire complex of 
principles which would normally (and in fact did 
originally) underpin a system of enumerated powers 
is in thè process of being dismantled. The result of 
this process has been to open up thè system and create a 
potential for expansion unparalleled even in most major 
federai states. If enumerated powers remain they do so 
as a hollow rather than hallowed principle. My first 
purpose in this part of thè study will be therefore to 
trace, and evaluate, thè legai process whereby these 
principles have been eroded enabling thè potential for 
expansion to emerge. The paradox deepens if we move to 
thè politicai level. For this development has not 
remained in thè realm of potential. Indeed on thè level 
of practice as noted by a leading commentator, thè 
Community system has, for some time,been showing "... una 
tendenza fortamente espansiva delle competenze Comunitarie, 
con risultati tali, anzi, da superare talvolta perfino
4 /le previsioni dei più generosi osservatori". — But, 
whereas in other federai systems similar expansive
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-processes or tendencies were often at thè root of
fierce politicai strife between federai government and
thè states, in thè Community these often dramatic
mutations have been achieved with a surprising
measure of equanimity not to mention connivance on thè
part of thè governments of most Member States. So,
my second purpose will be to try and explain why in
a system thè vertical developments of which might
have suggested a strong resistance to such an erosion
in both thè principle and practice of enumerateci
powers, we have in fact this politicai support. In
fact I believe that thè explanation must and can be
found in that very same supranational character of
thè Community. Finally I shall try and examine some
of thè legai and politicai implications of these
phenomena as regards thè future development of thè
Community. For whereas these developments may be
considered encouraging for thè process of European 
they may also,
Integration,/to thè extent that they are not matched
by corresponding developments of a constitutional
and decisional character, provoke a host of
problems and dangers to thè democratic character of
thè Community to thè legitimacy of thè judicial and
politicai processes and in thè long run they might
even pose a danger to thè very supranational structure
of thè Community itself.
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Footnotes
1. See e.g. Soberman in Florence Project.
2. But c. £• Heller who challenges somewhat this 
traditional history as applied to thè U.S.A. experience. 
Heller, F^gr^nce_Project.
3. See Chapter 3 supra.
4. Tizzano, Lo sviluppo delle Competenze Materiali 
delle Comunità Europee, 21 
139, 140 (1981).
Weiler, Joseph H. H. (1982), Supranational law and the supranational system : legal structure and political process in the 
European Community 
European University Institute                                                                    DOI: 10.2870/67242
Weiler, Joseph H. H. (1982), Supranational law and the supranational system : legal structure and political process in the 
European Community 
European University Institute                                                                    DOI: 10.2870/67242
- ATI-
==“ i=========i=i==^---J-5l-P-i---à__Eowers : The_Strict_and
Doctrines
No one can doubt that this distribution ... 
of legislative powers between thè Dominion 
and thè Provinces ... is one of thè most 
essential conditions,_probably thè most 
essential condrtion </in thè Canadian federai 
arrangement? .•. while thè ship of state 
now sails on larger ventures ... she stili 
retains thè waterfight compartments which 
are an essential part of her originai 
structure.
Lord Atkin, Attomey General 
for Canada v. Attorney 
General for Ontario /1937? 
|“.t. 32 6 (Ì>.C.)
Let thè end be legitimate, let it be within 
thè scope of thè"'Constitution, and all 
means which are appropriate, which are 
plainly adapted to that end, which are not 
prohibited, but consist with thè letter and 
spirit of thè Constitution, are constitutional.
Marshall C.J., McCulloch v. 
Maryland 17 U.S. (4 VJheat. ) 
316, 421 (18T9T.
A. The Ideology of Enumeration
In thè above tv/o statements which must be thè most
1 /well-known (and often abused - ) judicial pronouncements
on implied powers
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are encapsulated thè two poles between which thè
debate on enumeration in non-unitary system
\takes place. The contrast between these statements on thè
change of thè distribution of powers in federai states may
1 of course be attributable to thè differences in thè
constituent instruments establishing Canada and thè 
2/USA — as federai systems. In addition, these different
approaches may be traced to thè different style and
self-perception of their authors: thè US Supreme Court
and thè British Privy Council. —^ Be that, for thè time
being, as it may, they highlight an inevitable tension
which exists in any non-unitary arrangement and which
arises in a particuiarly interesting, and often distinct,
fashion in thè Community system.
i different levels.
By their very nature thè V  of government in
non-unitary arrangements must operate a division of
A
ends , and powers. The distinction between
different non-unitary systems may be explained by 
reference to this division. We may classify thè 
different systems by reference to three characteristics 
by which ends and means^^^V^enumerated.
1. There may be a difference in thè direction 
and source of attribution from centre to 
periphery or vice versa. Thus in a system of
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regional government thè centre will typically
devolve powers on thè regions. The regions1
powers will be enumerated and all residuai
(inherent) powers will be retained by thè centrai
government. By contrast in a confederation and
'Aitai, ^international organizations thè constituent 
members (thè periphery) will bestow competences 
on thè centrai organs and retain themselves thè 
residuai powers.
2. There may be differences in thè legai status
i_pcvflers.,
of enumeratài'Y' The demarcation may form part of
thè constitutional order and thus become more or
less entrenched or, by contrast, it may result
from a simple legislative act and be subject to
Vchange with greater ease. —
3. Finally thè actual division of powers and 
competences rationae materiae between thè different 
tiers of government will separate one non-unitary 
system from another. In some systems foreign 
relations will, say, be conducted entirely by
thè centrai organs and in others thè constituent 
member will partake in thè process.
The methodological utility of these formai 
distinctions is twofold. It enables us to achieve 
a comparison which may be extended to all systems -
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whether national or transnational. As we shall 
presently see this comparative potential between thè 
national and transnational will enable us to understand 
better thè politicai rationale behind thè insistence 
on enumerated powers as a Cardinal principle of any 
federai arrangement (including thè Community) and 
thereby also explain why under certain conditions 
(which, in part, now prevail in thè EEC) this 
resistance is misconceived. More importantly, thè 
formai distinctions raise certain politicai expectations 
and legai presumptions. Thus, we would not expect 
that a region which enjoys non-entrenched devolved 
powers will be able significantly to exceed thè 
competences attributed to it. Or, more cautiously, 
that a federai government or transnational organs 
v/hose powers are enumerated will be able to transcend 
thè enumeration without certain important constitutional 
mutations even if these are not transacted through
nomai consti tutional amendment.
( By all these indicia.»
X thè classical analysis of thè Community and its
constituent instruments would suggest a system strongly
leaning towards a restrictive approach to enumeration.
5 /There is Virtual unanimity among writers — that thè 
Community does not enjoy inherent powers; thè 
establishment of thè EEC must, so common wisdom tells 
us, be seen against thè failure of attempts to construct
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thè EDC and thè growing disenchantament of thè Member 
States with thè supranational characteristics of thè
Treaty of Paris. Indeed thè term supranationalism
was dropped freni thè Treaty of Fcme. TVie direction of enumeration 
was from thè Member States to thè Ccmunity. In thè EEC 
specific er.ds were bestowed gitani thè Community
and enumerated in its first 3 Articles towards thè
execution of which limited powers, elaborated
throughout thè remainder of thè Treaty were granted. 
^possible intended
TheHfirnmutabi 1 ity of this originai arrangement 
is suggested by thè creation of ----------- - - -----
C /_____an extremely cumbersome amending mechanism. —
Finally, thè actual enumeration was limited primarily 
to thè trade and commerce field excluding large 
segments of economie policy (e.g. currency, taxation) 
let alone such areas as defence and education.
Utilizing thus thè three irrìicia thè Community 
emerges as a relatively tightly closed system, thè 
mutation of which would be expected to encounter severe 
difficulties.
However, an insistence on relying on these three 
formai indicia of attribution as a descriptrve tool in 
classifying and seeking to understand thè variety of 
non-unitary systems can be dangerous. Formai 
attributions are often no more than an initial point
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of departure. For we know that in dynamic systems
rarely, if at all, have thè originai compétence
d 1attribution remained intact. The dry provisions
of constitutions, legislative acts and treaties
distributing powers between different levels of
government are in a sense like a stili photograph
of a living organism at birth. With thè passage of time;though
thè organism may retain seme essential gene tic traitsj>
Chis character changes substantially.
I have already alluded to thè expansive nature of
thè Community. What is remarkable is that for thè
most part thè Community process of jurisdictional
change and adaptation -- rememfcering that we are not
concerned with thè day to day implementation of thè
Treaties, but with those changes which affect thè
division of powers and competences between thè
Member States and thè Community -- has occurred
largely without recourse to thè formai mechanism for
Treaty (Constitutional) amendment, and contrary to thè
presumptions which thè formai characteristies of
Community enumeration would suggest. Since we are
interested precisely in this process of change it
would be only slightly more interesting to attempt
to give an up-to-date description of thè distribution
of competences, functional or institutional, as they
appear today at thè beginning of thè fourth decade of
Community life. Such a description, valuable as it
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may be in ascertaining thè legality or otherwise of
a specific act of thè Community or in determining
thè permissible parameters of a new policy will give
us only little insight into thè process of thè
expansion. To thè stili photograph of thè young
organism at birth one will simply have added another
one at maturity. Far more interesting and revealing
will be an analysis which will explain thè instruments
and tools, thè means and ways, by which, in relation
to thè delicate substantive and institutional
demarcation lines drawn between Member States and
thè Community, thè system was (and is) able to adapt
itself to thè changing economie, politicai and social
environment both internai and external. Such an
instrumentai analysis may, if successful, not only
provide us with a "cinematographic tool" not tied to
any specific moment in thè evolution 4^ thè Community
i
but will also constitute an interesting prism by which 
to examine thè interactions of politicai forces and 
legai principles in thè Community.
If thè three formai indicia of enum^ration 
themselves are only partially relevant in explaining 
thè actual life of non-unitary systems and as a means
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of predicting in practice expansive developinents, 
we are compelled to search for a deeper underlying 
principle. In search of this principle let us return 
momentarily to thè North American experience. In 
two recent statements by acknovrledged academic
^respectively„
of Canada and thè USÀ">tfe ~may find a key to this 
deeper principle. Professor V7ade in thè context of 
thè Canadian scene suggests that
The essential elements of a federai 
constitution are that powers are divided 
between thè centrai and provincial govern­
ments and that neither has legai power to 
encroach upon thè domain of thè other, 
except through thè proper process of con­
stitutional amendment .... /f?he spirit 
... which is inherent in thè whole federai 
situation /is/ that neither side, so to 
speak, should have it in its power to 
invade thè sphere of thè other. 2 /
By contrast, Professor Sandalow, reflecting a 
different American reality in thè USA suggests that
The disintegrative potential of 
/questions concerning thè legitimacy of 
governmental action? is especially great 
when they involve thè distribution of authority 
in a divided or federai system .... If Congress 
determines that a national solution is 
appropriate for one or another economie issue, 
its power to fashion one is not likely to be 
limited by constitutional divisions of power 
between it and thè state legislatures. 8/
Certainly as I suggested above these two statements 
may be explicable by reference to possible differences 
in thè formai characteristics of thè U.S. Constitution
experience
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and thè British North American Act as interpreted
in thè two jurisdictions. But they also disclose
a principled difference in thè value attributed to
enumerated powers as part of thè federai architecture
of thè two systems —  a difference between ends and
means, functions and values. In thè Canadian system
thè very division of powers is considered as a per se
v devided,value—as an end in itself. The\Ttorm of governance
is regarded cn par with thè other fundamental purposes
of a government such as obtaining security order and
t strict
welfare. This approach may be called thèTaPproach to 
enumerated powers. In thè United States, as they 
have evolved, thè federai distribution retains its 
constitutional importance but, in thè practice of 
that system and in thè doctrine of its Supreme Court, 
there is a tendencv to subject that principle of 
division to higher values and to render it as a 
useful means for achieving thè higher aims of tne 
American Union. To thè extent that thè division 
becomes an obstacle for thè achievement cf such aims 
(such as thè preservation of thè Union), it will 
give way and not be held sacrosanct. This may be 
called thè functional approach to enumerated powers.
To be sure this dichotomy is not total. We find strands 
of each in both systems. Eut as generai trends thè 
dichotomy of ends and means, function and purpose of
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these two differing spirits of enumerations, retains, 
I believe, a validity in characterizing thè two 
paradigmatic experiences. We must remember that 
thè evolutioi} of, or resistance to, one of these 
two orientations is a process which will happen over 
time and only gradually become part of constitutional 
doctrine.
Perhaps we can try and go even deeper and
enquire why is it that enumeration as a form of
govemance should be regarded an end in itself —
an act of faith. In this context thè comparison
between internai enumeration (regionalisation) and
extemal enumeration (federalism/transnationalism)
which I mentioned before becomes relevant. As Mény
9/cogently argues — thè drive for regionalism is 
explicable by reference to two dimensions: thè 
cultural and thè democratic. The cultural dimension 
is concerned with thè preservation of cultural 
diversity expressed in this broadest forms such as 
language, ethnic customs and particularist history. 
Regionalism seeks to give territorial expression to 
this diversity. The centralist state often opposes 
thè movement precisely because of its concem Vnational 
unity and centrai domination. The democratic
dimension gives expression to an even more profound
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exigency.
The division of power on territorial 
lines has been conceived of as an anti­
dote to excesses of power, as a guarantee 
against centralization ... /as consonant? 
with thè idea of broadened democracy ... 
whereby decision making power is better 
exercised or better controlled by those 
it applies to. 10/
In thè transnational/federal context wherein thè member
states are thè units, thè resistence towards "usurpation"
of competence by thè transnational/federal organs and
thè insistence on thè preserv'ation of originai
demarcations expressed by enumeration is thè reflection
of thè same values operating in reverse. The fear is
that a dissipation of strict enumeration and a transfer
of competences from thè constituent members to thè
generai power will lead to an erosion in these twin
values inherent in thè enumeration: cultural diversity
^even autonomy) and broadened democracy .Whether or not this
rationale is objectively valid, it gives us a powerful
explanatory tool in explaining negative attitudes tcwards
transnational expansion and thè erosion of enumerated pcv'ers^
^ A t  least from thè point 
thèof view of thè Member States thè lesser threat of loss 
of power and autonomy to thè Community as a generai 
power thè greater will be thè tolerance towards 
jurisdictional expansion. At thè same time this 
rationale should not be taken as an immutable criterion
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by which to evaluate (morally) thè process of change.
As Meny himself explains, thè rationale of 
regionalisation can become a useful mobilising myth 
(because of its appeal to cultural autonomy and 
diversity and broadened democracy). But thè mere 
fact of regionalisation cannot guarantee that these 
values will in fact ensue. Institutional arrangements 
he argues cannot in themselves be guarantors of 
freedom and democracy. It is rather thè social and 
politicai condition of their implementation that 
matters.
In thè transnational context much of thè 
resistence to Community jurisdictional expansion 
is based on a parallel myth namely that communauta- 
risation is necessarily synonymous with centralisation, 
loss of diversity and bureaucratic dictatorship. In 
certain instances this might be thè case but it is 
not necessarily so. In fact in thè USA, federai 
jurisdictional expansion in thè field of human rights
_J was promoted precisely because it was thought that, in a
np-ri-^ in period federai rather than locai standards could better
^protect democratic values and to an extent thè cultural 
autonomy and dignity of minority groups. Today thè 
situation may be reversed.
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ln Europe thè picture is complex. The changes
in thè decisional process which are clearly decentralist
already suggest that opposition to jurisdictional
expansion may as a result have become weakened and,
perhaps, less founded. I shall examine these trends in
greater detail below. What is important is to understand
vincreased ,
that it is not inevitable tha£fCommunity competences
thè
will lead to an erosion of values of diversity and 
democracy. That it might have been thè case in Canada 
with thè pecularities of thè Quebec position is possible. 
That it might be thè case in Europe today is a matter 
to be examined dispassionately. Indeed I shall point 
out some grave dangers in thè Community process. But
wV «/
in principle should Communautarisation not undermine 
either autonomy or democratic processes thè way must 
be open to evaluate jurisdictional expansion in any 
given field in a purely functional way: does 
Communautarisation improve thè potential for attaining 
thè objectives of a given policy or, at least, does it 
detract from this potential. Insistence on strict 
enumeration as a per se value without regard to thè 
"social and politicai condition of implementation" is 
as dangerous a myth as thè parallel insistence on
regionalization.
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The concept of mutation
To date, imich of thè legai literature — ^
surrounding thè doctrine of enumerated powers has
concentrated on thè material expansion of Community
competences. And as thè focal point of discussion 
J
we usually find thè contrasting or complementary 
doctrine of implied powers —  be it in its judicial 
form or in its "codified" form in Artide 235 EEC.
This concentration is understandable. It has thè 
advantage of utilizing a concept (implied powers) well 
■>
explored in other non-unitary jurisdictions —  both in
1 2 /federai states — and, in a muted form, in
13/international organizations —  —  and is naturai,
given thè very presence of Artide 235 and thè various 
judicial pronouncements on implied powers. For thè 
most part thè approach of these treatments is broadly 
similar. First thè provisions of thè Treaty are 
analysed with thè usuai inevitable conclusions 
that from thè legai point of view thè Community is a 
system of attributed rather than inherent powers. 
Writers differ (often?I suspect, depending on thèir 
ideological stance towards thè Community) on thè 
measure of lattitude for expansion available in thè 
light of thè Court's case law on implied power and
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on thè basis of Article 235 . Exaxnination of thè 
praetice(politicai and judicial) is thus usually 
conducted with thè purpose of determining whether any given
accept thè utility of these classical legai
analyses I find them wanting in three main respects.
Firstly there is a tendency to regard thè fact of expansion
—  especially under Article 235 -- as given. Not
cijLi'octsd.enough attention is either to thè origins of
expansion or its dynamics as a process. Secondly, 
as noted above, there is a tendency in evaluating 
thè issue of expansion to confine such analysis to 
questions of legai legitimacy. My contention is 
that in this field we may find developments which 
are legally legitimate and yet might have profoundly 
negative consequences by reference to other criteria;
equally , legai illegitimacy might stand
in thè way of pressing politicai or societal needs 
and that in this tension we might find clues to
thè strictly leg critically evaluated thè
changes in thè system of enumerated powers by reference 
to other criteria, this criticism can usually be 
reduced to one proposition. That wide ranging changes
is legally legitimate or otherwise. Whilst I
politico-
Finally, even where analysis has gone beyond
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which avoid thè employment of thè Treaty amending 
procedure exclude thè participation of national 
parliaments and are thus undemocratic.
I shall be arguing that this criticism 
goes^too far 'and does not go far enough.
My chief concern therefore will be to complement 
thè classic legai analysis (which I shall recount in 
extreme brevetv ) by an enquiry which will first try 
to explain both thè origins and thè legal-political 
evolution of thè process of change regarding thè 
substantive jurisdiction of thè Community and will 
then try to evaluate thè process not only in strict 
legai terms but also by reference to wider social 
and politicai implications. For convenience I 
propose to cali thè type of change we are discussing 
mutation. I use this term to designate developments 
which have a perceptible effect on thè demarcation 
line and initial balance of competences between thè 
Community and its Member States but which do not occur 
through formai Treaty amendment. The absence or 
dearth of mutative developments will indicate a system 
in which enumerated powers and thè initial balance 
between Member-State and Community are considered in 
themselves as fundamental. A wide incidence of mutation
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will indicate instead a system inclined towards a 
functional conception of enumerated powers. Thus through 
this analysis of mutation we may find one of thè keys 
to understanding thè Community approach to enumerated 
powers. This enquiry is not an easy one since in thè 
dynamic system which thè Community is, many changes 
in thè balance between Community and Member State are 
already envisaged in thè Treaty itself. We must 
therefore try and exclude those changes.constituting 
a simple implementation of specific substarvtive 
provisions directly traceable to thè Treaty or to 
legislation enacted thereunder. Inevitably there will 
always be developments which will fall on thè 
borderline betv/een normal evolution and mutative 
development. But then this fact in itself is already 
an indication of a certain trend in thè Treaty 
(counterbalanced by others) towards a functional rather 
than strict orientation towards enumeration. Finally, 
thè search for mutative developments is not an end 
in itself. The analysis will enable us to observe, 
from this particular angle, thè interplay between law 
and politics, judicial an4. politicai organs, Member 
States and thè Community.
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-The Erosion of Strict Enumeration: Method of Enquiry
The major trend I shall try to illustrate and
explain has been one whereby a closed strict approach
to enumeration^
Chas been replaced by an open and functionalist
approach and a practice of caution and self
limitation has been replaced by extremely wide
ranging mutation. In order to understand this trend,
especially that of of thè practice-- which, as we noted
may be regarded as paradoxical considering thè
generai deterioration of politicai supranationality —
I think it is important to distinguish between two
basic forms of mutation: internai mutation and external
mutation. This very important distinction may bes^
be explained by an example. In thè originai enumeration,
thè Community was assigned certain tasks and powers by
which to achieve these tasks. Its fields of competence
determined by a combination of these tasks and powers
were relatively clearly defined. Mutation of this
enumeration might occur in two ways. Let us say that
thè Community is assigned competences in thè field of
thè movement of labour but decidedly not in thè field of
education. What happens if in thè exercise of its
powers in thè field of thè movement of labour thè
Community encroaches on thè field of education which
is a domaine réservé of thè Member States? According to an
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approach of strict. enumeration thè Community would 
be allowed to exercis*e its jurisdiction over thè 
movement of labour only to thè extent that it would 
not encroach on any field reserved to thè Member States. By 
a functional approach would not prohibit_________
---- - such a mutation. The specific permissible
. t_In any .eventend would justify such an encroachmént>^the mutation
is internai since it does not give thè Community originai
jurisdiction over education in thè Member States. It
merely allows thè Community in thè exercise of its given
competence in thè field of labour movement to encroach on a
substantive area of thè Menrber States.
External mutation by contrast is thè process 
whereby thè Community gains originai substantive 
jurisdiction (other than by Treaty amendment) over an 
area in which hitherto it had no competence. Thus an 
expansion into fields such as environmental protection 
(not mentioned at all in thè Treaty) or consume^ 
protection (only mentioned in passing) or education 
(currently debated) are examples of external mutation.
We shall see that even in relation to external 
mutation there is a distinction of ends and means 
but this at a level which is so high as to maintain 
thè distinction between internai and external sufficiently 
wide. This distinction is not made for mere exegetic 
purposes. It enables us to analyse with greater
Weiler, Joseph H. H. (1982), Supranational law and the supranational system : legal structure and political process in the 
European Community 
European University Institute                                                                    DOI: 10.2870/67242
precision and insight thè erosion of strict
— ----- 7> enumerated powers. For an analysis of
developments reveals a subtle interplay between 
judicial and politicai practice.
The Court of Justice over a period of years has 
been slowly introducing a liberal and functional 
approach to ÌDÌ§£Dàì mutation. This it has done by 
four processes which I have called extension, absorption, 
incorporation and implied powers. It has, I shall 
later argue, given a cue, a legitimation^even an 
encouragement to thè politicai organs ^hat^or its 
part^ it had come to reject strict enumeration. ' When 
politicai conditions, which I shall analyse, were 
ripe, thè politicai organs could engage in external 
mutation with no sanction by thè Court. I have called 
this politicai process expansion. What I propose to 
do in thè following two chapters is first to analyse 
thè judicially inspired internai mutation, then to 
turn to thè politicai practice of expansion and finally 
attempt an overall analysis of thè entire process. It 
may be useful at this point to outline briefly these 
different categories of extension, absorption, 
incorporation, implied powers and expansion.
The Typology of Mutation
A strict doctrine of enumerated powers entails 
that, unless provided in thè Treaty and thus explicitly
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agreed upon by thè Member States, any changes in thè 
demarcation lines between Member States and Community 
competences must be effected by a formai amendment of 
thè Treaty. Mutation both internai and external 
may ---- take different forms.
Within thè Community system thè Member States 
retain^ despi te their memberships^ a variety of functions 
and areas of competence over which thè Community organs 
have no jurisdiction and which are intended to remain 
beyond Community reach. At thè other end there is 
an area of Community jurisdiction which is similarly 
self-contained and which, once again, despite their 
membership does not involve thè Member States directly. 
A good example might be thè rules of judicial review 
by which thè Community Court reviews Community 
legislation. Another area might be thè rules governing 
labour relations within thè organs. (These are not 
watertight compartments but as an indication of 
mutually exclusive areas of autonomy this description 
is, I believe, representative). In thè centre between 
these two ends there is thè criticai area of overlap 
wherein thè Member States have transferred to thè 
Community thè exclusive or concurrent powers to 
regulate fields that hitherto were governed by each 
Member State individually.
With this formula in mind we can now set out thè 
different types of mutation.
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1. Extension
Extension concerns mutation in thè area of 
autonomous Community jurisdiction. The classical 
example I shall use to illustrate this form is thè 
well known history of thè evolution of a higher law 
of human rights. Whereas in thè Treaty we do not find 
a codified bill of rights limiting thè Community organs 
and thus restricting thè guarantees afforded thè 
individuai to protection against material (and 
procedural) excess of powers by thè organs, there now 
appears to have been added to this area a new level 
of jurisdiction extending this protection. Mutation 
in this area touches only thè margin of thè principle 
of enumeration since it does not directly encroach 
upon thè jurisdiction of thè Member States. At thè 
same time even in this autonomous area mutation
represents a change in thè status quo which would be
contrary to a strict enumeration principle.
2. Absorption
Absorption is a deeper form of mutation. It occurs 
when, in thè course of exercising substantive
jurisdiction properly bestowed on thè Community, there
is an overlap into an area reserved to thè Member States. 
The example I shall use comes from thè field of free 
movement of workers. In order to ensure effective free 
movement thè Community has enacted laws which impinge
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on thè education policy of thè Member States. A strict 
doctrine of enumerated powers would suggest that thè 
efficacy °f thè free movement principle should be 
sacrificed in order not to transgress thè
jurisdictional divide. Should however such transgression 
be permitted -- should absorption take place -- we will 
have indication of a further erosion, going beyond 
extension, in this strict doctrine.
3. Incorporation 
This term is borrowed loosely from thè U.S.
experience. In thè Community system it will invoke 
a combination of extension and absorption. It will 
occur if we shall be able to shov; that thè fundamental 
rights introduced by way of extension may be applied as 
a standard against Member State action. This will illustrate 
r measure of erosion of enumerated powers.
4. Implied powers - Judicial form
Implied powers are of course a classical form of 
mutation. Powers hitherto not granted to thè Community 
and its organs will be implied so that by exercising 
rthese powers thè Community may better execute a policy in an 
in which it has jurisdiction. The classical example 
I shall use is thè implication of Treaty making powers 
and external relation competences so as to enable a 
better fulfilment of internai policies. The distinction 
between implied powers and absorption is reai even if 
fine. In thè latter we are concerned with a subtle 
encroachment of Member State jurisdiction in thè exercise
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of existing Community powers. In thè former we 
are concerned with an actual transfer - sometimes 
exclusive - of powers to thè Community for execution 
of a policy. Since these developments have been 
primarily judicially inspired I have referred to 
them as judicial implied powers.
5. Expansion
This is thè highest form of mutation involving 
fully thè so-called question of kompetenz - kompetenz 
Here we are concerned with thè actual substantive 
jurisdictional expansion of thè Community. The usage
of and limits to Artide 235 EEC —— - - --------
will be at thè centre of our discussion of expansion. 
Our focus will be primarily on thè politicai organs 
whose activities are centrai in this form of mutation 
Finally we may also mention other non-organic 
forms of mutation which occur outside thè strict 
framework of thè Treaty but which involve directly 
thè institutions of thè Community. The principal 
illustration here could be thè evolution of thè 
Framework for Politicai Cooperation.
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Footnotes
1. These two statements cannot and do not reflect 
thè precise constitutional situation in this 
complex area either in Canada or thè USA. In 
Canada see e.3 ., Russel v The Queen (1882) 7 App. 
Cas 82 9 (P.C.); Attorney General for Ontario v 
Canada Temperence Federation ^1946/ £.g. 193 (P.C.); 
and generally thè profound discussion in
(Butterworths, Toronto, 1977) esp at eh. 7. 
Naturally thè new Canadian Constitutional Settlercent 
will render much of this earlier law obsolete.
In thè USA, see thè subtle discussion of Sandalow, 
The Expansion of Federai Legislative Authority in 
Ei:_§£§Ìn &
(Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1982) at 49 ff.
2. The American Constitution in many of its
structural clauses is sufficiently open textured 
to lend itself, even invite, dynamic interpretation. 
By contrast thè Canadian Pre 1982 'constitution" 
is embodied in a British Act of Parliament, a 
form of legislation notorious for its resistence to 
teleology.
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The Privy Council which,by and large, was thè 
judicial Committee of thè House of Lords 
setting with a different hat did probably 
regard itself more as a guardian of thè integrity 
of thè Act rather than with thè welfare of thè 
Canadian Union. (I am not suggesting of course 
that a less strict interpretation would have 
furthered thè welfare of Canada but rather 
that thè option would be received with less 
receptiveness).
For an analysis of thè different forms of 
enumeration in thè national context, see 
Meny, Regional Policy in thè EEC: Integration 
through Regionalization, Florence Project
See
also&MacMahgn, Eg£|§£a2 ism_Mature_and___
at p.30.
Cf. R.H.Lauwaars, Lawfuness_and_Le2 al_Fg£gf 
of Community Decisions (Sijthoff, Leiden, 1973).
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Article 236 EEC. I shall discuss thè 
amending procedure below in Chapter Nine.
Wade, Memorandum and evidence on thè Amendgigot 
=====i===0 i=“ ==4 ====^=£i— —  submitted to 5Ì2§ 
|!Qr§Ì3D_£f|§A£f!_QQS®Ì££§§_Qf_tfe£ Hgyfe gf 
=2SP20- :
2 l=Ei£AAl§in£/ §=£=1=41 ¥2 Ìa_II (h.m.s.o.,
London, 1981) at 102 and 108.
Sandalow, note 1 supra at 51.
Meny, note 4 supra.
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10. Id.
11. E*2* Giardina, The Rule of Law and Implied
Powers in thè European Communities 1 •
9 9 (1975); Olmi, La place de 1 'article 235 CEE 
dans le système des attributions de compétence
à la Communauté, II
(F.Nathan/Ed. Labor, Paris/Bruxelles, 1979) 279; 
Ferrari Bravo & Giardina, Commento all'art. 235 
in Qygàlì/ (eds.) II £glHD§gt3 £io
§l_l£3 ±tato_Is titutivg_della__Co.munità_Economica
1707; Hi_gmit_|_Pi_gg£223 (eds.) T^§_^§w_gf 
Euro£ean_Econgmic_Cgmmyni£Y (Matthew Bender, N.Y.
de l'article 235 du Traité CEE 13 5i5L.Q■ 14 7 
(1970). Lesguillons, L'extension des compétences 
de la CEE par 1'article 235 du Traité de Rome, 
/1974? 375; Schwartz, Article 235 and
Law Making Powers in thè European Community 27 
|a£ì £ìQ- 614 (1978);
Introduction to thè law of thè European Communities 
( 4*4tV VUW* i 1 973) 122 ff. ;
L§a^i§£§ , note 5 supra.
Europea ( 1 965)
1977) - 269; Mareneo, Les Conditions d'applicatio
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12. Indeed, Sandalow, note 1 supra entitles his
discussion : "The theory of Enumerated Powers 
(Herein of Implied Powers)".
13- See e.£. Roma-Montaldo, International Legai
Personalitv and Implied Powers of International 
Organizations 1 1 1  (1970).
14. There is one noticeable exception - Tizzano, Lo
sviluppo delle competenze materiali delle comunità 
Europee 21 RÀ¥Ìs£i_^ì_BÌ£Ì±£g_|!y£QB§2 13 9 (1981) 
who also adopts a processual analysis and is 
interested in thè evolution of thè system and 
not merely in a normative evaluation. Although 
my analysis differs substantially from that of 
Tizzano I acknowledge thè validity of a contribution 
of thè highest scholarly value.
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In this chapter I shall illustrate thè main
forms of internai mutation. In relation to each form
I shall use one example and analyse thè background
and techniques involved. We shall have thus three
self contained excursions into disparate aspects of
Community law dealing not with thè generai and wide 
i_but with,
ranging trendY"specific instances of legai and 
politicai interactions. Although I believe in thè 
utility of this micro-analysis it should be remembered 
that theas elaborate examples are only given to illustrate 
thè macro-phenomenon —  thè transformation of thè system 
of enumerated powers -- which remains thè main subject 
of Part Two.
The most remarkable illustration of extension is 
thè emergence through judicial activism, of a framework 
of an unwritten higher law of human rights against which 
thè legislative and administrative activities of 
Community organs may be reviewed. — It is a clear case 
of mutation since it represents a fundamental development
Chaptgr_Seven
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which affords thè individuai a novel protection not
foreseen in thè Treaty. Although dramatic in many
ways it is only a mild instance of mutation since, on 
2 /its face, — thè effects of this developments on thè 
national legai orders are not direct. The declared 
purpose of this development is to subject only thè 
legislative and administrative activities of 
Community politicai organs to review on thè grounds 
of violation of individuai rights. —^ The example
is well-suited for our purposes since it brings into 
play factors such as legai legitimacy, democratic 
acceptability and system efficiency and involves 
most actors who participate in thè Community process.
The interplay of principles and actors may be best 
displayed by relating thè background and evolution 
of this instance of extension. The tale has featured
4/widely in accounts of thè legai order of thè Community — 
and sufficient for present purposes will be an 
analysis emphasising its major aspects.
The Law and Politics of Human Rights in thè Community 
Neither thè Treaty of Paris nor thè Treaty of Rome 
contain a specific list or bill of enumerated 
fundamental human rights which may serve as a check
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on thè Community organs and which may provide
- - >. criteria for judicial review. Traditionally,
resistance to enumerated bills of rights as a higher 
law in a legai order is tied to a concomitant 
principled resistance to judicial review as such. —^
This does not however explain thè lacunae in thè 
Community since in both Treaties we find well-developed 
systems of judicial review particularly as regards 
thè activities of Community organs. —^ In thè absence
7 /of an authentic "legislative history" of thè Treaties — 
we must try and explain this omission by reference to 
thè politicai climate prevailing at thè time of their 
conclusion and to thè originai conception of thè 
Community by its fathers. Inevitably, this analysis 
will be speculative. As regards thè Coal and Steel 
Community several inter-related factors may afford a 
plausible explanation to thè lack of a bill of rights. 
Cespite thè overt politicai origin of thè venture, 
evident both in thè Schuman Declaration and thè Preamble 
to thè Treaty of Paris, thè Coal and Steel Community 
was perceived as confined within limited economie 
parameters. The High Authority was given law making 
powers but thè subjects of this law were conceived as 
being primarily large industriai undertakings and thè 
Member States themselves. The concept of traditional
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human rights, particularly, in thè immediate; post 
War period seemed to have little hearing on thè 
prospective activities of thè Coal and Steel Community.
Thus, there was probably no overt intention to 
exclude guarantees from thè individuai. Indeed, it 
was in that very epoch that thè European Convention 
on Human Rights was adopted, in an exemplary —  unique 
perhaps —  manifestation of national and governmental 
self-restraint. Probably thè very same sentiments 
which explain thè voluntary association within thè 
ECSC explain thè subscription to thè ECHR. The two 
ventures must have seemed however as distinct rather 
than co-terminus.
The analysis becomes more complicated in relation 
to thè EEC. Here, after all, we find wide ranging 
expansion of Community activity into fields, albeit 
economie, where thè need for explicit protection of 
fundamental rights may have been perceived to be more 
urgent. The Treaty of Rome which contains chapters on 
social policy, movement of migrants, rights of 
establishment and thè like could hardly have been 
regarded as coming within a sphere immune to violation 
of fundamental human rights —  even thè traditional ones. 
Thus, in seeking to discover possible politicai factors 
for ommission of a bill of rights, excluding thè 
unlikely explanation of mere forgetfulness, we must 
turn to more nuanced reasoning.
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I would first return to thè actual provisions
of judicial review in thè Treaty. It is somewhat
surprising that thè Treaty, influenced in its
judicial and legai provisions by French
law embraces such a developed system of judicial
review which for long was alien, even anathema to />
thè French tradition. A closer look at these
provisions reveals that their purpose was not so much
to subject thè Community organs to a higher law but
--  Land its organs?
rather to guaranty that thè Community/would not
overstep theirjurisdictional limits. The system was
thus more akin to thè Canadian concept of judicial
review than to thè USA one. The language of these
articles, principally Article 173, with thè i
recurring reference to review on thè grounds of
"infringement of this Treaty" and "misuse of power"
and "lack of competence" strongly suggests judicial
review thè main purpose of which was to make sure that
Community organs would not get out of line and act
ultra-vires. If that was thè spirit of
thè originai system of judicial review it is of little
wonder that a bill of rights would not have seemed
9/particuiarly relevant. —
In thè politicai climate prevailing in 1957 at 
least some of thè Member States were fearful of any 
expansion in thè powers to be granted to thè Community
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centrai organs. In ratifying thè Treaty of Rome, 
thè Member States, no longer pure and virginal as in 
thè immediate post-war era, were committing themselves 
to an unprecedented experiment in contemporary 
international history. But why then was a bill of 
rights excluded? Why not curtail even further thè 
liberty of Community organs? Paradoxical as it may 
sound thè fear might have existed that thè very listing 
of rights which must not be encroached upon may become 
an invitation to extend powers and competences granted 
to thè limits of those rights. This argument is not
%as fanciful as it may at first seem. We find^clear
analogue in thè legislative history, and thè
interpretation thereof, of thè introduction of a Bill
of Rights into thè American Constitution. In trying
to interpret thè reason for enacting thè delphic Ninth 
10/Amendment —  several Supreme Court Justices as well
11/as Founding Fathers —  have pointed out, in thè words
of Ely, that thè danger existed that ”... thè inclusion
of a bill of rights in thè Constitution would be taken
to imply that federai power was not in fact limited to
those granted by thè Constitution?, that instead it
extended all thè way up to thè edge of thè rights stated
-  12 /in ^the newly introduced bill of rights/." — With 
thè available models of human right bills so closely
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associateci with inherent state power rather than 
with limited, enumerated
competences}could it not also be that national 
concern was to limit jurisdictional expansion of thè 
newly created EEC? Especially when thè creation of 
social and economie charter was even more speculative 
at that period than it is today?
We might find an even more deep-rooted 
explanation to thè omission —  one that touches 
on thè very architecture of thè Community legai order. 
We are today already habituated to thinking of thè 
Community as thè fully fledged constitutional order 
to which it has by now developed. In 1957 neither 
thè doctrine of direct effect nor thè doctrine of 
supremacy had emerged. If they were nascent in thè 
Treaty, as thè Court later claimed, they were
certainly very well hidden and as we saw in earlier
Untrcriuction 0 6  chaptersjVrhese concepts involved a series of daring
acts of judicial activism. The simple fact remains
that in 1957 thè protection of thè individuai from
Community measures allegedly violative of his or her
fundamental rights would seem to rest within thè
national orders. The yardstick for violation would
be assumed to exist within thè municipal protection
afforded thè individuai in the Member States'
Weiler, Joseph H. H. (1982), Supranational law and the supranational system : legal structure and political process in the 
European Community 
European University Institute                                                                    DOI: 10.2870/67242
constitutional orders (of which thè ECHR was one).
A Community measure coming into conflict with such 
national guarantees would be subordinated to thè latter.
An individuai could either simply refuse to comply 
with an alledgedly violative Community measure and 
have as a valid defence thè infringement by that 
measure of standards accepted in his or her national 
order. Or, at worst, thè Member State concerned could 
enact a national act abrogating thè Community offensive 
measure.
Finally there is simple but plausible explanation 
that post War socio-economic diversity had developed to 
such an extent that thè exercise of reaching a consensus 
on a commom bill of (socio-economic) rights already 
seemed impossible. Perhaps it was better to leave such 
an emotive issue outside thè Treaty rather than risk 
national parliamentary oppositior. at thè ratification stage.
It is to thè Court then that we must t u m  to
understand thè eventual mutation. The landmarks of
this judicial itinerary are among thè most famous in
thè contemporary history of European legai integration.
In Stork — ^and Geitling — ^decided in 195 8 and 195 9
thè judges (but not, interestingly, thè prophetic
15/Advocate General Lagrange — ) rejected an invitation 
to review and censure a Community measure allegedly 
violating a basic right recognized in one or other 
of thè Member States. Several reasons may explain 
thè Court's reticence at that time. ^The material 
context of these cases -- and, inevitably thè outlook 
of thè Court —  was within thè narrow economie sphere
Weiler, Joseph H. H. (1982), Supranational law and the supranational system : legal structure and political process in the 
European Community 
European University Institute                                                                    DOI: 10.2870/67242
of thè ECSC. To break into thè emotive language of human 
rights and higher law might have seemed scmewhat incongruous.
But, thè issue is not merely semantical. Unlike thè Treaty of
Rome, thè Treaty of Paris was much ___________
less of a Traité Cadre; The scope for teleological
interpretation would appear to be more limited if
respect for judicial propriety was to be maintained.
The reasons go even deeper. The fusion of thè
Community and national legai orders was limited and
fragile. At that time thè ECSC was perceived by thè
Court as an autonomous entity. Its task was to
protect that separation and to defend thè High
Authority's independence. Whereas later, in thè
EEC, thè main threat to thè independence of thè
Commission clearly seemed to come from its sister
Community organ, thè Council of Ministers, in thè
Stork situation thè major threat as perceived
by thè Court would arise if thè High Authority would
be obliged to look over its shoulders at each step
and to ensure that it was not infringing conS'titutional
guarantees in thè Member States. The Court would not
lend its authority to such a construction. The oft
quoted passage from Stork — ^clearly affirms these
notions of separation and autonomy. It should not be
forgotten that in thè absence of clearly established
doctrine of supremacy, there would be little to stop
thè challenge from moving from national constitutional
law to any national norms. (In fact in thè Stork
decision one fmds thè first indication of thè
subsequent supremacy decisions). Finally it was not
only thè Court's perception of thè Community order
which was reflected in that early jurisprudence. It
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was a reflection of its own self-perception:
17/Jurisprudence from a similar period — suggests
a self-image evocative of traditional international
tribunals. The Court's self-limiting —  not to
say self-deprecating —  characterization of itself
in Stork is thus a reflection in thè area of human
rights of thè international phase in Carraunity development.
18/Ten years later we find thè same Court —
speaking a different language. Faced with a similar
material dilemma of an individuai challenge to
Community law based on thè grounds of violation of
fundamental human rights, thè Court affirmed not
only that fundamental rights did form part of those
legai interests which thè Court could and would
protect, but also that thè source of these rights
may be found within thè very constitutional legai
orders of thè Member States including international
treaties (notably thè ECHR) which hitherto were
considered irrelevant. The technique by which they
were to be acertained was a comparative method of
distillation of those principles and rights into a
1 9/homogenous Community concept. —
The fact of mutation is clear enough. A new 
legai super-structure (though I stili have doubts 
about its contents — //) had been added to thè judicial
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protection afforded in thè Conununity. It is in 
this sense that we may speak of extension. The 
extension does not directly affect thè Member State 
domain. But, then, thè indirect effect is not 
insignificant. If thè structure is filled with 
content and does not remain as a judicial platitude, 
it could be regarded as a new check on thè powers 
of thè governments of thè Member States acting qua 
Community Council of Ministers. Even more indirectly, 
but no less profoundly, if thè Court's jurisprudence 
is accepted, (and this, it is submitted, will depend 
on thè content which thè Court puts into thè structure) 
it will remove national judicial claims to residuai 
control of Community legislation.
Our concern however is not to explain thè 
level of new protection afforded and thè evolving 
substantive rights distilled by thè Court but rather 
to outline and evaluate thè factors which prompted 
this type of mutation. For it was not only thè 
system which mutated; it was thè very Court and its 
perception of thè Community order which had mutated 
as well.
Whence thè legitimacy of thè Court to subject 
activity of thè legislative Community branch to review 
on thè basis of an unwritten higher law? On its face
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this situation conjures up thè classical conundrum
of thè Gouvernement des juges. In thè Community
context however this classical conflict is largely
fallacious. For as we have noted in earlier chapters,
thè legislative process of thè Community with thè
limited involvement of Parliamentarians and thè
increasing _____ _ __ power of civil servants
vcoupleg with.
in thè shape of thè COREPER V t h è  dominance of 
thè executive who are only notionally controllable 
by their national chambers, is a far cry from a 
representative democratic process. If thè new 
jurisprudence of thè Court represents a gouvernement 
des juges it is designed to control a gouvernement des 
fonctionnaires.
So we have here -— ■ one
d u e  which explains thè transformation of thè Court's
attitude since thè days of Stork. The absence of a
written bill of rights coupled with a decline in thè
accountability of thè Community and thè emergence of
thè "democratic deficit" can on this construction 
wboth thè moti ve of thè Court and ^ 
explainYwhy thè classic objection to this type of
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judicial activism is less applicable in thè Community
situation. The phenomenon which is often
characterized as thè antithesis of thè princiDle of
majoritarian decision making fails in thè Community
context since thè process is hardly majoritarian.
As to thè legai basis far. thè Court's decision
■ " ^  thè concept of
"generai principles of law" in a Traité Cadre is
probably wide enough to lend itself to such an
interpretation, a l t h o u g h ---- '— " ' ' ~
thè actual viability of transforming thè theory of
comparative distillation into a meaningful reality of
substantive rights is more questionable. There can be
other factors which explain this act of extension.
The ambit of operation of thè EEC is perceptibly
wider than thè ECSC. The language of human rights, in
21/a functional situation such as Stauder —  does not
seem so incongruous. Likewise, thè Treaty of Rome 
is to
itself conducive thè type of judicial comparative 
technique evoked as a solution to thè source of human 
rights. Artide 215 EEC, to give thè clearest example, 
explicitly refers to thè comparative method and to thè 
national legai orders as a source of law. On its face 
then thè objections seem resolved. But thè 
justification of judicial extension as an attempt to
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dose thè democratic deficit constitutes only part 
, perhaps,.
-^Vnoteven a major part —  of thè explanation. It 
may even be a rationalization. The prime motivation 
for judicial extension was not, I believe, a benevolent 
interest in human rights nor even in thè democratic 
structure of thè Community. At thè source of thè 
mutation one finds thè same protective sentiment which 
induced thè Court to reject thè fundamental right 
initiative ten years earlier. The difference is that 
in thè new constitutional configuration of thè 
Community —  a configuration to thè evolution of which 
thè Court itself had contributed —  thè expedient reply 
to thè same dilemma was affirmative rather than negative. 
For, as we know, in thè intervening years, thè Court 
had developed thè normative structure of thè Community 
in thè centre of which rests thè concept of supremacy.
In its own self-perception another profound metamorphosis 
had taken place. No longer did it see itself as an 
international tribunal determined to preserve thè 
autonomy of thè system over which it was charged, but 
rather a constitutional Court of a supranational order 
determined to preserve thè inte^rity and unity of thè 
system it had evolved. The "surface language" of thè 
Court in Stauder and its progeny is thè language of
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human rights. The "deep structure" is all about
IoJzATsupremacy. For thè writing,^scratched by thè German 
and Italian Constitutional Courts, was clearly visible 
on thè wall and threatening thè concept of supremacy 
of thè Community legai order and its judicial organ
—  thè Court. and Internationa JgHandélgeslschaft
become thus, in thè politicai circumstances of thè 
late 60s and early 70s an inevitable sequel to Van Gend 
en Loos, Costa v ENEL and their progeny: An attempt to 
protect thè concept of supremacy. Under this light
thè Court's reiterated statements in favour of human
rights must be treated with more caution. Be that as .it
may thè Court's act of extensions does cali at least as
of guarantees at thè national level. If fears are 
to be allayed^ thè Court will have to demonstrate that 
it is willing to use thè new mutated power to annui 
measures backed by thè concerted will of thè Council 
of Minister. To be sure it had done so on many occasions 
on criteria lesser than violation of human rights. And 
thè Council of 80s is not thè fragile High Authority 
of thè 60s. But here lies, it is submitted, thè 
unresolved legitimacy issue regarding this particular
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-(it is true that, 
instance of mutation. If^the Court developed
its human rights doctrine to protect thè integrity
of thè order rather than thè individuai, will it in
a case pitching on thè one hand human rights and on
thè other hand an important Community policy be ready
to prefer thè individuai to thè Community? For in thè 
v,the main issue .
Community is not thè traditional question of
legitimacy of an unelected»unaccountable court boldly
exercising its judicial power to thwart thè policy
of accountable politicians. The querelle is not
between judge and politician but rather between judge
and judge. For if I was correct in suggesting that
thè spirit of Stork stili hovers over thè recent
jurisprudence of human rights; if thè "deep structure"
of this new jurisprudence is one of Supremacy rather
than JJuman Rights; if thè Court* s commitment to thè
integrity of thè system is at thè basis of these new
developments, one may first wonder whether justice
may be seen to be done —  in thè type of conflict
stipulated above -- when thè adjudicator is so committed
so as,tto suggest a judgment in re sua. And secondly,
one may wonder, and there are indications in thè Court's
jurisprudence that this question is not entirely
theoretical, whether justice will in fact be done.
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One cannot conclude this analysis without allusions
to a final illustration of thè interaction between thè
various politicai actors among which we must clearly,
for present purposes, include thè Court. In 1979 thè
Commission proposed thè accession of thè Community to
thè ECHR. Various interpretations have been put on this
suggestion and its merits which need not concern us
here. It would appear that thè prospeets for
implementation are, for thè time being, slight. One
effect of thè proposai would be thè imposition of thè
European Court of Human Rights as a higher instance
above thè European Court of Justice in matters
concerning thè adjudication of allegedly violative
Community measures. The Court, by its very position,
had no way of commenting fully and openly on this
suggestion. But in its judicial activity since
publication of thè Memorandum of thè Commission it
has striven to show its superiority as an adjudicator
2 2/vis-à-vis thè Court in Strasbourg. —  Thus, although 
there was not explicit criticism of thè Court in thè 
Memorandum of thè Commission, it will indeed have had 
a positive effect if it induces thè Court to put more 
substance into thè framework it has created.
The human rights issue^o which I shall return 
in thè discussion of incorporation^ is an interesting 
example of extension. My analysis helped explain its
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-----------. ? background and lforces which
influenced this development. But do not let us forget 
thè raison d'ètre of this analysis: thè new self 
perception of thè Court did not only enable it to 
shift its orientation vis-à-vis thè human rights issue. 
It also involved a strong indicatLon that thè 
principles of enumerated powers would not constitute 
an obstacle to mutation at— least not in this limited
■---  ^category of extension.
g. Absorption
Absorption occurs when in thè legislative or 
administrative exercise of jurisdiction already 
bestowed on thè Community there is an impingement, 
often unintentional, on national policy or national 
*
rules, hitherto considered outside Community reach.
A strict policy of enumerated powers would suggest that 
such impingement should be prohibited and in any event 
constitute a ground for annulment of thè measure in 
question by thè Court. As we shall see thè Court 
has in certain cases sarctioned or even encouraged 
such absorption. VJhereas extension concerns a 
mutation of thè Community system which has only 
indirect effect on thè national order, absorption is 
concerned directly with thè overlap of jurisdictions:
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The Community system absorbs a national rule so as 
to give efficiency to a Community policy. Our 
analysis, in Part One of this study, 
of thè constitutionalization of thè Treaty is thè
most dramatic example of system absorption since 
t presenta
within tnTSYhorizontal framework of analysis, each
Community principle established by thè Court such
as supremacyfdirect effect and thè like, may be
regarded as an absorption of thè national rules
governing relations between states and international
organizations to which they belong. The system was
mutated by absorption of those rules into thè'
Community order. We need not spend much time
treating this system mutation. Our earlier discussion
of thè evolution of normative supranationalism and
thè decline of decisional supranationalism may be
, perspectivey
taken, under this V ^ a s a  large scale analysis of
thè various legal-political dimensions of "system
absorption". Rather I propose to deal here with an 
v of absorption / 
illustratioìì/xh ari area of substantive law. The
illustration, surely not unique, is taken from thè
field of free movement of workers.
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The Case of Donato Casagrande: — qnhstantive absorption 
illustrated
Alongside defence, foreign "high politics" and
some principal aspects of fiscal and monetary policy,
education is one of thè major areas of national policy
>_has_,over which thè Treaty»granted thè Community virtually 
cexplicit, 2 4 /noYjurisdiction. — Donato Casagrande, an Italian
national, son of Italian migrant workers lived all his
life in Munich. He was, in 1971-2 a pupil at thè
German Fridtjof-Nansen-Realschule. The Bavarian law
25/on educational grants (BayAfoG) —  entitles children 
who satisfy a means test to receive a monthly 
educational grant from thè Lànder. The city of Munich 
refused his application for a grant relying on Article
3 of thè same educational law which excluded from 
entitlement all non-German aliens except stateless
2 6/people and aliens residing under a right of asylum. —
Casagrande, in an action seeking a declaration of
nullity of thè educational law, relied principally
2 7/on Article 12 of Council Regulation 1612/68. — The 
Article provides that "... thè children of a national 
of a Jtember State who is or has been employed in thè 
territory of another Member State shall be admitted to 
that State’s generai educational, apprenticeship and 
vocational training courses under thè same conditions 
as thè nationals of that State, if such children are 
residing in its territory." Further, thè Member
23/
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States must encourage "... all efforts to enable such 
children to attend these courses under thè best 
possible conditions."
The Bayerisches Verwaltungsgericht —  in an
exemplary understanding of thè review role of thè
European Court of Justice —  sought a preliminary
ruling on thè compatibility of thè Bavarian
educational provision with Artide 12 of thè Council
Regulation. The issue of pov/ers and mutation is best
illustrated by thè submission of thè Bavarian Public
Prosecutor's Office (Staatsanwaltschaft) which
2 8/intervened in thè case. —
The Council, it was submitted, exceeded its 
pov/ers under Articles 48 and 49 EEC. These Articles 
are concerned with thè conditions of workers. "Since 
individuai educational grants come under thè sphere 
of educational policy /in respect of which thè Council 
has no jurisdiction/ ... it is to be inferred that thè 
worker can claim thè benefit of assimilation with 
nationals /as provided in Artide 12/ only as regards 
social benefits which have a direct relation with thè 
conditions of work itself and with thè family s-tay ...." 
Artide 12 of thè Regulation must under this view be 
read as entitling children of migrants to be admitted 
under thè same conditions but not to receive educational
29/
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grants. —  The Bavarian public prosecutor thus 
denied, at his strongest, thè very possibility of a 
conflict between Article 12 and thè Bavarian BayAfog
31/since it could simply not apply to educational grants;—
<tt its weakest he was pleading for a narrow
interpretation of thè provision of Article 12 because
of thè jurisdictional issue. Underlying this
submission was thè deeper ground that if education 
is outside thè Community competence then thè 
Regulation itself transgresses thè demarcation line 
and thè interpretation sought by Casagrande could not 
stand in any event.
This was not thè first case of its kind to come 
32/before thè Court. —  How then was thè Court to deal
with thè question? One can detect two phases in
thè process of judicial consideration. The first
phase consists of an interpretation of thè specific
Community provision in an effort to understand its
full scope. We shall return later to thè particular
method of interpretation adopted. It is important to
notice that whilst engaging in this phase thè Court
acts as if in an empty jurisdictional space with no
limitations on thè reach of Community law. It will
come as no surprise to learn that its rendering of
Regulation 12 lead it to thè conclusion that thè
Article cover thè distribution of grants./\
30/
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33/In thè second phase —  of analysis thè Court 
addressed thè jurisdictional-mutation problem. Vie must remember 
that thè primary ground for illegality of a measure 
-- infringement of thè Treaty —  certainly covers 
jurisdictional incompetence. This was already
34/established in thè Courts earliest jurisprudence. —
The Court first acknowledged that "... educational 
and training policy is not as such included in thè 
spheres which thè Treaty had entrusted to thè Community 
institutions." — ^ It is important to note thè 
allusion to thè Community institutions: thè case 
after all deals with an issue of "secondary legislation" 
enacted by thè politicai organs. But, in thè key 
phrase, (not an example of lucidity) thè Court 
continues "... it does not follow that thè exercise 
of powers transferred to thè Community /enlarging 
thus thè language from Community institutions to thè 
Community as a whole and hence from secondary 
legislation to thè entire Treatv? is in some wav 
limited if it is of such a nature as to affect /national/ 
measures taken in thè execution of a policy such
36/as that of education and training. —  It is now 
that we understand thè importance of thè two-phase 
judicial analysis.
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ln phase one thè Court explains thè meaning of
a Community measure. The interpretation may be
teleological but not to thè degree which thè CourtA
performed in relation to thè evolution of thè higher 
law of human rights. Absorption is in this way 
distinguishable from extension. In thè second phase, 
thè Court states that to thè extent that national 
measures —  even in areas over which thè Community 
has no competence —  conflict with thè Community rule 
as elaborated in phase one, these national measures 
will be absorbed and subsumed by thè Community measure. 
This is truly ingenious. It is not —  says thè Court —  
thè Community policy which is encroaching on national 
educational policy. It is thè national educational 
policy which is impinging on Community free movement 
policy and thus must give way. It is, once more, 
important to note thè limitation of absorption. It 
extends thè effects of Community policy and rules into 
an area ostensibly outside Community jurisdiction. It 
does not —  unlike, say expansion (Art. 235 EEC) -- 
give thè Community direct jurisdiction over thè area 
with thè power to legislate in thè educational field 
as such.
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This distinction should not diminish from thè 
fundamental importance of absorption and its inclusion 
as an important form of mutation. This can be gauged 
by trying to imagine thè consequences of a judicial 
policy which would deny this possibility of 
absorption. The scope for effective execution of 
policy over which thè Community had direct jurisdiction 
would, in a society in which it is impossible to draw 
neat demarcation lines between areas of social and 
economie policy, be significantly curtailed; but at 
thè same time there is a clear sacrifice and erosion 
of thè principle of enumeration. And, of course, it 
invokes a clear preference for thè Community competence 
rather than thè state competence. In a sense thè 
language of thè Court suggests a simple application 
of thè principle of supremacy. But this is not a 
classical case of supremacy. After all in 
relation to issues of jurisdiction
supremacy may only mean that each -- — rreme in
thè fields assigned to it. Here we have a case of 
conflict of competences. The Court is
ccrnpetence must prevali.This is prcbably thè doctrinal 
crux of absorption.
suggesting that in such confliets thè Community
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I suggested earlier that thè major
constitutionalising cases may be regarded as instances
of absorption in this context. Though thè argument
is abstract and complex it is important since we can
see here one instance of thè Crossing of thè vertical
t Comuni ty,
and horizontal dimensions of theV system. The 
distinction between thè two phases of judicial 
analysis is of importance here as well. In relation 
to substantive absorption such as Casagrande thè 
distinction was explicit. In thè major cases of 
system absorption such as Costa v. ENEL and Van Gand 
en Loos thè tv/o steps also exist although, unlike 
Casagrande, thè dividing line is not so clear. In 
thè first phase thè Court, on thè basis of provisions 
in thè Treaty ( even if intexpreted in a teleological 
way ) will construe (to borrow from thè language of 
Hart) a Community "tertiary rule" of, say, direct 
effect o 'C supremacy. — ^ In thè second phase —  while 
remembering that thè division is methodological, in 
fact thè two processes are part and parcel of thè 
same analytical process -- it will absorb or subsume 
thè national jurisdictional rule in question. By 
analogy to Casagrande thè Court will be saying that 
to thè extent that national law of foreign relations 
exist they cannot prevent an obstacle to thè operation
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of thè Community law. Naturally in relation to 
"tertiary" system rules thè process is more 
abstract but this does not destroy thè similarity.
Thus, as in thè case of substantive absorption, thè 
fact that thè Community absorbs an area of thè national 
rules of public international law and constitutional 
law does not give thè Community direct and full 
jurisdiction over that area. No more than thè 
Community by virtue of Casagrande can enter directly 
into thè educational field, can it by virtue of, 
say, Van Gand en Loos, legislate for thè national 
system as regards its generai rules on thè 
relationship between international law and national law. 
At thè same time, as in Casagrande where thè fact 
that thè Community was not accorded specific 
competence in thè field of education did not per se 
prevent exercise of Community powers in an area where 
there was competence to invade that field and absorb 
certain national rules, so, in relation to thè more 
abstract "tertiary rules" and thè field of 
constitutional law, thè fact that thè Community was 
not accorded specific competence in that "field" 
did not prohibit its own rules, as interpreted by 
thè Court, invading thè national field and taking 
effect there.
Weiler, Joseph H. H. (1982), Supranational law and the supranational system : legal structure and political process in the 
European Community 
European University Institute                                                                    DOI: 10.2870/67242
It is at this point that * • detection of thè 
two phases becomes important in thè context of 
interpretative theory and legai legitimacy (perhaps 
even in a manner which extends beyond thè specific 
issue of absorption) since different criteria will 
apply to thè evaluation of thè two distinct judicial
As regards thè first phase, thè judicial act 
consists in finding out, as in our example, what is 
thè meaning to be given to Article 12 of thè
Regulations on migrant workers,Yin relation to 
system mutation, in finding out what "tertiary rules" 
may be deduced from thè Treaty.
For this process thè Court relies on thè variety 
of interpretative techniques familiar in generai 
constitutional law.
The legitimacy of this judicial activity will
be tested and will depend on thè integrity and thè
skill by which this process is executed by thè 
Court. One may cavil at this or that result but not 
at thè process of interpretation itself. A 
systematic and coherent interpretation by thè Court
is .here can be no o thè only re to
all charges of legai, democratic and functional abuse.
acts.
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-The unease that is felt towards thè judicial 
encouragement of absorption may —  if thè two phase 
analysis is used —  be directed at thè second
phase of judicial activity where thè Court, having 
ascertained thè putative scope of Community law proceeds 
to legitimate thè absorption.
Thus in Casagrande, as we saw, thè Court states 
in its judgement that "/a7lthough educational and 
training policy is not as such included in thè spheres 
which thè Treaty has entrusted to thè Community institutions, 
it does not follow that thè exercise of powers 
transferred to thè Community is in some way limited..." 
if it encroaches on national educational policy.
But one may ask of course whether ié would not be
just as plausible, if unwelcome to those favouring
greater integration, to suggest that in a system of
enumerated powers such an encroachment would be
contrary to a Cardinal principle of thè entire system?
Indeed, as we noted, in a not entirely unsimilar
situation a Canadian provision was interpreted in this
39/restricted manner. —  In fact it is precisely at this 
point in thè judgement that thè Court implicitly makes 
its choice and elects for an enumerated principle which is 
furctionalrather than strict. I have insisted in this 
context on thè distinction between thè two phases of 
judicial activity because it enables us to identify
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the judicial leap and see it for what it is: a policy 
choice. This is important since it demonstrates that 
thè innovation of thè Court in many of its radicai 
decisions was not only in thè use of constitutional 
interpretative technigues to ascertain thè scope of 
thè Treaty but also in a jurisdictional leap as 
regards thè question of competences.
Identifying thè leap puts thè issue in its 
starkest form. It does not however necessarily lead 
to condemnation. From thè strict
point of view of legality thè problem is unanswerable. 
The first phase of thè judicial decision, in each 
instance where absorption is to take place, often 
leads thè Court to thè conclusions that as a matter 
of principle thè Treaty calls for jurisdictional 
encroachment. This then is posed against thè 
principle of strict enumeration. One way or another 
thè Court must take a stand. We may be happy or 
unhappy with thè result depending on our attitude to 
thè supranational enterprise but if, as I shall argue 
belov, even thè empirical premise of strict enumeration 
might be questioned, then thè legality of thè Court's 
leap might not be unacceptable even by thè jurists. To 
thè extent that there is a choice involved it is not 
altogether surprising that thè European Court of
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Justice in accordance with its integrationist ethos
choses more often than not to absorb as it
is not altogether surprising to have found thè Privy
Council going thè other way in thè Canadian context.
What is important is to recognize that thè judicial-
political leap will draw reactions from, and have
consequence for thè other politicai organs and thè
generai architecture of thè Community system.
\ "0  v V \ *  .
C. Incorporation
The term incorporation is borrowed from thè
constitutional and juridical history of American
Federalism. The first Ten Amendments to thè United
40/States Constitution —  are traditionally referred to
as thè Bill of P.ights. For a long period thè
provisions of thè Bill were considered as constituting
a limitation on thè federai government and having no
direct application to thè individuai states each of
which had its own constitution embodying some form
41/of individuai protection. —  By contrast, thè
42/celebrated Fourteenth Amendment — , which was introduced 
in thè wake of thè Civil War, was directed specifically 
at state jurisdiction. Section One, which is of thè 
greatest significance, proscribes thè states from 
abridging thè privileges or immunities of citizens of 
thè United States, prohibits deprivation of ]ife
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liberty or property without due process of law and
forbids a denial to any person within thè state of
thè equal protection of thè Laws. It will not be
surprising that thè broad, principled, language of
this section has made it a fountain for constitutional
dispute and constitutional adjudication. In a process,
thè first major landmark of which is usually traced 
43/back to 1925 — , thè Supreme Court has "incorporated"
substantive rights and limitations enumerated in thè
federai Bill of Rights and applicable on their face
to thè federai government alone, into thè
Fourteenth Amendment. The rights and limitations
thus incorporated became thereby applicable at state
level. The effect has been to curb legislative and
administrative practice hitherto limited only by
state constitutional and adjudicatory norms, if they
contradicted federai, constitutional and adjudicatory
norms. It is important, for comparative reasons, to
note that incorporation of federai rights, at least
theoretically, serves as a lowest common denominator
and, where thè nature of thè right in question permits,
does not prevent thè adoption of higher state standard 
44 /r^-f n m f QCtion — ' The process has had opponents from
icial, politicai and academic. Among 
supporters, even within thè Court, there has been a
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measure of diversity as regards thè interpretative
analysis adopted to explain thè process. Likewise
there have been debates about thè utility and merits
of incorporation, in terms of thè level of protection
45/afforded to thè individuai — . There can be no 
dispute however that incorporation represents and 
extraordinary form of mutation even in thè flexible 
American system.
The possibility of incorporation within thè 
Community system appears at first sight improbable.
We noted that thè Treaty contains no explicit bill of 
rights, so that Community incorporation would entail 
not one but two acts of high judicial activism. First 
thè creation of judge made higher law for thè 
Community and then its application to acts of thè 
Member States. But this very fact suggests that 
incorporation may not, after all, be so inconceivable. 
For it invokes no more than a combination, in thè 
field of human rights, of extension and absorption.
The frequency and regularity by which these two other 
forms of Community mutation are exercised might suggest 
that incorporation is not only possible but perhaps 
even likely to occur —  albeit in a form which is not 
on all fours with thè American counterpart. The
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necessity to fuse thè two other imitative forms might
suggest that incorporation will "creep in" rather than
arrive with a bang. In fact there are indications
4 6/that this process has already begun — . In thè
process of incorporation we should be able to
identify two anchors. One provides thè means for
definition and elaboration of thè human rights at
thè federai level. The second concerns thè
mechanism for their projection into state jurisdiction.
In thè American system these two anchors rest
securely within thè constitutional framework: thè
Bill of Rights and thè Fourteenth Amendment
respectively. This is clearly advantageous. Not
only does thè Supreme Court have an unassailable
authority to engage in a human rights jurisprudence
(an activity which in Europe necessitated in
itself an act of extension); but also, thè fully-
fledged federai system with its autonomous criminal
and civil jurisdictions provides a fertile ground
in which human rights norms may be "tested" before
47/their projection into thè State systems — . The 
only difficulty, not an inconsiderablg one, is in 
thè act of incorporation itself.
In thè Community system thè first anchor is 
far less secure. As we saw, thè evolution of
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Community human rights is far from a simple 
operation. To date thè Court has identified several 
sources for thè elaboration of its own norms. Some
48/rights are directly traceable to thè Treaty itself.—
Another source may be thè constitutional tradition
4 9/of thè Member States — . Yet another source may be 
thè international treaties in which Member States have 
collaborated or to which they are signatories and
50/principally thè European Convention on Human Rights — .
The inclusion of this latter Treaty is significant
since it gives thè Court a much more concrete source
-- more akin to thè American Bill of Rights —  on
which to build its own normative basis. And yet this
apparent abundance of sources serves to complicate
rather than facilitate thè actual process of
distillation. Thus thè Court has spoken of
Constitutional traditions common to thè Member States.
Often, with thè help of comparative analysis, it has
been possible to find commQnality in apparently
51/diverging traditions — . But this may not always 
52/be possible — . Likewise, although thè European 
Convention does not provide a coherent text, by 
virtue of different regimes of reservations not
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all Member States are subject to thè same
substantive obligations, and thè domestic application
of thè Convention differs from one group of states to
another — ^ In any event thè Convention can only
serve as a lowest common denominator a«^a source for
54/Community rights — . The elaboration of actual 
principles is thus likely to demand an intricate 
exercise of comparative jurisprudence which might 
lead to national resistence when it has to be given 
effect in thè Member States' legai orders.
It is here that we have thè d u e  to thè different 
purpose and effect of extension and incorporation of 
human rights in thè context of thè supranational 
system. The two forms of mutation derive from 
different juridical-political exigencies. In thè case 
of extension we noted that thè deep-rooted push for 
mutation was thè challenge posed by Member State 
legai systems (Germany, Italy) wherein fundamental 
human rights were enshrined in thè national 
constitutional order. The European Court, concerned 
that thè criteria for review of Community acts would 
remain integrai and within thè supranational ordery 
responded to thè challence by evolving its own doctrine. 
Neither thè German Court — ^ nor even thè Italian 
Court were fully placated by this new jurisprudence.
The reasons for this are clear. For its part thè
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European Court could not accept that in every case it 
would adopt as its review criterion thè highest norm 
existing in thè Member States. Not only is there a 
theoretical difficulty, in relation to some rights, 
of identifying "thè highest norm", but also this 
would reverse thè doctrine of supremacy and uniformity 
by giving each Member State, at least on thè 
constitutional level, thè ability to dictate its 
constitutional norms to thè Community as a whole.
For their part thè supreme national courts retained 
their fear that thè compromising European criterion —  ^
would enable thè enactment of a European Community 
law (or sanction European administrative practice) 
which would be contrary or fall beneath thè standard 
of protection afforded in thè national legai system. 
Shed of all trimmings thè fear is that thè European 
higher law will not be high enough.
By contrast, should a process of incorporation 
occur, resistence to it is likely to spring from an 
opposite sentiment. The application of a Community 
criterion of individuai protection to state practice 
—  which would be thè essence of incorporation —  is 
not likely to be problematic in those instances where 
thè Member State protection would be of a similar or 
higher level. This is also thè experience of thè
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American practice — . The main effect and resistence57/
is likely to be in situations where thè national 
standard is lower (or different) by comparison to 
thè supranational norm and thè consequence of 
Community standard would be to invalidate thè national 
practice.
It may be useful at this point to look at one
decided case whi< :>me dose to this notion of 
incorporation. It will also illustrate thè limitation 
and cruciai distinguishing mark between potential 
European incorporation and its counterpart in fully-
national was, on account of his trade-union activity, 
barred by thè French authorities from residing in
habitual residence. He appealed against this prohibition
claiming inter alia that it was at variance with thè
guarantees afforded him under thè free movement of
workers regime of thè Community. There was no
dispute that his status was such as to afford him
that protection. The French authorities relied
naturally enough on thè reservation to that regime
5 9/which, as elaborated in thè Treaty —  and in
6 0/"secondary legislation" — , allows exception to 
thè positive rule when justified on grounds of 
public policy (ordre public). A reference was made to thè 
European Court. One issue which t h è ______________
5 8/fledged federai systems. Roland Rutili — , an Italian
four 1 depar-Anents1 one of which was his previous
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European Court had to answer concerned thè 
conditions under which a limitation on thè free 
movement regime would be justified on grounds of 
public policy. This necessarily involved a 
definition of thè breadth of thè concept of public 
policy.
Although thè Court first confirmed that thè
Member States were "... in principle, free to
determine thè requirement of public policy in thè
61/light of their national needs" — , this
determination would be subject to Community control.
Community control could of course derive from thè
substantive requirements of Community law itself.
. inter alia
Thus Directive 64/221 imposes ya.n imperative of
considering thè individuai circumstances of thè
migrant. France would not be allowed to exclude
or restrict movements of say non French
chess players merely because they were, as a class,
unpopular in certain areas. Likewise thè directive
prohibits economie ends as a permissible factor
in thè determination of public policy. Thus high
unemployment in a French ' dépar-tjment ' would not be
sufficient for Community migrant workers, with no
62 /work, to be expelled or restricted — .
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Apart from these specific detailed requirements 
of Community law which limit thè freedom of thè 
Member States to determine thè scope of public policy 
as a ground for restricting thè freedoms of thè 
Community migrant worker there are generai explicit 
provisions in thè Treaty which have a similar effect. 
Most important is thè principle of non-discrimination 
on grounds of nationality articulated in Article 7 EEC. 
Thus even if thè definition of French public policy 
had not been at variance with specific provisions 
of Community law some of which I outlined above it 
could stili fall foul of thè Treaty regime if it
involved a non-authorized discrimination between
fi ^  /French nationals and Community migrants — . Up to
this point thè control of thè national law and
practice would involve no more than a straight
application of Community law.
But what would be thè situation if thè state
concept of public policy did not violate specific
detailed provisions of Community law nor discriminate
between nationals and non-nationals. In other words,
if thè national system permitted —  in respect of
Frenchmen and foreigners alike —  practices which 
i explicit positive^ 
while not violating~^fcommunity law could appear to
64/be in violation of fundamental human rights — . It
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would seem that under these conditions thè Community 
could not afford legai protection. Or could it?
We may safely assume that if thè Community 
secondary legislation, determining thè specific 
detailed Community concept of public policy, carne 
into conflict with fundamental human rights, these 
Community provisions would be reviewable by thè 
European Court of Justice in relation to thè 
three sources which we discussed above. The Court 
would attempt to distil an applicable norm of higher 
law and review thè alledgely offending Community 
legislation in accordance. This would be thè 
effect of extension. But could this higher law 
so distilled also become a source for adjudicating 
a non-discriminating national concept which did not 
violate thè specific provisions of secondary Community 
law? Could incorporation take place? In what for 
our purposes must be thè key Recital in its
gC /judgment — , thè Court seemed to be edging towards giving 
a positive reply to this question.
Having earlier in its judgment asserted that 
thè determination by Member States of public policy 
was subject to Community control it then expanded on 
thè explicit provisions of Community law on thè
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subject, both generai and specific, and in fact found 
that thè French practice violated these. But then, 
admittedly obiter, thè Court went on to suggest, in 
language virtually identical to thè extension cases, 
that thè specific detailed rules of Community secondary 
legislation limiting thè power of thè Member States 
to control aliens (by devices such as public policy) 
were not exhaustive. They were a specific manifestation 
of thè more generai principle, enshrined in Articles
8, 9, 10 and 11 of thè Convention for thè Protection 
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, signed in 
Rome on 4 November 1950 and ratified by all Member 
States, and in Article 2 of Protocol no. 4 of thè same 
Convention, signed in Strasbourg on 16 september 1963, 
which provide, in identical terms, that no restrictions 
in thè interests of national security or public safety 
shall be placed on thè rights secured by thè above-quoted 
articles other than such as are necessary for thè 
protection of those rights 'in a democratic society'.
If thè Community regulation and directives are 
but a specific manifestation of a generai principle 
it would follow that thè generai principle forms part 
of thè Community regime which Controls thè practices 
of thè Member States. It further follows, that a 
national practice which violated this generai principle
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-(of which detailed Community provisions were but a 
specific manifestation) even if applied to nationals 
and migrants alike, would be violative of Community 
law and, by virtue of thè principle of supremacy, 
inapplicable. The Community higher law would have 
absorbed thè corresponding lower national protection. 
Incorporation would occur. This aspect of thè
decision is of course obiter and yet to be followed
in a concrete situation. Although thè point has 
since been argued in several cases — { it has not
been necessary for thè Court to decide whether it
6 7/would follow its jurisprudence in Rutili. —
What would be thè impact of this policy if it 
were followed? In Rutili thè Court mentioned as its 
normative source thè European Convention and its 
Fourth Protocol emphasizing that all Member States 
were parties to it. Does not this diminish thè 
potential importance of European incorporation by 
comparison to thè American doctrine? Certainly,
there is less scope for an entirely independent 
jurisprudence by thè Court of Justice. However, 
should incorporation develop its impact might become 
not insignificant. In thè first place, so far as thè
European Convention is concerned, although all Member
States are signatories thè reservation regime varies 
from one to another. Likewise, in relation to thè
Weiler, Joseph H. H. (1982), Supranational law and the supranational system : legal structure and political process in the 
European Community 
European University Institute                                                                    DOI: 10.2870/67242
-  3>(0-
very Protocol which thè Court mentioned Britain,
Italy and thè Netherlands have to date failed to
ratify it. Even more dramatic would be thè consequence
in respect of Britain, Denmark and Ireland where
traditionally thè Convention does not form part of
thè law of thè land but which if incorporated by thè
European Court would have to be enforced by thè
6 8/national courts — .
Secondly, mindful that in its recent jurisprudence-
thè Court clearly designated thè ECHR as a minimum
standard which did not exhaust thè sources of
6 9/protection of thè Community individuai — , one can
imagine even farther-reaching implications. For i£
in its comparative distillation thè Court adopted a
"high standard" from thè tradition in seme Merrber States, this, by virtue of.,
ncorporation, would be transported into all other
national legai orders. Moreover, should incorporation
occur thè change would not only be substantive but
procedural as well. Decentralised judicial review
of legislation exists in only a few of thè Member
70/States of thè Community — . The process of 
incorporation coupled with thè systems of compliance 
operative under Article 177 EEC would introduce 
Community style decentralised review in thè sphere 
of human rights to each of thè ten partners.
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It is in Rutili however that we also find thè 
jurisdictional limitation on potential Community 
incorporation which crucially differentiates it from 
thè American version. We must turn here to thè 
second anchor of thè process —  that which allows 
thè transnational rights to be projected into thè 
state systems. In thè US any constitutionally 
protected fundamental right directed at thè 
states applies to any state administrative and 
legislative practice regardless of thè division of 
powers between thè federai and state legislatures.
Thus, these rights in thè first Ten Amendments once 
incorporated into thè Fourteenth Amendment are 
projected in an all-encompassing constitutional 
jurisdiction.
By contrast, in thè Community even thè widest
Treaty anchors do not, as yet, have this effect. In
this context, thè Court of Justice has been rigorous
in respecting thè jurisdictional divisions of power
between thè Community and its Member States. Non-
discrimination on grounds of nationality was accepted,
thus, by thè Court as a "generai prohibition", but,
faithful to thè language of Artide 7, only "... within
71 /thè field of application of thè Treaty" — . In
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Rutili this would mean that thè protection afforded
thè Community worker could not be projected onto
Community citizens not qualifying as "workers" in
thè Community sense of thè word and certainly not
to non-Community migrants. In one of thè Defrenne 
72/Cases —  this limitation becomes even more striking.
Although thè Court, using its traditional formula
for extension in thè field of human rights, accepted
a prohibition on sex discrimination (derived as
forming part of generai principles of Community law,
inter alia from thè European Social Charter and an
73 /ILO Convention — , these principles could not, at
thè time of thè decision, avail a woman plaintiff
who had suffered discrimination as regards her pension
rights. The second anchor, thè means for projection
was at that time, limited rationae materia, to
74/situations of equal pay — . The Advocate General 
in this case was most explicit: while accepting thè 
extension in a particuiarly full blooded version — ( 
he was as careful to lay down thè limits of 
incorporation : "... in so far as thè internai
provisions /_of thè Member State/ are not replaced 
by directly applicable Community provisions", state 
level of protection must apply — ( European 
incorporation is thus limited in its scope to thè
Weiler, Joseph H. H. (1982), Supranational law and the supranational system : legal structure and political process in the 
European Community 
European University Institute                                                                    DOI: 10.2870/67242
- i l * '
substantive areas over which thè Community has 
jurisdiction. With thè passage of time thè effects 
of this limitation may be reduced. In thè first 
place thè Court has a considerable discretion in 
determining thè scope —  rationft materia^ person<a§ 
or loci —  of Treaty provisions. An extensive 
interpretation of these enables more far-reaching 
absorption and, by necessity, incorporation. Secondly, 
by thè process of expansion, judicial and politicai, 
thè jurisdictional limits of thè Treaty are 
constantly being widened. As thè boundaries extend 
and thè Community's jurisdiction itself becomes more 
comprehensive thè effect^ of potential Community 
incorporation might become more pronounced.
I should emphasis&at this point that like thè 
doctrine of supremacy, thè realization of incorporation 
would depend on a bi-dimensional process: It must 
first be articulated by thè Court:, and then, more 
crucially be accepted by nationa] dnurts whldnwould 
have to give it effect. I have a lar^e measure of 
scepticism as to thè viability of this doctrine in 
thè near future. The Court1s pronouncements have been 
rather timid. More importantly I see very little 
prospect of courts in thè Member States (especially 
those dualist states which have not "domesticated" thè 
Convention) of accepting incorporation. In this sense 
I am far less optimistic t’^an some writers who have 
foreseen this developmentZZ/1 accept that in thè long
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run it might develop. Why then is it relevant to our 
discussion? In thè context of mutation we are not 
concerned with protection of fundamental rights per se. 
My focus is on thè Court’s attitude to enumeration.
Thus thè mere willingness of thè Court to take these 
first steps towards incorporation, tentative as they 
may be, is another piece of evidence of thè shift to 
a functional rather than strict concept. Whether or 
not thè national courts take thè cue is less relevant 
in this context although I shall return to vo
chapter nine when discussing thè dangers and generai 
limits on mutation.
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Footnotes
1 . I speak of a framework since thè substantive
content of these rights can only be determined
on a case by case basis and usually in thè wake 
of thè Court's decisioni and not in anticipation.
2. Later I shall discuss, under thè heading of
incorporation, thè potential for further
development.
* *3. In a certain sense extension can be regarded 
as *contraction: since thè development limits 
thè sphere of activity within which thè 
Community organs may freely act. Either way 
it is a case of mutation and introduces a 
change in thè jurisdictional balance set out 
in thè Treaty under which thè Member States 
assembled in thè Council would not be limited 
by this particular criterion.
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4. The bibliography is simply vast. Useful accounts 
are: Toth The Individuai and European Law 2 4
I.C.L.Q. (1975); Edison & Wooldridge, European 
Community Law and Fundamental Human Rights.
Some Recent Decisions of thè European Court 
and of National Courts LIEI (1976); Hilf, The 
Protection of Fundamental Rights in thè Community 
in (ed.) gprogean_Law_and_the
(North Holland, Amsterdam > (1976)
145 ff.; Philip, La Cour de Justice des Communautés 
et la protection des droits fondamentaux dans 
l'ordre juridique communautaire 21 AFDI 383 (1975);
' iyÉi=ìi==I=2=i===“ =àS=^ =i
iiI2BiIS=£2SiS84^èii (Kluwer' Deventer, 1979)
§ 5 3-5 6; Drzemczewski, The Domestic Application of thè 
European Human Rights Convention as European 
Community Law 3 0 I^^LiQ- 118 (1981); E£Q£§fj^ÌDg_Qf 
=======i=S=^=======ìè§_SyEQE§§Q_QgQYiDÌÌQD_QQ_StìS§2
Rìgh£j;_in_Ri23£Ì2|}_£g_Q£kj£_lQ|££^§££j_|Q£_£h§ 
E==========°=========i3==i (Athens Colloque, Sept.
1978) (Council of Europe, Strasbourg, 1979) esp. 
contributions by . See generai bibliography
in Q^JaggÈ-Qyilìgg^g^, DE§ÌÈ_£QI^yQ§yi§Ì£e_§ì_drgit 
Ì£ternatignal_2 ublic (1979).
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5. Cf. J^__Jaconnelli, §D^££Ì22_J|_gÌlì_Q£_RÌgh±§
( Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1 980).
6. E .£. Articles 169, 170, 171, 173, 175, 176, 177, 
184, 215 EEC.
7. Since thè travaux of thè treaties were never 
published •
8. .Cf. Cappelletti, The Mighty Problem of Judicial
Review and thè Contribution of Comparative 
Analysis LIEI 1 (1 979). fc/kop “fa U w
9. Canadian judicial review was largely based
on a similar conception. The limited measure 
of judicial review for infringement of fundamental 
rights in Canada usually turned on thè
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jurisdictional propriety of thè alleged 
violation rather than its substantive 
correctness. See e.g. JiDiWhYig & M====i=§==ÌS 
Canadiag_Cong^itutign^i_Law (Buttorworths,Toronto, 1 977) .
10. The ninth amendment reads: "The enumeration in thè 
Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be 
construed to deny or disparage others retained
by thè people".
11. E.g. Justice Black & Madison. See J ^ l ^  
=i=2££I===§===yi§i£Mis= (Harvard U.P., Massachusetts,
Cambridge, 1 9 8 C' f.n. 83; p34.
12. Id. at 34. Ely doe's not offer this as a total 
explanation of thè Ninth Amendment but he 
accepts it as a valid part explanation and 
certainly as a recognized fear at thè time of 
thè enactment of thè USA Bill of Rights.
13. Case 1/5 8 /Ì95 9? 17.
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14. Joined cases 36, 37, 38 & 40/59 ^?960/ E.CR. 423.
15. Id at 450.
16. ".../T/he Court is only required to ensure that in 
thè interpretation and application of thè Treaty ... 
thè law is observed .... Consequently, thè High 
Anthori ty is not empowered to examine a ground of 
complaint which maintains that when it adopted
its decision, it infringed principles of German 
constitutional law. Case 1/58 ^1959/ 17, 26.
17 .  E-2* Case 9 / 5 6  Meroni 957 — 1 9 5 8 /  ECR 149;
case 8 / 5 5  Fédéchar / T 9 5 4 - 5 6 ?  ECR 2 9 9 .
18. Of course thè personel composition had changed
both in thè Court and thè legai service of thè 
Commission which so strongly influences thè 
Court. Cf. Stein, 7 5  A ^ J ^ ^ .  1 (1981).
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19. The cases are well known: see e.2* Case 29/69 Stauder 
/Ì969/ E.C.R. 419; Case 11/70 International Handelsgesellschaft 
/1970/ E.C.R. 1125; Case 4/73 Nold /Ì974? E.C.R. 291; Case 
36/75 Rutili /Ì975? E.C.R. 1219; Case 44/79 Hauer /Ì979? E.C.R 
3727.
20. The doubts stem from thè difficulties inherent 
in this comparative distillation. Cf. Bellini, La 
Tutela dei Diritti Fondamentali 'Nell'ordinamento Comunitario 
secondo La Sentenza Hauer 64 Rivista di Diritto Intemazionale 
318 (1981).
21. Case 29/69 Stauder /1 969/ 419.
22. See Case 44/79 Hauer /1979/ 3727. Cf. Bellini
note 2 0 supra. The Court accepted thè ECHR but 
regarded it as a basic minimum standard and was at 
pains to shcw that thè protection of its cwn unwritten law might 
be higher.
23. Case 9/74 ===^¥===1= 
/Ì974/ | 773.
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24. There are of course some exceptions as in thè 
case of research.
But in generai thè main state educational 
functions remain outside Community reach.
Certain expansive developments will be discussed 
in Chapter Nine below.
25. Article 2 thereof.
26. Interestingly it would seem that within thè
Federai Republic thè competence for this area 
is reserved exclusively to thè various Lander. 
Thus thè Community was claiming a competence 
which thè German Federai Government itself did 
not enjoy. See submissions of thè Advocate- 
General at p. 783.
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27. O.J. 1968
28. At p. 775.
257, p.2.
29. At p. 776.
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30. Id.
31. And thus also thè inappropriateness of thè 
reference by thè national Court since in thè 
absence of a conflict thè interpretation of 
Community law becomes irrelevant. Vis, "/t?he 
interpretation of Article 13 of Regulation no. 
1612/68 approved by thè Vervaltungsgericht is 
therefore not justified" at 770.
32. See, e.2* Case 15/69 Ugliola /Ì969? EQB»
Case 44/72 Marsman T972/ Case 76/72
Michael 973/ 457.
33. The two phase process is important. The Court 
may in thè first phase find thè true intentions 
and scope of a measure and then, at least 
theoretically, hold that thè measure is invalid 
for lack of competence.
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34. See e.£. Case 8/75 Hauts Fourneaux /T957-87
253. / note 4 supra at § 2 90. Lack of
competence might even render an act "non-existent". 
See e.£. joined Cases 6 and 11/69. Rediscount case 
/T969/ E^C^B^ 5 39.
35. Recital 12 (my emphasis)
36. Recital 12 (my emphasis)
37. A use "tertiary rule" , adding to Hart's taxoncrny, 
to designate a rule of Community law which is 
not concerned with substantive obligation but 
with - in thè Community case - thè relationship 
of Ccrmunity rules of substance to national ones.
A primary rule will be a rule of substance.
A secondary rule will be a rule of recognition.
A tertiary rule will be thè .------- rule
of relationship. cf. H.Hart, ^  Concept of Law (O.U.P., 
London, 1961) 77-96.
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38. As we saw earlier there is of course a 
fundamental leap when thè Court moves from 
public international law to constitutional 
law interpretation techniques.
39. A.G. for Canada v A.G. for Ontario £1937/
A&£. 32 6 (P.C.).
40. Passed by Congress on Sept. 25, 1789 and 
ratified by 3/4/ of thè states on Dee. 15, 1791.
41 . See generally Karst & Jacobs , Florence Project.
42. Passed by Congress on June 13, 1866 and 
ratified on July 9, 1868.
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43. Gitlow v New York, 2 68 U.S.
652 (1 925)
44. See 2§!-2££ÌS¥=IB===ii^=^iJj (Harvard U.P.,
Cambridge, 1981) at 24.
Note however that it is not possible in all 
cases to discuss a minimum or maximum standard. 
This is usually possible in instances which posit 
thè individuai vis-à-vis public authority. But 
in cases where conflicting values of 
individuals conflict e.g. in thè case of 
abortion (mother v foetus) there is no maximum 
or minimum standard.
45. One major advantage is that recognition of a
right at thè supreme court level has erga orrtnes 
effect throughout thè states without need to 
fight thè issue in many states. Cf. Shapiro^ 
Frowein and Schulhofer, Florence Project.
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46.
47.
The best treatment on which I have relied and 
to which I am indebted is Drzemczewski , note 4 
supra.
Cf. Shapiro, Frowein, Schulhofer, Florence 
Project. Note that thè right applied to
state jurisdiction need not necessarily be 
identical to its federai equivalent.
48. E.g. non discrimination, at least in some 
forms. Cf. Article 7, 119 EEC.
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49. See Cases cited in note 19 supra.
50. Cf. Drzemczewski, note 4 supra and cites therein.
5 1 . Neville-Brown for instance has compared thè German 
doctrine of proportionality with thè Common law 
doctrine of reasonableness. Neville-Brown,
General Principles of Law and thè English Legai System 
in (ed.)
Common Law of_ Europe ( Sijthoff/Bruylant, Klett-Cotta, Le 
Mcnnier, Leiden, Brussels, Stuttgart, Florence, 1978) at 
171. This was cited with approvai by A.G. Warner in Case 
34/79, Henn & Darby /19807 2 w.L.R. 597 (H.L. and ECJ).
52. An example, from outside thè sphere of Community 
activity, is thè constitual attitude to thè Death 
penalty. What could be thè common denominator 
between Germany (which constitutionally prohibits 
thè death penalty) and other states which retain it?
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53. Thus for example in Britain, Ireland and 
Denmark thè Convention is not as such part of 
thè law of thè land.
54. This was clearly illustrated in Case 44/79 
Hauer/1 9 79/ ggg 3727.
55. _Cf. recent decision by thè German constitutional
Court which does not really reverse thè earlier 
challenge /?98o7 2 531.
56. Neatly characterised as 1 flexible-maximal1 . See 
Duffy, The Relationship between Community Law 
and thè European Convention on Human Rights, 
Leiden - London Colloque, July 1979 p.3.
57. American practice illustrates that incorporation 
does not affect higher state standards. See 
Shapiro, Frowein, Schulhofer, Florence Project.
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58. Case 36/77 Rutili v Minister For thè Interior 
/?975/ 11 EìSaE* 1219.
59. Article 48 (3)
60. Council Regulation 1612/68. 
Council Directive 68/360.
61. Recital 26 (emphasis supplied).
tla . fcot 4 lfo  0fo4| g .cl  my.
62. See generally, D^WYa^^A^Daswood, The 
sybst|gtiv|=law=g|_thg=EEC (Sweet & Maxwell, 
London , 1980) at 147.
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63. There are exceptions, e.g. in relation to
public Service. In fact France did 
violate,even discriminate on grounds of 
nationality (Recital 42 of
judgment)as well as violating specific rules.
(Recital 31 of judgment).
64. This hypothesis is not entirely fanciful. In 
Britain certain classes of woman migrants were 
subjected until recently to virginity tests.
65. At 1232.
66. See Drzemczewski, note 4 supra, at f.n. 101.
67. The case of Watson and Belman is another case 
where incorporation was near. Case 118/75 *
Watson & Bellman /Ì97f7 E^C^g. 1185.
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68. There would be a host of technical problems
as to thè extent of this domestic application 
through Community law. See Drzemczewski, note 
4 supra.
69. Cf. Hauer note 54 supra.
70. See supplement to Bull.E.C. 5/76 at 33-34;
38-40. Cf. Drzemczewski, note 46 supra at f.n.84.
71. Recital 12.
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72. Case 149/77 Defrenne v Sabena /T97§7 ECR 1365.
73. See Recital 28.
74. Recital 30.
It could however be extended rationae loci to 
Community officials. See Recital 29.
75. "I do not think that a lengthy consideration is 
necessary to show that thè rule that there should 
be no discrimination is a generai principle of 
thè Community legai order ..." at 1304.
76. At 1385.
77. Thus I do not share Drzemczewski’s optimism 
note 4 supra, Cappelletti is far more cautious 
merely toying with a distant possibility, note 8 
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Chapter Eight
Our analysis of mutation was concerned with changes 
in thè line drawn between thè Community as a generai 
power and its Member States as regards material compe­
tences. On thè one hand thè strict doctrine of enumera­
ted powers would suggest thè almost sacrosanct character 
of thè originai division, encroachment of which would 
violate a balance struck in thè constituent Treaties 
thè preservation of which is an end in itself. On thè 
other hand, thè dynamic character of thè Community 
resulting from those very same constituent Treaties 
has put inevitable strains on this division. Since thè 
Treaty amending procedure has proved a difficult instru- 
ment for accommodating these strains and unlike, say, 
thè Canadian experience, thè Community has had few other 
mechanisms {such as wide taxing and spending powers by 
which to achieve thè necessary mutation without affecting
thè constitutional division itself, thè Ccmnunity has evolved 
other mutative techniques. As)four analysis of extension, absorption and incorporation
have illustrated, Community mutation has affected
thè actual balance of competences. Yet, as we noted in 
Chapter Seven’
(Cespite thè diversity of form and technique, there is 
a theme which unifies extension, absorption and incor­
poration. They all relate to situations whereby in 
thè exercise of powers specifically granted to thè 
Community and within an area of authentic jurisdiction 
there is an impingement on fields retained by thè Member
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States. This is what was meant by internai mutation.
Unlike thè Privy Council, thè European Court has
allowed, in thè interest of a realization of Community
objectives an encroachment of thè demarcation line
between Community and States.Turning now to thè theme of this Chapter I would 
suggest that there can be a higher form of mutation
whereby thè issue is not one of exercising given powers
even if they encroach on thè jurisdictional balance
of thè Member States, but rather, in thè pursuit of
thè objectives of thè Treaty, thè seeking of "new pcwers" 
not perhaps, expressly delineatea, but which derive from legitimate 
substantive ccmpetences. The doctrine of implied powers represents 
thè form of rnuta^ j 
; tion whereby these 'hew powers" are acquired without
recourse to thè amending procedure.
Traditionally, in discussing implied powers thè
"judicial method" is distinguished and contrasted with
thè "politicai method" exercisable under Article 235
1 /EEC.— From thè legai point of view this distinction
is based on thè argument that thè scope for implication
by thè Court is not as wide as that available under 
2/Article 235.— From thè politicai point of view there 
is a far more profound reason for maintaining thè 
distinction. In federai states thè classical conflict 
over competences arises when thè federai government 
seeks to exercise a certain power which is then challenged 
on thè grounds of lack of competences or powers or both. 
The courts are then called in to adjudicate; -thè usuai 
technique to legitimate thè exercise of power is to 
suggest that thè power is implied in thè constitution.
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In thè Community context thè conflict is reversed.
More often than not thè Court is requested to imply
powers not in order to sanction or legitimate Community
action already taken , but rather in order to promote
or even force thè Council of Ministers to act within
a Community framework. The Council will often defend
non-Community action by relying on a lack of Comminit-y 
powers to act - saying that thè action is outside thè narrow scope 
of thè Cairnunity framework. The Court can prevent then fran doing 
so by refuting a narrcw doctrine of enumerated powers and implying 
a wider scope of Cannimi ty power. This rather — ----------- ->>
peculiar feature is easily explicable by thè hybrid
nature of thè Council of Ministers which is both thè
prime Community organ but also thè major vehicle for
representing thè interests of thè Member States. When
one or more Member States resist a Commission initiative,
as say in thè case of conclusion of Community agreements
in thè field of development aid and cooperation they
may translate that resistance into a challenge to thè
competence of thè Community to act in thè matter.
The Court may then be called upon by thè Commission to
determine whether in fact thè Community has thè relevant
powers with thè intention of removing that jurisdictional
obstacle. Inevitably this process is most efficient
from thè Commission's point of view when thè Court will
not only imply powers but preempt unilateral state 
Vaction
In examining thè evolution of thè Court's attitude 
to implied powers it is possible to identify a process
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of approfondissement which is evocative of thè generai
evolution of normative supranationalism. In thè first
phase thè Court was strongly influenced by thè doctrine
of implied powers found in generai public international
law and tended to be more restrictive and circumspect.
Over time thè Court developed thè less restrictive 
attitude of thè second phase, as it became influenced 
by thè more extroverted "constitutional" approach 
exemplified by thè U.S. Supreme Court. The doctrine of
implied powers in^general public----------------——
international law— is an elaboration of thè principile
of effectiveness^ This principle has played a role
in a variety of structural and substantive aspects of
international law and primarily as regards thè rules of
interpretation of treaties.—^ It evolves into a doctrine
of implied powers when thè treaty in question is one
setting up an international organization. The zenith
of thè doctrine may be found in decisions (opinions)
of thè International Court of Justice in its pronounce-
ment on thè supreme international organization —  thè
United Nations.—^ The cases are well known and a brief
allusion will suffice for our purposes.
In thè Reparations for Injuries suffered in thè Service
8 /of thè United Nations case— thè Court acknowledged
that n/t7he Charter /did/ not expressly confer upon
thè Organization thè capacity to include, in its claim
for reparations, damage caused to thè victim." And yet-iK*- C
proceeded to state that "/u7nder international law,
thè Organization must be deemed to have those powers
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which, though not expressly provided in thè Charter, 
are conferred upon it by necessary implication as
9 /being essential to thè performance of its duties."—
The same reasoning was utilised earlier to confinn thè
international personality of thè UN and its generai
right to bring an action on thè international piane.
In its opinion on thè Effects of Amounts of Compensation
10/made by thè United Nations Administrative Tribunal—  
thè very same language was used by thè World Court to 
sanction thè establishment of thè administrative tribunal 
as a forum for adjudicating disputes between thè Organi- 
zation and its staff.
In thè American constitutional context we find thè
locus classicus of an expansive doctrine of implied
powers in a federai setting. After acknowledging
that "</i7n America, thè powers of sovereignty are
divided between thè government of thè Union, and those
of thè States", and that t7hey are each sovereign
with respect to thè objects committed to it", Chief
Justice Marshall continued in thè oft-quoted statement
of principle -
"Let thè end be legitimate, let it be within 
thè scope of thè Constitution, and all means 
which are appropriate, which are plainly 
adapted to that end, which are not prohibited 
but consist with thè letter and spirit of thè 
Constitution, are constitutional..."11/
The language itself suggests a difference in 
emphasis and sentiment between thè two courts. The 
World Court’s language, undoubtedly as an expression 
of thè profound respect to thè principle of state
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sovereignty, is more circumspect and guarded whereas
thè U.S. Supreme Court uses a more extensive and
extrovert accent. Thus, although doctrine regards
both statements as species of implied powers, there are
marked differences between thè two. It is true that
a principle of effectiveness runs through both formu-
lations; but thè subject matter of this effectiveness
is not identical. The situations in which thè World
Court deals are introspective; they concern thè efficient
internai operation of thè United Nations as an organic
institution,an attitude analogical perhaps to private
law concern with smooth operation of company organs.
This is clearly thè case in thè Administrative Tribunal
opinions. But also in thè Reparations case thè Court
is concerned to ensure that thè individuai agents working
for thè United Nations will be adequately protected —
both as a per se value but also as a means to ensure
thè motivation of thè agent. Thus, thè Court explains
"^i?n order that thè agent may perform his duties
satisfactorily, he must feel that protection is assured
to him by thè Organization, and that he can count on 
12/it."— It is only in a very marginai sense that thè 
powers implied encroach on thè domain of thè constituent 
states. Indeed, thè Court is at pains to highlight 
thè artificiality of thè possible conflict of juris­
diction. Not only does thè Court rely on a formai 
argument to illustrate that there is no jurisdictional 
conflict ("there is no rule of law which assigns priority 
to one or to thè other"), since thè basis of thè claim 
is different, but as a distinguished authority pointsWeiler, Joseph H. H. (1982), Supranational law and the supranational system : legal structure and political process in the 
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out ’Yt/he Court could perhaps have added force to
its reasoning by pointing to thè possibility that some
of thè agents of thè United Nations might be stateless
with thè result that there would be no State able to 
13/protect them."— The importance of thè international
doctrine of implied pcwers should not be underrated. At
thè same time thè powers implied may perhaps be seen
as filling an internai vacuum rather than really extending
thè substantive reach of thè U.N. organs.
By contrast, thè U.S. Supreme Court was not concerned
to fili in a gap in thè internai operation of thè federai
government. The language and thè approach are extrovert.
The Court's concern is with thè entire federai system
comprising thè states both jointly and severally. And,
14/in adopting an expansive—  approach, thè Court was 
directly affecting thè balance between federai government 
and states.
What position has thè Court taken in relation to 
15/this dichotomy?—  The jurisprudence suggests a
graduai process of movement from thè first to thè 
second. In its earlier decisions in thè late 50'sand 
early 60's thè Court seemed to be relying in its juris­
prudence on thè more circumspect international law
cases. Then carne thè period of thè major constitutiona-
16/lizing decisions— whereby normatively thè system took 
on distinct constitutional characteristics. Thus when 
thè issue of powers carne up again thè time was ripe for 
thè Court to move from thè introvert international doc­
trine to thè extrovert constitutional one. It may be 
useful to look briefly at thè cases illustrating thisWeiler, Joseph H. H. (1982), Supranational law and the supranational system : legal structure and political process in the 
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process.
In thè Fédéchar case—  thè High Authority, already
entrusted with thè regulation of thè coal market sought
to depart from thè support systems for Belgium coal
industry moving from a fluctuating to a fixed subsidy.
This was done by a letter addressed to thè Belgian
government. The validity of thè letter and thè power
of thè High Authority to so fix new prices by mere
administrative act were challenged. To be sure, we are
not dealing with an internai organizational aspect of
thè High Authority in thè same sense as in thè United
Nations1 cases. At thè same time thè case does not go
beyond thè province of thè traditional High Authority 
18/activity.— What is interesting is thè language thè 
Court used in sanctioning thè High Authority's admini­
strative action, a language which is very reminiscent 
of thè World Court. It first seeks to narrow down as 
far as possible thè measure of expansion. Thus per thè 
Court "... thè power /which thè High Authority took? 
involved in this instance is one without which equaliza- 
tion cannot operate as provided in /thè Convention on 
Transitional Provisions of thè Treaty of Paris?"* Then, 
in a statement even more circumspect than thè World Court, 
thè European Court states
that without having recourse to a wide inter­
pretation it is possible to apply a rule of 
interpretation generally accepted in both 
international and national law, according to 
which thè rules laid down by_an international 
treaty or a law presuppose /those? rules without 
which that treaty or law would have no meaning 
or could not be reasonably or usefully applied.lV
The Court here seems to be taking thè most severe
17/
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test namely that thè expanded power must be necessary
and indispensable, to an existing rule. Even thè World
20/Court was not as severe as that.— ' In two subsequent 
21/cases—  thè Court repeated this restrictive formula
of implied powers. But whereas in Fédéchar thè Court
sanctioned thè High Authority action in these cases
it annulled it. Thus whilst acknowledging that "... thè
rules established by a treaty imply thè principles
without which these rules cannot effectively or reasonably 
22/be applied",—  it went on to limit thè application of
thè doctrine in thè cases at hand, precisely because
it would involve an encroachment on what was seemingly
2 3/thè province of thè states.—
Compare this language and construction of thè
doctrine to that which thè Court used 10 years later
2 4/in thè famous ERTA case.—  Although thè Court stili 
uses thè principle of effectiveness it departs from 
thè "necessary or indispensable" construction which 
stipulates that thè power can be implied only if in its 
absence another rule of thè Treaty cannot effectively 
or reasonably be applied. For here it is willing to 
confront a situation where there is an absence of 
internai rules (relating to thè regulation and con- 
clusion of international agreements in thè sphere of 
transport policy). The Court instead looks to thè 
entire scheme of thè Treaty to "thè generai system of 
Community law". This is, in my mind, clearly evoca­
tive of thè approach of Chief Justice Marshall encapsulated 
in his famous sentence "It is a constitution we are ex- 
pounding". The principle of effectiveness which operates
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tiere is on a macro scale ensuring (in thè eyes of thè
Court) thè effectiveness of thè entire system of
external contacts. The language of thè Court is generai
granting an overall implied power of external relations
(in thè sphere where internai competences exist,
naturally) rather than particular and clause bound.
The metamorphosis in approach is striking. In thè
International Rubber Case we see a similar sentiment.
Faced with thè question whether thè Community has thè
power and competence to engage in a commodity agreement
which clearly comes within a notion of cooperation and
development rather than strict commercial policy thè
25/Court does not hesitate to take thè wide approach.—
The functions (and limits) of judicial implied powers
Despite thè obvious movement in thè Court's attitude 
to implied powers it does not constitute a full scale 
dismantling of jurisdictional limits. For although thè 
powers "implied" may, as we saw in ERTA, be very wide 
indeed they are always such as to give wider effect 
and a further reach to policies and jurisdiction already 
granted in thè Treaty. Clearly, under thè early Fédéchar 
approach it would have been unlikely that thè Court could 
have implied thè external competence. It needed first 
to develop thè wide "Marshallian" constitutional approach 
—  thè reliance on thè generai system— to arrive at that 
measure of expansion. But it must be recalled, that 
thè widely drawn external competences are linked to 
existing categories of legitimate Community policies 
thè substantive internai base of which can be found in
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thè Treaties. Judicial implied powers cannot then be 
confused with actual material expansion.
What then are thè functions of implied power?
The first function may perhaps be cast in a narrow 
technical legai sense. Although thè Court is not able 
directly to attribute a new substantive competence it 
can directly expand instrumentai powers. Treaty making 
competence is not in itself a substantive field. But 
it is a cruciai means for achieving more efficiently 
thè objectives of policies in a field already granted.
The second, wider politico-legal function of 
implied powers brings us back to our departure point.
The Council is often reluctant to act supranationally 
within thè Community framework. The reasons for this 
can be many. First and foremost Member States may wish 
to retain their individuai autonomy. But in many 
instances they may prefer to act jointly but intergovern- 
mentally —  eschewing thè Commission (Communautaire) 
input, avoiding judicial review and European parliamentary 
consultation, and above all maintaining thè subsequent 
execution in their own hands.— ^
If we look at some of thè major decisions of judicial 
expansion in thè external relations field such as ERTA, 
thè Rhine Case, thè Rubber Case we find this very common 
phenomenon: attempts by thè Member State to act multi-
laterally but outside thè Community framework. The 
function of judicial expansion in these circumstances 
becomes not one of supplying thè measure for a subjectively 
felt exigency by thè legislature, but rather to prevent 
thè Council or Member States from relying on thè absence
Weiler, Joseph H. H. (1982), Supranational law and the supranational system : legal structure and political process in the 
European Community 
European University Institute                                                                    DOI: 10.2870/67242
- Ò 4 S -
of powers as an excuse for non-Community action. Not 
surprisingly as mentiòned above thè judicial expansion 
has always been strongly, even confusingly, connected 
to judicial pronouncement on preemption. In its earlier 
jurisprudence not only did thè Court imply "new powers" 
thereby legitimating activity considered beyond 
Community competences, but it also, in thè same breath, 
preempted Member State activity in this same area.
In more recent jurisprudence it has softened its
preemptory dictates.— ^ At thè ------ ------------- ^
end of thè day, gallant has thè effort of thè Court been, 
it has had to concede to thè primacy of politics.
For although thè Court may take, even drag thè
govemmental horse to thè water, it has realised that
it is politically impossible or counterproductive to
force it to drink. Thus in a style that has become
somewhat characteristic of thè Court's more recent 
2 8/jurisprudence-r— thè Court's expansion decisions include 
statements of principle with much weaker and more concili- 
atory operative instructions. Judicial expansion offers 
thè potential but cannot —  in most cases —  enforce its 
realization.
We must turn therefore to examine thè last form of 
mutation expansion by thè politicai organs in which both 
limits —  absence of jurisdictional competence and lack 
of politicai will—seem to find their solution.
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1. See in particular, Olmi, La place de l'article
2 35 CEE dans le systeme des attribution de
competence a la Communaute in Mélanges F^_Dehousse, 
voi.2. (F. Nathan/Ed. Labor, Paris/Bruxelles, 1979)
at 279.
2. C_f- Tizzano, Lo Sviluppo delle Competenze Materiali 
delle Comunità Europee 21
139 (1981) at 151-159.
3. See e.g. , The International Rubber Agreement case,
Opinion 1 / 7 8  / T 9 7 9 ?  ÌaSaE* 2 8 7 1 .
4. See e.g., t^Qi=§cke£±n§r|, IOÌÌggaÉÌgQal=Ins|i^y£iQOil 
L*aw (Sijthoff & Noordhoff, Alphen aan den Rijn,
1 9 8 0 )  at § 323 f f . ; iI±S£i2ÌÌi_Sf
InternatiOQaì_L|w (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 19 79)
686 ff.; Gordon, The World Court and thè Interpretation 
of Constituent Treaties, 59 A.J.I.L. 816 ( 1 9 6 5 ) .
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5. Cf. Schermers id. at § 1062; Brownlie id. at 687 
"In practice thè reference /by thè World Court? to 
implied powers may be linked to institutional 
effectiveness".
6* Especially constituent treaties of international 
organizations. Cf. Gordon, note 4 supra.
7. There were of course preceeding decisions as regards 
thè League of Nations and thè ILO.
aJt cU-
8. Advis»ry Opinion /194 9/, .
9. At 182.
10. /T95 4? lJQ±g. 4^*
11. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 316, 421 (1819).
Weiler, Joseph H. H. (1982), Supranational law and the supranational system : legal structure and political process in the 
European Community 
European University Institute                                                                    DOI: 10.2870/67242
-3+s -
12. Note 8, supra.
13. Si_LàtìÌl£Ei|£]2ì » _Xnternai4QD§ì
hà^ bY ==i=iS£i£iièigSIì=^2 M t  (Stevens, London, 
1958) at 276.
14. I am not suggesting that a constitutional approach 
necessitates thè expansive approach vis. thè Canadian 
experience. But it does require a consideration of 
thè entire system even if thè conclusions can be 
restrictive.
15. There is much tenninological confusion over thè 
different approaches. What I have called introspective 
extrospective may be similar to a distinction between 
additional powers 'similar to thè ILJ notion) and 
implied powers (similar to thè U.S. supreme court 
notion). cf. R.H. Lauwaars, note 20 infra.
16. From 1963 onwards. See chapter 2 supra.
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26. The best analysis of this problematique though
with conclusions which might involve a measure 
of wishful thinking is Schwartz, Article 235 
and Law-making Powers in thè European Community 
27 614 (1978).
27. See chapter 2 and 5 supra.
28. Once again cf_. Rubber Case, note 3 supra.
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External Mutation
Expansion; An Introduction
In thè taxonomy developed earlier in this study 
expansion was suggested as a high form of mutation.
Unlike internai mutation, it is through this process 
that thè Community competences are expanded to include
new substantive areas of law and policy not directly
^ 1 /foreseen in thè Treaty.— When expansion takes place
procedure
outside thè framework of Treaty amendment/it consti- example of an
tutes thè clearest/erosion of a strict doctrine of 
enumerated powers. Whereas thè Court of Justice could 
in its jurisprudence on implied powers play a judicial 
role in developing wider instruments for thè execution 
of existing policies —  often in thè face of thè opposi- 
tion from thè Member States or thè Council —  material 
expansion is properly in thè hands of thè Community's 
politicai organs. In theory at least thè Court should
2/play here thè role of an impartial federai adjudicator.— 
By contrast with extension, absorption and incor­
poration which have received less attention at least 
as steps in thè erosion of strict enumerated powers,—^
material expansion has been thè subject of immense contro-
4/versy among community commentators.— It is easy to 
trace thè roots of this controversa* since thè practice 
of expansion raises in bold relief thè tension between
Chapter Nine
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severai basic forces and principles of thè Community
system. On thè one hand, in thè words of a leading
commentator,—^
tC/X. is of great importance for thè Member 
States which transferred sovereignty to 
thè Communities, for thè Institutions, each 
of which has its own responsibilities, and 
for thè citizens of thè ^Ten/ in whose 
interest thè Communities are to work ... 
that no powers are exercised unless expressly 
founded in thè Treaties. Without some 
guarantee that thè limits of thè Treaties 
should be respected thè Member States might 
? not have been willing to transfer such wide-
----- ranging powers to thè Communities at all.
We may add to this and suggest that thè approfondissement
of normative supranationalism, which in certain respects
deepended thè sovereignty transfer, might have streng-
thened this sensibility. The translation of this
sentiment into thè enumerated powers debate would suggest
a strong argument in favour of strict construction.
On thè other hand, thè open textured character of 
thè Community, its inbuilt dynamism and thè underlying 
wide ideological integrationalist goals seem frequently 
to be at odds with a narrow concept of enumeration. The 
Treaty itself is equivocai and may lend support to both 
a strict and a wide functionalist approach. Thus 
Article 4 provides that 'Ye7ach institution /including 
thè Council? shall act within thè limits of thè powers 
conferred upon it by thè Treaty" but this limitation 
may of course be interpreted either as alluding to thè 
intra-institutional balance or to thè generai competences
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of thè Community as a whole. The same reasoning can 
be applied to Artide 173 which enables thè Court, 
inter alia, to review measures on grounds of lack of 
competence or infringement of thè Treaty. Is this 
measure intended to prevent thè institutions from acting 
ultravires vis-a-vis each other or to prevent thè Commu­
nity as a whole from exceeding its competence?—^
When one comes to thè actual enumeration of thè 
powers granted in thè Treaty one finds language thè 
ambiguity of which by comparison say to thè enumeration 
in thè British North-American Act allows an equal 
measure of doctrinal difference. Thus, thè tasks of 
thè Community set out in Artide 2 are extremely wide; 
there is specific mentioning of thè promotion of
"... closer relations between thè /Member? States".
One could hardly imagine a wider task.
Likewise Artide 3 which is thè generai instrumentai
enumerating clause contains a bewildering combination
7 /of specific and open ended clauses.— I shall be 
returning to more detailed analysis of this Artide 
below. Exacerbating this tension even further, is thè fact 
that thè activities set out in Artide 3, which may be regarded 
as thè instruments for thè fulfillment of thè tasks 
set out in Artide 2, must be read in conjunction with 
j thè more detailed implementing provisions in thè operative 
*• parts of thè Treaty.—^ And yet as we noted in analysing 
some of thè other forms of mutation these operative 
parts are often themselves sufficiently open textured
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to leave a large margin of interpretative discretion
in thè process of application. Schermers neatly
encapsulates both thè tension and ambiguity inherent
in this doctrinal confusioni
Under thè widest theory of interpretation 
thè attributìon of a specific task in thè 
initial articles of thè Treaties would 
imply thè grant of all thè powers necessary 
to fulfill that task. Acceptance of this 
theory /considering that one of thè tasks 
is thè promotion of closer relations between 
thè Member States/ would mean that thè 
Communities are in thè same position as thè 
national governments which are entitled to 
exercise all powers benefiting thè generai 
public. The rules and limitations, expressed 
throughout thè remainder of thè Treaties, 
clearly indicate that such extensive implied 
powers were not intended. No fixed limits 
can be set however. It should be accepted 
that when circumstances change over thè years, 
and detailed provisions of thè Treaty become 
outdated, thè generai articles at thè begin- 
ning of thè Treaties will assume importance 
and recourse to implied powers will become 
increasingly acceptable.—
Schermers avoids thus a dogmatic determination of
Community competences; moreover he even denies thè
possibility of setting fixed limits. He stipulates
a process of change —  of mutation to use terminology
developed here —  and foresees thè process of erosion
of strict enumerated powers. On thè one hand then
there is an insistence on thè "great importance ...
that no powers are exercised unless expressly founded
in thè Treaties"; on thè other hand an acknowledgement
of thè inevitability of expansion. These then are thè
two principles-------^ between which thè dynamics of
thè process of mutation operate.
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My purpose in this chapter will be in thè first 
place to set out thè already evolving practice of 
expansion employing thè usage of Article 235 EEC 
as my main didactical vehicle; then to explain some 
of thè legai and politicai considerations relevant 
to this practice attempting to unify our entire 
analysis of mutation, internai and external (extension, 
absorption, incorporation, judicial implied powers 
and expansion), into one coherent explanatory state­
ment regarding thè issue of enumerated powers, and 
finally to offer a critigue of this process.
Article 235: A Textual ftnalysis
If thè issue of material expansion is thè generai
focal point of thè classical discussion of mutation
in thè Community it is in relation to Article 235
that this discussion appears at its sharpest. In
addition to thè specific operative clauses that may
be found in thè Treaty for thè realization of thè tasks
set out in Articles 2 and 3 one may also turn to Article
235 as a generai "elastic" clause which on its face
offers _________  ^potential for material expansion.
Article 235 —  a grammarian's nightmare —  reads:
If action by thè Community should prove 
necessary to attain, in thè course of thè 
operation of thè Common Market, one of thè 
objectives of this Community and this Treaty 
has not provided thè necessary powers, thè 
Council shall, acting unanimously on a 
proposai from thè Commission and after 
C o n s u l t i n g  thè Assembly, take thè appro­
priate measure.
In order to interpret thè ambiguous and broad
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constitutional language of this Article we are pushed 
back to thè loose language of thè enumerating system 
in Articles 2 and 3 and thè operative chapters of thè
Treaty. What are thè "objectives" of thè Community?
*1 ì%What is a "Common Market ? When is a measure necessary? 
These are thè three principal concepts which apparently 
limit thè scope of thè Article. But these concepts 
are so wide and imprecise as to allow a field day 
for both strict constructuralists and teleologists.
We find ourselves in thè classical situation of consti­
tutional interpretative theory: Rather than thè
Article of thè "constitution" giving us a precise key 
to thè constitutional doctrine (and so indicate thè limits to 
jurisdictional expansion) it will be thè evolving 
constitutional doctrine which will have to give us thè 
key to a proper interpretation of thè Article.
In order to illustrate thè doctrinal cleavage 
which emerges freni a per se textual or even contextual 
interpretation of Article 235 it will be useful to 
examine briefly some of thè conditions set out in 
thè Article itself, It is not necessary for our purposes
to engage ----in a rigorous word by word analysis,
so frequently done in thè past with, as we shall see, 
such arid results.
Of thè various conditions set out in Article 2 35 
thè procedural one gives least rise to controversy. 
Council action is permitted solely on thè basis of a 
proposai by thè Commission and after Consulting (but not 
necessarily following) thè Parliament. But virtually 
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themselves to controversy between miniinalists and 
maximalists.
a. What are thè objectives of thè Community thè 
attainment of which are necessary for thè introduction 
of a measure on thè basis of Artide 235? The mini- 
malist approach might argue for a restrictive inter­
pretation limiting these objectives to thè rather 
technical enumeration to be found in Artide 3. But 
it is difficult to construe "objectives" as a term 
of art. In fact, Artide 3, in elaborating thè list 
of activities refers to these as serving thè "purposes" 
(rather than objectives) set out in Artide 2.
And Artide 5 which in fact uses thè term ’bbjective^' 
alludes to a concept which undoubtedly is closer to 
Artide 2 than Artide 3.— ^ If then "objectives" 
is definable in terms of Artide 2 it becomes difficult 
indeed to construe limits which would be narrower 
than national state limits. Since an "accelerated 
raising of thè standard of living" and "closer relations 
between thè states" is a gate through which almost any 
measure may pass.
Does this mean that from thè strictly textual 
analysis point of view there are no legai limits 
to Community expansion? This we cannot say at this 
stage since we are yet to examine thè other limiting 
elements of Artide 235. But perhaps at this point 
it may be useful to clarify some concepts which are 
used almost interchangeably in thè literature and
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which so far I have not distinguished: competences,
powers, attribùtion, and jurisdictional limits.
In principle, mutation in a non-unitary system may
be constitutionally limited by reference to ends
(substantive jurisdiction) and/or to means (powers).
Often thè analysis of enumeration is taken to include
both ends and means and hence thè interchangeability
of terms. But there is no necessary symmetry between
ends and means. The generai power (in our case thè
Community) may have objectives (ends) drawn in
extremely wide terms, but its executive/legislative
organs might lack thè constitutional powers to executein Chapter Six,
these ends. As we saw /in a strict doctrine of
enumeration thè limited powers are determinant and thè 
existence of wide ends does not give licence for ex­
pansion. In a functional system of enumeration thè wide
ends are determinant and from them thè powers are implied.
We might then say that thè competences of thè generai
power are thè combination of ends (substantive juris­
diction) and means (powers) thè limits to which will 
depend on thè openness of thè enumeration doctrine.
The a symmetry mightj
^however be different. The generai power (thè Community)
might have thè powers (thè means) but lack thè sub­
stantive jurisdiction (thè permitted ends). For example 
many aspects of consumer protection policy may be 
achieved with thè legislative powers already granted 
thè Community. But may these be used without consumer 
protection itself being an objective of thè Community?
This distinction between ends and means may I believe 
be useful in several ways. Firstly it may help clarify
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further thè distinction between internai and external 
mutation; between, say, absorption and expansion. In 
thè case of absorption thè question of ends is posi- 
tively settled. The issue relates to an implication 
of means. In thè case of expansion we are often more 
concerned not only with thè question of means but 
also with an expansion of endsl with thè granting of 
substantive jurisdiction. Secondly, and consequent 
on this first consideration, we gain a better under- 
standing of thè function of Artide 235. Ostensibly, 
it is concerned only with powers —  it codifies statu- 
torily that which Marshall C.J. established as a 
judicial doctrine. (Subject of course to thè 3 limita- 
tions we mentioned). But an examination of thè practice 
of Artide 235 reveals that although using thè language 
of powers it is often used for expansion of substantive 
jurisdiction. Environmental policy, consumer protection 
and various other areas which I shall discuss below, 
have all been introduced relying, at least partially 
on Artide 235 . Eow is this achieved?
We must now return to our discussion of thè first 
limiting factor of Artide 235 namely that thè required 
action should be necessary for one of thè objectives 
of thè Community. If so far I have insisted on thè 
distinction between ends and means I would now emphasise 
their intere flange ability, There is, as a matter of generai 
logie, an interplay between ends and means. X might be 
thè means by which to achieve Y. Y then becomes thè
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end vis-a-vis X. But Y itself might be thè means to
achieve a higher objective Z. Y then can be thè ends
to X and thè means to Z. If thè "objectives" mentioned
in Article 235 were in fact confined to thè operational
list in Article 3, a policy such as thè environmental
policy would have to be construed as an end; Article
235 could not be used for its implications. If however
Article 2 is utilised as thè reference to determine
thè objectives of thè Community, policies such as
may
thè environmental policy/be construed as a means (a
power) and Article 2 35 may be used. For its part thè
Court has indicated on thè one hand that Article 3
definitely comes within thè meaning of objectives for
11/thè purposes of Article 235.—  It has not, I submit,
confined thè objectives to Article 3. Elsewhere it
has indicated that Article 2 is not merely declaratory
1 2/but has a binding legai effect.—  It would follow
that Article 2 as well could be used for thè purpose
of defining thè objectives in Article 235, c
We conclude thus that from thè textual analysis
point of view thè lìmitation inherent in thè "permis-conclusively
sible objectives" clause in Article 235 is not in fact/ 
a limitation, The wide language of Article 2 extends 
to it a most generous reach. It also enables thè 
legislator by an interplay of ends and means to engage 
in an expansion of substantive jurisdiction and not 
merely thè ìmplication of powers. The position of many 
writers that "il faut en effet exclure du nombre des
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objectifs qui justifient l'application de 1'article 
235 les finalités ethiques et politiques"-- —^^S// is
I submit unprovable. It merely expresses a preference 
of thè writer and cannot be substantiated conclusively 
by thè Treaty. Schermers' dynamic approach is a 
more faithful, even honest, acknowledgement of thè ambi- 
guity of thè text.
b. What then of thè second limitation namely that 
thè action should be in thè course of thè operation of 
thè Common Market? Here again I submit that thè Treaty 
itself is so ambiguous as to allow both a restricted 
and a wide expansionist interpretation. The minimalist 
will suggest a technical/functional construction of thè 
term "Common Market" by which it should be confined to 
thè establishment of a customs union, thè attainment 
of thè four freedoms, and thè creation of defined common 
policies: agriculture, transport, competition, and
commerce. On this basis Article 2 35 may be used only 
for measures which can be said to further thè functioning 
of this narrowly defined economie enterprise. But even 
if thè Common Market is to be given this narrow meaning 
borne out by Articles 2and 3, there is no compelling 
reason when interpreting Article 235 to rely exclusively 
on thè use of that term in those particular Articles. 
Other articles in thè Treaty might suggest a wider 
construction.
Article 38 for exmaple provides that thè "... 
common market shall extend to agriculture" which would 
suggest thè dynamic nature of thè term. The minimalist
Weiler, Joseph H. H. (1982), Supranational law and the supranational system : legal structure and political process in the 
European Community 
European University Institute                                                                    DOI: 10.2870/67242
-could of course accept that but suggest that such
extension must be explicitly provided for in thè Treaty.
Similar arguments and counter arguments may be made
13/in relation to other Treaty Articles.— '
However if we turn to Articles 85-86 we find that while
thè first sentence of Artide 85 maintains this functional
notion of a Common Market^vis ”/t7he following shall
be prohibited as incompatible with thè Common Market"
immediately afterwards we find that thè prohibition
extends to all agreements" ... which have as their object
... thè distortion of competition within thè Common 
14/Market".— / Artide 86 uses similar language vis
"Any abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant
15/position within thè Common Market ...".— r Clearly 
thè language here is conceptual even geographical con- 
struing thè term as denoting an entity limited inter 
alia in space. Likewise Artide 123 speaks of "... 
opportunities for workers in thè Common Market ..." 
using thè same category of a politicai entity and 
geographical locus.
If then we are to interpret thè term Common Market 
in Artide 2 35 by reference to this entity-geographical 
construction we may arrive at a much wider, even unexpected 
results. Since, on this basis, Artide 235 could serve 
as a basis for material expansion even into thè area 
which is usually held out as totally antithetical with 
thè Common Market - defence. For on thè basis of this
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construction of thè term Common Market would not a 
threat to thè physical integrity of thè entity inter- 
rupt "thè course of its operation" and thus necessitate 
active or preventive action to obtain thè objectives of 
thè Community? Is not thè prevention of war a conditio 
sine qua non to attaining any objective of thè Common 
Market however narrowly these may be defined? The 
issue becomes even more delicate (since more realistic) 
in relation to fiscal and monetary measures in particular 
and macro-economics in generai. Tf~òhe takes thè posi­
tive imperative obligations found in thè operative 
part of thè Treaty it is reasonably clear that thè 
intention was to create an edifice which would operate 
primarily at thè micro-economic level and which would
exclude (at least on thè level of positive obligations)
16/fiscal and monetary policy.— The fact that fiscal 
and monetary measures are mentioned although only as 
facultative provisions and under a coordinatory regime 
rather than a mandatory regime makes it difficult to 
determine whether thè positive operative part of thè 
Treaty must be taken as constitutive as to thè legai 
concept of Common Market or whether thè Common Market 
was considered as encompassing thè totality of pro­
visions facultative and mandatory. Be that as it may, 
modern economie theory suggests today that even a 
faithful implementation of thè imperative clauses would
result in thè establishment of little more than a
17/"Custom Union Plus".—  In other words if a Common
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Market in its external modern economically meaningful
way is to be achieved one cannot exclude thè entire
gamut of fiscal monetary and other macro measures.
In this case then, textual analysis throws up
yet another classical constitutional dilemma. Is
thè term Common Market to be understood and inter-
preted in accordance with thè perception prevailing
at thè moment of its conception or may we rely on an
interpretation of thè concept as understood three
decades later in thè light of experience and a more
sophisticated economie science?
18/c. The final limitation— / for thè usage of Article
2 35 is thè requirement that thè measure in question
should be necessary to attain one of thè objectives
of thè Community. Here we do not need lengthy textual
analysis to establish thè ambiguity of thè Treaty,
The concept of necessity is notorious in thè legai 
19/lexicon.— ' What may seem necessary to one may be 
excessive to another. It is then classical constitu­
tional language leaving ampie discretion to thè Court 
to set limits in accordance with constitutional doctrine.
In conclusion then it is my submission that
----- -------- ? thè language of Article 235 is sufficiently
^ride to allow interpretation and practice ranging from 
a strict doctrine of enumeration to a wide functional 
conception. The Article cannot itself offer precise
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normative guidance. We must turn to thè jurisprudence 
and thè practice.
C' Expansion: The Jurisprudence
To date there is very little direct guidance to 
be received from thè Court. There is, so far as I 
know, no major decision of thè Court annulling 
a Community measure on thè basis of excess of sub­
stantive jurisdiction. I shall later suggest reasons 
for this absence but it does mean that those Court 
decisions dealing with Artide 2 35 must be treated 
with caution since in thè few cases in which that Artide 
has been considered it has usually been in other tan- 
gential contexts.— ^ We have already seen— ^ that 
thè Court has adopted a fairly permissive approach to 
thè alleged limitation of objectives. In ERTA thè 
Court stated thè facultative nature of Artide 235.
This is important because it does suggest that even if
Artide 235 can be given a wide expansionary function
2 2 /it will not be used as a preemptìve device.—  In 
Massey Ferguson, thè major case dealing with Artide 
235, thè Court allowed thè use of Artide 235 even 
when other bases for Community action existed. This 
suggests therefore a permissive attitude to thè issue 
of necessity as well, The Court apparently will not 
invoke a strict doctrine of proportionality, This
23/development is interesting since in an earlier case—  
thè Court insisted on thè supplementary nature of thè 
Artide: "Artide 235 offers a supplementary means of
action and applies only in thè cases for which thè
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Treaty has not provided thè necessary powers for thè
24/realization of thè object in view".— ' In other cases
in which thè Article was not even pleaded, thè Court
indicated voluntarily its own view. Thus in a line
25 /of case commencing with Rewe— ' thè Court, while
itself exercising a measure of judicial restraint
in respecting thè primacy of national procedural law
even in cases concerning exclusive Community rights
and duties, called upon thè Member States to utilize
Article 235 (and Article 100) so as to introduce a
measure of uniformity in community procedural law.
This is certainly not thè language of circumspection
in thè use of thè elastic clause, A similar inviting
reference is made in thè Defrenne case.— ^ We cannot
thus get direct guidance on thè scope of Article 2 35
from thè Court; if at all we detect a movement towards
a greater receptivity as regards an expansionist usage
of thè Article in say thè evolution as regards thè
concept of necessity.
We might now recali my initial proposition that
thè textual ambiguìty of Article 2 35 suggests recourse
to generai constitutional principles Community and
such as
other politicai concepts/thè ethos of thè system 
in order to get guidance as to thè permissìble scope 
of that Article. In this context although thè Court 
has not laid down firm rules it becomes clear in what 
direction thè judicial contribution towards thè evolu­
tion of such an ethos is mov ng. In thè jurisprudence 
of thè Court we find combination of activism as regards
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-internai mutation (extension, absorption, incorporation, 
implied powers) and"active passivism" as regards external 
mutation (expansion) e.g., a liberal approach to thè 
use of Article 235. In my opinion this suggests 
unequivocally thè Court's unwillingness to maintain 
a doctrine of strict enumeration which regards thè 
preservation of thè initial demarcation as a fundamental 
principle in itself. Further thè Court has demonstrated 
an unwillingness to regard itself as a federai adjudi- 
cator on matters of competences. We shall later have 
to consider thè reasons for this approach and its possible 
politicai implications. Before doing that we should 
look first at thè actual practice of expansion.
Expansion: The Practice
My analysis of thè practice of expansion will 
revolve primarily though not exclusively around thè 
usage of Article 235. Two preliminary cautionary 
remarks would be in order. Firstly it should be 
remembered that expansion may occur, and has occurred, 
through a variety of other devices such as, say, Article 
100. Article 235 gives thus only a partial picture 
though one which I believe is representative. Secondly,
I shall try in my analysis to highlight thè generai 
trend of evolution which has occurred over thè past 
twenty-five years. Inevitably it will be possible to 
find exceptions to thè generai trend but, I believe 
not to thè extent of invalidating thè generai conclusions.
In examining thè practice of expansion through
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Artide 235 I propose to employ a quantitative cri-
terion and a qualitative criterion. As regards thè
quantitative criterion I shall examine as a key indi-
cator thè number of times Artide 2 35 has been used
as an exclusive legai basis for Community measures
over thè years. (For comparative reference I shall
also supply thè figures of thè usage of Artide 235
in conjunction with other Treaty articles). Quali-
tatively I would suggest three categories by which
measures based on thè Artide may be classified.
Category One will refer to a usage relying on a
narrow interpretation of Artide 2 35 by which only
measures supplementing thè operation of thè Common
Market in thè narrow functional sense are permissible.
Category Two will refer to a wide interpretation
which however confines measures to thè broad economie
sphere. Category Three will refer to a far reaching
interpretation which regards Artide 2 as bestowing
V i r t u a l  i n h e r e n t  s u b s t a n t i v e  j u r i s d i c t i o n  o n  t h è
Community and which regards as legìtimate any measure
2 7/which can obtain politicai consensus.—
Untìl thè early seventies Artide 235 was seldom 
used as an exclusive basis for Community legislative 
activity. The few acts promulgated on its basis would 
certainly fit into thè narrow construction of thè 
Artide, The principal explanation for this caution 
lies in thè simple fact that thè need for expansion
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was not strongly felt. The Community was stili 
engaged in thè process of implementing its initial 
policies and thè explicit Treaty provisions constituted 
sufficient a basis for such legislative activity.
In addition thè notion of strict enumerated powers 
and thè concept of a limited Community were fairly 
strongly enshrined in thè politicai culture of thè 
time. Whilst thè Vision of European Union was never 
abandoned, de Gaulle's "Europe of nations" was, during 
that period, a powerful controlling force, As thè 
implementation of negative integration advanced and 
as more and more positive policies (or fragments 
thereof) carne into effect thè need for expansion became 
however ìncreasingly felt. This need is explicable 
in several ways. In thè first place thè actual operation 
of thè Common Market (defined in thè narrow sense) 
revealed that reliance on thè four freedoms and thè 
few positive policies could not on its own ensure even
thè limited objective of rationalising production
28/factors.— In addition thè Community could not escape 
dealing with thè social dimensions of an expanding 
integrating market. Consumer protection and dimensions 
of labour law to give some examples became pressing 
exigencies. Finally thè Community was displaying 
dangerous redistributìve effects and had to find mecha- 
nisms which could counteract thè generai provisions 
(especially under thè CAP) which while on their face 
equally applicable to all, tended to favour thè rich
Weiler, Joseph H. H. (1982), Supranational law and the supranational system : legal structure and political process in the 
European Community 
European University Institute                                                                    DOI: 10.2870/67242
- aio-
29/
farming sectors in thè North.
From -thè mid-seventies we suddenly have a dramatic
rise in thè use of Article 235 which has been sustained
ever since. The rise is not only quantitative as Table
1 shows but also qualitative in thè sense that many
of thè measures now adopted —  in fields such as
energy research/\ thè environment —  necessitated a
wider reading of thè Article.
====i=i
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Whereas on thè quantitative level we see therefore
a two-phased development with a sharp increase in
1973 which stabilises itself in thè mid-seventies
I think it is possible to deiect a three-phased
development on thè qualitative level. As mentioned
above thè first phase is characterised by a usage of
Article 235 which is based on a narrow conception both
of implied powers and thè Common Market. Typical
examples might be thè Acceleration decision,— ^ thè
Regulation defining thè customs territory of thè 
31 /Community,—  thè Regulation for thè nomenclature
32/for external trade statistics of thè Community—  and
thè famous Regulation on thè Valuation of Goods for
Customs purposes.— ^
The second range of measures falls into Category
Two which encompasses a much wider concept of Article
235 but one which is stili broadly in thè economie
domain. Interestingly this qualitative development
corresponds in time to thè quantitative development
seen in Table 1. It is in this phase that thè Community
branched into a variety of new socio-economic activities.
Typical measures may be found in thè field of thè environ-
ment,— ^ Regional policy,— ^ Energy,— ^ and monetary
3 7/cooperation,— This last development indicates yet 
another usage of Article 235 in thè second phase: 
thè setting up of independent agencies with a legai 
personality distinct from thè Community. Thus in addition 
to thè European Monetary Cooperation Fund, thè Council 
created thè European Centre for thè Development of 
Vocational Training.!®/ and thè European Foundation forWeiler, Joseph H. H. (1982), Supranational law and the supranational system : legal structure and political process in the 
European Community 
European University Institute                                                                    DOI: 10.2870/67242
-r>à-
thè Iraprovement of Living and Working C o n d i t i o n s ^
The third phase is as yet embryonic. Under it
we find measures —  at this stage usually projects —
which extend beyond economie activity. Perhaps thè
predecessors of this phase may already be found in
mid-seventies measures in ihe field of scientific
and technological research.— ^ But recent projects
go well beyond that branching into "... education,
public health, thè free movement of persons not involved
in economie life, and protection of wild-life and
41/naturai amenities".— '
Thus Lachmann cites as examples thè 1978 Commission
proposai for a second research programme in thè sector
42/of medicine and public health— (including subjects
such as "attempted suicides as a public health problem");
thè proposai for special (politicai) rights for Community 
4 3/citizens;—  and finally thè proposals on thè
4 4/role of Community in education.—  To this list we
might add thè proposals of thè European Parliament con- 
cerning compensation for victims of accidents and crimes
45/and thè harmonisation of extradition laws.—
To suggest as I did before that it is only in thè 
second phase that thè need for expansion was felt may 
explain thè motive for a change in thè quantitative 
and qualitative dynamics of expansion. It does not 
explain thè factors which enabled such a change 
actually to take place. There is thus a missing link 
in our analysis.
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The explanation of this phenomenon can, I believe, 
be found in elements already discussed in thè study. 
Three factors must surely be prominent in this expla­
nation: The change in legai ethos by thè Court, thè
changes in thè generai process of decision making in 
thè Community (primarily thè decline in decisional 
supranationalism) and contingent politicai factors 
such as thè demise of de Gaulle and thè first enlarge- 
ment.
The effect of judicial policy vis-a-vis attribution 
de competence is easy to explain. The Court must have 
contributed, consciously and unconsciously —  especially 
in thè Commission —  to a change of climate as regards 
thè issue of expanding jurisdiction. Each decision 
of extension, absorption, and implied powers was a 
signal and tacit hint that thè Court would not take a 
stern view as regards expansion. We also noted thè 
encouraging noises initiated by thè Court itself as 
regards thè usage of Artide 235, Naturally it is 
difficult to establish a direct causai link between 
thè Court’s activism and "active passivism" and poli­
ticai expansion. But it appears extremely plausible 
that had thè Court taken in a case such as ERTA thè 
narrow restrictive view this would have had a profound 
negative effect on all forms of politicai expansion 
as well.
But whence thè politicai readiness of thè govern­
ments to engage in this process. The judicial signals
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could have, after all, remained without a politicai 
response. As indicated above our analysis of thè 
politicai response must be sought in two directions.
In a process commencing in 1969 and culminating in 
thè 1973 enlargement thè Community was seeking for 
ways to revitalise itself politically. This was a 
determined effort to extricate thè Member States 
from thè 11 years of de Gaulle and from thè traumas 
of doublé British rejection and thè morose of thè 
Luxembourg crisis. An ambitious programme of sub­
stantive expansion of Community jurisdiction and a 
revival of European union at whatever level were thè 
order of thè day. Article 2 35 could be a major 
instrument to achieve many of these goals relatively 
rapidly and without major restructuring of thè Treaty.
Paradoxically, thè decline in decisional supra­
nationalism may, I would submit, have contributed 
significantly to thè confidence of thè Member States
in engaging in this process. Since by virtue of thè
over
control achieved by thè Member States/thè decisional
more
process thè Community began to look/as an instrument 
at their service than a usurping power. Each
Member State had a greater confidence that its interests 
would be assured in thè decisional process. To be sure, 
both Article 235 (and Article 100) provide for unanimity. 
Why then should there have been any initial fear of 
a wide use of 235 if a proposai could be refused in 
any event? A veto in Council is not an easy matter.
There is a certain politicai price to pay for its 
exercise especially if frequent. In addition thè veto
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assumes a black and white situation. But in most 
cases thè national resistance is not to thè entire 
measure but to certain aspects of it. Opposition 
to these bits and pieces cannot be vindicated by thè 
veto. Also, there would have been an unease as 
regards thè execution of new policies once promulgated, 
For, especially in thè new category of socio-economic 
policies, such as environmental control, much dis- 
cretìon would have to be left in thè hands of thè 
executive. The prospect of leaving this discretion 
exclusively to thè Commission would have been another 
cautionary factor. Both thè complexity and subtlety 
of thè decisional process meant that thè veto power 
alone, already enshrined in Article 235, would not 
allay all fears of an expansive interpretation.
The essence of thè process of diminution of 
decisional supranationalism was however that thè Member 
State would have a profound influence at all stages of 
thè decisional process so that when a finalised proposai 
reached thè Council of Ministers thè politically embar- 
rassing veto would rarely have to be used. And when a 
policy carne to be executed similar national Controls 
would remain. The decline of decisional supranationajistrt 
resulted thus in a potential increase of confidence in 
thè Community by each of thè Member States. It is 
always dangerous to try and pinpoint landmarks in a 
subtle politicai process which is essentially graduai 
but thè temporal factor is quite suggestive. By thè 
early 70s thè diminution was substantially complete.
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The Luxembourg Accord which in 1965 was grudgingly 
accepted by thè other five, especially thè Benelux 
countries, was, particularly during thè enlargement 
negotiations in 1971-72, accepted as a fundamental 
principle. As I have already pointed out it was a 
major dimension which featured in thè internai British 
and Danish Accession debates. The COREPER, institu- 
tionalised in thè Merger Treaty in thè mid-60s had by 
thè early 70s fully established itself as a major 
component' in thè decisional process. The principle of, 
and power accorded to, Management Committees in super- 
vising thè execution of policies by thè Commission, if 
initially in doubt was legitimated in 1970 by thè 
Court of Justice. Finally, it was precisely at that 
period that thè European Council emerged as a permanent 
feature and as thè prime politicai motor for future 
developments. It is not surprising thus to find at 
that very point in time thè Member States at thè Paris 
Summit of (October) 1972 make reference to thè need 
for an increased use of Artide 235 and, with thè 
inevitable time lag for preparation of legislation 
this increased use was to come.
In conclusion thè convergence in time of thè 
growing objective need for expansion; thè politicai 
desire to relaunch thè Community; thè judicial erosion 
of a strict separation doctrine; and thè decline in 
decisional supranationalism —  which in this context 
can be seen as inducing a growth in confidence by thè
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Member States in thè decision making process of 
thè Community —  created thè right conditions for 
thè process of expansion which we have seen,
Finally there are two dimensions which should 
be briefly mentioned before we turn to an evaluation 
of thè implications of this process,
Firstly, whereas I have strongly submitted that 
thè constitutional ethos and politicai conditions of 
thè Community system have developed in such a way as 
to permit an expansive interpretation of Article 235, 
so expansive as to render a strict construction of 
enumerated powers a matter of dogma no longer applicable 
to thè Community of thè 80s thè Court has been cautious 
not to insist on thè compulsory nature of Article 235.
Its jurisprudence here is perhaps reflective of its 
approach towards preemption —  namely an approach which 
prefers politicai pragmatism to high principle. Thus 
it is clear that at thè limits of thè Treaty, say in 
relation to politicai cooperation, there could be no 
insistence that thè Member States should legally be 
bound to use Article 235 rather than thè intergovern- 
mental method. Though as I have argued, had thè Community 
chosen to use Article 2 35, even in this area of foreign 
policy and defence, there could be a valid constitutional 
basis to defend such a position.— ^
Secondly, we can see now with clarity why in thè 
Community thè process of expansion is not met with 
thè same politicai drama frequently associated with 
similar developments in federai states. The source of 
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power trangresses on thè domain of distinct consti­
tuent parts. In thè Community, especially in thè 
light of thè diminution of decisional supranationalism, 
thè governments of thè Member States are thè generai 
power. Thus there might be conflict and disagreement 
and even deadlock in thè process of deciding an expansion 
in any particular direction. But once thè decision goes 
through thè decisional mi11 a "politicai estoppel" 
prevents thè Member States from challenging thè juris­
dictional basis or constitutionality of thè measure.
Thus in a case concerning a measure taken under thè 
environmental policy in which thè Italian government 
was under attack for non-implementation of a directive 
it explicitly said that it would not raise in its
defence thè questionable jurisdictional basis of thè
. 4 7/ac t . —
Mutation: An Evaluation
Undoubtedly thè process of mutation, internai and 
external, is evidence of thè dynamic and flexible 
character of thè Community and of its ability to adapt 
itself to changing exigencies felt from within and 
without. This does not however mean that thè process 
is without its problems and dangers.
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The question of legality and constitutionality
In thè preceding analysis I have sub­
mi tted that thè consensus, shared by most (though 
not all) writers, that Artide 235 legally limits 
external mutation (expansion) to measures taken in 
thè broad economie field cannot be proven on thè basis 
of thè Treaty. It is a view which rests on an assumption 
that thè word objectives in Artide 235 must be confined 
exclusively to those set out in Artide 3 and that thè 
concept of Common Market is limited to its functional 
economie meaning and not to its political-geographical 
one. I argued that there was, in my submission, nothing 
either in thè Treaty or thè jurisprudence which neces- 
sitates such a restrictive view.
Does this mean that there are no limits to thè 
usage of Artide 235? After all thè construction of 
thè Artide (thè 'if clause) suggests that some limita- 
tion is intended. I think limitations do exist and 
these may be founa on two levels of legai and consti­
tutional analysis. As a preliminary remark I would 
observe that it is not impossibie that thè framers had 
a limiting intention but thè language chosen was such 
as to defeat any unambiguous construction of th is 
precise meaning. Limits can, and indeed ought to be 
found for reasons I shall presently suggest.
On thè textual level I think that despite its 
ambiguity Artide 235 does impose two substantive 
limita'tions. The first is a limitation on capriciousness 
and arbitrariness. Artide 235 must be used for bona 
fide Communitarian reasons and cannot become an open-Weiler, Joseph H. H. (1982), Supranational law and the supranational system : legal structure and political process in the 
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ended instrument of governance or (economie.) oppression. 
It is another basis from which thè Court might derive 
legitimacy in reviewing thè legislative and admini- 
strative practices of Community organs when these 
operate on thè basis of Article 2 35 at thè periphery 
of thè Treaty.
The second limitation, stili within thè textual 
framework, is more tentative. I have argued that 
Article 235 can be used for "... finalités éthiques 
et politiques". But these, I would suggest must be 
integrated into thè operation of thè Community, Thus 
I am suggesting that thè wording "in thè course of 
thè operation of thè Common Market" imposes a dictat 
of gradualism. The process of expansion should not 
operate in leaps and bounds. New measures adopted 
on thè basis of Article 235 must be seen as relating 
and responding to and solving problems created by 
thè already existing acquis. The Article thus imposes 
a discipline of growth.
This of course poses a formidable and legally 
imprecise task on thè Court. But, I believe, it is 
one which should not be shirked especially in thè light 
of thè second order of constitutional analysis.
This second order of constitutional analysis takes 
us outside thè textual analysis of thè Treaty. Whereas 
our earlier analysis of decisional supranationalism 
helped us to understand thè dynamism of expansion, we 
must turn now to thè analysis of normative supranationa-
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lism to understand a major constitutional constraint.
The evolution of thè normative structure of thè
Community is based on a judicial-constitutional
contract between thè European Court of Justice and
its supreme counterparts in thè Member States. The
European Constitution is integrated with thè national
constitutions. In its key judgments laying down thè
foundations of normative supranationalism thè Court
has always insisted that thè new legai order was based
on a limitation of sovereignty by thè Member States
in favour of thè Community albeit within limited fields.
It was on this basis of material limitation that tne
Court formulated its new doctrine and "called" for
constitutional cooperation by thè national legai
orders. The acceptance by these orders —  at least
some of them -- is indeed on that basis of limitation.
Thus, in Chapter Five, I have already shown how thè
Italian Constitutional Court accepted, after a long
resistance, thè normative structure" ... on thè basis
4 8 /of a precise criterion of division of jurisdiction".—
Shades of thè same argumentation may be found in thè
4 9 /Decision of thè French Constitutional Court—  and to 
a lesser degree thè Gerinan Constitutional Court.— ^
Among thè new Member States Denmark offers thè clearest 
example of an order which regards jurisdictional limits
51 /as essential to thè "constitutional contract".—
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An unchecked expansion might thus haye two adverse 
results. It could lead to a loss of confidence in 
thè European Court by its national counterparts and, 
secondly, it might threaten thè already existing 
normative structure. It is important thus that thè 
European Court assert itself in this field. It might 
choose to adopt a substantive criterion of limitation. 
(The Treaty does not impose this but neither does it 
prohibit it). Or else it might prefer a more process 
oriented, reflexive type of criteria based on gradualism 
and perhaps even thè manner in which thè measure was 
adopted. This last point leads us indeed to thè second 
evaluate criterion of expansion - its democratic 
character.
The Question of thè Democratic Character of Expansion 
The traditional non-legal argument used in . 
attempting to limit thè scope of Artide 235 or in 
criticism of thè expansive practice of thè Community is 
thè loss of democratic control which this procedure 
involves. Usually thè argument is made by contrasting 
Artide 236 thè Treaty amending procedure with Artide 
235. Since thè Treaty was concluded for an indefinite 
period thè framers recognized that it would be impossible 
to foresee all potential contingencies which might cali 
for amendment. The Treaty includes therefore an open- 
ended generai amending formula. Artide 236 EEC provides
that
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The Government of any Member State or thè 
Commission may submit to thè Council 
proposals for thè amendment of this Treaty.
If thè Council, after Consulting thè 
Assembly and, where appropriate, thè Commis­
sion, delivers an opinion in favour of calling 
a conference of representatives of thè Govern­
ments of thè Member States, thè conference 
shall be convened by thè President of thè 
Council for thè purpose of determining by 
common accord thè amendments to be made 
to this Treaty.
The amendments shall enter into force 
after being ratified by all thè Member States 
in accordance with their respective consti­
tutional requirements.
It comes as no surprise that thè formula adopted 
in this Treaty Article is far more restrictive than 
thè normal provisions for legislative change. The 
Treaty, akin to a constitution in municipal systems, 
is thè fundamental law of thè Community. Constitutional 
amendments traditionally encompass a variety cf pro- 
cedural safeguards. In thè cont?xt of an international 
system of enumerated powers these safeguards might 
have seemed particuiarly appropriate when thè balance 
of competences between centre and periphery was at issue. 
Thus, this "amending raaze" foresees a uniquely controlled 
decisional process. The right of proposai is formally 
(and initially) granted to each government of thè 
Member States as well as to thè Commission. Since 
amendment invokes in its final phase national pariia- 
mentary ratificatìon one could envisage that a national 
government even before making a proposai for amendment 
would already consult its own assembly. The proposai 
must then encounter thè usuai deliberation in council
and may proceed only with unanimous agreement. Con-
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-sultation with thè European Parliament is obligatory 
as well as, in thè case of a Member State initiative, 
consultation with thè Commission. The process must 
then repeat itself in a diplomatic conference which, 
again, must reach common accord. Finally, and crucially, 
each national parliament retains a power of veto over 
each proposed amendment.
One could cogently argue that thè procedure over 
changing thè Treaty should correspond to thè procedure 
by which thè Treaty was made. But here one goes even 
further since we have an accumulation of both thè 
Community and thè diplomatic decisional processes.
When thè Treaty of Rome was concluded this accumulation 
may have seemed indispensable: to exclude thè diplo­
matic tier would not have accorded with thè initial 
international character of thè Treaty; to exclude 
thè Community tier would enable amendment without 
reference to thè Community institutions.
The process of amendment may involve a doublé set 
of tensions: one which involves a politicai tension
between thè Community and thè Member States and thè 
other between thè executive and popularly elected 
parliaments. The coinvolvement of both national 
politicai organs and national assemblies -- as well 
as thè European Parliament and thè Commission -- might 
be an attempt to diffuse thè tension in both instances.
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And yet, despite thè forcefulness of thè politicai 
argument for an accumulation of decisional processes 
and notwithstanding thè democratic sentiment and 
public international law principle which explains thè 
ratification power vested in each and every national 
parliament, a dissonance has emerged between on thè 
one hand thè dynamic evolutive nature of thè Community 
and its politicai and economie momentum, and, on thè 
other hand, thè restrictive nature of thè amending 
procedure. In thè perspective of thirty years this 
dissonance has translated itself into a discrepancy, 
which does not come as a surprise to thè student of 
comparative federalism. Whereas thè Community has 
seen wide ranging and, at times, profound substantive 
and system changes —  mutations —  in its structure 
very infrequent and little use has been made of 
Artide 236 . Does this mean that we may consign 
Artide 236 into thè legai and politicai wastebin?
A simple affirmative answer could perhaps be given 
if we were interested merely in thè actual process 
of mutation. But thè importance of Artide 236 does 
not lie in thè frequency or otherwise of its usage. 
Rather it lies in its potentially debilitating norma­
tive effect. The insistence in thè Artide on a 
specific procedure, and above all thè unanimous rati­
fication requirement by national parliaments, may be 
construed with persuasion as illegitimating all other
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forms of alleged amendment which avoid these safe- 
guards. Criticism of Community mutation, judicial 
or politicai, which is not based on thè formai amending 
procedure, tends to focus on thè omission of thè natio­
nal parliamentary function. From thè strict legai 
point of view thè existence of Articel 236 EEC neces- 
sìtates a construction of mutation which will distinguish 
it from amendment. The narrow legai argument is simple 
enough. Provided a correct use is made of Article 235, 
observing all its procedures etc. one may do every- 
thing which thè Treaty does not explicitly prohibit.
Only where such categorical prohibitions are concerned 
will one have to resort to Article 236. This is a 
construction consonant with Marshall's distinction in 
McCulloch. Whereas this construction can overcome 
perhaps narrow legai objections to thè non-usage of 
thè amending procedure, it leaves open thè wider 
objections which regard thè provisions of Article 236 
EEC as encapsulating broad representational and demo­
cratic principles. After all, there is an inevitable 
measure of legai fiction and constitutional choice 
in thè interpretation which allows thè exclusion of 
Article 236 EEC. The mere fact that a cissonance 
exists between an objective or subjective need for 
mutation and thè inflexibility of thè formai amending 
procedure may explain but does not in itself justify 
or legitimate thè ensuing dìscrepancy between practice 
and constitutional/Treaty provisions. These may be
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d e s i g n e d  for p r e c i s e l y  t h i s  r e a s o n :  t o  s e r v e  a s  a
c h e c k  o n  W h o l e s a l e  1u n d e m o c r a t i c 1 m u t a t i o n .
It is difficult to negate completely this argument. 
It is possible however to qualify it and illustrate 
its possible weaknesses. For thè dissonance between 
thè dynamism of thè Community and thè apparent cumber- 
someness of thè amending procedure and thè consequent 
discrepancy between thè wide practice of mutation and 
thè low usage of Article 236 do not only represent a 
conflict in which expediency is preferred to principle. 
Rather it reflects a tension which is in thè Treaty 
itself —  thè tension between internationalism and 
constitutionalism. The contrast between, say, Articles 
169 and 177 or between programmatic provisions such as 
Articles 85-87 EEC and Article 220 are familiar illustra- 
tions of this tension. The severity of thè amending 
process has rendered it very much at variance with, 
and inapplicable to, thè transformed constitutionalised 
order of thè Community which it was designed to control. 
Article 236 is a reflection of a formai order which 
existed perhaps in thè Treaty of 1958 which no longer 
corresponds to reality. In thè light, say, of our 
analysis of decisional supranationalism which included 
for example thè establishment of thè European Council 
and thè prominence of COREPER in most echelons of 
decision making, it hardly makes sense to cali for a 
formai diplomatic conference, as 236 EEC does, when thè 
organic Community decision making process has become,
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for that type of fundamental issue, extremely diplo- 
matic in substance and form. Likewise, thè evolution 
of thè normative structure of thè Community and thè 
progress in substantive integration, in short, thè 
realization of a constitutional legai order cali into 
question thè single national Parliamentary veto power 
provided in thè formai amending procedure. Artide 
236 simply does not recognize thè possibility of reai 
Community building.
Under a constitutional perspective rather than
international, one may wonder, polemically perhaps,
if democratic principles are really satisfied when a
few deputies in thè Luxembourg Parliament representing
a miniscule fraction of a Community population of
several hundred million should be able to thwart any
Treaty amendment. Or whether there is much meaning in 
preservine
i an international legai framework in a system which in 
so many ways departs radicallv from thè classical 
international legai tradition. This range of questions 
played a part in thè transformation of thè American 
system from confederai to federai. One of thè changes 
was indeed concerned with thè liberalisation of thè 
amending formula. I would submit, that at least in 
thè normative sense, as defined in this study, Europe 
of thè 60s and 70s displays even more federai characteri- 
stics than thè USA at thè second constitutional conference.
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The democratic argument based on Article 236 is not 
thus water tight. Nevertheless one should be careful 
not to carry these arguments too far and this for 
several reasons. Even a more flexible amending pro­
cedure, say requiring only a majority o<6 state rati- 
fication would stili remain cumbersome. The pressure 
for "non-constitutional" mutation would remain strong.
The main reason however for caution is thè 
absence of thè Community's own parliamentary chamber 
which may legitimate —  at least in thè formai sense*-— 
mutation oustide thè frameowrk of Article 236. At 
present thè growth of expansion does not merely raise 
thè politicai problem of a further transfer of power 
from thè Member States to thè Community.
Indeed I have argued that this politicai issue 
is diffused since thè transfer is not only from thè 
Member States but it is also b^ thè Member States.
It raises instead thè problem of an increased transfer 
of power from parliaments to thè executive and admini- 
stration since there is no adequate body at thè 
European level —  certainly not thè European Parliament 
under its present limits —  which can fili that gap. 
This dimension increases even more thè responsibility 
on thè Court to fili, so far as possible, this control 
function.
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Expansion: thè decision making and representation
dilemma
There is one more dimension which poses serious 
questionmarks over thè process of expansion. Parlia- 
mentary control, even, say, by thè European Parliament 
(should it get a codecision function in relation to 
Artide 235 as suggested by thè Vedel Report) can bestow 
formai democratic legitimacy on thè process. It does 
not necessarily ensure thè social acceptability of 
thè eventual outcome. The drive for expansion is 
increasingly in thè areas of social law: consumer
protection, environmental protection, education etc.
Overall material expansion might, as I said, be 
legitimated legally and even, in thè future, in a formai 
democratic sense. But thè elaboration of detailed operative 
measures will rely on thè existing decisional pro­
cesses in thè Community. These, as I suggested in 
Chapter Three, are extremely inadequate at least in 
some respects. Whether we use a more old fashioned
model of representational democracy or whether we 
iaccp$.t neo-corporatist models it is clear that in 
thè social fields interest groups representing varying 
social exigencies have been integrated to one degree 
or another into thè national policy making processes.
A transfer of competences, even partial, to thè Community 
disrupts thè equilibria achieved at thè national scene 
in at least some of thè Member States. Moreover, thè 
current Community decision making, with its growing 
emphasis on secrecy, with its inevitable channeling of 
all issues into state interests (can there be an objective
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British position on consumer protection?) tends to 
favour certain interests which can better operate 
at thè Brussels level and disfavours others - those 
for example which rely on parliamentary pressure.
The decisional process can in this perspective be 
damaging to thè objectives of expansion.
In conclusion thè entire stay of mutation reveals
once again thè basic fundamental traits of thè Community:
An organism oscillating between internationalism and
constitutionalism, between confederalism and federalism.
The contrast between Artide 236 and 235; internai
mutation and external mutation, normative constitutional
structures and decisional international structures are
all reflections of this oscillation. It is difficult
to predict thè direction thè process will take in thè
future. But perhaps one lesson should be left from
my analysis, The main issue is not whether or not thè
system can legally or otherwise mutate, nor is it one
of what directions should thè Community branch into.
should
Rather, thè main issues/be thè manner in which new 
competences are exercised, thè responsiveness of thè 
decisional systemjthe gradualism of development.
In thè final analysis it is thè ability of thè Community 
to respond to social exigency which counts. Getting 
thè competnece is only thè first step. Exercising it 
is guite another challenge.
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1. There is of course a measure of begging thè 
question at this point as to thè Treaty basis 
of expansion. Even thè most far-reaching
expansionists" rely on a measure of Treaty 
legitimacy.
2. Cf. Articles 4; 173 EEC; And see H^G^_Schermer s , 
^y^Ì£Ì3l_P^gtecÈion_ig_^e_European_Communities 
(Kluwer, Deventer, 1979) at § 193.
3. The illustrations I gave, especially in thè field 
of human rights have been analysed extensively
but not always as part of a process of jurisdictional 
mutation.
^  ’ See e.g., L^uwaars, ti^fulogj|_§g^_^§gal_Fgrc§ 
§£_QQOH]jyQÌÌY_Q§cisions (Sijthoff, Leiden, 1 9 73)
9 4ff.; Schermers, note 2 supra, § 264 ff.; Schwarz, 
Article 235 and law making powers in thè European 
Community 2 7 61 4 (1 978); Ti zzano, Lo
Sviluppo Delle Competenze Materiali Delle Comunità 
Europee 21 g i v i § 13 9 (1981); 
Marenco, Les conditions d'application de 1'article 
235 du Traité CEE, 13 . 147 (1970); Olmi, La
place de 1'article 235 CEE dans le systeme des
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attributions de competence a la Coramunaute in
(F. Nathan/Ed. Labor, 
Paris/Bruxelles, 1979) 279; Lesguillons, Extension 
des competence de la CEE par l'article 2 35 du traité 
de Rome 886 (1974); Giardina, Sulla
competenza a stipulare della Comunità Economica 
Europea 54 RÌvis£^_^i_2iri££g_Jg£g£n§dQQ§i|; 609 
(1971); Giardina The Rule of Law and Implied Powers 
in thè European Communities 1 IìXIì Ìì L* 9 9 (1975); 
Ferrari-Bravo & Giardina, Commento all1art.235 in 
Qu§^ £i, MQDSgQr Sl====S=4' Q§“ iS=I=A===i=l£I==Ì==
istitutivo_dglla_Cgmunità_econgmica_europea 
( 1965) 1 707.
5. Schermers, note 2 supra.
6. Indeed in thè latter case we would probalby have 
a situation of a non-existent act rather than 
lack of competence.
7. E.g., Artide 3j speaks of thè establishment of thè 
European Investment bank whereas Artide 3h speaks 
of thè approximation of thè laws of thè Member 
States to thè extent required for thè proper 
functioning of thè Common Market.
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8. Thus Article 3 commences: "For thè purposes set
out in Article 2, thè activities of thè Community 
shall include, as provided in this Treaty 
(emphasis added) and then comes thè enumeration 
of thè Article.
9. Schermers, note 2 supra, § 266 (emphasis added).
10. Article 5 defines a specific and generai obligation 
on thè Member State to fulfil their Treaty obli­
gations. In particular they must abstain from any 
measure which could jeopardise thè attainment of 
thè objectives of thè Treaty. This is language 
wider than thè positive obligation in thè first
part of thè Article (ensure fulfilment of obligations).
11. Case 8/73 Massey Ferguson /1973/ 897.
12. E.g., Case 6 / 7 2  Continental Can </ T 9 7 3 /  l^^B-215. 
Recital 23-25.
12 bis. Olmi, note 4 supra cited with approvai by Lachmann 
note 27 infra.
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13. E.g., Articles 67; 99; 100; 105; 115-117; 130; 
224-226 EEC.
14. Emphasis supplied.
15. Emphasis supplied.
16. Cf. J. Pelkmans Florence Project.
17. Id.
18. There are of course other limitations e.g., that 
thè Treaty has not provided thè necessary powers 
etc. These however do not pose serious policy 
dilemmas. Cf. Tizzano note 4, supra.
19. In thè context of European Community law it is often
considered in relation to thè exceptions to thè free
movement of goods provision. Cf. Case
Henn & Darby ^19 75/ E ± Q ± R .  •
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20. The main case is Massey Ferguson Case 8/73 /?973/
907. Other cases in which Article 235 
was considered are: Joined Cases 2 and 3/6 2
Commission v. Luxembourg 1^*9 6 27 E^C^R. 425, 4 30; 
Joined Cases 73 and 74/63 International Credit /T9647 
1, 28; Case 38/69 Commission v. Italy /Ì9707 
!=£=§• 57' Case 22/70 ERTA </T97l7 g^C^g. 283;
Case 33/70 Sace /Ì97o7 g ^ g .  1213-1221; Case 43/75 
Defrenne /Ì9767 | ^ g .  455 , 470; Case 33/76 Rewe 
^19767 1998; Case 45/76 Comet /19767 g^S^R. 2053; 
Case 61/77 Commission v. Ireland /Ì9787 g^.£^R. 28; 
Case 151/77 Peiser /Ì9797 E ^ g .  3, 7; Case 11/78 
Italy v. Commission /T9797 g^C^g. 2, 28; Case 27/78 
Rasham /?9787 gigiB- 7; Case 95/78 Dulciora /T9 797 
E^g^B- 5, 15; Case 157/78 Trawigo ,/T9797 Eigig. 3,
7, 8; Cases 4/79 and 109/79 ONIC </19807 E^C^g. 5,
19; Case 145/79 Roquette </T9807 g-i^g- 10^ 34, 41.
21. Text to notes 11 and 22 supra. In Massey Ferguson 
however it refers to Article 3; I do not believe 
this is an exclusive reference. When in Rewe and 
other cases thè Court reccmmends thè utilization of 
Article 235 so as to eliminate disparities in 
national procedural law, this surely must apply to 
national procedural law involving areas of Community 
activity which are not within a narrow definition
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of thè Common Market. Likewise in Defrenne 
Article 235 is mentioned in thè context of expanding 
thè social policy of thè Community.
22. Schwartz, note 4 supra, has consistently argued 
for thè preemptive character of Article 235 
suggesting that thè Member States cannot adopt 
measures when these measures fulfil thè conditions 
of Article 235. Neither thè Court (in ERTA) nor 
thè practice is consonant with this assumption.
23. Case 73 and 74/63, note 20 supra.
24. At 29.
25. See chapter 11 infra and cases in note 20 supra.
26. Case 43/75, note 20 supra at Recital 63,
27. For a similar categorization cf. Lachmann, Some
Danish Reflections on thè Use of Article 235 of 
thè Rome Treaty 18 Qil&iLiBf-Y* 271 (1981).
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28. Cf. Pelkmans note 16 supra,
29. Cf. The Economist, ^ • U- $ 4  0T.
30. Council Decision 66/532 O.J, of 21,9..1 966 p,2971 .
Note that this measure was also based on Artide
14 EEC.
31. Council Regulation 1496/68, O.J. L 238/1 of 28.9.68.
32. Council Regulation 1445/72 O.J. L 161/1 of 17.7.72.
33. Council Regulation 803/68 O.J. L 148/6 of 28.6.1968. 
This was thè subject of controversy in thè Massey 
Ferguson.
34. Declaration of thè Council of thè European Economie 
Communities and thè Representatives of thè Governments 
of thè Member States of 22.11.1973 OJ No.C/112/1 of 
20.12.19 73 on thè programme of action of thè European 
Communities on thè environment; Convention, signed
at Barcelona on 16.2.1976 for thè protection of thè 
Mediterranean Sea against pollution.Weiler, Joseph H. H. (1982), Supranational law and the supranational system : legal structure and political process in the 
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35. Council Regulation (EEC) No.724/75 of 18.3.1975 
entry into force 22.3.1975 OJ No. L 73/1 of
21.3.1975 establishing a European Regional Development 
Fund.
36. Council Resolution of 17.9.1974 on a new strategy 
OJ No. C 153/1 of 9.7.1975; Council Resolution of 
17.12.1974 concerning Community energy policy 
objectives for 1985 OJ No. C 153/2 of 9.7.1975;
Council Resolution of 17.12.1974 on a Community action 
programme on thè rational utilization of energy
OJ No. C 153/5 of 9.7.1975; Council Resolution of
13.2.1975 concerning measures to be implemented to 
achieve thè Community energy policy objectives adopted 
by thè Council on 17 December, 1974 OJ No. C 153/6
of 9.7.1975; Council Resolution of 26.6.1975 on 
thè setting of a short-term target for thè reduction 
of oil consumption OJ No. C 153/9 of 9.7.1975;
Council Resolutìon of 26.6.1975 extending thè powers 
of thè Advisory Committee on Programme Management 
for "Treatment and Storage of radioactive waste"
(direct action) and "Management and Storage of radio­
active waste" (indirect action) OJ No. C 153/10 of 
9.7.1975; Council Resolution of 9.12.1975 on thè setting 
of a short-term target for energy saving for 1976/77 OJ 
No. C 289/1 of 17.12.1975; Council Regulation (EEC)
No. 1302/78 of 12.6.1978, OJ No. L 159/3 of 16.6.1978
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on thè granting of financial support for projects 
to exploit alternative energy sources; Council 
Regulation (EEC) No. 1303/78 of 12.6.1978, OJ No. L 
158/6 of 16.6.1978 on thè granting of financial 
support for demonstration projects in thè field of 
energy-saving.
37. Council Regulation (EEC) No. 907/73 of 3.4.1973,
OJ No. L 89/2 of 5.4.1973 establishing a European 
Monetary Cooperation Fund.
38. Council Regulation 337/75 OJ L 39/1 13.2.75.
39. Council Regulation 1365/75 OJ L 139/1 30.5.75.
40. Council Regulation (EEC) No. 2380/74 of 17.9.1974,
OJ No. L 255/1 of 20.9.1974 adopting provisions for 
thè dissemination of information relating to research 
prograirones for thè European Economie Community;
Council Decision (75/20Q/EEC) of 18.3.1975 OJ No. L 
100/18 of 21 . 4 . 1975,
41. Lachmann, note 2 7 supra at 10.
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42. OJ C 213/3 1978.
43. Giving right of residence to Community nationals
in other Member States - OJ C 207/14, 1 979-,
44. "Resolution prepared in thè Committee for Education
on
- thè European Community and Europe in Schools
- thè admìssion of students from other Member States
- foreign language teaching
- preparation of girls for working life and equality 
of opportunity for girls and boys in society.
The material context of thè projects has been approved
whereas thè problems of thè legai form and budgetary
consequences were referred to thè Coreper for further 
studies" Lachmann, note 2 7 supra, at 12.
45. OJ C 77/77 6.4.1981; PE 77.141.
46. There has however been a lively academic debate 
whether in matters pertaining directly to thè 
jurisdiction of thè Community, thè Member States are 
obliged to use Article 235 as on expansive method 
rather than on intergovernmental agreement. Dr.
Schartz in a series of influential writings, note 4Weiler, Joseph H. H. (1982), Supranational law and the supranational system : legal structure and political process in the 
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supra, has suggested strong arguments for such 
an obligation. But, thè Court in its jurisprudence, 
wisely I believe, has not given full support to 
this alleged obligation. Its pragmatic approach 
on preemption especially thè recent decision in 
thè Rubber Case would suggest an attitude which 
moving in that direction stops short of actually 
obliging thè Member States.
47. Case 91/79 Commission v. Italy /?9807 1099.
48. Frontini /Ì974? 372, 385 .
49. Decision of December 30, 1976.
50. ^19 747 2 551.
51. § 20 of thè Danish Constitution.
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In thè first two parts of this study I attempted 
to analyse systematically thè relationship between 
thè Member States and thè Community. Part One and 
Two dealt respectively with this relationship as it 
manifested itself in thè hierarchy of actors and 
norms (Part One) and thè distribution of competences 
(Part Two). In relation to both spheres we observed 
a fundamental legai development: The transformation
of thè Community from an international order (albeit 
one with unigue features even at its inception) to 
a constitutional order. This metamorphosis occurred 
primarily in thè period commencing in thè mid-60s 
and continuing into thè mid-70s and was accompanied 
by a divergent politicai trend. If thè first decade 
of legai Community life (early 50s to early 60s) 
may be called thè international phase, this second 
decade may be called thè constitutional phase thè key 
characteristic of which was perhaps conceived with 
thè establishment of effective and uniform precedence 
of Community law and policy over competing national 
measures and with thè destruction of strict enumeration 
as a severe constraint on Community activity.
However this maturity of thè system in itself has 
created problems and challenges for future Community 
development. In a certain sense these challenges
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thè symptoms of which have already eraerged in thè late 
70s —  can be seen almost as being born out of 
constitutionalization process and from substantive 
expansion.
Effectìveness cannot be guaranteed solely by 
thè existence of solid constitutional principles 
and accepted relational hierarchies, These only ensure 
a theoretìcal resolution to potential Community-national 
conflicts, Substantive Community policies and law 
must be applied and thè duties and rights they bestow 
vindicated and enforced. Should concrete application 
of policies or vindication of rights be impaired —  
or executed in a manner inconsistent with Community 
norms —  thè constitutional principles of normative 
supranationalism will be rendered arid.
Effective application may be inhibited by several 
factors both legai and extra-legal. I propose to deal 
with three of these factors each indicative of a 
larger problem and each operating at a different level 
in thè complex Community social, politicai and legai 
order: The problem and challenge of non-compliance; thè
problem and challenge of uniform application and thè 
problem and challenge of Access-to-Justice.
Thus in Chapter Ten, in dealing with thè issue of 
non-compliance we shall see both thè operational and 
policy difficulties of preserving thè integrity of thè 
system of compliance analysed in Part One. I shall be
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more concerned to outline thè problem and explain 
thè difficulties of translating sound constitutional 
principle into practice. Equally in Chapter Eleven, 
in analyzing thè issues of uniformity and access-to- 
justice I shall hope to show how thè very normative 
architecture and its interaction with thè decision 
making process produce a serious conflict between 
uniformity and diversity claims. Here it is important 
to remember that whereas I have chosen to deal with 
one illustration of thè problem as it manifests itself 
in thè procedural field (with constitutional implica­
tions) , thè problem of Uniformity vs. Diversity will 
be surfacing increasingly in all spheres of Community 
lif e .
The Golden Thread linking thè challenges of non- 
compliance, uniformity and access-to-justice and making 
these an important next phase in thè evolution of 
normative supranationalism is thè notion of effective 
and fair Communìty-wide implementation and protection;
In making constitutional developments a sound reality 
and not hollow principles. If this analysis were 
concerned with thè prospects of both European integration 
and thè Community as a whole, I would have tried to point 
out those substantive areas of social and economie policy 
where Community action is needed. Supranationalism as 
discussed here is, however, concerned with thè framework 
and instruments within which thè policies may be adopted. 
In this sefise it precedes thè concrete policies. The 
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u.was thè necessary first step in laying down thè 
hierarchical and competence relationships. These 
principles may have been sufficient in a period in 
which thè common rules and principles called prima- 
rily for elimination of certain Member State 
practices. In a period increasingly characterized 
by thè need for positive Community policies, normative 
supranationalism must develop so that thè application 
of these policies, within, and mostly by thè organs 
of, thè Member States will be equal and efficient 
and will not destroy or contradict thè principles 
already pioneered. A sound normative basis will 
thus be a condition for thè success of all present 
and future substantive policies.
What then of developments in thè decisional 
field? Here thè symptoms are far less clear, thè 
crystal ball far more obscure. I propose therefore 
in my concludìng chapter to deal briefly and 
tentatively with two developments which might affect 
thè decisional game: The second enlargement and
direct elections to thè European Parliament. In 
this sphere I can do no more than offer a few possible 
options or future scenarios for development. QuestionsL *
may be posed but answers only guessed at.
Weiler, Joseph H. H. (1982), Supranational law and the supranational system : legal structure and political process in the 
European Community 
European University Institute                                                                    DOI: 10.2870/67242
- - w -
=SSi====^lti2nj._è2gìÌ£§ÉÌ2Q_^0^_Enf orcement_of _CommunitY 
^Ì^l_2hè_£fe§llgD9g_of_Non-compliance—^
£) ■ NQQr£Qm2iiàQse^~_in_lnirQductioQ
Earlier in this study (chapter 4 ) I analysed thè 
system of compliance of thè Community suggesting that 
it constituted an essential feature of thè supranational 
order. The basic characteristic of this system which 
involved a unique combination of international and 
constitutional law was thè emergence of a so called 
"all or nothing" effect. The major elements in pro- 
ducing that effect were thè existence of a compulsory 
jurisdiction of thè European Court of Justice entitled 
to review directly Member State compliance, thè super- 
visory and prosecutory function of thè Commission as 
public attorney generai and, above all, thè unique 
tandem of thè European Court and national courts 
established by thè preliminary ruling procedure under 
Artide 177 EEC. The emergence of thè effect, albeit 
incomplete, essentially meant that unlike traditional 
international systems, thè element of complete voluntari- 
ness in thè execution by states of obligations resulting 
from membership in an organization was removed. Judicial 
judgment, often emanating from a court of thè recalci- 
trant Member State itself, substituted considerations 
of utility or fear of reciprocai breach by other states
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as a major sanction against breach which are thè
usuai motivations for compliance under normal treaty
yfurther,
relations. I arguedVthat whereas Member States 
retainedthe politicai option of withdrawal from thè 
Community they had lost thè option of total selecti- 
vity in thè fulfilrr.ent of their obligations during 
membership. The rule of law within thè Community 
had thus begun to resemble much more a municipal 
legai system than an international order and Community 
norms achieved a "habit of obedience" associated with 
national law.
All this however does not mean that law infraction 
by Member States and its rectification do not present 
a problem in thè Community. The "all or nothing" effect 
represents a constitutional and judicial structure, a 
legai ethos and perhaps even a changing attitude to 
Community law in contrast to international law. But 
tihe existence of all these elements does not ensure 
that no infractions will take place nor can it ensure 
without more that all infractions will be rectified 
or remedied. This is not surprising. The problems 
t facing thè Community system are not in principle dissimilar frar 
those facing anY national legai order in Western democracies.
I In these states we find developed legai and judicial 
structures, a system of sanctions and effective means 
of enforcement. And yet we know that these structures
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and sanctions cannot eliminate law breaking by thè 
subjects of thè law. Nor can they ensure that all
and of greater interest to us, thè enormous rise in 
administrative law litigation in our epoch indicates 
a similar problem in all areas where thè state has 
delegated its executive and administrative function
to administrative organs are entrusted with 
applying thè law. We arrive thus at that trite truth 
that thè efficiency of thè system of compliance in any 
legai order is not only dependent on thè availability 
of judicial sanction and enforcement (thè existence of 
which, in thè Community, is represented by thè "all or
monitoring, supervising —  policing —  compliance and 
bringing infractions and infractors to book .
The rise in administrative law litigation in generai 
is pertinent since for thè purposes of our analysis we 
may regard thè Member States (when charged with executing 
Community law) as agents of thè Community. It should 
not therefore come as a surprise if in thè Community 
as well there will be large scope for "misapplication" 
of thè law and policy in thè charge of thè Member States. 
This danger of "misapplication" might be rendered even 
more acute in thè Community system since thè actual
offenders are detected and punished. Equally,
nothing" effect)
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^  Even nere crucially states charged with applying thè law are 
often its cfcjects.
administrators are usually removed from thè sources
in conflict with national priorities at least as seen 
from thè perspective of thè national administration. ^  
It will thus be reasonable to expect a correlation 
between any growth in Community law and Community obli-
compliance and thè problems of supervision. My purpose 
in this chapter will be in thè first place to develop 
some categories or at least a taxonomy by which to ana- 
lyse thè issue of compliance. In thè second place I 
shall seek to illustrate empirically how thè problem of
ccrrpliance resulting from this "maturing" of thè system, has become
of such magnitude as to emerge as an important item 
on thè Community agenda. Finally I propose to discuss 
some of thè legal-political dimensions of this problem 
and raise some points relevant to a possible solution.
The categories of non-compliance
In order to understand better thè problem of non- 
compliance I think it is necessary in thè first place 
to analyse with greater accuracy thè relationship 
between thè Member States and Community norms. This 
relationship may be broken down into four phases of 
adoption, implementation, application and enforcement. 
Infraction, and hence policing, must take place as 
regards all three final phases - implementation, applica­
tion, and enforcement.
enacting thè law
ut4th_applyina/ -> which they are
law might be considered
on Member State: ìie measure of non-
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Adoption
This phase concerns thè process whereby thè 
Community institution in cooperation with thè 
Member States come to adopt thè legai measure 
or policy. We discussed this process at some 
length in preceding chapters but I shall high- 
light certain aspects which I believeVrelevant 
to thè discussion of compliance.
Implementation
Here we are concerned with those norms -- such 
as thè directive —  which require that thè 
Member States introduce thè Community measure 
into their municipal legai order. This is 
thè first potential point for non-compiiance 
with Community law.
Application
Here we are concerned with thè correct admini­
stration of, and compliance with, Community 
law deriving either from direct sources such 
as thè Treaty or regulations or from implemented 
measures.
Enforcement
The correct and effective application of Com­
munity law requires that violation of thè law 
at thè national level will be met with adequate
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remedies. Correct enforcement must be attained 
both by positive governmental action and by 
making, where relevant, adequate remedies 
available to thè individuai. It will also 
depend on national judicial compliance with 
Community law and processes. This is important
This taxonoray of implementation, application and enforce­
ment gives however only thè first elements for under- 
standing thè problem of compliance. It is necessary to 
develop three further categories of analysis.
"Pre" and "post" litigation non-compliance
Earlier in thè study I explained that one of thè 
lacunae in thè full realization of thè "all or nothing" 
effect is thè possibility of Member States to disregard 
judgments rendered by thè European Court of Justice in 
direct jurisdiction before it (a possibility not open to 
them under thè 17 7 procedure). In analysing thè problem 
and examining thè practice of Member State compliance a 
distinction thus must be drawn between those infractions 
taking place at any one of thè phases before litigation 
and those involving a failure to execute a judgment of 
thè Court of Justice eìther given directly/ or indi- 
ree tly through a judgment in a similar case.
since in case of infraction it involve_ rj>licing
not only of national administration but also
of independent judicial organs.
Weiler, Joseph H. H. (1982), Supranational law and the supranational system : legal structure and political process in the 
European Community 
European University Institute                                                                    DOI: 10.2870/67242
( S -
The distinction is important since whereas prelitigation
----- > involves fully thè problem of monitoring
and supervising---- -------non- compliance
a much more transparent infraction, brings 
non-compliance into a more profound category. Apart 
from bringing a second action for failure to fulfil an 
obligation(namely thè obligation under Article 171 EEC 
to obey thè Court) there is not much that can be done 
on thè judicial level to remedy this latter type of 
infraction. In this sense post-litigation infraction 
is more serious. It highlights thè stili existing 
weaknesses in thè entire system of compliance.
Legislative, executive and judicial non-compliance 
Non-compliance might occur at thè instance of 
national legislatures, executives and judicial organs. 
Legislators may fail to implement Community law or enact
law in violation of Community law . — - ---------------
— - --------- Executives with their wide administra-
tive discretion might equaily engage in wrongful
application or even non-implementation and Courts might
i misapplv thej Igr.d/J disregard or N^^'proceduresror thè substance of Community
law. Dealing with non-compliance by each of these organs
may invoke different considerations.
Defiance, evasion and benign non-compliance
The last element which may be useful in thè analysis 
of non-compliance is probably thè most subjective and
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thus thè most difficult to apply with accuracy. Here 
I am concerned to differentiate thè openness of, and 
motiv ation for,Member State non-compliance.
At thè two extremes we may distinguish between 
defiance and benign non-compliance. Defiance occurs 
when a Member State through one of its constitutional 
organs decides deliberately and openly not to comply 
with Community law. In thè pre-litigation situation 
this might occur with a deliberate failure not to
implement Community law - especially directives; in
2/a decision not to apply Community law in force— or
in a failure -- especially by Courts -- to enforce 
3/Community law— . it might occur in thè post-litigation
4/case where either a government defies a Court decision— 
or when a Court defies thè European Court.—^
By contrast benign non-compliance occurs where 
there is no deliberate decision not to comply and thè 
infraction is thè result of neglect, disinterest, 
administrative or legislative difficulty or simple 
misconception. The number of cases of pre-litigation 
benign non-compliance is probably large but once thè 
attention of thè state is invoked thè infraction is 
remedied —  usually without recourse to thè full 169 
procedure.
Surprisingly perhaps, I would suggest that benign 
non-compliance might occur even in post-litigation cases 
that is in failure to comply with a judgment of thè Court. 
As we shall see there have been in recent years several 
cases where Italy has failed to comply with judgmentsWeiler, Joseph H. H. (1982), Supranational law and the supranational system : legal structure and political process in the 
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of thè Court condemning her for failure to implement 
directives. I regard at least some of these cases 
as benign since they do not result from an Italian 
decision to defy thè Court and thè Community but 
are due to thè objective parliamentary and administra­
tive difficulties of legislation and decision making 
in that country. These issues will be discussed further 
below.
A more complex situation is thè intermediary case 
which for convenience I shall cali evasion. Here we 
are concerned with deliberate infraction but not going 
as far as open defiance. The difference is that whereas 
in thè case of evasion thè Member State, or an agency 
thereof, do seek to evade their obligation under Com­
munity law they will not defy an open challenge by thè 
Commission —  or eventually thè Court -- if discovered. 
Many of thè infractions under Article 30 and 36 (EEC) 
probably come under this rubrìc. Likewise after a 
condemnatory decision by thè Court there may be evasive
compliance; either by thè state itself—^ or even by
7 rthè national courts.—'
The_2uantitative_gvjall|nge_-_An _Empirical..Analysis
We may now approach thè actual manifestation of
these issues in thè Community. First I shall set out
in an a-priori manner thè emergence of thè quantitative 
( legislation,Jgrowth in— "n/ T  sha 11 then try to trace through an examina-
Q /
tion of thè available statistics- thè extent to which
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the growth in Community activity is matched by similar
growth of non-compliance with thè attendant problems
of monitoring and supervision.
So far we have refrained from discussing directly
thè various legislative tools and sources of law availa-
ble in thè Community. Using thè terminology of thè
EEC, ---------------thè Treaty distinguished among
three principal bìnding tools. These are thè regulation,
which is generally binding and directly applicable; thè
decision, which is binding only on its addressee; and
thè directive, which is binding as to thè result to be
achieved upon thè Member State to whom it is adaressed
but leaves national authorities thè choice as to thè
form and methods of implementation and introduction
into thè municipal legai order. All measures, if con-
forming with certain prescribed requirements may have 
9 /direct effect.— It is clearly regulations and directives
which are thè main generai legislative instruments. To
be sure, thè doctrine of direct effect as applied to
directives has blurred some of thè distinctions between
thè two. But direct effect of directives remains excep- 
10/tional—  and thè instruments maintain their substantive
distinction. The choice of instruments is determined
in thè first place by explicit provisions in thè Treaty.
In some cases thè Treaty is neutral —  speaking of 
11/"measures"— to be adopted; in others specific, giving
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thè Council and thè Commission choice between regula- 
tions, directives—  ^ and decisions In other in-
stances it stipulates thè use of a directive —  notice- 
ably in dealing with thè generai provision for approxi- 
mations and harmonization of laws, one of thè principal 
instruments for effective integration .— ^
The directive is a more subtle tool than thè 
regulation: it is mindful of thè social and politicai
fabric to which laws belong and thè intricate relation- 
ships which frequently operate between apparently dis­
parate rules. By imposing on thè Member States thè duty 
as to thè result to be achieved but allowing them to 
find thè best methods of internai implementation, thè 
framers of thè Treaty were presumably making allowances 
for thè disadvantages of fully centralized legislation 
which, although being generally binding and directly 
applicable and thus more likely to produce direct 
effect, could produce disruption in national systems.
The price to be paid for thè choice of directive 
as a tool lies in thè efficacy of its translation into 
binding law. For unlike thè regulation, which can come 
into effect immediately, thè directive, by definition, 
has to give a measure of time for Member State adjust- 
ment and —  apart from thè exceptìonal cases where 
directives will produce direct effect —  implementation 
depends on Member State compliance; it is this last 
link which exposes thè main quantitative challenge.
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To be sure, thè systems of judicial review and thè
principles of normative supranationalism provide
for legai remedies in case of failure to implement
a directive. But before thè Commission —  one task
of which is to "ensure that thè provisions of this
Treaty and thè measures taken by thè institutions pur-
15/suant thereto are applied"—  —  can take legai action
against a recalcitrant or dilatory Member State, it 
has to be cognizant of non-compliance. To be cognizant 
of non-compliance it must have effective monitoring 
mechanisms. In thè retroactive analysis we noted thè 
role of thè individuai as a guardian of thè Treaty
achieved by thè decentralized component in thè Com-
16/munity1s system of judicial review.—  But thè 
individuai can come into direct play only in respect 
of measures which produce direct effect which isvery 
often not thè case in relation to directives or in 
situations where thè directive has already been incor- 
porated into national law. The Commission remains 
itself thè main guardian of implementation of direc­
tives .
The magnitude of this problem can be gauged by
reference to thè numerical explosion in thè number
17/of directives. In 1970, 28 directives—  were in
force. Ten years later it would appear that within
thè legai order of thè Community there are no less
18/than 700 directives in force.— .Even on a dogmatic
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assumption of only one national measure to implement 
each directive, in a Community of Ten this would mean 
that thè Commission has to monitor thè introduction 
of 7,000 implementing measures. Admittedly these are 
spread over a number of years but thè trend is likely 
to continue into thè future. The Commission has intro- 
duced data processing equìpment to try and fulfil 
this task. It has also introduced, in most direc­
tives, a duty on thè Member States to report on imple- 
mentation measures, failure of which could trigger en- 
forcement proceedings under Article 169 EEC. But even 
should thè Commission eventually be able to put tags 
on all thè implementine measures three further problems 
immediately arise.
Firstly thè sanction against non-compliance depends
on direct judicial adjudicatìon before thè European
Court of Justice —  albeit after a conciliatory phase
in which thè Member State is given time to put its
house in order. The prospect of a flood of actions
which may congest and even choke thè Court is no less
alarming than non-implementation especially since thè
Court is already working under a heavy case load. A
further increase of such case load will not only
threaten thè Court’s efficiency but also dilute its
19/normative-constitutional role as a supreme court.—
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in thè second place, even on thè optimistic
assumption that thè Commission would indeed be able
to monitor thè introduction of implementing measures
thè fact of implementation alone would not in itself
be sufficient to ensure effective application and
enforcement. The national legislative act might
after all misconstrue thè enabling directive. Ad-
mittedly, thè implementing measure can be judicially
reviewed against thè enabling directive at thè instance 
20 /of individuals— affected by it. But often in order 
to test thè validity or legality of an implementing 
act thè individuai would first have to violate it so 
that thè validity may be contested, a risky course of
21 /action which many individuals would be loath to take.—
In addition thè Community origin of thè implementing
2 2/act may be oblique— so that thè individuai is not 
aware of thè possible ground for judicial review.
Thus correct monitoring of implementation does not 
only mean making sure that internai legislation was 
brought in but that it actually implemented thè direc­
tive correctly. The magnitude of this substantive 
task —  for it does not merely involve counting -- 
cannot be exaggerated. It is probable that thè Commis­
sion simply has not got thè necessary technical staff 
to engage in this exercise on a systematic basis.
In certain classes of directives -- say in thè
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agriculturai field —  thè Member States are required
to submit thè draft of thè implementing measure to thè
Commission for commentary. In some instances question-
naires are sent out. But even this would not compietelyi and final,
solve thè thiruY problem since even a well drafted nati­
onal implementing measure has, as we saw above, to be 
applied and then enforced. In thè Community system 
this is done by national administrative authorities 
which creates a new tier of potential misapplication 
which in turn would need Community supervision.
Monitoring thè implementation of directives into 
national law, controlling thè conformity of thè national 
measure with thè directive and supervising execution 
are problems which are inevitable consequences of thè 
system. The Council and Commission are primarily legis­
lative organs, thè execution of their positive policies 
being entrusted —  unlìke many federai states —  to thè 
Member States. Indeed thè quantitative explosion may 
be thè result of a legislator not fully responsible for 
thè execution of policies.
The emergence of thè compliance problem
In Table 1 I have Consolidated all publicly 
available data regarding thè usage of thè infringement 
procedure under Artide 169 EEC, Despite thè selective- 
ness and limitations of this data which I shall explain 
below, I believe this compilation may Be a useful indi-
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cator of thè growing problem of compliance. Apart 
from thè basic numerics I have tried to distinguish 
between cases concerning non-implementation and 
cases concerning wrongful application; Further, I 
have tried to indicate, very tentatively, cases in- 
volving benign, evasive and defiant non-compliance.
On thè basis of this table I shall attempt, through 
a closer analysis of certain detached elements in 
thè table, to draw conclusions on thè generai trend 
of non-compliance, thè efficacy of thè monitoring 
and supervisory machinery, and finally on some of 
thè legai and politicai consequences of these trends.
2i====!
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The most noticeable trend is a rather dramatic growth 
in thè numbers of infringement procedures in all 
phases including final judgments by thè Court. This 
is illustrated in Table 2.
Table 2
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We must treat this graphic presentation with thè 
caution that all statistics demand. Firstly, it does 
not reflect thè full picture of non-compliance. The 
basic figures in table 1 refer only to infringement 
proceedings under Article 169. Through thè jurispru­
dence of thè Court under Article 177 we know that many 
cases of non-compliance occur which are not caught by 
thè 169 procedure. In addition, thè apparent growth 
might not represent simply a growth in non-compliance 
but either a better monitoring system by thè Commission 
and perhaps a policy of enforcement which is more 
aggressive or both. But even with these qualifications 
it is clear that thè problem of faithful compliance and 
of Commission supervisìon is growing or at least has 
become more visible and hence, politically, more signi- 
ficant. If thè figures simply reflect a more aggressive 
Commission this must be at least partially explicable 
by a perception of growing non-compliance by that 
organ. I estimate that thè problem is a combination 
of objective growth and a change in policy.
The broad correlation in thè increase as regards 
all three phases in thè infringement procedure {warning 
letter, reascned opinion, initìation of action) is 
understandable. (Note however that thè statistics of 
initiation of actions will relate to reasoned opinions 
brought in prevìous years!). We further notice that 
only a percentage of infringement proceedings commenced 
actually result in a reasoned opinion; that only
Weiler, Joseph H. H. (1982), Supranational law and the supranational system : legal structure and political process in the 
European Community 
European University Institute                                                                    DOI: 10.2870/67242
-  -4òo -
a percentage of reasoned opinions have to go to 
trial and only a percentage of cases brought to 
trial result in judgment and are not withdrawn earlier 
when thè Member State corrects thè infringement. This 
means that thè mere commencement of thè infringement 
procedure is enough to bring a significant number of 
infringements to an end; that of those which remain, 
thè reasoned’ opinion reduces thè infringement further 
and that once thè Commission actually brings a case 
this drastic action in itself is sufficient to termi­
nate thè infringement in yet a further substantial 
number of cases. Thus in thè period 1975-1981 thè 
initiation of infringement proceedings was sufficient 
to terminate thè infringement without thè necessity 
of a reasoned opinion in 5 7% of thè cases. Of thè 
reasoned opinions on average only 25% of cases had 
to go to trial and for those cases brought to court thè 
Member States remedied thè situation before thè proceed­
ings took their full course in 55% of cases.
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Elimination of Infringements by thè 169 Procedure
percentage of infringement percentage of reasoned % of trials
proceedings going to opinion going to trial taking fullreasoned opinion ronr<J
1975 38 9 50
1976 42 16 33
1977 41 28 50
1978 46 33 40
1979 40 22 44
1980 34 34 64
1981 61 33 34
Note that thè figures in each of thè second and third 
columns will relate to infringement proceedings or rea­
soned opinions of previous years. The overall picture 
however is not affected.
These average figures are interesting since they suggest 
thè relative effectiveness of thè procedure. After thè 
first phase of thè proceedings there is a large drop in 
cases going to thè second phase of reasoned opinion 
(slightly over 50%). An even larger drop is registered 
in thè number of cases going from reasoned opinion to 
legai action (75%). A similarly impressive percentage 
of cases (55%) is settled after thè bringing of thè case 
so that no judgment is neeaed. The success record of 
thè Commission is extremely high so that thè chances of 
"acquittal" for iMember States are marginai. Of thè 80 or so 
judgments delivered between 1960 and 1981 under 169 
proceedings, thè Commission "lost" in only 8 instances.
The threat of a condemnation by thè Court seems thus
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reai enough. The figures are even more dramatic if 
we consider thè pre-169 procedure. The Commission 
opens a file in every instance in which it suspects
an infringement or when a compia. m d  a prima-facie 
case is established. These files are subjecrt to in­
formai negotiations before thè formai procedure is con- 
templated. In 86% of cases thè matter is settled in
this informai way. Overall, only 1% of these files
23/reaches thè final stage of a Court judgment.—
This apparently encouraging statistical analysis 
of thè deterrent and/or conciliatory effect of thè 
169 procedure with all its phases must however be 
qualified. We have dealt with average figures for 
a block period of 6 years. On its face,if we examine 
thè last few years we can see in table 2 that thè 
increase in thè number of infringements going to trial 
is not matched by a similar increase in thè number of 
judgments. This might suggest an even growing effi- 
cacy in thè deterrent effect of judgments.
In fact thè statistical data is misleading. The 
reason why thè number of judgments seems not to have 
grown in proportion to thè increase of cases initiated 
is that thè Court's numerical burden has i n c r eased, and thè 
waiting lists have grown. In fact less rather than 
more cases are being remedied by thè Member States
before judgment.— ^ ---- - ---------In other words
thè Member States appear to be less concerned with thè 
possibility of a condemnation by thè Court. Here then
received,
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-we have thè first indicator that thè problems of faith- 
ful compliance are being exacerbated not merely because 
of thè quantitative increase of Community law but pos- 
sibly also because of a deterioraticn in thè attitude 
of thè Member States —  in this instance of rather 
subtle nature towards thè rule of law in generai 
and thè sacrosanct character of judicial decisions 
in particular. In fact I shall be arguing below that 
these two processes of quantitative increase and decline 
in respect to judicial adjudication are partially inter- 
linked.
Earlier we noted thè dramatic rise in thè number 
of directives during thè 70s and in particular thè 
middle part of thè decade, If our hypothesis of a 
causai connection between legislative growth and non- 
compliance is correct we should find a correlation 
between that growth and thè proportion of infringements 
concerning non-implementation rather than wrongful 
application. This cannot conclusively prove thè hypo­
thesis but absence of such correlation would refute thè 
hypothesis. The figures are rather interesting. If we 
take thè overall figures of judgments for 1973-1981, 
of thè 5 2 judgments decided by thè Court non-implementation 
accounted for 23 whereas non-application for thè remaining
29. The percentage of non-implementation constitutes thus 
a relatively high proportion of all judgments consìdering 
that in thè previous decade non-implementation was hardly 
an issue at all. The figures for infringements give a
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further insight. Whereas in thè years 1975-1978 thè
number of infringement proceedings comraenced were
divided roughly equally between implementation and
wrongful application (with a slight predominance of
thè latter), since 1979 non-implementation accounts
on average for 75% of all infringement proceedings
cornmenced. (See table 4) . There is then a noticeable
increase in non-ìmplementation cases which is main-
tained in roughly similar proportions for thè second
phase of thè reasoned opinions. Whereas thè overall
increase in numbers is, as indicated above, explicable
at least partially as a result of a more aggressive
prosecutory policy of thè Commission, thè growing
proportion of non-implementatìon must find explanation
by other factors. First and foremost is thè simple
objective fact that thè period of increase in question
corresponds largely to thè period in which numerical
growth in directives will have worked itself into thè
inplementationsystem and dates for will have falien due.
Secondly, and far more problematically, is thè fact
that thè visibility of non-implementation as disctinct frorf
non-application or wrongful application is far higher.
25 /The Commission’s ASMODEE data base— / can cover most 
cases of non-ìmplementation especìally since many 
directives contain a reporting requirement. For cases 
of wrongful application thè Carmission's technology must 
depend on a relatively haphazard system of complaints
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Percentage of cases of non-implementation and non­
application among warning letters sent out by Commission
(phase 1, 169 procedure)
non-implementation non-application
1975 55 45
1976 33 66
1977
1978 40 60
1979 75 25
1980 75 25
1981 75 25
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from third bodies and on a far from perfect internai 
supervisory system. The upshot of this is that whereas 
we can safely conclude that non-implementation is a 
growing problem, we cannot conclude that non-application 
is declining. Non-application is simply an iceberg, 
thè magnitude of which remains so far unfathomable.
The statistical data may also be useful in evaluating 
thè sìgnificance of infringements in accordance with 
thè taxonomy of benign, evasive and defiant non-compliance. 
More than ever must we be careful in this exercise; a 
correct evaluation is possible, if at all, only on thè 
basis of a case by case analysis which is beyond thè 
scope of this work. A first generai indicator may how­
ever be desirable even in thè statistical data. Whereas
------- p  thè cases of non-implementation have in thè
last few years clearly predominated in thè first stages 
of thè infringement procedure when one examines actual 
cases which result in judgment this predominance disap- 
pears. On average a higher number of judgments concern 
non-application than non-implementation. This may there- 
fore suggest thè benign, or at worst evasive, character 
of non-implementation and a greater willingness of thè 
Member States to rectify non-implementation when alerted 
to their delict by thè Commission. Wrongful application 
could probably be more easily inserted into thè evasive 
and defiant categories.
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So far I have examined instances of non-compliance 
in thè prelitigation phase where thè judgment of thè 
Court was considered as thè ultimate sanction. I 
underlined severa! times thè fact that thè quantitative 
growth of thè problem was partially objective but par- 
tially an unmasking of a pre-existing problem. As 
regards post-litigation non-compliance, at least in 
relation to cases concerning thè direct jurisdiction of 
thè Court, we are definitely confronting a relatively 
new phenomenon. In thè past thè high measure of obe-
dience accorded to thè European Court of Justice has
always been one of thè distinguishing features of thè
Community system. The celebrated Art Treasures cases
have been usually cited as an exception proving a 
generai custom of observance. Since 19 78 we begin to 
detect what may be regarded as thè first creaks in this 
edifice of obedience. Here as well we have a process of 
growth. I should immediately emphasise that thè problem 
is far from dramatic, but unlike cases of infringements, 
defiance of thè Court can be very damaging even if it 
occurs in a limited number of instances.
Table 5
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Of all infringement cases in which judgment has 
been given since thè first enlargemern: in 1973, in 18
instances Member States have failed fully or partially 
to compìy with thè judgments. (We should note here 
that many of these cases concern Italy; thè national 
breakdown will be discussed later). Of these 18 cases 
over half concerned non-implementation issues - i.e., 
Member States failing to implement a directive even 
after judgment for failure to fulfil an obligation.
Of those 10 cases I would suggest that at least 8 
could be classified as benign: in other words not in- 
volving a politicai determination to disobey thè Court 
but rather thè same factors of politicai and administra­
tive paralysis which caused non-implementation in thè 
first place probably caused non-compliance with thè 
subsequent judgment. If I am correct in this explanation 
it might appear that thè problem of non-compliance with 
judgments is less acute than thè figures at first sug­
gest. This however would be a dangerous conclusion for 
three principal reasons.
Firstly of thè 8 cases concerning non-compliance 
with a judgment concerning wrongful application of 
Community law, only 2 could probably be classified as 
benign, thè rest remaìnìng cases of evasion or defiance.
Secondly we have to consider thè negative symbolic 
effect and thè erosive consequences to thè authority 
and credibility of thè Court which any non-compliance
—  with whatever motive —  may have, Indeed from this 
point of view benign n o n —compliance is dangerous sinceWeiler, Joseph H. H. (1982), Supranational law and the supranational system : legal structure and political process in the 
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if even a Court decision cannot bring about thè
faithful implementation of Community law a wide
lacuna opens in thè legai order. This is especially
acute when one considers thè contagious effect of
non-compliance. Non-compliance by one Member State
might well invite non-compliance by another.
Finally, in thè category of post-litigation
non-compliance, perhaps even more than thè pre-litiga-
tion category, some of thè most clamorous instances
occurred in thè context of cases coming under actual
or potential preliminary ruling procedur.es. The recent
defiant declaration of thè German Government in thè
26/Eutter Ships case— ' is one glaring example of non-
27/compliance by thè executive and thè Cohn-Bfcndit case—
2 8/as well as thè decision of thè Bundesfinanzhof— —
both cases defying thè European Court’s jurisprudence
on thè direct effect of directives —  are cases of
29 /equally worrying defiance by national courts.—
Indeed these two sets of cases may be taken as possible 
examples for thè contagious effect of non-compliance.
The Bundesfinanzhof may certainly have felt freer so 
openly to defy thè ECJ with thè precedent of thè Conseil 
d'Etat already established. The high respect which 
is accorded to judicial decisions in, say, thè German 
and British systems must be severely undermined by dis- 
obedience occurring, say, in France and Italy. Thus,
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one may wonder whether thè Government of thè Federai 
Republic, hitherto in thè frontline of obedient states 
would have broken its record in thè Buttership case 
without thè precedent established by thè French in 
thè Mutton and Lamb saga. This may be an opportune 
point to turn and examine thè wider legal-political 
context of non-compliance.
C  S5=: = =:= = i=li£i=2==2l“ 2===-=2Ìi=S = -
To be sure in one sense thè maturing of thè 
Community system has rendered thè non-compliance 
issue predictable and inevitable. In another sense 
my earlier analysis of normative and decisional 
supranationalism presents a dilemma, or even paradox, 
in thè context of thè non-compliance discussion.
The approfondissement of normative supranationa­
lism has distinguished thè outcome of thè Community 
decisional process from that of most other international 
organizations. In many of these international "law" 
making fora thè participating states may accept rela- 
tively "lightly" a convention even one including new 
international obligations since these normally will be 
subject to national ratification before they become 
binding on thè signing states. Further, a regime of 
reservation is also available before thè obligations 
are to become binding on thè parties. In dualist 
states there is thè added "insulation" of national 
parliamentary implementation, The Council of Europe 
and thè various agencies of thè United Nations allWeiler, Joseph H. H. (1982), Supranational law and the supranational system : legal structure and political process in the 
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boast impressive lists of international treaties; 
many of these however remain unsigned, unratified 
or subject to reservations by thè participating states.
By contrast, in thè Community, although thè process of 
decision making has become increasingly "diplomatic", 
once decisions are taken, once proposals are accepted, 
they have in most cases thè immediate binding effect 
either on thè states and, depending on their direct 
effect, very frequently even within thè states. The 
immediacy of this binding effect might, as I have argued, 
have contributed to Member States’ increasing degree 
of caution in their Community law making since they 
do not have thè "escape mechanisms" available in thè 
public international order. Indeed, as I suggested 
above this factor may have been one powerful reason 
for thè decline in decisional supranationalism. But 
here lies thè principal paradox of Community non-compliance 
If thè Member States, through this process of decline, 
have achieved jointly and severally, a position of 
dominance in all phases of Community decision making why 
is it that there is this increasing trend of non-compliance 
Each Member State may check thè eventual obligation at 
each of thè four cruciai stages in its adoption: Poli­
ticai initiation (European Council); technical elabora- 
tion (working groups, groups of experts, COREPER); adop­
tion (veto power in Council) and subsequent secondary 
elaboration (management and other Committees). In this
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extended and laborious process ampie opportunity is 
given to each Member State to weigh thè consequences 
of adoption, to foresee eventual implementation or 
application problems be they politicai or technical 
and to amend, or even block any unacceptable proposai. 
With all this "foreplay" it does indeed seem strange 
that after eventual —  often extremely protracted —  
adoption "consummation" should seem to be posing such 
difficulties. The deliberate dismantling by thè Member 
States of thè supranational decisional structures was 
executed precisely for this reason: to prevent a
Member State having to face a normatìvely binding 
measure thè making of which it could not control. Why 
then thè implementation/application problems? There 
can be no single answer to this problem. Moreover thè 
explanations which I shall offer must, in thè absence 
of further (methodologically complex) research, be 
regarded as tentative even speculative.
In dealing with this paradox I propose to divide 
thè decisional process into three primary compartments: 
The national^
- Spoliticai and administrative process in thè
pre-adoption phase
thè decisional process within thè Community 
itself leading to adoption
- thè national politicai and administrative 
process in thè post-adoption phase
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Naturally these are not watertight compartments. On 
thè contrary thè process within each of these affects 
thè others and all three have implications for eventual 
faithful compliance.
Judicial activism; Law without politicai consensus 
A first step in solving thè paradox of non- 
compliance may be made if we return to thè distinction 
drawn in thè empirical analysis between implementation 
and application. If we isolate thè cases of wrongful 
application —  thè number of which, at thè stage of 
judicial adjudication —  is equal or even superior 
to non-implementation —  we shall see that a great 
majority of them are traceable back to breaches of 
positive law in thè making, or at least perfection, 
of which thè Member States did not partake. I am 
referring to decisions of thè Court of Justice as a 
source of law and obligation. So far in our analysis 
of judicial activity I have concentrated on thè generai 
constitutionalizing decisions of thè Court. The Court1s 
dynamism has not however been confined to these generai 
questions of "federai" structures. In treating thè 
substantive obligations contained in thè Treaty thè Court 
has frequently been motivated by a Vision of thè evolu- 
tion of thè Common Market, thè purity of which although 
traceable to thè Treaty was not shared by thè Member 
States years after. Thus, Member States have found 
themselves faced with an increasing number of substantive
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Treaty obligations to which direct effect was extended
and thè scope of which was judicialiy widened. By
contrast^derogation measures —  principally those
relating to thè fundamental four freedoms— //-_ were
given a restrictive interpretation by thè same Court.
Leaving aside thè question of thè legitimacy of thè
interpretative techniques adopted by thè Court in this
process, this substantive corpus of obligations repre-
sents a source of positive obligations in thè elaboration
of which thè Member States did not fully partake. In
other terms thè "acceptability" factor which\bne of
thè positive aspects in our analysis of consensus deci-
31/sion making does not exist here.— ' (To be sure they
all accepted thè Treaty but we have already noted that, 
to put it at its most neutral, thè understanding of 
thè character of obligation which thè Treaty imposed 
was different^v-Hhe post-1963 conception of thè Court). 
Prominent among areas of judicial activism has been 
thè field of free movement of goods and thè interpretation 
of Articles 30 and 36. The concept of a measure having 
an effect equivalent to a quantitative restriction on 
imports (or exports) has been completely remoulded by 
thè Court. Article 36 has, at least until recently, 
been a^Lmost ìnterpreted out of existence. Further, 
unlike say thè area of free movement of persons where 
thè Court has been equally creative, thè free movement 
of goods comesfrequently into conflict with Member State 
economie or commercial interests. Thus in relation to 
obligations derivìng from this source we might not be
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surprised to leam that most non-application cases relate to 
this subject matter. Ihe non-conpliance paradox does not thus 
arise in this context.
National pre and post adopticn process - Problems of non-canpliance
What then of thè growing area of non-compliance
namely thè non-implementation of directives. Here,
after all, thè Member States do partake closely in
thè process of adoption. We must therefore return to
thè decisional process itself with a view to identi-
fyifKf-possible elements which might explain how despite
consensus decision making and national technical and
politicai control non-compliance remains problematic.
The national preparatory phase in which Commission
proposals are formulated and then negotiated is not rnuch
not
researched at least by legai scholars; partly 
because of thè difficulty of penetrating bureaucratic 
practices, partly because of lack of research interest, 
partly because it has not been perceived as having any 
legai dimension. We may consider two ranges of problems 
in national preparation which might have subsequent 
negative effect on faìthful compliance.
At thè level of administrative preparation much 
will depend on lateral coordination between different 
governmental departments which might be eventually 
affected by a proposed Community directive. In other 
words it will not be sufficient for thè immediate 
department concerned to consider alone thè ramifications 
of a proposai with a view to identifying potential 
national obstacles to implementation and feeding these 
into thè Community decision making process. OtherWeiler, Joseph H. H. (1982), Supranational law and the supranational system : legal structure and political process in the 
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national departments must be equally concerned since
is rare that a measure in whatever field, will not
have consequences going beyond its primary subject
matter. Typically in relation to almost any proposai
there will be an interest, apart from thè principal
department concerned with thè subject matter, by thè
departments of foreign affairs, finance, and justice.
If subsequent compliance problems are to be avoided
a high measure of lateral coordìnation will thus be
necessary. iMember States differ sharply in this respect.
A recent study on thè French administration— ^ reveals
a highly coordinated and relatively efficient prepara-
tory system organized within thè framework of a special
interministerial governmental organ directly answerable 
iDenmark has an equally efficient if less formai structurev 
to thè prime minister's officeX" By contrast in italy
this coordinating function is as yet embryonic. In thè
Italian governmental structure where ministerial files
are distributed among a host of different coalition
partners there is a tendency —  felt in national admini-
stration as well —  towards lateral fragmentation. The
absence of a proper prime minister’s office only exa-
cerbates this fragmentation. As a result I would suggest
that despite thè possibility of a check by Italy of
thè Community decision making process, she may simply
be unable to identify with precision those problems
which might later occur. Other Member States —  say,
Belgium, may find themselves somewhere in between this
Franco-Italian dichotomy.
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A second dimension of thè national preparation 
concerns thè measure of politicai control. Here it
may be useful to compare Denmark with Italy. Denmark—
offers perhaps thè most advanced model of direct
parliamentary control of thè national input into thè
Community decision making process. Although thè system
is far from perfect it does yield two benefits. Firstly,
thè Danish ministries will have an internai incentive
to prepare their brief thoroughly because of this
additional layer of public scrutiny. The typical
question of thè Danish Parliamentarian will be addressed
to thè possible impact Commission proposaJs might have
on and within thè country. This preparation will help
highlight potential problems of implementation which
may then be raised in thè Community process. Secondly,
thè Danish Parliament having partaken in this scrutiny
exercise will be less reluctant or suspicious towards
thè output of thè Community organs and more willing to
implement them in accordance with their obligations.
3 4 /The much weaker Italian parliamentary involvement—  
and control will naturally yield opposite results. 
Parliament simply will not have thè politicai incentive 
or confidence to accord priority to Community directives.
We can at this point see that although thè division 
of thè decisional and implementation process into three 
elements is analytically useful in enabling us to under- 
line particular problems in relation to each element,
33/
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the national preparation before adoption will be
tightly connected to national implementation after
adoption in thè Community.
If we focus then on thè national situation in 
v (i.e. post adoption), 
thè implementation stagéy^once again we will find
differences among thè Member States which will help
explain thè paradox of non-compliance- --- -------- ?
•--------^  The most important element is probably
thè constitutional position regarding implementation.
Here it may be useful to compare thè United Kingdom;
Italy and France. In Italy, constitutionally, Parlia­
ment itself has to enact every implementing measure. 
Considering thè short life of Italian legislatures, 
thè increase in thè number of directives and, as a 
result of thè pre-adoption elements, thè lack of 
interest towards thè Community output we have a
sure recipe for long term delays. By contrast, in 
thè U.K., thè initial constitutional arrangement of 
British accession enables thè Government to adopt
many implementing measures by statutory instruments
only
with Parliament having an infrequently used veto 
power. Clearly thè whole range of problems which 
full fledged parliamentary adoption involve are avoided 
here. .France, with its mixed allocation of legislative 
competences, stands somewhere in between.
We have found therefore, within thè national systems, 
certain elements which might help explain, despite consensus 
decision making/ thè non-conpliance paradox. But
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even in thè Community process itself certain elements 
might contribute to subsequent implementation problems.
The Community decisional process - problens of non-compliance 
Consensus decision making is undoubtedly one pre- 
vailing characteristic of thè Community process. The 
potential for control by thè Member States which flows 
from this is, as we saw, at thè core of thè non-compliance 
paradox. It is however possible to identify several 
factors in thè Community decisional process itself which 
may help explain why, despite thè consensus, com­
pliance problems might arise. These factors, ranging 
from thè generai to thè specific, can represent no
more than an overall check list. In relation to each
twouldj
individuai case a more specific analysis/become neces­
sary.
a, Clearly one fundamental aspect of thè decisional 
process which might well have a basic influence, 
albeit indirect, on subsequent compliance, is 
thè fact that thè Commission as initiator and 
proposer of legislation is not, except in few 
areas, subsequently responsible for implementa­
tion and application. It is true that in relation to 
municipal legislation, naticnal parliaments *t .least in
thè formai sense, do not —--------------have
such responsibility, But we are well aware 
that for thè most part national legislation 
almost invariably emanates from governmental
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aepartments and tne civix Service with tne 
backing of thè elected executive and that thè 
parliaments initiate legislation very rarely.
National
legislators are, so to speak, sandwiched by thè 
executive/adminstration which first propose and 
then apply thè law. This is particuiarly true for much 
of thè detailed economie and carmercial legislation which 
is similar to thè bulk of Caripunity activity. This 
asynmetry in thè function of thè Ccmrission (when 
contrasted with national administrations) may explain a 
certain insensitivi ty to thè entire prcblem of irrplementation
and application. This is evideneed for example in a certain 
over-emphasis on numerical output and for less con­
cern with effective compliance. Certainly this 
problem is mitigated by thè pervasive presence 
of national administrations which can contri- 
bute that realistic dimension to this otherwise 
asymmetrical process. But this mitigating effect 
is neutralised by two factors: Firstly, thè
Commission often determines thè legislative 
agenda. A numerìcal escalation might overwhelm 
thè national representatives which are required, 
by thè rules of thè system, to deal with all 
ìtems on this agenda. Secondly, thè national
jrepresenta£ica_at, , . .—   tne Brussels level is freguently frag-
mented, each national department dealing with 
thè specific subject matter allocated to it.
The overview, thè perception of size and quan­
ti ty, remains essentially in thè Commission's 
hands. Although this trend of legislative fever 
has been checked during thè Jenkins’ presidency^ 
it remains a possible explanation for some ofWeiler, Joseph H. H. (1982), Supranational law and the supranational system : legal structure and political process in the 
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thè excesses of thè mid-70s.
There has been a tendency by thè Commission 
at least in some fields to draft extreraely 
detailed directives —  directives which thus 
resemble final legislation such as a regulation 
rather than a determination of ends as envisaged 
by thè Treaty.
In itself this phenomenon highlights once again 
thè dialectrcs of thè decisional process and 
thè issue of compliance. A vague and open-ended 
directive gives a Member State wide latitude 
for wrongful application. In addition it pre- 
vents thè possibility of invoking it by an 
individuai before a national court, a possibility 
which was centrai to thè system of compliance.
The tendency towards thè detailed directive 
becomes thus at least partially explicable. On 
thè other hand this tendency might have two 
negative effects. First, it might prolongate 
thè actual decisional process within thè Community 
as a simple consequence of thè greater detail of 
thè measure. But even in terms of compliance 
thè detailed directive might create problems. 
Because whereas it is true that thè increased 
detail reduces thè latitude for wrongful appli­
cation it also increases thè potential for non- 
implementation. A detailed directive which is 
poorly drafted, and it is often suggested that 
thè legislative technìques of thè Community leavesWeiler, Joseph H. H. (1982), Supranational law and the supranational system : legal structure and political process in the 
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much to be desired,— ^ may itself constitute 
an obstacle to implementation.
c. A closer look at thè functioning of thè groups 
of experts involved at thè Commission formula- 
tion stage and even during formai adoption of 
thè proposai may add another possible explana- 
tion to thè paradox. Clearly one of thè functions 
of these national experts is to highlight and 
then iron out those elements in a proposai 
which will render its implementation or applica­
tion in thè Member States difficult. For thè 
most part they are concerned with technical 
and legai aspects. On thè whole their contribu- 
tion, despite thè slowing down affect it has 
had on thè decisional process, has significantly 
improved thè quality of proposals and has 
also improved thè potential for faithful com­
pliance. But there remains a weakness or limi- 
tation cn their potential utility which derives 
from thè inevitable distinction between thè 
technical and thè politicai dimensions of pro­
posals. The experts will be able to iron out 
most if not all of thè technical problems. At 
thè end of their work they might remain with 
unsolved technical problems which however repre- 
sent genuine politicai or policy differences.
These problems might be precisely those which 
later could cause difficulties in compliance.
But, thè solution to these issues will be taken
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away from ------ "P> thè experts and handed to thè
politicai fora (and this includes thè upper 
echelons of thè COREPER) which will be less 
sensitive to thè technical-policy nuances. 
Moreover, thè solution or compromise eventually 
adopted might also be influenced by external 
considerations thereby leaving thè differences 
intact, Strangely thus thè most difficult issues 
might be those which remain unsolved when thè 
proposai is adopted.
d. This last point leads us to another set of
t might.
factors whicKYheip explain thè paradox. Although 
a Member State can theoretically veto any propo­
sai, it is wrong to believe that no politicai 
Drice attaches to such national obstructionism.
As we saw in thè analysis of thè decisional 
process in chapter 3, "package dealing" (horse 
trading) has become a common feature of thè 
Community game, A Member State will have "to 
give" on issue X in order "to take" on issue Y. 
Failure to observe this etiquette might create 
politicai stagnation and precipitate crises. The 
freedom to veto is curtailed thus by politi­
cai pressure. It is possible then that within 
this decisional horse trading, proposals will 
be accepted by Member States despite internai 
objections and foreseeable implementation/com-
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pliance problems as part of a deal thè stakes
of which are considered more important. Later
however, distance in time and place from such
politicai exigencies, thè implementing and
applying bureaucracy —  often different from
thè "compromising bureaucracy" —  might seek
ways to "derail" thè difficult legislation.
One should add in this context briefly that much
of thè generai secondary legislation is passed
within thè Committee structure by majority or
quasi-majority voting. In these structures
thè element of acceptability is not present
and therefore thè paradox does not arise in
its acute form.
e. As we noted, one consequence of thè trend towards
intergovernmental decisional structures has
been thè increase of secrecy surrounding Community
activity in its preparatory phases. (This secrecy
also affects thè very issue of compliance. The
Commission is increasingly cautious in releasing
figures regarding non-compliance precisely because
of thè diplomatic sensitivity of these data).
The possibìlìty of public debate and societal
impact by groups which are not formally incor­
r e ,
porated intovdecisional structure is thus limited. 
The European Parliament can only remedy this
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problem in an extremely limited extent. Not only 
because of its lack of decisional influence 
but even its consultative function is severely 
ìmpaired because of thè Community process. At 
thè moment at which Parliament is able to give 
its opinions diplomatic bargains will already
have been struck - ---- - ------------ ' “ ^
-— — -------------- which will not be easily
undone. Consequently, pressure groups and social 
forces which are unable to exert direct impact 
at thè level of Brussels may be instrumentai in
lobbying  ----- ------- at thè national level for
non-implementation and application,
f, Last but not least,objective technical defi-
ciencies in directives might impede implementation. 
Directives may be vague, they may be technically 
imperfect, thè time for implementation might be 
too short. Even a well wishing national admini­
stration might find difficultiel~v?aithfully 
iirplenenting thè output of thè Community decisional 
process,
The non-compliance paradox - conclusions
It is now possible to attempt a reconstruction of 
all these elements into one whole. Although thè dif- 
ferentiation of thè decisional process into 3 -- thè 
national preparation, thè Community decisional processand 
national implementation and application —  enabled us 
to isolate possible elements which affect faithful com-
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liance, it is clear that all three form part of one
single if complex process. Indeed, what is striking
is thè interconnectedness of all elements. Some
factors remain Constant. This is particularly true
as regards thè constitutional arrangements (e.g.,
whether thè executive can implement directives without
a formai and fully fledged parliamentary process) and
thè generai efficiency of thè administration. But
as regards other elements, we saw how for example
politicai involvement in thè preparatory phases,or
thè measure of lateral coordination within thè national
vlikelihoodj
administration could affect thè "V^ by which thè output 
of thè decisional process will be liable to resistance 
at thè implementation stage, We also noted an even 
more interesting relationship whereby all three elements 
combine into an apparent contradiction which so often 
characterises thè Community system and which may be 
expressed as follows.
The greater thè national preparatory input, thè more 
professional thè preliminary scrutiny by thè national 
administration and politicai organs, thè wider thè 
involvement Qf interest groups, so will thè decisional 
process be difficult and thè passage of a proposai 
through^V^ommunity process slow and tortuous. More 
objections may come to light, more interests will have 
to be squared. And yet these very factors which might 
thus contribute to a frustration of consensus making 
and consequently to frustration in thè adoption of 
Community policy and thè attainment of Community objec-
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Distribution of 169 condemnations by thè Court 
according to Member State
To Member States No. of condemnations
Italy 46
France 7
Bel'gium 7
U.K. 5
Ireland 4
Germany 2
Denmark 1
The Netherlands 1
Greece 0
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Non-compliance with Court judgments (169 proceedings)
since 1973
Member State
Italy 14
France 2
U.K. 1
Denmark 1
Belgium 1
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tives will, if agreement is eventually reached, subse-
quently contribute to thè full and faithful realization
of those measures which pass such a mill. By contrast
a positive and less insistent national preparation
input will ease thè decisional process facilitating
thè attainment of Community objectives as reflected
in its legislature programme but will potentially
create a danger of non-implementation and hence frustra-
tion of thè actual realization of thè programme. If
I may use once again,by way of conclusion,thè Danish-
Italian example, Denmark which, overall, has perfected
interesting structures for dealing with Community pro-
posals^ is a tough detailed-minded
negotiator verging almost on thè obstructionist but
also has a record of very faithful compliance. Italy
by contrast has a reputation of one of thè most Cornmunau-
taire Member States instrumentai in many a politicai
compromise but with a record of non-compliance (even if,(See tables six and seven)■j 
mostly benign) second to noneTV*Within thè Community
apparatus itself a greater emphasis on technical profes- 
sionalìsm, a strong drive to have genuine consensus
rather than package dealing - -------------------- ---- -5
----------— - -------- >> and longer time given for imple­
mentation all represent elements which might simultaneously 
contribute to a feeling of a less dynamic Community but 
which at thè same time might help true realisation. 
Graphìcally these relationsftips may be expressed in thè 
following two dichotomous situatìons:
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Questions of policy
The primary purpose of this study is neither to 
describe in any detail thè Community machinery and its 
operation nor to make explicit policy proposai for thè 
future. At thè same time legal-political analysis may 
hopefully give some new perspectives which might also 
contrìbute to policy thiriking. By way of conclusion I 
will touch briefly on a number of points which might 
have relevance in thè policy discussions of thè 80s.
1. Most generally but no less fundamental because of 
this/must be thè simple conclusion that non-compliance
—  of whatever category —  should feature high on thè 
agenda of thè European Communities of thè Eighties.
The collapse of thè doctrine of attributed powers has
Weiler, Joseph H. H. (1982), Supranational law and the supranational system : legal structure and political process in the 
European Community 
European University Institute                                                                    DOI: 10.2870/67242
merely rendered this prohlem more acute. There would
be little purpose in further expansion of Community
activity into new fields,if legislation cannot be
^and,
assured of relatively faithful compìiance/Tf thè 
existing acquis Communautaire is simultaneously 
eroded because of a failure to observe Community law.
Most important in this respect would be further research 
into thè scope of thè problem, particularly thè extert to which 
[it manifests itself in wrongful application rather than 
non-implementation.
2. I have insisted on dealing at length with thè
decision making process as a factor in thè non-compliance
debate. I have done this not only because this accords
with thè orientation of thè whole study; but also to
counter a certain trend in thè analysis of thè problem,
There is thè beginning of a tendency to define thè
problem predominantly in technical terms of supervision
36 /and in legai terms of enforcement.—  Solutions are thus 
sought which would increase thè supervisory capacity of 
thè Commission by, say, improved data processing tech- 
niques and by a more effective or aggressive prosecutory 
policy. In thè European Parliament diagnosis has tended
to focus on thè lack of enforcement powers or reai sanc-
tions by thè Commission or thè Court vis-a-vis a violative 
Member State other than, ultimately thè declaratory judg­
ment. Suggestions of fines or withdrawal of Community 
privìleges as a sanction have been mooted.— ^
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Whereas I do not disagree that there is wide scope
to improve thè supervisory capacity of thè Commission
or to give greater bite to thè present declaratory
judgment(though I doubt thè politicai realism of this
latter suggestion), our analysis helps to illustrate thè
deeper politicai and structural dimensions of thè problem.
Detection and deter rence, even punishment are all useful
tools in any battle against non-observance of thè law.
But, I would suggest, on thè International level —  even
within a supranational structure -- prevention is probablyt it isj
even more important thanYat thè municipal level and within 
thè private law realm. The way towards prevention is 
inherent in thè analysis of theN/compliance paradox :
An improvement in thè decisional processes at both Com­
munity and national level. Inevitably this process for 
which there is no rough and ready solution will involve 
a compromise between thè competing values of a dynamic 
and rapid decisional process and faithful implementation 
which as we noted could at certain points be construed 
as being in conflict with each other.
3. In my earlier analysis of thè system of compliance
(chapter 4 ) j pointed out several of thè advantages
of thè preliminary ruling as a device for ensuring
compliance at thè instance of individuals. There may
be place for greater utilìzatìon of this potential by
thè Commission. Whereas thè doctrine of direct effect
of directives has been curtailed by thè Court in its
38/recent jurisprudence—  thè doctrine remains intact
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—as regards "negative direct effect", namely an instru- 
ment for nevieving wrongful (either non-implementation 
or wrongful application) compliance by Member States,
The policy of utilizing thè individuai and national 
courts as guardians could be combined with thè 169 
procedure. The Commission could give maximum publìcity 
-- especially among interested parties — - to reasoned 
opinions of thè Commission, The existence of a reasoned 
opinion delivered to Member States might induce 1indivi­
duals (which will be supported by thè Commission as
h r»intervenor) to test-case allegedly violative national 
practices. The record of thè Commission should provide 
some confidence in this context, One could even consider 
more radicai ideas such as thè Commission itself directly 
or through agents instigating or at least financing 
such actions in thè national courts,
4. A reduction in thè volume of directives is apparently 
already Community policy which, in thè perspective of 
compliance at least, should be welcomed. Not only will 
it reduce thè legislative burden of thè Member States 
but it will also contribute to a higher standard of 
directives which might facilitate implementation, There 
has also been a judicial dimension to this reduction 
Very tentatiTr^ ly I v.rould suggest that thè Court of 
Justice has tried to influence thè numbers game.
39 /One effect of thè ruling in thè Cassis de Dijon case—
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has been, at least so far as thè Coinmission is concerned—
to reduce thè need for many harmonization directives.
It would appear thus that by one judicial stroke a major
source of non-implementation has potentially been struck
out. At thè same time it is probable that as a result
of this ruling thè instances of non-application in this
field will increase and since thè logie of Cassis invites
, p o s s i b l e  mi s a p p i i c a t i c n , thèj 
C o n s t a n t  j u d i c i a l  s c r u t i n y  f o r V p o t e n t i a l  f o r  j u d i c i a l
defiance or evasion will increase as well. The recent
Buttership case is a warning fren a closely related field.
5. The emergence»cases in which thè Court is defied 
introduces a new element into thè prosecutary policy 
of thè Commission qua public attorney generai. Whereas 
an aggressive prosecutory policy may be welcome in a 
period of slowly escalating non-compliance, thè danger 
of diluting thè credibility of thè Court cannot be
ignored. Serious issues of --- —-- p policy are at
stake. On thè one hand one cannot but doubt thè utility 
of a growing lìst of judgments hanging against, say,
Italy which are then defied or not^V'^'UrT'thè other hand, 
failure to prosecute in thè face of non-compliance and 
despite a reasoned opinion might induce, even invite, 
futher non-compliance, Moreover, failure to prosecute might 
reduce thè potential deferment effect of thè pre-trial 
procedure, penalise other Member States faithfully com- 
plying with Community law and introduce a measure of 
discrimination to a process thè impartiality of which 
is essential. How should thè Commission deal with thè
40/
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prospect of a Member State not complying with a judg­
ment? Despite thè apparently imperative nature of 
Article 155, thè Commission has discretion whether or
not to bring an action order under 169 after thè reasoned
^Commission v France 7/71 ^1971? ECR 1003?. A.G. Roemer 
has specifically mentioned politically sensitive situa-
General did not probably have in mind thè possibility—©£-a
state defying thè Court, I would submit that this un-
doubtedly constitutes a politically sensitive situation
and would thus not be, legally, an illegitimate consi-
deration at least by reference to thè guidelines of thè
Advocate General. For its part thè Court has frequently 
jonce a case is brouoht/ 
indicated thatViegislative-political difficulties (benign reasons)
can be no legai defence for failure to implement.— ^
Surely thè Court could not say anything else if it was 
not to legitimate Wholesale non-compliance and indeed 
undermine thè entire normative structure. It is pre- 
cisely this inability of thè Court to say anything else, 
which places thè politicai responsibility on thè Commis­
sion as prosecuting authority. The distinction between 
defiant or benign non-compliance in itself does not solve thè 
problem. On thè one hand one night argue that one should 
not prosecute cases other than deliberate (defiant) non- 
compliance. But it is precisely in this type of case 
(e,g ,, Mutton and Lamb) that a Member State is likely
41/opinion—  a discretion recognised by thè Court— ^
Although thè Advocate
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to defy thè Court as well. Equally, a policy to avoid 
prosecuting benign non-compliance (especially non- 
implementation) might invite further cases. Should 
thè Commission perhaps prosecute cases where it is 
relatively sure that thè Court will be obeyed? This 
would be difficult for two reasons: It is not easy
to predict in advance thè Member State reaction to 
conviction. Also, as we saw in thè empirical analysis, 
often it is thè initiation of an action which terminates 
an infringement. Further, this policy would have thè 
effect of rewarding defiance and lawlessness. In thè 
absence of new enforcement measures it would seem that 
no such overall policy is viable. I would tentatively 
suggest that a policy of automatic prosecution after 
a failure to comply with thè reasoned opinion is mis- 
taken. Perhaps greater caution should be exercised in 
thè dispatch of reasoned opinion. Although thè language 
of Article 169 is mandatory ("... it shall deliver a 
reasoned opinion) thè Mandate becomes imperative only 
"if thè Commission considers that a Member State has 
faìled to fulfil an obligation" which introduces, perhaps 
through thè back door an element of dìscretion.
At thè same time thè Commission should not refrain 
from bringing an action even if it confidently expects 
subsequent defiance or benign non-compliance. However 
it should be ready to use every power available to it 
both private and public to ensure that thè decisions of 
thè Court are complied with, This might invoke action 
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cooperation with thè European Parliament. Above all 
thè Commission should not establish a new asymmetry 
in
^  thè earlier tendency of thè Commission
to concentrate on legislation but not o.n ensuring com­
pliance. There should notnow develop a situation whereby 
thè Commission indulges in prosecuting (as a correction 
to its earlier policy of neglecting compliance) without 
considering execution. The supranational structure 
demands efficient and responsive decision making, con- 
sistent compliance, effective judicial enforcement and 
faithful execution. A policy which focuses on any of 
these elements to thè exclusion —  partial or complete
—  of thè others might undermine thè coherence of thè 
entire system.
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Footnotes
1 . See generally, , ErgervisigQ_in
(North Holland, Amsterdam,
1978)? Evans, The Enforcement Procedure of 
Article 169 EEC: Commission Discretion 4 E^^EllY■>
442 (1979), SiSi_Sgìl§rn}§£f> » ^M=i==ii===£====ì§= 
in_the_European_Communities (Kluwer, Deventer,
1979) i 386-442; 1982 Report of Legai Affairs
Committee of thè European Parliament PE 77,275 
(Sieglerschmidt Report). I am also indebted to
thè contributors and participants to a conference 
on non-compliance in thè European Community organi- 
zed by Professor Rasmussen and thè Danish Society 
for European Studies in November 1981, Copenhagen.
2, E.G., thè French decision (or conviance) to obstruct 
thè entry of Italian wine in 19.81,
3. E.g,, The Cohn-Bendit case ^19 797 E§£y±ì_D§ììglr§Ì£§Y 
161 .
4, The Mutton & Lamb Case, Case 232/78 Commission v 
France 9 79? ECR 2729.
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5. This was done indirectly by thè Italian consti­
tutional Court in its 1981 Decision in Cana- 
vicolla which failed to follow thè European 
Court1s earlier decision in Simenthal.
6. See, e.g., Case 128/78 Commission v. U.K. ^19797
419: Britain has only partially complied
with thè decision.
In Case 171/78 Commission v. Denmark 1980 
447, Denmark has technically complied that thè 
new Danish law while respecting thè letter of 
thè judgment completely avoids its spirit. See, 
Rasmussen, Denmark in Face of her Community 
Obligations, paper to colloque, note 1 supra.
7. See, e.g., Secretary of State for thè Home Department, 
ex parte Santillo /?98l7 2 AllER 917 in which thè 
British Court of Appeal on receipt of a reference
by thè European Court (Case 131/79 /19807 
1585) managed whilst paying lip Service to thè 
preliminary ruling rendered a judgment inconsonant 
with thè ruling.
8. The Commission is reluctant to reveal full statistics 
of non-compliance. I have relied on thè following
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sources. The Bulletin which since 1978 publishes 
lists of reasoned opinions; The Annual Report of 
activities which gives overall figures for infringe- 
ments; Figures given to thè European Parliament 
and published in thè Sieglerschmidt Report (note 1 
supra) and Commission Reply to Questions 2191/80.
9. The Court has been consistent in its enumeration
of thè conditions for determining thè direct effect 
of a measure: in generai it must impose a precise
obligation which does not necessitate an implementing 
measure and which leaves no discretionary power to 
thè Member States. (As regards thè direct effect 
of directives one must ascertain, in addition,
"... whether thè nature, generai scheme and wording 
of thè provision in question are capable of having 
direct effects". Case 41/74 Van Duyn /Ì974/ E^C^P.^ 1337 
at 1356 (per Payras A.G,)),
There is a conflict in thè Court as to whether these 
two tests are cumulative or mutually exclusive.
Cf. Case 131/79 R. v, Home Secretary ex parte Santillo
note 7 supra; -------------------  Case
1 48/78, Ratti /T9797 l^C^R. 1 629. ---------- —>
_____----------- ------------------------------------------------
See discussion in Usher, Direct effect of directives: 
dotting thè i’s 5 . 470 (1980) at 472-473;
and see also, Tiiranermans, Directives: Their Effect 
within thè National Legai Systems, 16 .
533 (1979).
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10. See Case 148/78 id. Usher, id. Timmermans id.
11. E.g., Article 121 EEC.
12. E.g., Article 87 EEC.
13. E.g., Article 43 (2) EEC.
14. Article 100 EEC.
15. Article 155 EEC {emphasis supplied).
16. And see also, Sc^§rmgr|, note 1 supra at §§ 4 39-441 
(pp.252-254).
17. E±_Er^c£, The-Eolitics-of_the=Euroeean=Cammuni±^ 
(Butterworths, London, 1979) p.59.
18. Question 453/79 —  Debates of thè European Parliament
10.3.80 at 24 (English version).
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Doctrine of Stare Decisis and thè Civil Law: A
Fundamental Difference —  or no Difference at All?, 
in S.^_l§£IìfLÌ§ÌQr (eds.)
F§§t§chrift_ftir_£onrad_Z^eigert ( J . C . B . Mohr,
Tiìbingen, 1981 ) 381, esp. at 383-387 and references 
therein. Cf. Rasmussen, Why is Article 173 Interpreted 
Against Private Plaintiffs 5 E^L^Rev. 112 (1980).
20. See e.g., Case 51/76 Federation of Dutch Undertakings 
v. Inspector of Customs and Excise </Ì977/ 1
113 and see Puffy, EEC Directives, Judicial Control 
of National Implementation, 41 219 (1 978).
21. Since not all legai systems provide for a "preemptive" 
declaratory challenge of legislation. Even if thè 
disputed provision is not penai, entering into any 
legai obligations on a basis of a law subsequently
to be declared ìnvalid may be aronomically harmful.
22. In Ireland, for example, Finbarr Murphy observes 
that "/ì/n a number of its Reports thè Oireachtas 
Joint Committee has pointed to thè existence of 
possible hindrances to access to remedies in con­
nection with Community law. It has observed that 
Irish implementing measures frequently do not cite 
thè Community basis for thè measures in question". 
Finbarr Murphy, Remedies for Breach of Community Law,
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Irish Report to Ninth FIDE Congress. (Fide —  
Sweet and Maxwell, London 1980) 5.12-5.13.
23. Sieglerschmidt Report, note 1 supra.
24. Id. at § 18.
25. On which all data relevant to thè implementation 
of directives.
26. Case 158/80 REWE v. Hauptzollamt kiel (not yet 
reported);
27. Note 3 supra,
28. Decision of 16,7.81, /198l7 Europarecht, 442,
29, Note 5 supra,
Weiler, Joseph H. H. (1982), Supranational law and the supranational system : legal structure and political process in the 
European Community 
European University Institute                                                                    DOI: 10.2870/67242
- 474 -
30. E.g. Article 36 EEC.
31. Cappelletti has cogently argued that thè 
presence of thè parties before a judicial 
tribunal and observahce~òf thè fundamental 
guarantees in combination with thè
rules of national justice can bestow a different, 
no less valid, legitimacy on thè outcome. In 
order for this rationale to apply fully to thè 
European Court,procedures will have to be evolved
which ensure — — - ------------thè adequate
representation of thè Member States' point of 
view. Cf. Cappelletti, The Mighty Problem of 
Judicial Review and thè Contribution of Comparative 
Analysis L.I.E.I. 1 (1979).
32. I am indebted to Ms. N.Vavasseur whose work on 
thè French administration has been very
enlightening.
33. See
in (ed.), Parliamentary_Contol_of
IgreÌ2n=Pol|cY ( 1 O o o r l ^  , A l j W  o~v .
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34. .U,
35. Copenhagen Colloque, note 1 supra.
36. Sieglerschmidt Report, note 1 supra.
37. Id.
38. See Case 8/81 Becker (not yet reported).
See also Case 148/78 Ratti /T9797 ILC^R. 1629 
per Advocate-General.
39. Case 120/78 /1979? 649.
40. Commission Document OJ* C  2-5 ^ [2- 3 °
Cc£- Of ccC ,envj(ssfgl (Ju).
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41. See generally Evans, note 1 supra and Schermers, 
note 1 supra at i 425-428.
42. Cf. Case 7/71 Commission v. France ^1971/ E^g^g. 
1003; Case 2/73 Geddo /19737 gè£iR* 865 (per 
Trabucchi).
43. See e.g., Case 144/77 Commission v. Italy ^1978/ 
E.C.R. 1307.
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Ibf ^S4==== ==“ ==— == =J ========^ Law--Uneqyal Remedies :
=£2=SÉB==à =&=ii§8iÉ thè Access to Justice Challenge
fa. The Procedural Challenge
The issue of uniform protection, like that of non 
compliance discussed in thè preceeding chapter, also 
results from thè maturing of thè system.
Even in those situations where individuals are 
able to invoke Community law directly before thè national 
courts (and thus serve as indirect guardians of 
inccrporation and application of Community law by Member 
States), thè special character of supranationalism 
produces a problem which touches on thè fundamental 
issue of uniformity and diversity with which all "federai" 
systems have to grapple. I shall'be concerned here with 
thè situation in which a choice has to be made between 
enacting a Community measure allowing thè Member States 
more or less diversity. But with thè situation where this 
choice has been made and a Community law already introducec 
either directly, by a measure having direct effect, or 
through state implementation. My focus will be on thè 
use of such laws by individuals in seeking to protect 
thè rights bestowec upon their..
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In this situation where thè legislative choice
has been for "one law" thè uniform application of
Community measures throughout Member States has been
among thè most consistent principles upon which thè
Court of Justice has insisted in its jurisprudence.
It has been used amongst other reasons as a
■justification for evolving thè doctrines of direct
1 /effect and supremacy — and was one of thè strongest
arguments used by thè Court in resisting thè national
constitutional challenge in thè context of thè human
rights debate. Should this principle be unjustifiably
compromised one of thè very foundations of normative
supranationalism would be threatened. Thus in a recent
restatement of its human rights position, thè Court
affirmed that
</t/he introduction of special criteria for 
assessment </of thè compatibility of Community law 
with fundamental human rights/ stemming from thè 
legislation . . . of a particular Member State
would, by damaging thè substantive unity and 
efficacy of Community law, lead inevitably to 
thè destruction of thè unity of thè Common Market 
and thè jeopardizing of thè cohesion of thè 
Community. 2/
And in another case thè Court elaborated this generai
constitutional principle by stating that
/t/he binding force of thè Treaty and of measures 
taken in application of it must not differ from 
one state to another as a result of internai 
measures, lest thè functioning of thè Community 
system should be impeded and thè achievement of 
thè aims of thè Treaty placed in perii. 3/
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The explicit underlying value of this unity principi
is clearly integrationalist. Its counterpart in thè
Treaty is thè very Artide 177 which provides thè
mechanism for ensuring that Community measures will be
uniformly interpreted and, as we saw in Part One
4/--- - - applied throughout thè Community. — Beneath
thè explicit integrationalist value lies an even deeper 
one. Non-uniform protection in similar situations, 
without a meaningful distinguishing criterion, would 
violate thè per se principle of equality before thè same 
law. Thus from thè strict, almost idealist, integrationa 
list point of view thè existence of unequal remedies
—  remembering that rights and duties are only meaningful 
and measurable in terms of thè remedies available for 
their vindication for thè protection of thè same
substantive Community based rights, would be inconsistent 
with fundamental principles of equality acknowledged in 
democratic legai systems. —  ^ In this sense thè constitu­
tional principle and procedural principles become 
interchangeable. To thè extent that this inequality 
would coincide with national bounaaries, thereby 
redividing nationally thè integrated legai system, it 
would represent a serious gap in thè normative edifice of 
supranationalism.
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And yet thè very enmeshment of thè legai Community 
and national orders, whereby Community derived rights 
and duties are often vindicated -- by thè logie of 
thè system —  through thè national courts by means of 
national procedural law, has come to produce this 
very result —  a disturbing inequality of remedies.
Given that thè Community system is not a unitary one, 
it is unavoidable that differences of protection will, 
in some cases, justifiably exist among thè constituent 
parts —  a fact accepted even in well developed federai
7  /systems like thè USA. This problem/ thè solution to 
which must necessarily be one of thè main future 
challenges in thè evolution of normative supranationalism, 
may be best illustrated by reference to a number of 
concrete judicial decisions.
a. Unequal remedies —  a conflict of principles
As a background to understanding thè emergence of 
thè problem of unequal remedies and non-uniform 
application one must recali tv/o aspeets in thè process of 
judicial review. We noted in thè retrospective analysis 
that a reference under Artide 177 for an interpretation 
of Community law often serves as a means for judicial 
review of national laws or administrative practices for 
their compatibility with Community law. Frequently, thè 
review takes place when a litigant challenges a national 
charge, levy or tax (often on imports) which, he claims, 
violates a superior Community norm.
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The matter is rendered particularly complex
since thè European Court in thè first place, has
insisted on thè declaratory rather than constitutive
nature of its interpretative judgments. "The interpretation
which, in thè exercise of thè jurisdiction conferred
on it by Article 177 . . . thè Court of Justice gives
to a rule of Community law clarifies and defines . . .
thè meaning and scope of that rule as it must be or
ought to have been understood and applied from thè time
8 /of its coming into force. —
In thè context of challenging a national charge or 
levy, thè ex tunc effect of thè judgment would mean that 
in situations where thè national measures were in fact 
to be declared incompatible with Community law thè full 
vindication of Community rights would entitle thè 
individuai not only to a moratorium on future charges of 
thè same kind but also to a repayment of all sums 
previously illegally exacted from him.
In thè second place, despite certain doctrinal 
considerations which insist on thè strict individuai
binding force of European Court judgments of this type — 
thè better and more widely accepted view is that these 
judgments have at least de facto, erga omnes effect.
9/
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The Paris Court of Appeal went so far as to state
that
The decisions of thè Court of Justice of thè 
European Communities rendered for interpretation 
are of a generai nature because they are designed 
to unify thè case law of thè courts of thè Member .„ , 
States; they are therefore binding on those courts.—
This means that not only would thè individuai claimant
be entitled to retroactive redress but all others, even
in other Member States, from v/hom similar unlawful
charges were exacted would be equally so entitled. The
economie stakes can be very large: in one case after a
11 /decision of thè Court of this kind —  thè Dutch authorities
were obliged to repay an excess of seven million Florins
12/in respect of a charge illegally levied. —
Yet in many cases characterization of thè Court’s 
decisions as declaratory (with ex tunc effect) is quite 
artificial especially in situations in which a widespread 
diverse understanding by individuals and Member States 
prevailed prior to thè decision. The Court, in one famous 
instance, — ^recognized thè "serious effects" its judgment 
might have had if given erga omnes ex tunc validity and 
accepted thè possibility of a "constitutive" decision.
In that exceptional case thè Court gave a prospective 
ruling, its applicability to past relationships extending 
only to those claims already lodged at thè time of 
judgment. But in its subsequent jurisprudence thè Court
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emphasized thè exceptional nature of that judgment,
and thè fact that only thè Court itself could exclude
14/generai ex tunc or erga omnes effect. —  Perhaps thè
fact that in that case horizontal legai relationships
established in good faith among individuals on thè
basis of thè previous understanding of thè law swayed 
15/thè Court. —  Recently thè Court has experimented 
further with prospectivity but thè device remains 
essentially exceptional. — ^ In principle, then, in all 
cases involving monies illegally exacted, thè individuai 
claimant and all those in his class would be entitled, 
pursuant to thè direct effect of Community law, to 
reimbursement going back to thè commencement date of 
thè Community measure.
In practice, since thè vindication of these rights 
takes place necessarily through thè nat.ional courts and 
national legai systems, successful claimants will have 
to satisfy thè procedural requirements of their national 
legai system, say, as regards time limits. It is thè 
procedural variations among thè different systems which 
gives rise to thè problem under discussion. The issues 
became concrete in two cases in thè mid-70's. — ^ It has
been brought into sharper focus and magnified in a spate
18/of recent cases — and is likely to arise in a variety 
of manifestations until thè source of thè problem is 
tackled in thè future. The complex issues are best
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-discussed by reference to some of these cases.
b. The case of Rewe and its progeny
The facts in this case are as simple as thè law
and issues raised therein are complex. The plaintiff,
a German importer of apples was claiming thè reimbursement
of a charge imposed on him in 1968 by thè German authorities
for a phyto-sanitary examination of his imported fruit.
In fact thè charge had been unlawfully exacted, a fact
which carne to light in a decision of thè Court decided
some years after 1968 which found thè charge to be
contrary to thè directly effective Artide 13 EEC and
19/a Council regulation. —  It should be pointed out that 
there are many hundreds of diverse non-tariff barriers 
to trade in thè Community and to most intents and purposes 
only thè European Court can authoritatively decide 
which of these are prohibited in accordance with thè 
rules of thè customs union. The facts of these cases 
may seem trivial but it should be remembered that, apart 
from thè procedural-constitutional principles which 
concern us, thè economie stakes are very large; further, 
thè smooth operation of thè customs union is a mainstay 
policy which thè Common Market ought to achieve. The 
fact of illegality was undisputed in thè present case 
by thè defendants, thè German administrative authorities.
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But an application for refund by Rewe was met by thè 
defence that they were time barred by thè German 
limitation period which had expired long before thè 
illegality carne to light.
The question which thè European Court had to 
answer was
. . . whether where an administrative body in a 
state has infringed thè prohibition on charges 
having an effect equivalent to customs duties 
. . . thè Community Citizen concerned has a right
under Community lav; to thè annulment or revocation 
of thè administrative measure and/or to a refund 
of thè amount paid even if under thè rules of 
procedure of thè national law ^through which, by_ 
necessity, thè Citizen must vindicate his rights/ 
thè time limit for contesting thè validity of thè 
administrative measure is past. 20/
21/In its laconic judgment — thè Court first 
affirmed thè direct effect of thè Community measures 
in question -- and it is worth noting that Article 13 
of thè Treaty comes within Part One of thè Treaty dealing 
with Principles, a fact which thè Court had often 
adverted to in its jurisprudence —  and thè duty, in 
accordance with thè Community system, of national courts 
to protect thè rights those measures confers on citizens. 
It also noted that as far as thè remedies for violation 
of thè principles were concerned thè Community did not 
have its own procedural rules to grant a remedy. Hence
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it was for " . . .  thè domestic level system of each
Member State to designate thè courts having jurisdiction
and to determine thè procedural conditions governing 
2 2 /actions . .. " . — '
The Court did insist —  delphically —  that these
must be "reasonable", and that thè national procedural
2 3/requirements —  should not make it completely impossible 
in practice to exercise thè rights which thè national 
courts are bound to protect. It also said that within 
thè national system thè procedural requirements in 
respect of Community measures should not be less 
favourable by comparison to requirements concerning 
purely national claims. On thè facts, thè German 
limitation period of one month was not considered 
unreasonable. To be sure thè Court accepted thè 
fundamental reciprocity between remedies and rights in 
that total exclusion of thè former was seen to extinguish 
thè latter. And yet, as stated by thè Commission in 
its submissions, thè time limits laid down by national 
law vary between one month, as is thè case in Germany, 
and 3 0 years. — ^
The effect of thè Court’s decision, leaving thè 
vindication of Community rights almost exclusively to 
thè procedural requirements of national law, was to 
create thè unsatisfactory situation whereby thè measure
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of protection afforded thè individuai in respect of 
thè wrongful application of Community law by national 
authorities would vary considerably depending on thè 
national forum where thè case would be tried and its 
rules of procedure.
The difference are not mere discrepancy between 
constitutional-substantive Community rights and national 
procedural rules. For to thè extent that in thè 
Community system in many situations national law and 
national courts become willy-nilly Community law and 
Community courts, and further, to thè extent that civil
procedure defines and limits thè remedy (and thereforei
thè right), these differences imply a contradiction in 
thè constitutional right itself. We have here one of 
thè inevitable consequences of thè non-unitary system 
in which principles of uniformity and diversity interact.
In principle and as a permanent solution thè European 
Court could not have excluded completely thè legitimacy 
of imposing a time limit for bringing an action to redress 
wrongs caused by national administrative measures 
violative of Community law. Time limits serve thè 
essential legai principle of certainty, and balance thè 
interests of thè individuai with that of society. — /
The Court was also probably correct in judging that thè 
ultimate rectification of this diversity -- leading both 
to thè non-uniform protection of Community rights 
throughout thè Common Market and to unequal treatment
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of individuals before thè same substantive law —
could be achieved by harmonization of procedural law,
a matter coming within thè legitimate domain of
explicit legislative action thè precise technical
domain of explicit legislative action thè precise
technical details of which are best left to thè Member
States. Thus thè Court states that ''Where necessary,
thè harmonization provisions of Articles 100 to 102
and Artide-235 enable appropriate measures to be
taken to remedy differences between thè /procedural
provisions? in Member States if they are likely to
distort or harm thè functioning of thè Common Market".
It may, nevertheless, be useful to examine whether
thè Court, so impactful in thè "Constitutional Phase"
of normative supranationalism is obliged to leave
this important next evolutionary step entirely in
thè hands of thè politicai organs. The arguments
are too finely balanced to give a decisive reply. 
iOn thè side of "uniformity" one could make thè 
following observations:
There is a certain tension —  at least in tone 
and emphasis -- between Rewe and, say, thè decision 
of thè Court in Simmenthal. In thè latter case, 
thè integrity of thè legai order of thè Community 
was regarded as sufficient to prohibit thè internai 
Italian procedural requirement which obliged lower 
Italian courts to refer any questions of supremacy
2 6/
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to thè national court designateti for this purpose
—  thè Italian Constitutional Court. In Rewe, and
its progeny, by contrast thè Court stated that "... in
thè absence of Community rules ... ^it is permissible?
for thè domestic legai system of each Member State to
designate those Courts having jurisdiction and to
2 7/determine thè procedural conditions ...". —
At first sight Simmenthal is distinguishable since 
in that case there was no absence of Community rules : 
Article 177 itself fills thè gap. But it was only thè 
creative interpretation by which could not therefore 
be excluded in thè present instance especially if we 
are to remember that thè very purpose of Article 177 
is to ensure thè uniform interpretation and, necessarily, 
application and enforcement of Community law.
A more fundamental distinction is tied to thè fact 
that by contrast to Simmenthal where thè Court could 
strike down an incompatible procedural requirement of 
thè Italian legai system, in Rewe and its progeny it 
would appear that thè Court could not merely strike out 
but would have to provide a replacement since, as stated 
above, time limits are an essential feature of any 
legai system. It would be unrealistic to expect 
positive judicial legislation on such intricate and 
technical issues; although in relation to thè 
Community's own rules of procedure thè Court has not
Weiler, Joseph H. H. (1982), Supranational law and the supranational system : legal structure and political process in the 
European Community 
European University Institute                                                                    DOI: 10.2870/67242
been completely impotent. — As a permanent solution, 
undoubtedly specific Community legislation or 
harmonization measures are called for. But this in 
itself does not exclude thè possibility of judicial 
action by way of striking out thè national time 
limits as an interim measure until such time as a 
unifying instrument is introduced. Qualitatively thè 
Court would be doing no more than it did in any of 
its previous landmark decisions such as Costa v. ENEL. 
Making Community rights procedurally unconditional 
would be stiff medecine indeed, but this would provide 
a strong incentive for Community legislative action.
On thè judicial level this proposed action is less 
alarming than might seem at first sight. Two legai 
principles are locked in conflict: thè integrity of 
thè Community legai order which calls for thè uniform 
protection of Community rights and equality before 
thè law, as against thè principle of legai certainty 
which is at thè foundatior. of thè national time limit. 
The thrust of thè uniformity argument would be that 
there is no compelling reason for thè Court to 
compromise almost completely thè first principle at thè 
expense of thè second one.
It could be argued that by provisionally striking 
down national time limits another type of inequality
2 8/
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would be created within thè national legai system
whereby different time limits would be applied
depending on thè source of thè right at thè basis of
thè claim— national or Community. This inequality
is more illusory than reai, however, since
d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n  o f  t i m e  l i m i t s  d e p e n d i n g  o n
substantive source of law (e.g. contractual or
delictual) is quite normally accepted in most
national legai systems. Furthermore, substantive
Community law in any event does not always fall
easily into thè procedural categories of national
law for thè purpose of determining thè national
2 9/procedural rules which should apply to it. —
This conclusion leads to a further point? The
eventual legislative correction which will be required
need n o t  i n v o l v e  a  W h o l e s a l e  h a r m o n i z a t i o n  of n a t i o n a l
procedural law but rather specific Community regulatory
action to establish relevant time limits in respect
of Community acquired rights. This would be legally
justifiable and politically far less explosive. One
can only speculate whether thè efforts already made
3 0/in this direction —  would not have received a 
considerable boost had thè Court of Justice taken a 
bolder stand on thè normative principles.
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Corning now to thè "diversity" argument one should 
not forget that thè existence of different municipal 
legai systems which include a diversity of procedural 
rules is not a mere technical obstruction to uniform 
protection of Community rights to be removed —  with 
or without thè Court's prompting -- by a simple 
technical exercise. Rather, arguably, thè strict 
connection between procedure and substance may indicate 
that thè national procedural diversity is a reflection 
of deeper differences depending on societal values such 
as thè relationships between thè Citizen and thè 
administration, thè privileges of thè executive and 
thè generai balance between public and private interests.
If thè latter hypothesis is correct -- and comparison
31 /with non-unitary systems may point in this direction —  —  
then thè Court's decision becomes more understandable. 
Integration in this case would clearly become a matter 
for a slower, orderly and voluntary process of 
harmonization —  as provided e.g. in Articles 100-102 EEC. 
And, as far as equality is concerned, this alternative 
hypothesis would suggest that given that thè 
"belongingness" of individuals to different legai systems 
is not a mere technicality, and that, as a result, 
similar factual claims based on identical Community rights 
are in effect objectively "unlike situations", this 
reasoning would justify unlike treatment. It is also
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possible that this line of decisions is one of thè 
indications of a phase of judicial self-restraint, of 
a levelling off of thè approfondissement process, of 
a recognition by thè Court of thè fourth order of 
analysis outlined above. The overall stability of thè 
legal-political system must also be accepted as a 
valid factor in evaluating this recent jurisprudence.
Pending final resolution of this issue it may be
possible for thè Court to take a midway position. I
would suggest that thè Court could perhaps consider a
policy of judicial abstention as regards thè actual
national time limits but impose a Community judge-made
32/rule as to thè moment time must start running. —
A possible commencement point could be thè moment when 
thè plaintiff should reasonably have become aware of 
his rights,,such as thè date on which thè Court itself 
clarified thè issue. This would not affect thè ex tunc 
nature of thè judgment, although it would favour thè 
individuai's ignorance of his rights as against thè 
Member States' ignorance of their wrong. This may be 
a useful via-media between thè neec? for equal and 
uniform protection on thè one hand and thè acknowledgment 
of Member State legitimate procedural diversity on thè 
other.
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The issues raised in Denkavit, Just and Ferwerda
v/ere broadly similar. The basis for non-uniformity
in those cases was not thè diversity of time limits
but thè basis for calculating thè loss suffered as a
result of thè illegally exacted charges and levies.
Apparently in some systems thè question of whether thè
trader has passed on thè cost of thè illegal charge
to thè customer is relevant in calculating monies
to be repaid. In other systems this matters not.
Once again thè Court employed thè formula that
"... in thè absence of Community rules concerning
thè refunding of national charges which have been
unlawfully levied, it is for thè domestic legai
system of each Member State ..." — ^ to prescribe
thè remedies. The Court specificallv allowed
considerations of unjust enrichment to be taken into
account so that it would not be contrary to Community
law to consider whether or not thè unlawful levy
was passed on to thè customer and full repayment
would constitute an unjustified windfall to thè 
34 /importer. —  Once again, individuals, in apparently 
equal factual situations would be treated differently 
according to thè jurisdiction in which they sought 
or were obliged to seek Community derived protection.
In Ferwerda thè reverse situation arose. The question 
was under what conditions could thè national - Community
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authorities claim from individuals thè repayment of 
a subsidy erroneously granted. The Court accepted that 
(Dutch) national rules of legai certainty should govern 
thè question, leading of course to thè same type of 
diverse treatment.
A peculiar twist to this problem occurred in thè 
Express Dairy case. There thè illegal charge was 
collected by thè Member State acting as an agent for 
thè Community in respect of a Community measure held 
to be illegal. This then was a situation in which a 
Community measure created a wrong applied accross thè 
board throughout thè Member States. — ^ And yet 
vindication of rights, dependent on thè national 
legai systems with their procedural diversity was 
acknowledged as leading to "... difference in treatment 
on a Community scale". —  ^As a result, individuals 
may receive different redress, in terms of time limits, 
quantum of repayment, interest charges and so forth.
In this context thè procedural challenge is 
particularly stark, since in this situation uniform 
enforcement of thè Community rule would be likely but 
no uniform redress should thè rule be found to have 
been illegal.
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c. Unequal protection -- other instances
Rewe and its progeny illustrate most clearly thè 
emerging constitutional-procedural gap and one of thè 
prospective challenges to thè evolution of normative 
supranationalism. Two other illustrations will serve to 
demonstrate that this line of cases is not unique and 
that thè procedural challenge is likely to creep up 
in a variety of other situations.
It will be recalled that one way of sidestepping 
thè restrictive approach of thè European Court 
regarding direct individuai challenges to generai 
Community legislation under Article 173 was by way of 
reference on thè validity of Community law under 
Article 177. The substitution is not complete since 
thè effects of annulment (under 173) are different
37/from those of declaration of invalidity under 177, —
but it undoubtedly ameliorates thè almost completely
blocked avenue under 173. Yet, again, thè ability of
thè individuai to use thè 177 challenge to validity
will depend on thè range and form of national modes of
action. Thus for example in thè Royal Scholten Hoenig 
38/case, — and English plaintiff was able to challenge 
thè application of a Community measure (through thè 
intermediary of thè British administrative authorities) 
by way of an application for a "declaration" in thè
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English High Court -- a specific form of action
suited to judicial review of administrative action.
The High Court duly referred thè nratter to thè
European Court of Justice which in turn gave its
decision on (partial) invalidity which was applied
by thè High Court. The plaintiff had his redress.
This is particularly efficient remedy since thè law
can be clarified in advance of any action thè legality
of which is unclear. This satisfactory result depends
of course on thè availability of thè declaration and
its scope. Thus, if thè Community measure, say a
directive, were not merely a matter for national
administrative action but were implemented by an
Act of Parliament, it is doubtful whether in England
3 9/a declaration would lie. —  By contrast it would
seem that in Denmark and Ireland, if thè individuai
could establish sufficient interest it probably would.
Once again we have thè prospect of unequal remedies
in relation to a Community norm which presents itself
identically throughout thè legai order.
Finally, it is easy to imagine that as regards
thè non-contractual liability of thè Community thè
policy of thè Court of Justice to encourage thè
40/processing of claims through national courts —  will 
similarly lead to a diversity of remedies -- including 
perhaps thè quantum of damages —  depending on thè 
specific national delictual rules.
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There are no easy solutions to these problems. They 
involve profound policy issues about thè measure 
of diversity which thè Community system can tolerate 
and no less difficult pragmatic questions about thè 
feasibility of Community regulation and harmonization 
in so technical a legai field. Nevertheless, thè 
centrality of thè principle of uniform interpretation 
and application of Community law to thè entire normative 
structure of supranationalism is such that thè present 
difficulties cannot but be a major challenge to be 
resolved in thè future. The per se value of non- 
discrimination only adds moral acuteness to thè 
integrational problem.
)^. Application Enforce^ent of £Qmniuni£y Law —  The
41 /Access to Justice Challenge —
This final challenge to normative supranationalism
is only beginning to reach thè consciousness of thè
42/European policy maker.—  Access to justice is concerned 
with thè need to transform formai rights into effective 
rights. In its basic manifestation it is concerned 
with thè essential constitutional requirements in civil 
(and criminal) procedure to ensure a process which 
corresponds to societal notions of justice. At a 
second level it is concerned with facilitating thè 
access of individuals and groups to dispute resolution
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fora and questioning thè adequacy of thè existing 
fora with a view to developing new processes and 
bodies more suited to thè exigencies of thè contemporary 
problems faced by individuals in a mass society. 
Questions such as legai, thè mechanisms, procedural 
and institutional, to vindicate diffuse and fragmented 
rights such as consumer and environmental rights, thè 
role of individuai litigants, public authorities, 
prosecutors and special conciliation and arbitration 
bodies are among thè questions with which thè search 
for effective access to justice has to grapple.
At first sight there seems little connection between
this range of problems and thè evolution of normative
supranationalism. It is possible to take thè view
that since, in most instances, thè application of
Community law and thè vindication of Community based
rights are achieved through thè municipal legai system
and national courts, thè issues of acccess to justice
4 3 /do not rise at thè supranational level. —  A closer 
look reveals, however, several points of contact,
a) Accessible justice even in its extra-legal 
manifestation can be viewed as extension of procedural 
law; thè availability of effective legai services is 
no less cruciai to thè party seeking to vindicate his 
rights than is thè need to satisfy procedural 
requirements such as locus standi and time limits.
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Substantial differences in thè range of legai services
affecting, inevitably, thè protection of Community
based rights will lead to thè same type of
fragmentation and inequality along national lines
discussed in relation to thè "procedural challenge".
Harmonization in this fiedl, however, is far more
difficult, for whereas it was possible to argue that
procedural requirements such as time limits need not
be, within thè municipal system, identical for
national and Community rights, thè same cannot as
a generai principle be argued as regards thè provision
of legai services. It would be difficult and
undesirable to argue for certain legai or extra-legal
services to Community migrant workers which would be
44/denied to non-Community migrants. —  The harmonization 
effort would have to be therefore in most cases universal.
b) In those fields where thè Community exercises a 
very frequent direct jurisdiction over individuals 
such as competition and agriculture and where there 
is a correspondingly frequent direct recourse by 
individuals to thè European Court for legai protection, 
there is scope for investigating thè procedural rules 
before thè Court with thè concerns of access to justice 
in mind. Issues such as locus standi for consumer 
groups and thè role of thè Commission as a supranational 
public attorney have already emerged in thè competition 
field. Thus, for example, one of thè objectives of thè
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Community competition policy is to improve thè 
quality and thè prices of goods for thè benefit of 
consuraers. The prohibition on monopolistic agreements 
and practices when translated into a duty imposed on 
undertakings to refrain from certain activities, 
bestows a diffuse and indirect right on consumers to 
be protected from abuse. This immediately poses one 
of thè main access problems; that of safeguarding 
rights not directly granted, and formed in terms of a 
duty on potential violators. Under Council Regulation 
45/17 —  thè Commission has thè direct task of enforcing 
thè competition policy —  acting thus as a 
supranational public agency. In addition Regulation 17 
provides that individuals, even if not parties to an 
alleged violative agreement, may lodge a complaint 
against it with thè Commission provided they have a 
"legitimate interest". This terms is yet to be 
clearly defined by thè European Court. Should 
consumer groups —  national or transnational —  be 
bestowed with automatic legitimate interest which thè 
Member States already enjoy? The advantages would be 
obvious since they would have then all thè legai and
politicai resources of thè Commission with them.
4 6/In one of its competition cases —  thè Court allowed 
thè intervention in thè proceedings by thè Italian
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Unione Nazionale Consumatori in accordance with 
Article 37 of thè protocol of thè Court's statute. It 
said :
Since it is thè particular objective of thè Union 
to represent and protect consumers, it can show an 
interest in thè correct application of Community 
provisions in thè field of competition, which not 
only ensure that thè common market operates normally 
but which also tend to favour consumers.
Accordingly thè Union has an interest in thè solution 
of thè Cases at issue, to thè extent that thè latter 
concern thè finding that thè applica.nts in thè ma in 
actions indulged in a concerted practice with thè 
object and effect of protecting thè Italian market. 47/
We can see here evidence of thè type of argumentation
surrounding thè issue of class action, private-public
48/prosecutors and so forth. —  With thè expansion of 
Community jurisdiction to environmental and consumer 
protection thè classical fields in which thè emergence 
of potentially interested parties constituted on 
transnational rather than national lines, this problem 
is likely to be magnified in thè future. Issues such 
as Community class actions widening thè rules of 
standing to allow individuals —  or groups of 
individuals —  to challenge more easily directives 
will all have to be tackled as part of this nex 
consciousness.
c) The emergence of access to justice as a major 
prospective preoccupation goes to thè very social and 
human credibility of thè Community and its organs, a 
Community often accused of being concerned solely with
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businessmen and trade. As has been argued elsewhere:
. . . By its very nature, thè Community, to give 
but one example, has encouraged thè transnational 
mobility of labour and goods. In so doing, it has 
incurred responsibility for resolving thè special 
problems created by these phenomena. If we consider 
thè plight of thè migrant worker in contemporary 
Europe, and thè problems he may have in finding 
housing, claiming social security and confronting 
immigration laws, problems which are exacerbated by 
thè difficulties of language, social adjustment 
and family and educational disruption, v/e can 
appreciate that integration at thè level of 
governments raises a corresponding set of new 
problems at thè lowest levels in society. Likewise, 
thè free movement of goods creates its own range of 
problems for thè consumer. It v/i 11 be argued, 
correctly, that solutions to these transnational 
problems can best be found, and in some cases have 
been found, by thè Community at thè transnational 
level. Indeed, thè response of thè Community -- and 
thè Court —  has been to create transnational rights 
protecting migrant workers and thè like. However, 
if these rights are to become more than "paper rights", 
institutions and machinery must be created to make 
them truly accessible to those whom they were 
designed to protect. 4 9/
The problem also takes on a quantitative dimension since:
As thè Community branches out into new embryonic 
fields such as Consumer Protection, Environment and 
Workers' Participation, one can envisage that 
quantitatively thè number of cases coming before 
national and transnational "European Courts", and 
possibly choking thè system, will be drastically 
increased. Moreover, movement into new substantive 
areas will no doubt give rise to a new set of 
substantive rights and these would, in turn, inevitably 
increase pressure for procedural developments within 
institutional frameworks. The problem is not one of 
simply creatina new safeguards . . . important as
these may be. Rather, thè problem is essentially 
how to make existing rights effective within these 
new situations. One of thè most pressing tasks, 
then, will be in assisting thè evolution of new types 
of legai services, prototypes of which exist in 
several Member States and towards which thè Community 
has already taken certain stepts. 5 0/
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d) Finally, there is an access to justice dimension 
which is unique to thè supranational system. The 
traditional concerns of access to justice are with 
giving increased protection to thè individuai and 
his rights and with thè improvement of dispute 
resolution processes in society. It will however be 
recorded that a centrai feature of thè supranational 
system was thè function of thè individuai as a 
guarantor of inter-state obligations. The so-called 
"all or nothing effect" depended, in part, on thè 
ability of thè individuai to bring actions before thè 
national courts thè judgments of which —  when applying 
Community law -- would be binding on thè respective 
governments. In this sense improved access by way of 
raising thè level of Community law consciousness, 
and generally removing obstacles to Community based 
actions will have thè integrational consequence of 
strengthening an important dimension on which 
supranationalism partly depends. Increased access 
will not only work for individuals but for thè 
Community system itself.
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Footnotes
1. In Costa, Van Gend en Loos and their progeny thè 
Court always relied on thè uniformity requirement 
introduced inter alia by Article 177 as a major 
ground in thè decisions. See citations in Chapter 
Two supra.
2. Case 44/79 Liselotte Hauer v Land Rheinland- 
Pfalz /T9797 ECR 3727, Recital 14 of Judgment.
3. Case 14/68, Wilhelm v Bundeskartellair.t /1 969? E.C.R. 1 
Recital 6 of Judgment.
4. Viz. "thè purpose of that /177/ jurisdiction is 
to ensure thè uniform interpretation and 
application of Community law, and in particular 
thè provisions which have direct effect, through 
thè national courts." Joined Cases 66, 127 and 
128/79 Amministrazione della Finanze v Meridionale 
Industria Salumi, /19807 ECR 1237
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5. "At an early stage in his legai education thè
student encounters thè Latin maxim Ubi jus ibi
remedium ... /to/ which thè realist replies :
Ubi remedium ibi jus." F.H. Lawson, Remedies in
English Law (Penguin, 1972) 14. Cappelletti,
Judicial Review in thè Contemporary World (Babbs-Merrill, 
Indianapolis, 1974). 
fis equally emphatic: "All of this hearkens back
to thè old truth that a right without an adequate
remedy is no right at all".T78-79.
6. The Court on numerous occasions has indicated that 
"thè generai principle of equality ... is one of 
thè fundamental principles of Community law.
The principle requires that similar situations 
shall not be treated differently unless thè 
differentiation is objectively justified." Joined 
Cases 103, 145/77 Royal Scholten-Honig v Intervention 
Board for Aqricultural Produce /Ì978/ ECR 2037, 
Recitals 26-27 of Judgment. See also Joined Cases 
117/76 and 16/77 Ruckdeschel v Hauptzollamt Hamburg - 
St Annen /T977/ ECR 1753 at 1769. And see generally 
Schermers, Judicial Protection in thè European Ccmrrunities
(Kluwer, De^ tenter, 1979) §§ 89-94 (at 52-54).
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7. See generally, C.A. Wright, Handbook of thè Law
of Federai Courts (West Publishing) (1976) at e.g.,
195-196.
8. Salumi, supra n 4, Recital 9 of Judgment (emphasis
added). On thè generai question of thè 
retroactive and prospective nature of judicial 
review, see M. Cappelletti and VI. Cohen,
Comparative Constitutional Law (Bobbs-Merrill 
1979) 98-112, and Aldisert, The Judicial Process
(West Publishing 1976) 877-935.
9. See Lagrange A G submissions in Joined Cases 28,
29 and 30/62 Da Costa v Nederlandse Belastinc- 
administratie /T963? ECR 31, 41. See also thè 
oblique reference by thè Court itself, Case 2 9/68 
Milchkontor v Hauptzollamt Saarbrùcken /?96 97 ECR 
165, Recital 3 of Judgment. For a generai 
discussion on thè issue of Inter partes v Erga omnes 
decisions, see Cappelletti & Cohen, supra n 8,
96-98; Trabucchi, L'effet "erga omnes" des Décisions 
Préjudicielles Rendues par la Cour de Justice des
Communautés Européennes (1 974) 1 0 RTDE 5 6.
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10. French Raffaele Case, Court of Appeals, Paris,
decision of 13.11.70, Gazette du Palais, 1971,
J. p.206. Cited and translated in Schermers, 
note 6 supra
g 618 (p.354); and see also Schermers, id.
§619 for a survey of attitudes of other Courts.
11. Case 51/74 Hulst v Produktschap Voor Sierqevassen 
/T975? E.C.R. 79.
12. Schermers, supra n 6 , at 355, n 155.
13. Case 43/75 Gabrielle Defrenne v SABENA /Ì976?
ELCR. 455 .
14. Salumi, supra n 4, Recital 10 of Judgment;
Denkavit, Case 61/79 /T9807 SaCìB* 1205 
Recital 18 of Judgment. In Defrenne thè Court 
was obviously swayed by thè enormous economie 
impact a fully fledged ex tunc, erga omnes decision 
would have brought about.
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15. Cf. Bebr Remedies for Breach of Community Law
IIEgr Peports of Ninth Coraress (Sweet and Maxwell, London, 1980) 10. 
But see Warringham v Lloyds Bank /ì 981,7 2 A11ER 
434, 435 h.
16. See Case 4/79 Providence Agricole de la Champagne 
v ONIC /1 980J7 ECR 2823 ; Case 1 09/79 Malseries de 
Beauce v ONIC /Ì980? ECR 2883; Case 145/79 
Roquette Frères v French Customs Administration 
/19807 ECR 2 917. In these particular cases 
concerning compensatory amounts thè Court 
declined retroactivity at least partially 
because of thè inability accurately to calculate 
sums owed. Note also that thè cases concern 
wrongful application of "secondary" Community 
law by Member States rather than conflicting 
national measures.
17. Case 33/76 P.ewe-Zentralfinanz v Landwirtschaftskammer 
fiir das Saarland /?97§7 ECR 1 980 /hereìnafter Rewe/ .
Case 45/76 Comet v Produktsfoap voor SieCqewassen
1 97 6/ ECR 2043. For a sharp analysis see Bebr, 
supra n 15.
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18. Denkavit, supra n 14; Salumi, supra n 4;
Case 68/79 Hans Just v Danish Ministry for Fiscal 
Affairs /1980/ ECR 501? in a slightly different 
context see Case 130/79 Express Dairy Food v 
Intervention Board for Agricultural Produce /?980/ 
ECR 1887. And see Hartley (1980) 5 ELRev 366.
See also, Case 826/79 Amministrazione delle 
Finanze delle Stato v HIERCQ /^T9807 ECR 2559; 
and Case 265/78 Ferwerda v Produktschap Voor 
Vee en Vlees </?980? ECR 617. Case 811/79 
Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v 
Ariete S p A  /1980/ ECR 2545.
19. Case 39/73 Rewe-Zentralfinanz v Landwirtschaftskammer 
Westfalen-Lippe /T973? ECR 1039. The higher 
Community law was Article 13(1) EEC and 
Regulation 15 9/66 EEC.
20. Rewe, supra n 17. Recital 3 of Judgment.
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21. The Court at that time, it is submitted, was 
hardly cognizant of thè profound nature of thè 
problem. In subsequent cases thè laconism was 
substituted by more detailed analysis and a 
greater appreciation of thè policy conundrums. 
The Court even carne to express its "regret" at 
thè situation. See n 36 infra.
22. Rewe, supra n 17, Recital 5 of Judgment.
23. An expression extending to all "thè conditions 
under which /claims/ may arise, thè requirements 
for lodging an action, periods of prescription 
and awards of interest" Bebr, supra n 15, 104.
24. Commission submissions at 1994.
25. See e.g., Schermers, supra n 6, §g 67-88 
(pp. 39-51).
Weiler, Joseph H. H. (1982), Supranational law and the supranational system : legal structure and political process in the 
European Community 
European University Institute                                                                    DOI: 10.2870/67242
-^£14-
26. Rewe, supra n 17, Recital 5 of Judgment.
27. Rewe, supra n 17, Recital 5 of Judgment.
28. Indeed thè Court has been quite adept in
creatively casting rules of procedure in 
relation to its direct jurisdiction. Cf. Oliver, 
Limitation of Actions Before thè European Court 
(1978) ELRev 3. Further, thè Court in its 
human rights cases has indicated its willingness 
to draw on thè different constitutions of thè 
Member States in construing a Community standard. 
Are procedural rules -- or at least time limits —
«
so much more difficult? Recently, in its 
interlocutory decision in Case 1 4 9/79. Ganrlssion 
v Belgium /T980? |ì£ì B> 3881 , — - -----
thè Court stated that "reference to /substantive? 
provisions of domestic level systems /as a means? 
to restrict thè scope of thè provisions of 
Community law, which has thè effect of damaging 
thè unity and impairing thè efficacity of that 
law, cannot be accepted" (Proceedings of thè Court 
of Justice no. 28/80, 15-19.12.80). Diverse
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domestic procedural provisions may have thè same 
damaging effect on thè unity and efficacity of 
Community law. Yet whereas in Case 149/79 thè 
Court indicated in principle a preparedness to 
overrule Belgian Constitutional law in order to 
protect thè unity of Community law, in thè cases 
discussed here national procedural law was a 
sufficient obstacle for thè Court to concede 
disunity and lack of efficacity.
In Rewe thè Commission correctlv asks "... whether 
each Member-State can, insofar as it is concerned, 
decide which is thè right laid down by national 
law to which /for thè purpose of applying thè 
time limits? a Community right must be assimilated" 
Rewe, supra n 17, 1994.
First steps have been taken in this direction in 
relation to Community charges. See e.g., Council 
Regulations 1430/79, OJ 1979 L 175/1; 1697/79 
OJ 1979 L 197/1. But note that even here thè 
Regulations are not aimed specifically at 
reimbursement in cases of annulment or declaration 
of invalidity by thè European Court.
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31. See supra n 17. Comparative analysis of this 
issue may be particularly rewarding.
32. This approach of "tolling" state procedural law 
is apparently one of thè American federai 
solutions to this problem.
33. Just, supra n 18, Recital 25 of Judgment.
34. This, of course, should be balanced against thè
possible drop in turnover which thè imposition 
of thè illegal charge may have had on thè 
importer's business. The Danish legai system 
in which thè Just case took place acknowledges 
this factor. See now Case 66/80 I££ (13.5.81)
(not yet reported)
in which thè Court in respect of some Community 
regimes declined recovery since costs were passed 
to thè consumer.
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35. Express Dairy, supra n 18, gives an oblique
positive indication as to thè question of thè
erga omnes effect of decisions of invalidity 
based on 177. The claim was brought on thè 
basis of a similar decision in an earlier case:
Case 131/77 Milac v HZA Saarbrucken /Ì978/ E.CR 
1041. And see Case 66/80 id.
Cf. Cases 4/79, 109/79 and 145/79, supra n 16.
36. Express Dairy, supra n 18, Recital 12 of Judgment.
Here thè Court was moved to indicate its view
by actually acknowledging thè "reqrettable” 
absence of Community provisions.
37. See Bebr note 15 supra; Schermers note 6 supra at
§ 371 (210-211); Case 66/80 note 34 supra.
38. Supra n 7. And see also Case 118/78 C J Meijer
B V v Department of Trade and Others </?979/ PCR 1387.
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39. Cf. Pickin v British Railway Board /^T9747 765.
But when thè British Parliament enacts an Act 
implementing a directive it is, in principle, 
administering Community policy. Should not one 
of thè actions for judicial review of administrative 
action lie against thè Act even if in form of full 
fledged Parliamentary legislation? And cf.
Jaconelli (1979) 28 ICLQ 65.
40. See generally Harding (1979) 16 CMLRev 389;
In Case 26/74 Roquette v Commission /19767 ECR 677 
thè Court said: "On thè question of interest ... 
</i7n thè absence of provisions of Community law on 
this point, it is currently for thè national 
authorities, in thè case of reimbursement of dues 
improperly collected, to settle all ancillary 
questions relating to such reimbursement, such as 
payment of interest". Recital 12 of Judgment.
Determination of quantum of damages falls within 
thè difficult category of issues in which arguably 
there exist objective societal reasons to pay a 
different measure of damages to plaintiffs in 
different Member States suffering from a similar 
type of non-contractual violation, since thè 
quantum of damages should probably be in line with
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thè generai expectation based on normal awards.
In other words differing expectations would create 
an "unlike situation" calling for "unlike treatment".
41. See generally, M. Cappelletti and B. Garth (eds.), 
Access to Justice: A World Survey Alphen aan den 
rijn/Milan, Sijthoff/Giuffrè 1978); M. Cappelletti 
and J. Weisner, (eds.), Access to Justice: Promising 
Institutions (Alphen aan den rijn/Milan, Sijthoff/ 
Giuffrè 1979); M. Cappelletti and E. Garth (eds.), 
Access to Justice: Emerging Issues and Perspectives 
(Alphen aan den rijn/Milan, Sijthoff/Giuffrè 1979).
42. See e.g., Provisionai Commission Document, L 1Accès 
des Consomir.ateurs à la Justice, ENV/2 6 6/8 0/orig.
43. Thus, e.g., thè question is hardly treated in thè 
otherwise excellent Community Report on Remedies 
for Breach of Community Law submitted to thè Ninth 
FIDE Congress. Bebr, supra n 15.
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44. And this despite thè very different substantive 
rights. To create such a distinction might produce 
and even more offensive type of inequality. The 
constitutional weakness of thè non-Community 
migrant calls perhaps for even stronger extra-legal 
protection.
45. JO 1962 L 13/204.
46. Joined Cases 41/73, 43-48/73, 50/73, 111/73, 113/73, 
114/73 Générale Sucriéres v Commission /Ì973/ ECR
1 465 .
47. Recitals 7-8 of Judgment.
48. See generally, Temple-Lang, The Position of Third 
Parties in thè EEC Competition Cases, 3
ELRev 177 (1978).
49. Economides and Weiler, (1 979) 42 .Mod L Rev 68 3 , 694 .
50. Id.
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A • The Community and thè Federai Experience: Divergence
and Convergence
The inability neatly to cfcssify thè Community 
experience in classical federai terminology was one 
of thè starting points of this study. I rejected, 
because of its narrowness, a tendency in politicai 
science to characterize thè Community as simply 
confederai (Elazar) or even as moving from federai 
to confederai (Taylor). Equally unacceptable was 
thè legai approach which, whilst not necessarily 
using thè terminology of federalism, focussed on 
certain aspects which presented too narrow and un- 
representative an image of thè structure of thè 
Community.
Instead our approach was to show through a 
separate focus on thè relationship of norms and actors 
that in thè "normative sense" thè experience had strong 
"federai" (or rather federai state) characteristics 
whereas in thè decisional sense thè system was in 
fact more confederai. Equally, in relation to thè 
third element examined (in Part One), thè system of 
compliance, we found thè same duality: an order strad-
dling and perhaps "marrying" international (confederai)
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anci constitutional (federai state) elements. I 
suggested that this combination of federalism and 
confederalism, of relatively high normative supra­
nationalism and low decisional supranationalism, 
was perhaps a key to giving a meaning, in thè 
structural and processual sense, to thè concept of 
thè supranational order.
Failure to grasp this distinction accounts, in 
my opinion, at least partially for much confusion 
among Community observers and enables us to under- 
stand better some of thè conceptual contradictions 
set out in Chapter One. The main purpose of thè analysis 
was however not confined to a search for a slightly 
neater conceptualization of thè supranational system. 
Rather it was to trace, from a different angle,
thè dynamics of its evolution. But here again, our 
distinction and separate treatment of thè two principal 
strands of supranationalism, as well as thè system of 
compliance, enables us now to examine afresh some of 
thè operational critiquesof thè system. Dahrendorf, 
cited in thè introduction, is I believe symptomatic. 
Suggestìng a contradiction in evolution he commented, 
as we will recali, that so far as thè substance of Euro­
pean cooperation is concerned thè Community has been a 
success whereas as regards thè framework for taking 
common decisions "... we have locked ourselves into 
procedures and institutions which at times do more 
damage than good".
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But in thè light of our analysis, if correct, 
we could now suggest that one cannot separate thè 
success from thè alleged failure. Thas whereas in 
thè process of conceptualization we were concerned 
to draw distinctions between thè normative and thè 
decisional in thè analysis of dynamics we were 
concerned with interaction.
We did not "lock ourselves into procedures and 
Institutions". The decisional changes were part of 
a complex process which had its own logie but which 
were also dependent on thè very factors which made 
substantive cooperation a success. Failure to under- 
stand this inter-connectedness (I am not suggesting 
a rigid determinism); failure to comprehend this as 
part of thè Community supranational system is akin 
on thè operational level to thè failure of thè 
theoreticians on thè conceptual level.
Both conceptually and operationally then thè 
Community system, thè supraiftional order, represents 
a divergence from classic non-unitary federai and 
confederai analogues.
If we turn from norms, actors, and thè compliance 
system to thè fourth element in thè analysis —  powers 
and competences -- we will have thè d u e  to one sense 
(not unique) in which thè Community experience displays 
a profound convergence with thè federai, even federai- 
state, experience. This convergence may be expressed 
in thè notion of "combined federalìsm".
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The modern expression of thè national federai 
esperience departs from some of thè originai notions 
which saw, at least in a certain sense, as thè 
essence of federalism a division of tasks, competences, 
powers and execution between thè different levels of 
generai and constituent governments.
By contrast thè modern reality of federalism, 
from thè 30s in thè U.S.A. and since thè last World 
War in most other states, has been one of sharing, 
cooperatìon and concordance between thè two levels: 
Sharing in power, sharing in competences and, above 
all, sharing in execution.
Naturally in each system this notion has developed 
with its own specificity. In thè Federai Republic 
it is given constitutional expression in thè very com- 
position of thè federai organs of power. In virtually 
all federai states thè mechanisms of "new federalism" 
have had an important <ole in thè evolution of sharing 
and cooperation. The Canadian experience is most: 
telling since there although from thè legai point of 
view separateness was retained largely intact for many 
years, in many fields thè federai government and thè 
provinces combiend to achieve certain tasks in areas 
which formally were in thè domain of one or thè other. 
In short this new notion is concerned to preserve thè 
utility which thè division of governmental tiers can 
bring but also in harnassing thè utility from coopera­
tion, compilation of resources and joint ventures
between thè two levels.
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In thè Community this concept of "combined 
federalism" finds accord with much of our analysis.
In fact in more than one way it is thè essence of thè 
Community as a federai experience. At thè very con­
stitutional core we observed thè necessity and utility, 
in thè supranational system, of judicial cooperation 
between thè European Court of Justice and its national 
counterparts.
Likewise we observed in thè evolution of thè 
processes of decision making thè increased intermeshing 
of Community and Member States at all levels. Our 
evaluation of this process was mixed but there can be 
no doubt that for thè foreseeable future this co-involve- 
ment will remain a permanent feature of thè system.
Our discussion of thè challenge of compliance in 
Chapter 10 illustrates thè intrusion of thè combined 
model even in relation to such strict principles as 
supremacy. For although on thè constitutional level 
Community law in its legitimate sphere, is supreme to 
national law, it falls to national administrations to 
implement and administer much of this supreme law. 
Inevitably supremacy can be compromised by thè measure 
of control thè national bureaucracies are given. Thus 
although as a normative-juridical principle, extremely 
useful in litigatìon, supremacy and thè sharp distinction 
it highlights between purely municipal and "Community- 
municipal" (since Community law is considered part of 
thè law of thè land) law remains intact, in thè day to 
day evolution and application of Community law thè
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combined model is not only a reality but an essential 
requirement for faithful compliance,
It is however above all in relation to thè issue 
of powers and competences that thè notion of "combined 
federalism" finds its most remarkable expression.
How has thè Community reached a situation where it 
may —  despite certain dangers —  engage itself in 
almost any field even far from thè strict notion of 
thè Common Market? If we were to condense thè analysis 
of Part Two of this study into one proposition this 
would be that in thè final analysis competences are 
transferred from thè Member States, by thè Member States 
(through their governments - and hence part of thè 
danger) to thè Member States,
The process of internai mutation and thè considerable 
"softening" of thè princples of preemption, de jure and/ 
or de facto, were thè juridical contributions to this 
process, The Community displays thus, from this 
perspective, considering all thè factors I mentioned, 
a considerable convergence with thè generai federai 
experience.
The dynamics of Supranationalism: Equilibrium and
ir sequilibrium
The evolution of normative and decisional supra­
nationalism and of thè system of compliance were 
important elements in my argument concerning thè 
equilibrium and resilience of thè system. Rather than 
basing my analysis of equilibrium on a balance between
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Community (and Member State) institutions I was con- 
cerned with thè balance of processes. I argued, 
especially in Chapter Five, that thè diverging
evolutionary trends of thè two facets of
supranationalism produced a certain equilibrium as
regards integrating and disintegrating factors.
Similar balances were perceived in relation to thè
system of judicial review with its constitutional and
instìtutional dimensions and even in relation to thè
process of erosion of enumerated powers. It will serve
no purpose to reiterate arguments sufficiently rehearsed
in thè text.
Instead I wish to touch upon thè disequilibrating ' 
factors inherent in thè very same processes and in 
particular three i-'cV,
a. From an international phase to a constitutional 
phase to a procedural phase
The first is a reflection of thè shift from Parts One 
and Two of this study to Part Three. The very evolution 
of normative supranationalism on thè one hand —  thè 
process of constitutionalization —  and thè collapse 
of strict enumerated powers followed by substantive 
expansion on thè other hand have produced exigencies 
which do not exist in purely international systems.
They have come to exist because of thè constitutionaliza- 
tion and because of thè substantive expansion,
Since Community policies do involve binding rules 
on Member States, since they do create legai rights 
and obligations for individuals, since they do, especially
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in thè area of "new rights" create social expectations 
and violation thereof has potential for social dis- 
ruption, it becomes important that thè law is observed, 
that rights are vindicated, that access to remedies 
is available, and that in thè application of this law 
constitutional principles of equal protection are main- 
tained. In short, thè supranational order, because 
of its constitutional component demands thè effective 
and just application and administration of its regime.
If I may use again thè very rough phasing analysis, 
thè shift from thè international phase to thè consti­
tutional phase produces in turn thè necessity of engaging 
in a 'procedural phase1, a phase in which thè emphasis 
should be perhaps less on increased law and policy 
making but on ensuring that thè law already made functions 
properly and is not either a dead letter or simply 
disobeyed; or that it is applied equally and without 
discrimination; or that methods for vindication of 
rights are available;or that law and policy become alive 
and reai to those who are meant to benefit from it.
I have suggested that this is a disequilibrating factor 
because whereas thè constitutionalization produces 
this exigency» analysis in thè preceding chapters 
Part Three has demonstrated how tough thè challenge 
is. And yet failure to meet thè challenge might have 
serious disruptive effects on that which has already 
been built.
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b. Representation and disequilibria
If thè failure to meet these above mentioned 
exigencies risks undermining thè constitutional order, 
thè erosion of strict enumeration created a danger of 
no less profundity. I have touched upon this factor 
both in Chapters Three and Nine and sufficient will be 
a brief recali in this context of discussion on dis­
equilibria. The potential for expansion while promising 
in many ways is at odds with thè decisional structure 
of thè Community. First there is thè classical analysis 
of thè democracy deficit. Second, I have underlined thè 
dissonance between expansion into fields with increasing 
and immediate social contact, and a decision making 
apparatus and process which is diplomatic, often secret, 
bureaucratic and might exclude thè type of interest 
representation which is essential for successful acceptable 
policy. The disequilibrating potential becomes clear.
The cruciai question for Community decision making becomes 
cfthus less one "what" but one of "how" and "with whom".
A
c, The problem of institutions
Although I sought to show a certain untenabìlity 
in simple complaints on institutional malaise without 
seeing their development in thè wider supranational 
context one cannot and should not negate thè danger in 
thè decline of decisional supranationalism. At thè risk 
of being accused of blowing hot and cold at thè sameWeiler, Joseph H. H. (1982), Supranational law and the supranational system : legal structure and political process in the 
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time I would suggest that whereas it is true that thè 
divergence between decisional and normative supra­
nationalism produced a certain equilibrivi it also 
contains thè seeds of disequilibrium precisely because 
of thè uneven, nay opposing, development. The reason 
is simple in thè light of thè earlier two disequilibra- 
ting factors: If thè normative evolution has produced
these exigencies a solution to which must be found in 
thè politicai arena, thè decline of decisional supra­
nationalism makes such a solution that much more difficult 
to envisage. Although I do not propose to engage in 
futurology it may be useful to examine two recent events, 
thè election by direct universal suff rage of thè European 
Parliament and thè process of thè second enlargement, 
with a view to assessing possible impact on decisional 
structures and processes. In this brief analysis I shall 
be concerned to highlight thè difficulties, thè barriers 
to change, which stand in thè way of significant changes 
which these developments might be expected to bring 
about.
1 /C. The Directly Elected Parliament —  A New "Relance"?—
On its face it would appear that thè new Parliament 
has a ready slot in thè Community decision making process, 
into which it may fit: initially, even if denuded of
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formai legislative power it could make up, by virtue 
°f its newly acquired legitimacy, for thè decline of 
thè Commission and become thè proposer of new Communau- 
taire policies; it could, by virtue of its much 
strengthened composition which includes leading persona- 
lities drawn from thè national politicai arenas, become 
a politicai match to thè European Council and Council 
of Ministers and assert a Community check or Community 
boost to thè activities of these bodies; it could 
become a new focal point for galvanizìng thè politicai 
will which is a necessary condition for any further 
qualitative advances in thè process of integration; 
further, by virtue of its more direct and immediate 
link to its constituents, it could bestow a new 
"legitimacy" on thè entire Community apparatus and 
commence a new relance of Community action. It could 
thus begin to fili thè democracy deficit in both its 
aspects by providing at thè Community level effective 
representation of national even sectoral interests and 
by preventing thè Council from using thè Community legis­
lature as a means for passing measures which on thè 
national level would be subject to various checks and 
Controls. According to this admittedly optimistic 
Vision thè Commission, while maintaining its formai 
initiatory function, would —  because of its need for 
an influential ally in promoting policies hitherto 
received sceptically by a reluctant Council —  associate 
closely with thè Parliament in thè formulation of new 
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whether out of democratic respect to a directly
elected chamber, or by politicai need would, according
to thè same vision, concede at least de facto co-decision roZ<cr>
to thè new chamber. At a later stage there could be a
formalization of this process by actual changes in thè
current de jure competence of thè Parliament. Such
changes, were they to occur, could not only suggest
an arrest in thè decline of decisional supranationalism
2 /but perhaps even a reversai of trend.—
Mindful of thè connection between thè two facets 
of supranationalism, this reversai would follow a 
certain legai logie of thè system. It will be recorded 
that in its landmark constitutionalizing decisions thè 
European Court stated as one justification for making 
thè normative supranational leap that "... it must be 
noted that thè nationals of thè states brought together 
in thè Community are called upon to cooperate in thè 
functioning of this Community _ ____ .
through
thè intermediary of thè European Parliament...".—^
There was, with respect, a measure of judicial tongue-
in-cheek in that reasoning since in 19.6 3 both in terms
of parliamentary decision making power and in terms of
4 /Parliament's politicai composition— this alleged 
cooperation by nationals was extremely tenuous. And 
yet, given that thè normative supranational leap was 
taken for a good many other reasons, it would be possible, 
even justified, to turn thè Court’s reasoning on its
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head and suggest that instead of thè cooperation being 
a justification for thè development of normative 
supranationalism, that very development which in any 
eventtook place should be thè justification of effective 
cooperation, namely a much strengthened Parliament.
The cali by thè supreme German Constitutional Court 
for a fully fledged European Parliament to which thè 
Council of Ministers would be answerable, as a condition 
for accepting completely thè supremacy rule, follows 
thè same logie.
It is beyond thè scope of this analysis to suggest 
with any degree of precision what shape a reconstructed 
Parliament-Commission-Council triangle may look like 
and even what steps thè Community organs may take short 
of a complete overhaul of thè entire institutional frame- 
work. Rather I would like to suggest some of thè barriers 
which any such initiatives would have to overcome in 
granting a new role to Parliament.
i. The fact of direct elections is thè single most 
important immediate factor which gives both justification 
and politicai power to thè demands for a new institutional 
role for thè Parliament. And yet it should not be over- 
looked that thè pattern of voting —  especìally in those 
Member States which show least enthusìasm for thè Community 
—  was disappointingly low even by comparison to national 
elections.-^ The claim for "legitimacy" must therefore
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be treated with caution. Probably, thè next direct 
elections, where thè novelty factor will have disappeared, 
will be a more telling fact in this respect. Further- 
more, in those Member States where thè European Parlia- 
mentarians are not closely involved in national politics 
there would appear to be evidence of a noticeable divide 
between electors and elected.—^
ii. This divide leads in turn to a further "legitimacy" 
problem. The European Parliament may be perceived as 
being part and parcel of thè Community bureaucracy.
There is a danger of a vicious circle emerging in thè 
delicate relationships among thè Community organs on thè 
one hand and thè Community as a whole and thè Member 
States on thè other. In its quest for more influence 
thè Parliamentary cali will often be for more Community 
policies and more Community spending^ In thè present 
economie climate and given a growing national grassroot 
reaction sgainst thè Community, this may be a source
for a widening of thè divide between Parliament associated 
thus with thè negative image of Europe, and electorate. 
Finding thè middleway between electoral credibility
and institutional reassertion will thus be another
8 /important challenge and barrier to overcome.—
iii. That thè Council may resist Parliamentary resurgence 
seems obvious. This resistance does not result merely 
from an inherent unwillingness to concede power to a 
different forum. Council opposition is rooted in thè
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very structure of thè Community which rejected both
maximalist and minimalist, Proudhonian and Hamiltonian
9 /versions of federalism.— The emergence of thè European 
Parliament would, according to this perception, be a 
dangerous revival of those federai inclinations to be 
resisted by thè Council. The prospect then for a formai 
change involving, say, an amendment to thè Treaties is 
highly unlikely. In thè foreseeable future Parliament 
will have to utilize its existing powers and politicai 
will to carve itself a meaningful policy making role. 
Given its Virtual impotence vis-a-vis thè Council it 
is only naturai that Parliament has recently tended to 
turn its criticai attention towards thè Commission over 
which it exercises politicai control. In particular 
it has demanded an increased role in thè making of 
proposals realizing that this is at present its only
1 0effective way to gain access to thè decisional process.— '
The naissance of opposition from thè Commission is not
surprising. Here as well thè peculiar dialectics of
thè institution^l balance produce slightly bizarre if
not entirely unexpected results. The Commission, acutely
cognizant of its weakening position, is not going to
concede lightly to an assault from yet another body —
thè directly elected chamber —  even if thè latter is
concerned with thè strengthenìng of thè totality of thè
Communautaire effort. There are already signs of such
11 /strains between Commission and Parliament.—
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iv. Finally, it must be noted that Parliament itself
is not thè cohesive Community minded body with a unitary
self-perception of its role as is often imagin ed. It
includes factions —  important ones —  which not only
resìst further strengthening of supranationalism in
its twin facets but which also resist any strengthening
1 2/of thè role of Parliament itself.— Apart from these
internai, democratically understandable, divisions there
is thè question of pure functional credibility. The
new Parliament —  with its numerous members and conrmittees,
beset by different traditions, languages and priorities,
struggling under a proportionality principle under which
each internai parliamentary organ must square politicai
13/affiliation and national origin—  —  will need consi-
derable time before it finds thè modus operandi to balance
thè conflicting demands coming from within and without.
After thè first two years it is evìdent that Parliament
has not yet settled into a groove which will enable it
1 4/to realize thè potential inherent in its existence.—  
Certainly, these factors are among thè most important 
challenges which thè Parliament will have to tackle if 
thè process of reshaping decisional supranationalism 
is to succeed.
The Second Enlargement —  The Question of Numbers
In a useful analysis of association of states in
15/thè Canadian context,—  Soberman and Pentland draw a 
distinction between two-member associations, associations
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in thè order of six to ten (Canada, EEC, Australia) 
and large associations in thè order of say fifty such 
as thè USA. The decisional consequences of this distinction 
are significant.
The two-member association is both promising and
dangerous. The small number may facilitate thè actual
process of negotiation and cooperation with less
interests to square and less technical communication
barriers to overcome. Arriving at concordance may be
16/simply shorter.— 7 However, in situations of conflict 
and polarization —  assuming de facto or de jure veto 
power of each of thè members -- deadlock may, as 
Soberman and Pentland suggest, have to be resolved by 
dissolution.
In thè medium-size association of which thè Community 
of six or even nìne and, perhaps, ten is a good example 
dissolution-producing polarization is less likely to 
occur, Unless one Member State finds itself consistently 
in a minority of one (thè U.K. has at times come danger- 
ously dose to this situation) there is a high probability 
of a shift of alliances and interests from one group of 
states to another maintaining thereby useful equilibria 
of benefits and interests. The balancing within thè 
Community system of thè interests of large and small 
Member States is an . sxample of thè use of
formai voting arrangements for eliminating thè possibility 
of either all thè small states or all thè large states 
imposing their will on each other. The Luxembourg Accord
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significantly altered this structure by moving from 
majority voting to consensus decision making giving 
each Member State an effective veto power. In a 
medium-size association thè alteration would not be 
lethal. Apart from thè effects of, say, thè preemption 
principle which in certain cases obliges thè Member 
States to reach agreement, thè very fact of a Member 
State finding itself isolated in opposition to thè rest 
of thè Community renders a consistent use of thè veto 
power difficult and exceptional.
How will thè enlargement to twelve —  falling 
between thè medium-size and large categories of associa- 
tions —  affect thè decisional process? In thè associa­
tion of, say, fifty, thè possibility of a single consti­
tuent veto in thè decisioanl process would render any 
effective governance simply impossible. Assuming that, 
in principle, all Member States will continue to be 
represented, even if with a different weighting, in all 
Community organs, thè shift to twelve may produce different 
results. The addition of three new South Mediterranean 
countries at a substantially different level of industriai 
development compared to most if not all other Member States 
coupled with difficult socio-agricultrual problems, is 
likely to make consensus decision making much more 
difficult. It is not improbable that thè three new 
Members will find a common line on many issues. The 
"embarrassment" factor of consistent isolated vetoing 
may thus disappear. The common denomination for Community 
action will be lowered even further. It is possible to
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envisage four possible outcomes to thè process.
a. The bumbling-on possibility: Continuation of thè
status quo with an increase in thè measure of dis­
agreement and crisis solution by way of ad hoc
measures. The pattern of activities of thè European 
Council and thè Council of Ministers would according 
to this scenario continue as it is with thè same 
negative impact on decisional supranationalism;
b. The irrelevance possibility: The clash of interests
will become so irreconcilable that it will in practice
produce a debìlitating standstìll of achievement.
The inabilìty to advance and to take Community decisions
in thè face of new challenges will not lead necessarily
17/to a crisis but to irrelevance,—  whereby thè rora
and methods of decision making will simply shift
elsewhere;
c. The "two (or three?) speed" Europe possibility:
18/Accession might revive thè idea— of a Community 
posing a different ra.ìj.e of duties and obligations 
and conferring different rights on its Member States.
The measure of disunity which this will bring may 
make this, if a choice is to be made, an unattractive 
idea. It is certainly being resisted by thè Commis­
sion;— ^ it will have a disastrous effect on normative 
supranationalism as well.
d. The "dialectical possibility": It is possible that
thè decisional difficulties which a Community of 
twelve will present under thè current arrangements
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and thè dangers indicated in thè previous three 
options will push thè Member States voluntarily 
to remedy thè decisional process, going beyond thè 
technical suggestions made in thè Three Wise Men 
Report. This remodification may take thè shape 
of a rethink of thè veto power,* a less recalcitrant 
attitude towards thè European Parliament and a 
reappraisal of thè role of thè Commission in thè 80s, 
and 90s. In other words, thè decisional dangers 
presented by enlargement may give thè drive to a 
more rather than less supranational decision making 
process. Which one or combination of several of 
these possibilities will emerge is a matter one must 
simply wait and see. It is interesting however 
that recently, in relation to thè present agricultural 
crisis France, of all, has requested decision by . 
majority.
5". Policies and Interests - thè Missing Element
At no point should we forget that thè analysis 
of dynamics, equilibria and of supranationalism itself 
Cftonot be complete without a profound discussion of thè 
actual content of Community policies, and their perception 
by thè Member States and their peoples. A failure to 
satisfy, over a period of time, essential interests and 
a sustained negative balance of costs and benefits as 
perceived from any single Member State will have serious 
disruptive effects on any generai structural and prò-
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cessual equilibrium.
On thè conceptual level it is equally important
to remember that thè perception of supranationalism
and a supranational system may be construed to include
thè element of content and not simply structure and
process. A supranational system, according to this vision,
will be one in which states have transferred to thè
generai power {or pooled together) competences in fields
traditionally associated with national sovereignty.
Whilst it is impossible to draw with any precision a 
20/ranked list—  it is clear that defence and foreign
policy rank higher than, say, transport. This comple-
mentary element will be thè subject of thè next phase
in my research. The concentration on structure and
process is however an indispensable stepping stone to
thè content analysis; since; I would submit, it gives
us a methodological approach not frequently tried in
2 1 /substantive analyses of Community activity.—  It provides 
essential elements for an examination of policy impact 
and interest analysis. In relation to any field we 
would have to examine in turn in an integrated manner 
thè issues of norms, actors, competences and compliance 
as thè major components of thè Community system without 
which any content analysis would be incomplete, even 
misleading.
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But I would go, in conclusion, even further than 
this. In a fundamental sense thè Community structure 
and process have a value which transcends their importance 
as a framework for execution of any specific policy and 
which puts a high premium on their per se preservation.
They represent stili a unigue experience, a. historic 
choice of an alternative for thè conduct of relations 
between states. The single most excitìng feature of 
thè supranational order which emerges from our analysis 
is its ability to acKieve such a rare measure of trans­
national integration, cooperation and coordination 
while maintaining unthreatened thè constituent units -- 
thè Member States —  with their rìch diversity and 
developed national identities. The outside observer 
cannot but marvel at thè transformation of Western 
Europe within one generatìorv from a continent in which
nationalìsm took mankind to its lowest abyss in human
of thè abyss
history, into a region in which thè memory/seems so far
thè very
away as to be forgotten sometimes by/'people who lived 
through it. The Community experience, manifest
through thè supranational structure and process independent 
of any specific policy choice, must have contributed 
in some measure to this transformation. Its preservation 
might give some small hope to regions and peoples stili 
locked in thè conflict, victims of national rather than 
supranational systems.
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Footnotes
1. The literature on thè European Parliament, its 
functions and powers is very large. See K^_Kujath,
i=èià§2£ÌgÉ^=gI=ÌMI2EiiS=l8Ìii£IÌÌQB (Europa Union 
Verlag 1977) § 5.2 and The European Parliament, 
!ifei429IIEÌlY (European Parliament, DG for Research 
and Documentation, 1979 and 1980).
2. Parliament itself has made proposals in this
direction. See Working Documents of thè European 
Parliament: 1-216/81; 1-207/81; 1-335/81 and
Resolutions of 9.7.81, PE 73 676.
3. Case 26/62, Van Gena en Loos 96 3/ E^L^R. 1, 12.
4. Under thè system of thè dual mandate it was 
suggested "... that thè aspiration of most members of 
/national7 parliaments interested in European affairs 
/was7 also to serve not in thè European Parliament, 
but in national government. In other words, thè 
/European? Parliament /was? also limited by its com- 
position, in that its memebers tend/ed? to be essentially 
backbenchers of thè national parliaments." Cpombes, 
5 ^|_Rgi§_0 |_^hi_|u£0 g|ag_P|rligm|g^ in Q^_§aj>§§, et al, 
D§gi|igQ_^g^ÌDg_iQ_ìh|_|uxgp§§n=_gommynity (Prager, N.Y.; 
London, 1977) 239.
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5. The overall turnout was 62 per cent. In thè U.K.
it was 31 per cent. In Italy it was substantially 
higher but that is a Member State with a generai 
system of voting albeit without reai
sanctions against non-voters. See generally, Editorial, 
'The European Parliamentary Election' 4 ||LB§¥ 145 (1979).
6. A recent poli in thè U.K. showed that despite 
direct elections only recently held thè connection 
between electors and their Members was extremely 
tenuous. See, 'Britain and thè EEC’ (1980) Which?
101, 104.
7. It is true of course that Parliament has criticized 
aspects of thè wasteful Common Agricultural Policy.
The 1980/81 budgetary crisis may however place Parliament 
in thè public eye as a Community spender opposed to 
national thrift.
8. In my guess it is likely that thè new Parliament 
will find thè necessary majority to censure thè Commission 
as an electorally minded device of correcting this image.
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9. For a lucid discussion of thè history of these 
strands in thè European Federai movement, see Greil- 
sammer in gì§za£, (ed.) Federalism_and_Pglitical
(Turtle Dove, Ramat-Gan, 1979) 112-119.
10. On Parliament's claim for a greater role in thè 
initiatory phase see generally Working Document 1-207/81; 
and ^^._W§ii§r, The_European_Parliament_and_.its_ggj:glgn
Affaigs_gom^itteeg (Cedam, Padua, 1982).
11. The signs of strain are apparent for example in 
thè Commission’s delicate rejection of Parliament*s 
request to get a more meaningful say in thè international 
agreement making process. See, e.g,, Reply of President 
Jenkins to thè European Parliament, Debates of thè 
European Parliament of 16.4.80 at 136 (English version).
12. See, e.g,, Debates of European Parliament of 
12.12.1978 at 163 (English version).
13. On thè rule of proportionality and its effect
on thè operation of Parliament, see Weiler, supra n.10 
eh. 3 .
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14. See e.g. , remarks of Sir Fred Catherwood MEP —  
Debates of thè European Parliament, 15.2.1980 at 325 
(English version).
15. I am indebted to Professor Soberman of Kingston 
Law School, Canada, discussion with whom was of great 
help in preparation of this section. In generai, see 
Soberman and Pentland, Forms of Economie Association 
(to be published by thè Institute of Intergovernmental 
Relations, Queen's University (Canada) in its series 
of Discussion Papers on thè "Future of thè Canadian 
Communities"). And see Soberman, EÌQ£fQ£§_E^2 Ìec^.
16. Puchala's model, 10 J^C^M^Stud. 267 (1972), 
illustrates thè variety of interests which have to 
be squared in reaching concordance among just two 
states. The larger thè Community thè more factors, 
rising geometrically, which will have to be squared 
in order to reach concordance.
17. See R^ Da^repdgrf, A_^i£d_EuggEi (E.U.I., Florence, 
1979).
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18. On thè "two speed" Europe, see thè Tindemands 
Report (European Communities, Luxembourg, 1976).
19. See Jenkins, 'Europe à la Carte1 (1981) 1/2 Europe 
81. Cf. Grabitz and Langeheine Legai Problems Related 
to a Proposed "Two-Tier System" of Integration within 
thè European Community, 18 QMLSey 33 (1981).
20. But see Elazar and SharkanskyJs attempt, in 
§==1=1111 (ed.) §§If_Ryìg_-_§h§Iià_ByìÌ (Turtle Dove, 
Ramat Gan, 1979) at 244. The listing includes:
1) Foreign relations; 2) Police; 3) Military;
4) Internai taxation; 5) Customs; 6) Control of 
banking and currency; 7) Definition of citizenship 
and control of immigration; 8) Education; 9) Religious 
sites and services; 10) Ports; 11) Transportation;
12) Posts and telecommunications; 13) Electric power;
14) Water; 15) Tourìsm; 16) Health; 17) Environmental 
protection; 18) Economie development; 19) Regulation 
of commerce and industry.
21. But see Daintith and Williams, Rehbinder and 
Stewart, EÌ2Eiigi=lIgli££•
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